Preface

This book is the first of a three-volume series of related but stand-alone works on the first two sections of Đzong-ka-ba's *The Essence of Eloquence.* The focus of all three volumes is the exposition of emptiness in the Mind-Only School according to numerous Tibetan and Mongolian scholars over the last six centuries who have tried both to find and to create consistency in his often terse and cryptic tract.

This first volume is in four parts:

- A historical and doctrinal introduction
- A translation of the General Explanation and the Section on the Mind-Only School in *The Essence of Eloquence* with frequent annotations in brackets, footnotes, and backnotes
- A detailed synopsis of the translation
- A critical edition in Tibetan script of these sections in *The Essence of Eloquence*.

The second volume, *Reflections on Reality,* will:

- place reactions to Đzong-ka-ba's text in historical and social context by examining the tension between allegiance and rational inquiry in monastic colleges,
- expand on the religious significance of the three natures of phenomena
- present Jo-nang-ba' views on the thoroughly established nature and Ge-luk-ba criticism,
- explain the reasonings establishing mind-only as means to overcome basic dread of reality, and
- consider how Đzong-ka-ba and his commentators present the provocative issue of the relationship between two types of emptiness in the Mind-Only School and compare how the topic of two emptinesses is debated today in America, Europe, and Japan, thereby demonstrating how the two forms of scholarship refine and enhance each other.

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a tong kha pa blo bzang grags pa; 1357-1419.
c jo nang pa.
d dge lugs pa.
The third volume, *Absorption in No External World*, will examine a plethora of fascinating points on the three natures raised in six centuries of commentary through:

- identifying the teachings in the first wheel of doctrine,
- probing the meaning of “own-character” and “established by way of its own character,”
- untangling the implications of Đöng-ka-ba’s criticisms of Wonch’uk, and
- treating many engaging points on the three natures and the three non-natures, including (1) how to apply these two grids to uncompounded space; (2) whether the selflessness of persons is a thoroughly established nature; (3) how to consider the emptiness of emptiness; and (4) the ways the Great Vehicle schools delineate the three natures and the three non-natures.

I became involved with Đöng-ka-ba’s *The Essence of Eloquence* in 1982, while under a Fulbright Senior Fellowship in India. I was visiting at the Shar-dzay College of Gan-den Monastic University, resettled in south India after the Tibetan diaspora beginning in 1959. I was checking with the abbot, La-di Rin-bo-chay—who is a reincarnate lama (most abbots in the Ge-luk-ba sect are not recognized reincarnate lamas) from the southeastern province of Tibet called Kam⁴—my translations of Đöng-ka-ba’s presentation of Yoga Tantra in his *Great Exposition of Secret Mantra*⁴ and his exposition of the view of emptiness in his *Medium Exposition of the Stages of the Path*. I checked the translations by orally retranslating the texts into Tibetan. Before our meetings, I would not look at the Tibetan text, so that my retranslation would be from the English as much as possible. The Tibetan of stock phrases was obvious, and thus, since he knew no English, he could not confirm my choice of translation-equivalents; however, he was skilled at rapidly criticizing or confirming my reading of the syntax of a sentence and thus its basic structure and meaning. We sometimes would pause to discuss an issue troubling to me or one on which he wanted to explore my understanding.

One day fairly early in my two-month stay at Shar-dzay College, he informed me that the Dalai Lama would probably come to Gan-den University to teach Đöng-ka-ba’s *The Essence of Eloquence*. Since the text is renowned for its difficulty, I knew that I must prepare for the event; so I obtained a copy and started reading it. However, I found that little of the content was staying with me, and, since translation is, for me, an effective mode of focusing concentra-

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*shar ri, literally, East Point.*

*dgas 'ldan (tsulha).*

This is one of four major orders of Tibetan Buddhism. It came to be the dominant form, in terms of numbers, and is the order from which the Dalai Lamas come.

*khams.*
tion and of retaining material, I decided to use it as an exercise to immerse myself in the text, despite the fact that my long-time friend, Professor Robert Thurman, then of Amherst College and now of Columbia University, had translated the entire text and would be publishing it. Translation would promote my own understanding, even if nothing significantly different from Thurman’s work emerged. It turned out that I found it useful to add into the translation in brackets and in footnotes a great deal of material from six centuries of commentary to place *The Essence of Eloquence* in its subsequent context in Ge-luk-ba scholarship and to indicate the historical context of the composition.

* * *

I want to express my profound gratitude to fifteen Tibetan and three Mongolian scholars with whom I have worked on comparative systems of tenets (both Buddhist and non-Buddhist), on *The Essence of Eloquence* and/or its commentaries, and on related topics. I list these in order to show how what we learn depends on others’ help—an illustration of Buddha’s focal teaching, dependent-arising.

In the order of the first teachings received from these scholars (for full references to the texts see the bibliography):

The late Ge-shay Nga-wang-wang-gyel of the Go-mang College of Dre-bung
Monastic University: portions of Jam-yang-shay-ba’s *Great Exposition of
Tenets*

Professor Ge-shay Hlin-drup-so-ba of the Jay College of Se-ra Monastic
University and the University of Wisconsin: Gon-chok-jik-may-wang-bo’s *Pre-
cious Garland of Tenets* (see Sopa and Hopkins, *Cutting through Appear-
ances: The Theory and Practice of Tibetan Buddhism*)

The late Ge-shay Gel-den of the Go-mang College of Dre-bung Monastic
University: Dzong-ka-ba’s *Extensive Commentary on the Difficult Points of “The
Afflicted Intellect and the Mind Basis-of-All”: Ocean of Eloquence*

The late Ken-sur Nga-wang-lek-den, abbot emeritus of the Tantric College of
Lower Hla-sa and ge-shay in the Go-mang College of Dre-bung Monastic
University (in Tibet): except for the chapter on the Autonomy School, all of
Jam-yang-shay-ba’s *Great Exposition of Tenets* and Nga-wang-bel-den’s
Annotations (the chapter on the Consequence School twice); Dzong-ka-ba’s
*Extensive Explanation of (Chandrakirti’s) “Supplement to (Nagarjuna’s)
Treatise on the Middle”*: Illumination of the Thought; all but twenty-five
folios of Jam-yang-shay-ba’s *Great Exposition of the Middle*; lectures on the
Consequence School at the University of Wisconsin (which I translated)

The late Professor Ge-shay Gen-dun-lo-dro of the Go-mang College of Dre-

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* I did my own translation without reference to Thurman’s and, several years into my work on the text, checked my translation against his.
Preface

Tsong Monastic University and the University of Hamburg: many aspects of Jam-yang-shay-ba's *Great Exposition of Tenets*: a portion of Gyel-tsap's *Explanation of (Dharmakīrti's) Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition": Unerring Illumination of the Path to Liberation*; recorded teachings to Professor Joe Wilson on Jam-yang-shay-ba's *Great Exposition of Tenets* on the Mind-Only School; and lectures on calm abiding (which I translated; see Lodrö and Hopkins, *Walking through Walls*, republished in restructured form as *Calm Abiding and Special Insight*).

Ke-dzün-sang-bo Rin-bo-chay of the Nyimg-ma order, founder of a monastery in Boda, Nepal, and a retreat center in the hills: tenet systems as presented in Long-chhen-rap-jam's *Precious Treasury of the Supreme Vehicle* and *Precious Treasury of Tenets: Illuminating the Meaning of All Vehicles*.

The late Ge-shay Dā-drin-rap-den of the Jay College of Se-ra Monastic University: the Fifth Dalai Lama's *Instructions on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment: Sacred Word of Manjushri* and many discussions on epistemology.

La-di Rin-bo-chay, abbot emeritus of and ge-shay in the Shar-dzay College of Gan-den Monastic University: Pur-bu-jok's small and middling Collected Topics; Ge-shay Jam-bel-sam-pel's *Presentation of Awareness and Knowledge*; Pur-bu-jok's *Explanation of the Presentation of Objects and Object Possessors as well as Awareness and Knowledge* and *The Topics of Signs and Reasonings in the "Great Path of Reasoning"*; Jam-yang-shay-ba's *Great Exposition of the Concentrations and Formless Absorptions*; and lectures on the Mind-Only School and other systems of tenets (which I translated).

Den-ma Lö-chö Rin-bo-chay, abbot emeritus of the Nam-gyel College and ge-shay in the Lo-sel-ling College of Dre-bung Monastic University: Jam-yang-shay-ba's *Seventy Topics*; the sections on the two truths, the concentrations, and the formless absorptions in Pan-chön Sö-nam-drak-ba's *General-Meaning Commentary on the Perfections*; Gün-chok-jik-may-wang-bo's *Presentation of the Grounds and Paths: Beautiful Ornament of the Three Vehicles and Thorough Expression of the Natures of the One Hundred Seventy-Three Aspects of the Three Exalted Knowers*.


The late Ge-shay Lö-sang-gya-tso of the Lo-sel-ling College of Dre-bung Monastic University, principal of the School of Dialectics in Dharamsala, India: presentation of the two truths in the Middle Way Consequence School as found in Dzong-ka-ba's *Illumination of the Thought*.
Ge-shay Tup-den-gya-tso of the Go-mang College of Dre-bung Monastic University: large parts of Jam-yang-shay-ba’s Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive and Gung-tang’s Difficult Points; parts of Gung-tang’s Annotations and A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso’s Precious Lamp

Ge-shay Bel-den-drak-ba of the Lo-sel-ling College of Dre-bung Monastic University: Ser-shül’s Notes in its entirety and the introduction and the section on Mind-Only in Ke-drup’s Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate

Gen Lo-sang-den-dzin of the Go-mang College of Dre-bung Monastic University (in Hla-tha): the three wheels of doctrine in Gung-tang’s Difficult Points and the beginning of the Mind-Only section in Dzong-ka-ba’s The Essence of Eloquence


Ge-shay Gon-chok Tse-ring of the Shar-dzay College of Gan-den Monastic University: Gung-ru Chö-jung’s Garland of White Lotuses in its entirety and part of Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s Port of Entry

I want to express my heartfelt appreciation to His Holiness the Dalai Lama, whom I first met in 1972 in Dharmsala. When he asked me to translate his Key to the Middle Way, I said that I would do so if he would answer whatever questions I had, and he responded affirmatively. This opened the way to working on seven books with him, often based on having become his interpreter on lecture tours in the United States in 1979, 1981, 1984, 1987, 1989, and 1996; in Canada in 1980; in Malaysia, Singapore, and Australia in 1982; in Great Britain in 1984; and in Switzerland in 1985. These experiences opened me to many topics that I otherwise would not have encountered. I also attended his lectures on Nāgārjuna’s Six Collections of Reasoning, Dzong-ka-ba’s Medium Exposition of the Stages of the Path, and Maitreya’s Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle, the last being from the viewpoints of many Tibetan commentators. He truly sees the forest from the trees.

Extended explanations by the above Tibetan and Mongolian scholars made it possible for me to present this and the two other volumes on the Mind-Only School.

It was most fortunate that John C. Powers, then a graduate student in the University of Virginia Buddhist Studies program, wanted to translate Sutra Unraveling the Thought, a foundational text of the Mind-Only School, which we read word by word in tutorial over several years. Also, Cyrus Stearns’s completion of his fascinating thesis on Shay-rap-gyel-tsen, Dzong-ka-ba’s chief opponent in The Essence of Eloquence, was most timely and illuminating.

Many thanks to William Magee, who read through the entire text of this
volume and made many editorial suggestions; to Paul Hackett, who provided copious bibliographical assistance; and to Craig Preston, who created a new diacritics font and modified a Tibetan font. Many thanks also to the four seminar classes at the University of Virginia that tackled earlier versions of the three-volume series and helped me to see how to shape my work.

Jeffrey Hopkins
University of Virginia
Technical Notes

It is important to recognize that:

- footnotes are marked “a, b, c....”; backnotes are marked “1, 2, 3,....” References to texts are mostly given in the backnotes, whereas other information, more pertinent to the reading of the material at hand, is given in the footnotes. Footnote references in italics indicate that the note includes a linkage to a chapter in Reflections on Reality or an issue treated in Absorption in No External World;

- I have translated the term drang don (neyārtha) sometimes as “interpretable meaning” and other times as “requiring interpretation,” or a variant thereof. There is no significance to the multiple translation other than variety and clarity, the latter being to emphasize that the scripture requires interpretation;

- full bibliographical references are given in the footnotes and backnotes at the first citation in each chapter;

- citations of the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought include references to the edited Tibetan text and French translation of it in consultation with the Chinese by Étienne Lamotte in Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra: L'Explication des mystères (Louvain: Université de Louvain, 1935) and to the English translation from the stog Palace edition of the Tibetan by John C. Powers, Wisdom of Buddha: Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra (Berkeley, Calif.: Dharma, 1995). There is also a translation from the Chinese by Thomas Cleary in Buddhist Yoga: A Comprehensive Course (Boston: Shambhala, 1995), in which the references are easily found, as long as chapter 7 of Lamotte and Powers is equated with chapter 5 of Cleary as per the Chinese edition that he used (see appendix 2, p. 457ff.). Passages not cited in Đōng-ka-ba’s text are usually adaptations of Powers’s translation as submitted for his doctoral dissertation;

- in this volume, references are made to Reflections on Reality by chapter since it is not yet finished. The issues in Absorption in No External World are arranged in numbered sequence, and thus references to it are by issue number;

- cross-references to the Translation, Synopsis, and Text are given throughout the book. Those to the Translation are indicated by page numbers in square brackets; those to the Synopsis, by page numbers in parentheses; and those to the Text, by page numbers in curly brackets (braces);

- in part 2, the translation of the first two sections of Đōng-ka-ba’s The
Essence of Eloquence, the two section titles and the twelve chapter titles have been constructed closely following Ōzong-ka-ša’s own outline;

- the Sanskrit for quotations in part 2 is found in the footnotes to the Tibetan Text, with references in the footnotes or backnotes to the Translation to the corresponding page number and footnote in the Tibetan Text;

- in part 3, a synopsis of Ōzong-ka-ša’s text, almost all references are omitted since they are easily found in the corresponding section of the Translation;

- the names of Indian Buddhist schools of thought are translated into English in an effort to increase accessibility for non-specialists;

- for the names of Indian scholars and systems used in the body of the text, *ch*, *sh*, and *ṣh* are used instead of the more usual *c*, *ś*, and *ṣ* for the sake of easy pronunciation by non-specialists; however, *chch* is not used for *cch*. In the notes the usual transliteration system for Sanskrit is used;

- transliteration of Tibetan is done in accordance with a system devised by Turrell Wylie; see “A Standard System of Tibetan Transcription,” *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 22 (1959): 261-267;

- the names of Tibetan authors and orders are given in “essay phonetics” for the sake of easy pronunciation; for a discussion of the system used, see the technical note at the beginning of my *Meditation on Emptiness* (London: Wisdom, 1983; rev. ed., Boston: Wisdom, 1996), 19-22. The system is used consistently, with the result that a few well-known names are rendered in a different way: for example, “Lhasa” is rendered as “Hla-ṣa” since the letter “h” is pronounced before the letter “l”; and

- an English-Tibetan-Sanskrit glossary will be given at the end of the third volume, *Absorption in No External World*. 
PART ONE:

INTRODUCTION
1. The Voice

In an earlier work, *Meditation on Emptiness*, I attempted to present a multifaceted view of a Tibetan tradition of Buddhism by adopting the literary convention of assuming the voice of the tradition. My intention was to re-create for the reader facets of my encounter with the tradition by letting the tradition present itself, thereby drawing the reader into its culture, much as I had over the period of a decade. I hardly need mention that there is no way merely "to let the tradition present itself"; this is a literary convention that, given the writer's creativity and background in the culture, can yield a narrative voice through which certain aspects of that culture can come to life for the reader. My primary intention was to present a philosophical tradition, but without editing out what did not fit into my view of what philosophy is. I was fascinated with what seemed to be a cacophony of perspectives within the tradition and wanted the reader to experience my sense of the clash of perspectives.

Again and again, I had been faced with an analysis of phenomena, presented carefully and logically, that appealed to my most rational (or just plain sensible) side, but then this was juxtaposed with an utterly fabulous view of history that has, for instance, Padmasambhava living for 1,773 years and Shāntarakṣita living for 999. Again and again, what for me was philosophical precision was seamlessly combined with "religion through story," accounts of fabulous events that were, at once, childishly amusing and mythically moving. Painstaking investigation of objects that could originate only from the data of actual experience was set side by side with a cosmogony, told not as if it were other beings' distant accounts but almost as if the tellers had been present there and were giving an eye-witness report.

I wanted the reader to be drawn into a position of being attracted and repelled, clarified and confused, without an overarching voice that claimed to have made sense out of what, for me, was incongruous. By "assuming the voice of the tradition," especially of a particular lama whose storytelling capacities were so great that he could seemingly *encompass* the tradition, I could easily avoid the arrogance of pretending to have a privileged position and could convey the majesty of horizon of a tradition of spiritual development—that culminates in omniscience—as well as its non-analytical acceptance of fables and its psychologically evocative stories. Thus, I intended not to shrink from the fabulous aspects of the tradition that, by their very improbability, undercut the claim—made in much of its philosophy—to an utterly rational perspective.

I wanted to show, within the raucousness of these facets of the tradition, the fascinatingly intricate nature of its philosophical and psychological analysis, which is built around a conflict between appearance and reality. By putting the reader in the context of the tradition "as it is," rather than as what I had hoped it would be (witness the European accounts of Theravāda Buddhism earlier in
this century as if a purely rational religion had finally been found), I intended to convey some of the richness of its context as well as the impossibility of a simpleninded perspective on the tradition.

Thus, my primary aims were (1) to evince a respect for the directions, goals, and horizons of the culture itself without falling prey to the arrogance either of swallowing an Asian tradition as if it had all the answers or of pretending to have a privileged position and (2) to re-create for the reader my varied reactions to this diverse culture, without attempting to resolve the tensions between these conflicting aspects. The risk I took in adopting the “voice of the tradition” was that, for those who could not stand the tension of my not having a one-sided perspective, I could appear to be at a level that Wilfred Cantwell Smith describes as adulation, the third of five attitudes toward other cultures—attitudes of superiority, relativism, adulation, benefiting from learning about other cultures, and benefiting from learning from other cultures about ourselves. I viewed my position as more like the fifth stage, about which Smith says:

In the prospect of learning not only about other cultures and other ages but also from them, including especially learning from them about ourselves, we profit most, as well as being intellectually most correct, as we discover that their very otherness is a stage that we are today in process of leaving behind.

By dwelling on its own perspectives and not forcing a fabricated synthesis, I was maintaining a respect for the tradition as a part of our world culture. However, the danger was that I could be viewed, by those uncomfortable with the multiplicity of perspectives, as having swallowed the tradition uncritically, whole hog, 1,773-year lifespans and all. The risk, I determined, was worth taking since, at minimum, the tradition would be allowed to speak, rather than being stultified in what I perceive to be the all-too-frequent nihilistic relativism that, upon uncovering the historical strata of traditions, assumes that such investigation is sufficient. Historical analysis is not only beneficial but also necessary to this field, but to be satisfied with it is to miss a great deal of the dynamics of a culture. Though such scholarship has the grand goal of exposing traditional claims of extrahistorical revelations of the truth by pointing out that revelations cannot occur except within a context, it too often succumbs to the view that what arises in dependence upon conditions—because it does not have the self-existence it seems to have—is as good as nonexistent, non-functional, dead. Worldviews, in the hands of scholarship that does not realize the dynamic contextuality of even its own perspective, lose their very life. I was trying to give the other side of the coin.

The literary device of, for the most part, assuming the voice of the tradition afforded me a framework for presenting a Tibetan tradition as a living phenomenon with its own horizons. My own historical imbeddedness was clear
from a list (in the introduction to *Meditation on Emptiness*) of thirty-two common views of the philosophy of the Middle Way School that evidence showed are not shared with this particular Tibetan tradition. The conflict between how the Middle Way School is presented in works of contemporary American, European, Indian, and Japanese scholarship and how a Tibetan tradition presents itself formed the underlying theme of the book.

Now that I am thirty-seven years into an encounter with Tibetan Buddhism, my current endeavor, while sharing many of the same goals, is different. Here, although I also seek to convey the experience of a participant-observer (what observer is not a participant to some extent?), the voice is that of the participant-observer myself. Again, I seek to convey some of the multifaceted richness of Tibetan Buddhist traditions but more through the medium of what at least seems to be my own voice. As before, I call my approach “multifaceted,” not “holistic,” since I assume that no presentation can convey the whole picture. What most who describe their work as holistic mean is just that it communicates aspects that others, or more likely they themselves, had not previously thought to include. If they really meant that in however many hundred pages they could convey a whole tradition, their wings of feathers and wax of Icarian arrogance would certainly melt and plunge them down to drown in the ocean of inanity.

What I risk here—now that my voice is more my own and now that I have emerged from the facilitative garment of the guise of merely “reporting” a tradition—is inadvertently to communicate that I have found a privileged position from which my observations somehow encompass Tibetan culture. Rather, my hope is that, as before, the style may help to open horizons. My aim is to contribute to what Smith so aptly describes as “we all” talking with each other about “us human beings,” “as heirs of many cultures.”
2. The Text

The Ge-luk-Val order of Tibetan Buddhism was founded by the yogi-scholar Đzong-ka-Val Lo-sang-drak-Val (1357-1419), the fourth in a family of six sons in the Đzong-ka region of the northeastern province of Tibet called Am-do. He took layperson’s vows at the age of three from the Fourth Karma-Val Röl-bay-dor-jar and novice monastic vows at seven. He studied and practiced in Am-do until age sixteen, when he left for central Tibet, never to return to Am-do. There, Chö-jar Don-drup-rin-chen advised him to study the Five Great Books of Indian Buddhism (described below, p. 9ff.), which became the basic curriculum of sūtra study in the monasteries that Đzong-ka-Val and his followers established. From childhood, his study and practice was interlaced with tantra, and thus it is only a misimpression outside of Tibetan, Mongolian, and Chinese circles that he was not deeply involved with tantrism.

He studied a great deal with masters of the Ga-gyu and Sa-gya orders. As Stephen Batchelor says in The Tibet Guide:

Tsongkhapa was born in 1357 in Amdo, the northeastern province of Tibet. During the time of the Third Dalai Lama his birthplace was marked by the erection of the Kumbum Jampa Ling Monastery near Xining. While still very young he was recognized as possessing unusual spiritual qualities and as a young man was sent to Central Tibet to further his understanding of Buddhism in the more cultured region of the country. The first monastery he visited was that of Drigung, where he studied medicine and the doctrines of the Kagyu lineage. From here he proceeded to Netang, Samye, Zhalu, and Sakya monasteries. He met his main teacher Rendawa at Tsechen Monastery just outside Gyanise. For many years he studied the full range of Buddhist philosophy, including the more esoteric tantric systems. He then retreated to Olka, north of the Brahmaputra downstream from Tsetang, and

\[\text{tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa.}\]

\[\text{a mdo.}\]

\[\text{karma pa rol pa’i rdo rje (1340-1383).}\]

\[\text{chos rje rin chen don grub.}\]

\[\text{bka’ brgyud.}\]

\[\text{sa skya.}\]

spent the next four years in intense retreat. Upon returning to society he found himself much in demand as a teacher. One place where he taught was the hill in Lhasa on which the Potala was eventually built. Together with Rendawa he stayed for some time at Reting, where he composed his most famous work, *The Great Exposition of the Stages on the Path to Enlightenment*. After another meditation and writing retreat at Chöding Hermitage (above where Sera monastery now is), he founded, in 1409, the famous annual Mönlam (prayer) festival in Lhasa, which, after a twenty-five year hiatus, was reinaugurated in 1986. (In the political unrest that followed the demonstrations of 1987 and 1988, it was canceled in 1989 and by 1994 had not been resumed.)

After the prayer festival Tsongkhapa decided to found his own monastery. He selected Mt. Drokri, a mountain upstream from Lhasa, and called the monastery “Ganden,” Tibetan for “Tushita,” the pure land where the future Buddha Maitreya resides. Within a year seventy buildings had been completed, but it was not until 1417 that the main hall of the monastery was consecrated.

Tsongkhapa died at Gaden two years later, in 1419, and shortly before his death passed the mantle of succession to Gyeltshab Je, one of his two chief disciples. Gyeltshab Je held the position of Gaden Tripa (Throne Holder of Gaden) until his own death twelve years later, when it passed to Tsongkhapa’s other chief disciple Khedrup Je. The post of Gaden Tripa was later given to the senior Dharma Master of one of the two main Gaden Colleges, Jangtse and Shartse. It was a five-year post for which to qualify one must first have obtained a geshe degree with highest honors (*lhamarpal,* proceeded to the abbotship of one of the two Lhasa tantric colleges, and from there been appointed Dharma Master of either Jangtse or Shartse college. The tradition has been continued in India. It is the Gaden Tripa, not the Dalai Lama, who heads the Gelukpa order.

During his lifetime Tsongkhapa was regarded as a remarkable spiritual figure whose genius and saintliness held him above the sectarian differences of his times. Although greatly inspired by the example of Atisha, to the point of attributing authorship of his own major written work to him, and by the spirit of the Kadampa tradition, Tsongkhapa nonetheless studied widely with representatives of all the major orders in Tibet and assimilated their lineages. It is uncertain whether he intended to form his own order, though he must have realized it was liable to happen. He could not have foreseen, though, the dimensions this order (the Gelukpa) would eventually assume and the political power it would wield.

Over the following centuries Gaden Monastery grew to the size
of a small township, delicately perched along the high sheltered slopes of the mountain. By 1959 this calm, secluded center of learning and contemplation housed more than five thousand monks, but with the Chinese occupation the monks were forced to scatter, and by the mid-sixties the monastery was nearly deserted. The final blow came with the cultural revolution. Coerced by the Chinese and caught up in the frenzy and terror of the times, the local Tibetans demolished the buildings. For many years only jagged ruins remained. The greater religious freedom permitted after the death of Mao allowed the laborious and gradual reconstruction of the monastery to begin. One by one the buildings emerged from out of the rubble and monks trickled back to their former home. Yet, perhaps because of its symbollic power as the stronghold of the previous spiritual rule as well as its distance from the capital, Ganden has been rebuilt largely through private funds and has received scant support from the government. Four hundred monks are officially allowed to live here now, although there are around six hundred actually in residence.

It strikes me that the construction of seventy buildings in one year and Đzong-ka-ba's later instruction to two students to build other monastic universities in the Hla-sa' Valley—Dre-bung—suggest that he did indeed intend to form a new order. In any case, the writings of his immediate followers, such as Gyet-sap, Ke-drup, and the latter's brother Ba-so-chó-ghi-gyal-tsen, clearly indicate the raising of Đzong-ka-ba to the status of saint and founder of a new religious order.

His followers eventually came to have great influence throughout a vast region stretching from Kalmuck Mongolian areas, where the Volga empties into the Caspian Sea (in Europe), to Outer and Inner Mongolia, and the Buriat Republic of Siberia, as well as to most parts of Tibet and Ladakh. Đzong-ka-ba established a system of education centered in large monastic universities—eventually in three areas of Tibet which became some of the prime centers of religious education.

The form Buddhism took in Tibet was greatly influenced by the highly developed form of the religion present in India through the twelfth century and

\* lha sa.
\* 'bras spangs.
\* rgyal stshabs dar ma rin chen, 1364-1432.
\* ba so chos kyi rgyal mthrin, born 1402.
even later; the geographic proximity and perhaps relatively undeveloped culture of the region provided conditions for extensive, systematic transfer of highly
developed scholastic commentaries and systems of practice. Unlike many of its
East Asian counterparts, Tibetan Buddhism is centered not on Buddha's word
as found in sūtras and tantras but on Indian commentaries, many of which
never made their way to East Asia. Scholasticism, therefore, often (but not al-
ways) occupies a more central place in aspects of Tibetan culture than it does
farther east.

These Ge-luk-ba colleges came to share a curriculum that is based on Five
Great Books of Buddhist India—a program of study that begins around age
eighteen and lasts for about twenty-five years—but they use different textbooks
that are commentaries on those Great Books. To prepare students for study of
these texts, the curriculum begins with a class on introductory debate that
serves to establish the procedure of outwardly combative but inwardly probing
analysis used throughout the course of study. The debate format is at once in-
dividualistic, in the aim to win one-on-one debates, and group-stimulated, in
the sense that information and positions are acquired from fellow debaters in an
ongoing network of communication and shared appreciation of insight. As
further preliminaries, the classes study Awareness and Knowledge, which
is basic psychology, and Signs and Reasonings, which is basic reasoning. Then
begins the first of the Five Great Books: the coming Buddha Maitreya's Orna-
ment for Clear Realization, a rendering of the hidden teaching on the path
structure in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras, which, according to the tradition,
were spoken by the Buddha of this age, Shākyamuni. In the standard Ge-luk-ba
educational curriculum, six years are spent studying Maitreya's Ornament for
Clear Realization—a highly elaborate compendium on the paths that is not
practiced in Tibet in its own form. Rather, the long period of study is used to
enrich understanding of a complex structure of spiritual development that pro-

\[a\] In his condensation of Dzong-ka-ba’s biography, Geshe Ngawang Dhargyey (“A Short
Biography,” 9, 11) speaks of the Five Great Books as if such a category predates Dzong-ka-
bā; this is possible, although it necessary to pursue whether Geshe Ngawang Dhargyey is
overlaiding a system of education that developed based on Dzong-ka-ba’s advice or a system
that his successors founded. For a list of the seventeen texts that Dzong-ka-ba taught in a

\[b\] Translation of a typical text with commentary can be found in Lati Rinbochay and
Elizabeth Napper, Mind in Tibetan Buddhism (London: Rider, 1980; Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow

\[c\] Translation of a typical text with commentary can be found in Katherine Rogers, A
Tibetan Manual of Logic: An Introduction to Reasoning in the Ge-luk-ba Monastic Educa-

\[d\] mgon rtags regs, abhisamayalākāra; Peking 5184, vol. 88. A notable exception is the
curriculum at the monastery of the Pan-chen Lama, Dha-shi-hlin-bo Monastic University
(bkra shis lhun po), where Dharmakirti’s Pramāṇavārttīka is the topic of this initial long pe-
riod of study.
vides an all-encompassing worldview daunting in its intricacy. Though the structure of the path, as it is presented in this text, does not provide the rubric of actual practice, much of its import is brought over to "stages of the path" literature, the practical implementation of which is certified by the great number of short texts in this genre aimed at daily meditation. The more complex system is dauntingly elaborate, such that it provides a perimeter within which the more practical teachings can be implemented.

Classes on Maitreya’s text (and the others) meet with a teacher for about two hours daily and then for two sessions of debates, each about two hours. Every year throughout the twenty-five-year program, time is taken out for pursuit of the second of the Great Books, Dharmakirti’s *Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Prime Cognition”*—largely epistemological and logical studies.

Having settled the path structure through the study of Maitreya’s *Ornament for Clear Realization*, the class passes on to the third Great Book, Chandrakirti’s *Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle,”* to ex-

* dbu ma la ’jug pa, madhyamakāvatāra; Peking 5261, Peking 5262, vol. 98. Since Chandrakirti often refers to Nāgārjuna’s *Treatise on the Middle* (dbu ma’i bstan bcos, madh

yamakāvatāra) merely by the appellation madhyamaka, the madhyamaka of “madhyamakāvatāra” is held to refer to a text propounding the middle, specifically Nāgārjuna’s *Treatise on the Middle*. My translation of avatāra (’jug pa) as “supplement” is controversial; others use “introduction” or “entrance,” both of which are attested common translations in such a context. My translation is based on the explanation by Dzong-ka-ba that Chandrakirti was filling in holes in Nāgārjuna’s *Treatise on the Middle*; see Tsong-ka-pa, Kunsur Lekden, and Jeffrey Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism* (London: Rider, 1980; reprint, Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1980), 96-99. Among the many meanings of the Tibetan term for avatāra, ’jug pa can mean “to add” or “to add on.” To summarize the oral teachings of the late Kunsur Nga-wang-lek-den:

Avatāra means “addition” in the sense that Chandrakirti’s text is a supplement historically necessary so as to clarify the meaning of Nāgārjuna’s *Treatise on the Middle*. He wanted to make clear that the *Treatise* should not be interpreted according to the Mind-Only system or according to the Middle Way Autonomy School (dbu ma rang rgyud pa, svaatantrikamādhyamika), the founding of which is attributed to Bhāvaviveka. During Nāgārjuna’s lifetime, Bhāvaviveka had not written his commentary on the *Treatise*, nor had he founded his system; therefore, it was necessary later to supplement Nāgārjuna’s text to show why it should not be interpreted in such a way. Moreover, it is said that Chandrakirti sought to show that a follower of Nāgārjuna should ascend the ten grounds by practicing the vast paths necessary to do so. This is because some interpret the Middle Way perspective as nihilistic. They see it as a means of refuting the general existence of phenomena rather than just their inherent existence and conclude that it is not necessary to engage in practices such as the cultivation of compassion. Therefore, in order to show that it is important to engage in three central practices—compassion, non-dual understanding, and the altruistic mind of enlightenment—and to ascend the ten Bodhisattva grounds, Chandrakirti—in reliance on Nāgārjuna’s *Precious
plore for two years the emptiness of inherent existence. Emptiness is the prima-
ry content of path consciousnesses and is the explicit teaching of the Perfe-
tion of Wisdom Sutras.

The next Great Book is Vasubandhu’s *Treasury of Manifest Knowledge,* a
compendium of the types and natures of afflicted phenomena and their causes
as well as the pure phenomena that act as antidotes to them and the states of
cessation brought about by these antidotes; this takes two years. The last Great
Book is Gunaprabha’s *Aphorisms on Discipline,* again studied for two years. At
the end, there are several years for review and preliminary rounds of debate in
preparation for the yearly debate competition.

Dzong-ka-ba wrote commentaries on Maitreya’s *Ornament for Clear Real-
ization* and Chandrakirti’s *Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle,”*
and his two main students, Gyal-tsap and Ke-drup, wrote commentaries on
Dharmakirti’s *Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Prime Cognition.”*
Gyal-tsap also wrote a commentary on Maitreya’s text, which is said to reflect
Dzong-ka-ba’s more mature thinking later in his life.

These commentaries by Dzong-ka-ba and his two chief disciples are used
by the colleges, along with Tibetan commentaries by Chim Jam-ba-yang and
the First Dalai Lama, Gen-dün-drup, on Vasubandhu’s *Treasury of Manifest
Knowledge* and Tso-na-wa’s and the First Dalai Lama’s commentaries on
Gunaprabha’s *Aphorisms on Discipline,* but Dzong-ka-ba’s works are not the
chief textbooks in the monastic colleges. Given that the basic structure of the
monastic university is to divide into camps that stimulate intellectual exchange,
the main textbooks are sub-sub-commentaries written by prominent scholars,
which present the aforementioned commentaries in a clearer format and at-
tempt to resolve issues unclear (or confused) in those texts. These commenta-
ries, called the college’s “textbook literature,” are the main focus, elevated even

Garland—wrote this supplementary text.


This Tibetanized reading of *jug pa* as “supplement” accords with the Tibetan term *rtag* *jug* (śāntavāma) [Sarat Chandra Das, *A Tibetan-English Dictionary* (Calcutta: 1902; re-
by gender in Tibetan grammar—in various positions in a syllable. It also perhaps accords
with the fifth meaning given in Vaman Shivaram Apte, *Sanskrit-English Dictionary* (Poona,
India: Prasad Prakashan, 1957), 163, “Any new appearance, growth, rise,” though it seems
that not much of a case can be made from the Sanskrit. Of course, such a supplement also
serves as an introduction, or means of entry, to Nāgārjuna’s *Treatise.*

a mchims ‘jam pa’i dbyangs.

b dge ’dun grub; 1391-1475, retrospectively called the First Dalai Lama when Sō-nam-
gya-tso, the reincarnation of his reincarnation, received the title of Dalai.

c mchub na wu rin chen bzung po.

d yig cha.
to a status of primary concern and adherence. Despite my dubbing them “sub-sub-commentaries,” their significance in the community is focal. (Perhaps due to Protestant emphasis on early Christianity, we often unwarrantedly assume that the focus of religious systems is on their founder and early history, whereas the focus in this system is on the thought of the author of the textbook literature, perhaps as a door to the thought of the founder of their sect but more likely as the embodiment of his thought appropriate to one's own time. I do not deny that the “door analogy” leads back eventually to Shākyamuni Buddha; rather, it seems that the focus is on the more current.)

Students identify with the college units to the point where, as a friend put it, one wonders what significance the general monastic university has. Their members' adherence to these units is so strong that the Chinese communists, upon their recent minor relaxation of religious suppression in Tibet, have not allowed the colleges to reopen. Out of fear of the loyalty so successfully inculcated in these units, they have, by refusing to let them reopen, stifled the basic structure that promotes vigorous intellectual interchange. The lack of easy communication in Tibet and the consequent highly factional and parochial nature of the society are reflected in the monks' intense adherence to these colleges, but the other, perhaps more powerful, factor is the esthetic appreciation of intellectual confrontation that is a result of the almost endless number of scholastic disputes between the colleges.

Composition Of The Essence of Eloquence

This work is the most famous of the five texts that Dzong-ka-ba wrote on the view of emptiness. In 1402, at the age of forty-five, he wrote the Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path, which has a long and complicated section on special insight into emptiness. Five years later, when he was fifty, he began writing a commentary on Nāgarjuna's Treatise on the Middle, called Ocean of Reasoning, at Chö-ding Hermitage above what became Sé-ra Monastic University on the northern outskirts of Hla-sa, but in the midst of explicating the first chapter, he foresaw that there would be interruptions if he stayed there. Thus, he left Chö-ding Hermitage for another hermitage at Sé-ra, Ra-ka Precipice. Indeed, the Yung-lo Emperor of the Ming Dynasty sent a representative to Chö-ding Hermitage who, not finding him there, proceeded to Hla-sa. Dzong-ka-ba then came to Hla-sa, where he was asked to come to China to teach. Referring to his advancing age and wish to be in retreat, he sent images of the Buddha in his stead, thereby avoiding embroilment in politics.

Returning to Ra-ka Precipice, he began writing the Treatise Differentiating

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1. Parinyāta
2. chos ldongs
3. rwa kha brag: perhaps the meaning of the name is Goat-Face Crag.
Interpretable and Definitive Meanings: The Essence of Eloquence. I imagine that he felt the need to compose his own independent work on the view of emptiness in the Great Vehicle schools as background for his commentary on Nāgārjuna’s treatise, before returning to the complications of these schools’ stances. If this is so, he wrote The Essence as an overarching structure in which that commentary could be understood.

After completing The Essence in 1408, he returned to commenting on Nāgārjuna’s text. Then, at age fifty-eight in 1415, he went on to write the Medium Exposition of the Stages of the Path, and finally, at age sixty-one, one year before his death, he wrote a commentary on Chandrakirti’s Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle.”

Request For The Teaching

The person or persons who request the teaching that leads to the writing of a text are usually listed in the colophon, but Dzong-ka-ba’s The Essence of Eloquence does not list anyone. Nevertheless, Jay-dzin Chö-gyi-gyel-ten reports in his biography of Ke-drup, one of Dzong-ka-ba’s two main disciples, that Dzong-ka-ba composed the text in response to questions concerning the interpretable and the definitive from the Sa-gya scholar Yak-truk Sang-gyay-bel-wa, also known as Yak Mi-par-chö-gyi-la-ma. Called Yak-truk (Yak-Child) since he was the student of Abbot/Professor Yak-yu, he was of sufficient stature that the Omniscient Rong-bo took him as a lama. Gön-chok-jik-may-wang-bo reports that Yak-truk Sang-gyay-bel-wa was a great scholar and that Dzong-ka-ba’s teacher, the Sa-gya scholar Ren-da-wa Shön-nu-lo-drö, and he were re-

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a For the date, see Leonard W. J. van der Kuij, “Apropos of a Recent Contribution to the History of Central Way Philosophy in Tibet: Tsong Khapa’s Speech of Gold” in Berliner Indologische Studien 1 (Reinbek, Germany: Verlag für Orientalistische Fachpublikationen, 1985), 68, n. 2.

b rje btsun chos kyi rgyal mthun; 1469-1546.

c The material on the person requesting the teaching is drawn from Wel-mang Gön-chok-gyel-ten’s Notes on (Gön-chok-jik-may-wang-bo’s) Lectures (381.5-382.3) and Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s Port of Entry (15.4-15.6).

d g yag phrug sangs rgyas dpal ba / g yag phyon sangs rgyas dpal ba; 1348-1414.

e g yag mi pham chos kyi bla ma.

f mkhan po. Nowadays in Ge-luk-ka circles, this term tends to mean “abbot,” but in other contexts it also was and is used to refer to a rank of scholarly authority.

g g yag yu.

h kun mkhyen rong bo / rong ston shes bya kun gzhi; 1367-1449. He is called sūkya rgyal mthun in Wel-mang Gön-chok-gyel-ten’s Notes on (Gön-chok-jik-may-wang-bo’s) Lectures (382.5).

i red mda’ ba gzhon nu blo gros; 1349-1412. A Sa-gya lama, he was Dzong-ka-ba’s main teacher. It is reported in Wel-mang Gön-chok-gyel-ten’s Notes on (Gön-chok-jik-may-wang-bo’s) Lectures (382.4) that “except for being included in Dzong-ka-ba’s lineage of lama-
nowned in the Sa-gya sect as the “Yak-Shön duo.”

Gön-chok-jik-may-wang-bo reports that Yak-truk Sang-gyay-bel-wa, having received Dzong-ka-ba’s *The Essence of Eloquence* in answer to his questions, read it and thereupon developed great ascertainment, such that he wanted to go to listen to his teachings. However, his students intervened, telling him that, since he himself was an aged, eminent, scholar, it would damage his reputation, and thus they did not let him. Given the tendency of Tibetan (and every other) culture to create exalted reputations through fabrication and hyperbole, it is difficult to determine whether this account reports Yak-truk Sang-gyay-bel-wa’s actual response to Dzong-ka-ba’s text or just a creative apologetic for why a respected scholar did not become Dzong-ka-ba’s student after reading this most central and most profound of his works on the view of emptiness. In this century, for instance, a Tibetan scholar from the Go-mang College, Gen-dün-chöpel, whose powers of intellect are unquestioned, wrote a text, *Ornament for the Thought of Nāgārjuna,* criticizing Dzong-ka-ba’s presentation of emptiness in the Consequence School, but some contemporary Ge-luk-ba scholars, operating no doubt on the principle that no one of any intelligence who was versed in Dzong-ka-ba’s thought could criticize him, have made claims that Ge-dün-chöpel did not author the text. They say that one of his students wrote it (at least from a certain point to the end) but credited himself with only being the scribe.*

The working principle that anyone of caliber who studied Dzong-ka-ba’s works could not possibly criticize them in preference to another interpretation has caused me to wonder whether it may have been operating in the account of why Yak-truk Sang-gyay-bel-wa did not become Dzong-ka-ba’s student. In a

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a *gyug gzhon gnyis*; Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s *Port of Entry*, 15.5.

b *vgos mang*.

c *de’u chos ’phel*; 1905-1951.

d *khyi sgrub dgyeng rgyan*. Donald S. Lopez Jr. is translating this work.

* Indeed, the text stylistically is in two parts, one clearly being Ge-dün-chöpel’s own prose, as is attested by his biographer, the other being constructed from notes on his teachings. Ge-dün-chöpel was ultimately accused of being a communist and was arrested and imprisoned for two years; his case is cited by many forward-thinking Tibetans as a prime example of the conservative excesses of the old government. See my condensation of his biography in Gedün Chöpel and Jeffrey Hopkins, *Tibetan Arts of Love* trans. and intro. by Jeffrey Hopkins (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1992), 11-32. For a thorough account of his life, see Heather Stoddard, *Le mendiant de L’Amdo*, Recherches sur la Haute Asie, 9 (Paris: Société d’Ethnographie, 1985).
similar fashion, I doubt the story, widely renowned among Ge-luk-ba scholars, that the great fifteenth-century Ša-gya scholar Šak-tang Shay-rap-rin-chen,\textsuperscript{4} who detailed contradictions in Dzong-ka-ba's works,\textsuperscript{18} eventually accepted the correctness of Dzong-ka-ba's position and "wrote a stanza of praise." It strikes me as highly implausible that this prolific scholar would have confined himself to a single stanza had his view changed so dramatically.

In the Tibetan culture of reincarnation, creative reformulation of history is not limited even to a single lifetime; the lists of previous incarnations of a great figure sometimes become not even thinly disguised attempts to subsume other sects under one's own banner. For instance, the eighteenth-century Mongolian scholar of the Ge-luk-ba order, Jang-üa Rö-ba-yor-jay,\textsuperscript{9} friend and lama of the Ch'en-lung Emperor, is said to be the reincarnation of Mar-ša Chö-ü-yi-Lo-drö,\textsuperscript{10} the great translator and teacher of Mi-la-re-ša,\textsuperscript{11} both of whom are central to the Ga-gyu sect of Tibetan Buddhism! One of my Ge-luk-ba teachers, in a rather matter-of-fact way, reported that Ke-drup, one of Dzong-ka-ba's two most important disciples, was an incarnation of Long-chen-rap-jam,\textsuperscript{12} who represents the crowning development of the Nying-ma-ba sect in the fourteenth century and in many respects is to the Nying-ma-ba sect what Dzong-ka-ba is to the Ge-luk-ba sect. I was speechless. The sectarian rewriting of history is endless. Still, it is not that all Tibetans gullibly swallow these manipulations, for most Tibetan scholars are critical of such constructive hyperbole; cynicism is not limited to persons from other cultures, just as disbelief in American political and commercial advertising is not limited to non-Americans.

Whether or not Yak-truk Sang-gyay-bel-wa was satisfied with Dzong-ka-ba's answers to his questions as presented in The Essence of Eloquence, the text became the central source of philosophical fascination for a long tradition of Ge-luk-ba scholarship divided among competing colleges.

The Steel Bow And Arrow

The Essence of Eloquence is considered to be so challenging that it is called his steel bow and steel arrow.\textsuperscript{13} As the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century commentator Wel-mang Gön-chok-gyel-tsen,\textsuperscript{14} from the Am-do Province\textsuperscript{15} of Tibet,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{4} \textit{stag shang lo nā ba shes rab rin chen}, born 1405.
  \item \textsuperscript{9} \textit{lcang skya rol pa'i rdo rje}, 1717-1786. For a short biography, see Reflections on Reality, chap. 3.
  \item \textsuperscript{10} \textit{mar pa chos kyi blo gros}, 1012-1097.
  \item \textsuperscript{11} \textit{mi la ras pa}, 1040-1123.
  \item \textsuperscript{12} \textit{klong chen rab 'byams / klong chen dri med 'od zer}, 1308-1363.
  \item \textsuperscript{13} \textit{lcags ma' lcags gshu}.
  \item \textsuperscript{14} \textit{(dbyal mong dkon mchog rgyal mthran; 1764-1853)}, Notes on (Gön-chok-jik-may-wang-bo's) Lectures, 381.4-381.5.
  \item \textsuperscript{15} Born in \textit{bsang khog tshar tsha}. For dates and birthplaces of Am-do scholars, see Tenzin
\end{itemize}
says, just as it is hard to pull a steel bow to its full extent but if one can, the arrow will course over a great area, so even the words—not to consider the meaning—of this text are difficult to understand but, when understood, yield great insight. The metaphor states a martial challenge to the reader, calling for heroic strength of intellectual will; the work is viewed as one of genius, difficult to control because of its often cryptic brevity but yielding profound insight if pursued with analytical fortitude. (The metaphor also may be a polite way of communicating that the book is so abstruse and sometimes apparently self-contradictory that it takes tremendous effort to attempt to construct a consistent account of Đzong-ka-ba’s thought.) Thus, among his five great works on the view of emptiness the steel bow and arrow is just The Essence of Eloquence.

This daunting challenge to take up the steel bow and arrow, repeated from generation to generation, has been accepted by so many brilliant Tibetan and Mongolian scholars, testing their strength on the steel bow and arrow, that we have a veritable treasure-trove of expositions. The emphasis on reasoning in the Ge-luk-ba sect—combined with the impetus gained from the culture’s parochialism such that small units came to be emphasized to the point of overwhelming the whole—spawned a dynamic tradition of commentarial exposition. Each educational unit sought to have its own distinctive literature on a topic in order both to promote analytical inquiry and to establish the claims of the greatness of the local leader. Disagreement even with Đzong-ka-ba, the founder of the sect, is promoted within the bounds of not openly criticizing his works but doing so under various polite facades. Through such techniques, an atmosphere of considerable intellectual freedom is fostered, prompting the writing of many commentaries on a fundamental text like his The Essence of Eloquence.

The first is found in a work by Đzong-ka-ba’s student Ke-drup (1385-1438), called Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate: Treatise Brilliantly Clarifying the Profound Emptiness. Ke-drup views his work as bringing considerable clarity to Đzong-ka-ba’s explanation:

Even though our Omniscient Foremost One [Đzong-ka-ba] has already extended the kindness of completely clarifying the systems of the great chariots [great leaders] in his Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive: The Essence of Eloquence, the power of intelligence of present-day beings is very weak, and, therefore, all of these beings, subsumed in a state like intellectually undeveloped childhood, cannot open even a portion of [Đzong-ka-ba’s presentations that are] like words [used in] the Vajra [Vehicle whose meaning is hard to understand]. Having understood that they are just not penetrating [his words], I will show to listeners with very few words just those meanings—like a treasure beneath the ground—such that they are like

Palbar, The Tragedy of My Homeland (nga'i pha yul gyi nga ba'i lo rgyu) (Dharmasala, India: Narthang, 1994).
olives resting in the palm of their hands. Stay with your ears inclined!

Ke-drup puts the blame for not understanding Òdong-ka-ºa’s profound intent on the low intellectual level of “present-day beings,” but, given that Ke-drup was Òdong-ka-ºa’s own student and was writing his exposition approximately twenty years after the master’s work and thus not after centuries of possible decay of intelligence, his decrying the intellectual level of his compatriots hints at Òdong-ka-ºa’s lack of clear exposition relative to his audience. Ke-drup obviously takes delight in providing such clarity on several major issues.

His exposition is synthetic, in that he draws from the entire scope of Òdong-ka-ºa’s works on the view of emptiness, and thus this work is not strictly a commentary on The Essence of Eloquence. However, in the section on the Mind-Only view of emptiness, his exegesis is largely limited to The Essence of Eloquence. Still, since his presentation is oriented to several key issues and follows his own order, he does not provide either a section-by-section summation or exploration of a great number of issues in The Essence of Eloquence.

Such a summation subsequently was provided by Nyel-don Bel-jor-hlin-drup’ (1427-1514) of the Jay College of Se-ra Monastic University, who wrote an exposition of Òdong-ka-ºa’s text in a genre called a “difficult points commentary,” most likely around the end of the fifteenth century or the beginning of the sixteenth. His text, entitled Commentary on the Difficult Points of (Òdong-ka-ºa’s) “The Essence of Eloquence”: Lamp for the Teaching, cites all of Òdong-ka-ºa’s text (with a few unintended omissions) and summarizes its meaning except when the original seemed adequately clear. Since Bel-jor-hlin-drup only occasionally expands on issues, the strength of his commentary is its restatement, usually in brief but clear form, of the entire text, making it a good introduction. He does not touch on scores of difficult issues, and thus its use is preliminary.

Later, Gen-dün-gya-tso (1476-1542), retrospectively called the Second

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* skyu ru ra (śāmalaki). The term also is used for a sour medicinal fruit, Emblica officinalis Linn., said to cure diseases of phlegm, bile, and blood; see Sarat Chandra Das, A Tibet-English Dictionary (Calcutta: 1902; reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1969, 1970; compact reprint, Kyoto: Japan: Rinsen Book Company, 1981), 103. The usage here is to indicate something that is perfectly clear in front of the eyes.

b Òdong-ka-ºa wrote The Essence in 1407-1408 (Thurman, Tsong Khapa’s Speech of Gold, 88), and Ke-drup wrote Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate sometime between 1424-1428 (Cabezón, Dose of Emptiness, 17).

c gnyal [also spelled gnyan] sten dpal ’byor lhun grub. A student of Lo-drö-rin-chen-seng-ge (blo phros rin chen seng ge), he was taught The Essence of Eloquence by Nyen-ºi Shákya Gyal-tsen (nyan po sákya rgyal mchab), who was taught the text by both of Òdong-ka-ºa’s main students, Gyal-tsap and Ke-drup.

d se ra byes.

e dka’ grel.

f dge ’dun rgya mtho.
Dalai Lama when his reincarnation Šô-nam-gya-tso received the title of Dalai from the Mongolian chieftain Altan Khan, wrote a section by section exposition on the entire text in the same genre as Bel-jor-hlün-drup, called Commentary on the Difficult Points of "Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive" from the Collected Works of the Foremost Holy Omniscient [Dzong-ka- ba]. Like Bel-jor-hlün-drup’s work, it assumed considerable importance since it covers Dzong-ka-ba’s complete text. When Ge-luk-ba scholars criticize it, the format is largely one of pretending to reframe his actual intent. The attention that it receives today is testimony to its stature in the tradition, since a text even from a Dalai Lama easily can be ignored.

Difficult issues are faced in print in a genre of literature used in monastic colleges called “general meaning,” which are often supplemented with “decisive analyses.” In their more advanced forms, these textbooks on seminal Indian texts actively stimulate the intellect through juxtaposing assertions that are, or appear to be, contradictory and through making often highly elaborate and esthetically attractive reformulations of assertions in order to create coherence. In this genre, the intellectual fervor behind the topics and the format of philosophical confrontation—which is not accompanied by concluding practical summations—suggest that the aim is not what usually would be considered practice, that is, meditation cultivating what has been studied, but endless intellectual reflection. This perspective has resulted in the flowering of intellectual pursuits in Tibet but calls into question the injunctions to practical implementation. It appears that internal practice has given way to external debate on major and minor issues, but the emphasis on intellectual development also stems from stark recognition that these matters are not easily penetrated, requiring much intellectual exploration, and that immersion in topics—even to the point of entering into a maze of conceptuality—can bear fruit over lifetimes. At least, this is the system’s self-justification for the pursuit of ever more refined conceptualization.

Also around the beginning of the fifteenth century, two scholars—who during the long and varied course of their education studied with the same teacher—wrote general-meaning commentaries on Dzong-ka-ba’s The Essence of Eloquence. Pan-chen Šô-nam-drak-ba’ (1478-1554) wrote his Distinguishing through Objections and Answers (Dzong-ka-ba’s) “Differentiating the Interpretable and Definitive Meanings of All the Scriptures, The Essence of Eloquence”: Garland of Blue Lotusese, and Jay-dzin Chö-gyi-gyel-tsen (1469-1544/46) wrote his Gen-

a tâ le. This is a translation of the last two syllables of his Tibetan name, “gya-tso” (rgya msho).
b spyi don.
c mtha’ dpod.
d Jam-jiang-dön-yö-bel-den (‘jam dbyangs don yod dpal ldan; 1445-1524).
e pan chen bod nams grags pa.
f The late Ken-sur Ye-shay-tup-den reported that Pan-chen Sö-nam-drak-ba also wrote a
eral Meaning of (Dzong-ka-ba's) "Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive": Eradicating Bad Disputation: A Precious Garland; in which he often refutes views held by Pan-chen So-nam-drak-ba. Both of these texts are mostly limited to commenting on the introductory and Mind-Only sections of Dzong-ka-ba's work. Among the monastic colleges near Hla-sha, the former came to be used by the Shar-dzay College of Gan-den Monastic University and the Lo-sel-ling College of Drepung Monastic University; the latter came to be used by the Jang-dzay College of Gan-den Monastic University and the Jay College of Se-ra Monastic University.

Gung-ru Chö-jung wrote a much more extensive work, often highly critical of other commentaries and containing particularly good "word commentaries" on Dzong-ka-ba's text, called Decisive Analysis of (Dzong-ka-ba's) "Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive, The Essence of Eloquence": Garland of White Lotus. This came to be used by the Go-mang Drepung Monastic University. Two texts similar to those by Jay-dzin Chö-gyi-gyal-tsen and Pan-chen So-nam-drak-ba, but structured around the three wheels of doctrine, were written by Den-ba-dar-gyats (1493-1568); these came to be used by the May College of Se-ra Monastic University. Afterward, followers of these scholars wrote other commentaries (listed below), usually to support their colleges' textbooks as issues of controversy and need for greater clarity came to the fore.

The last major development in college literature—in the sense of changing the basic curriculum—came more than a century later, with the production of a revised set of monastic textbooks by Jam-yang-shay-ba (1648-1721). A long, involved treatment of the introductory and Mind-Only sections of Dzong-ka-

"decisive analysis" entitled Eliminating Qualms about Difficult Topics in (Dzong-ka-ba's) "The Essence of Eloquence" (legi bshad snying po'i dka' gnad dogs good) but that, despite an extensive search, it has not been found.

a Jay-dzin Chö-gyi-gyal-tsen refutes several of Pan-chen So-nam-drak-ba's positions, and thus it seems likely that Pan-chen So-nam-drak-ba's text was written first even though he was nine years younger than Jay-dzin Chö-gyi-gyal-tsen. However, there are many ambiguities involved in trying to determine the historical order of texts written by contemporaries since positions finally put to print could have been part of an earlier, oral tradition.

b blo gsal gling.

c byang rtsi.

d Whether he preceded or followed Pan-chen So-nam-drak-ba and Jay-dzin Chö-gyi-gyal-tsen is unclear; nevertheless, he refutes positions that they held. I obtained a copy of his seemingly unobtainable Garland of White Lotus from the Inner Mongolian scholar Lo-sang-den-dzin (blo bzang bstan 'dzin) while studying at Go-mang College in the fall of 1988. He had received it from Gum-bum Monastic University in eastern Tibet just outside Shingling, the capital of Am-do Province (Ch'ing-hai), where I later purchased copies. Gung-ru Chö-jung's text on the twenty types of sangsra is still used by the Go-mang tradition.

e bstan pa dar rgyas.

f se ra smad.

f 'jam dbyangs brzhad pa ngag dbang brtson grus.
ba's text, his text presents a sometimes lengthened but more often condensed and refined version of Gung-ru Chö-jung's _Decisive Analysis_. Jam-ýang-shay-ba often merely copies his predecessor but sometimes corrects what he found to be errors; he also sharpens criticisms of Jay-dzun Chö-gyi-gyel-tsen's and Pañ-chen So-nam-drak-ba's texts (Den-ba-dar-gyay seemingly being ignored). Jam-ýang-shay-ba's text, entitled _Decisive Analysis of (Dzong-ka-ba's) “Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive”: Storehouse of White Lapis-Lazuli of Scripture and Reasoning Free from Error: Fulfiling the Hopes of the Fortunate_, replaced that by Gung-ru Chö-jung as the textbook on this topic for the Go-mang College of Dre-bung Monastic University near Hla-ša, and he installed it as the textbook for this topic at the Dra-shi-kyl Monastic University in Am-do Province, which he founded.

After Jam-ýang-shay-ba, a series of Am-do scholars rose to the challenge of Dzong-ka-ba's text. Jam-ýang-shay-ba's reincarnation, Gön-chok-jik-may-wang-bo (1728-1791), who was born in Am-do Nang-ra, northwest of Dra-shi-kyl, gave lectures on the text in 1782, which were written down by his student Wel-mang Gön-chok-gyel-tsen (1764-1853), born in Am-do Sang-kok-tset-tsa. The length and complexity of Gung-ru Chö-jung's and Jam-ýang-shay-ba's works, as well as their intricate probing of Dzong-ka-ba's sources (and thus reopening of issues), led to brilliant analyses by a gifted scholar of possibly Mongolian descent, Gung-tang Gön-chok-den-bay-drön-may (1762-1823), who was born in Am-do Dzo-ge south of Dra-shi-kyl; he became the chief student of Gön-chok-jik-may-wang-bo. Gung-tang Gön-chok-den-bay-drön-may began but did not finish two commentaries in the genres of "annotations" and "difficult points" on the Mind-Only section of Dzong-ka-ba's text, usually from Jam-ýang-shay-ba's viewpoint but with considerable adjustment of the latter's views, largely within the facade of explaining Jam-ýang-shay-ba's text. Occasionally he prefers Gung-ru Chö-jung's interpretations to Jam-ýang-shay-ba's, and, conversely, at other times he explains away deficiencies in the latter's presentation as due to merely cribbing Gung-ru Chö-jung's.

To get a handle on the plethora of commentaries, one of Gung-tang's students, Don-drup-gyel-tsen (not from Am-do but in this tradition), wrote a text

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1. bkra shis khyil.
2. dkon mchog jigs med dbang po.
3. snang ra.
4. Wel-mang Gön-chok-gyel-tsen also was a student of Gung-tang Gön-chok-den-bay-drön-may.
5. bsang khog tshar tsha.
7. mdoz od dge.
8. don grub rgyal mshon.
entitled *Extensive Explanation of (Dzong-ka-ba's) "Treatise Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive. The Essence of Eloquence," Unique to Ge-luk-ba: Four Intertwined Commentaries.# It refers to four sets of works (and other minor texts) on Dzong-ka-ba's *The Essence of Eloquence* found in the four major scholastic colleges around Hla-sa, as well as to the Second Dalai Lama's *Lamp Illuminating the Meaning*. The four sets are:

Lo-sel-ling College of Dre-bung Monastic University
  Pañ-chen So-nam-drak-ba's *Garland of Blue Lotus*es (also used as main textbook by Shar-dray College of Gan-den Monastic University)
  Tsül-kang Lek-ba-dön-drup's* Commentary on the Difficult Points

Go-mang College of Dre-bung Monastic University
  Gung-ru Chö-jung's *Garland of White Lotus*es
  Jam-yang-shay-ba's *Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive*
  Gung-tang's *Annotations*
  Gung-tang's *Difficult Points*

Jay College of Se-ra Monastic University
  Bel-jor-hün-drup's *Lamp for the Teaching*
  Jay-dzün Chö-gyi-gyel-tsen's General-Meaning Commentary (also used as main textbook by Jang-dray College of Gan-den Monastic University)
  Shay-rab-wang-bo's* Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive*
  Dra-di Ge-shay Rin-chen-dön-drup's* Ornament for the Thought*

May College of Se-ra Monastic University
  Den-ba-dar-gyay's *General Meaning*
  Den-ba-dar-gyay's *Decisive Analysis*

(I have used all of these texts except for two that I could not locate, Tsül-kang Lek-ba-dön-drup's *Commentary on the Difficult Points* and Shay-rab-wang-bo's *Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive.*) Rather than a grand synthesis of these many commentaries, Dön-drup-gyel-tsen's text provides very short compilations of stances on many issues, and thus its usefulness is limited. It is likely that he was seeking to place Gung-tang's brilliant analyses in a wider framework of scholastic interaction by identifying in brief terms the positions of other scholars.

That Gung-tang did not finish his two commentaries drew another of Jam-

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* tshul khang legs pa don grub.

b shes rab dbang pa.

c *pra sii dge bshes rin chen don grub*. He flourished in the mid-seventeenth century and was born in Am-do dpa' ri pra sii.

d Dön-drup-gyel-tsen indicates that, in addition to these four sets, he consulted other texts, such as the *zur rgyal* by Kyung-truk-ba (khyung 'phrug pa), a text from the Jang-dray College of Gan-den Monastic University, which is used in addition to Jay-dzün Chö-gyi-gyel-tsen's *General-Meaning Commentary*. 
yan-gshay-ba’s followers, A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso, who was born in Am-do Dza-yü, southeast of Dra-shi-kyil, and flourished in the early twentieth century (1851-1930), to write a “difficult points commentary” that also includes very short sections on the Autonomy and Consequence Schools. At times he abbreviates Gung-tang’s opinions and at others explains issues that Gung-tang only indicates require more thought.

Another early-twentieth-century follower but frequent critic of Jam-yan-gshay-ba, Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (1898-1946), born in Am-do A-wa, north of Dra-shi-kyil, wrote a comprehensive commentary on Dzong-ka-ba’s entire text. Entitled Treatise Distinguishing All the Meaning of (Dzong-ka-ba’s) “The Essence of Eloquence”: Illuminating the Differentiation of the Interpretable and the Definitive: Port of Entry to “The Essence of Eloquence,” it lists and examines the positions of many of the above authors. A synthetic, lengthy tome in two volumes on Dzong-ka-ba’s entire text, it provides extensive detail on the entire scope of commentaries.

Among these, the works by Gung-ru Chö-jung, Jam-yan-gshay-ba, Gung-tang, A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso, and Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso are most effective when read in series. Since Gung-ru Chö-jung’s text was the basis for this tradition and since Jam-yan-gshay-ba often condenses his predecessor’s more free-flowing presentation, Gung-ru Chö-jung’s work provides both a clear introduction and increased access to the twists and turns of the later texts. Many difficulties in Jam-yan-gshay-ba’s textbook that can hinder continued reading are handled by Gung-tang’s brilliant and incisive analyses, whose work, therefore, can be understood only within its context as a supplement to Jam-yan-gshay-ba’s. A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso’s text is indispensable because it explains many points that Gung-tang leaves hanging; still, it cannot stand alone since its flow

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*a kha blo gros rgya mtho; also known as Gung-tang Lo-drö-gya-tso.*

*b tsa yu.*

*c Mention also should be made of Jo-ne Pandita Lo-sang-gya-tso (co ne pandita blo bzang rgya mtho), who was born in Am-do chos dpal zhung in co ne and flourished in the early twentieth century. He gave lectures on Dzong-ka-ba’s The Essence of Eloquence in 1927, from which notes were taken by Pa-bong-ka-ba Jam-ba-den-dzin-lay-gya-tso (1878-1941), entitled Presentation of the Interpretable and the Definitive, Brief Notes on the Occasion of Receiving Profound (Instruction from Jo-ne Pandita Lo-sang-gya-tso) on (Dzong-ka-ba’s) “The Essence of Eloquence.” The text is brief and somewhat haphazard, since it was intended merely as personal notes.*

*d ‘jigs med dam chos rgya mtho; 1898-1946. He was recognized as the reincarnation of ‘jigs med bsam gdan; his poetic name is Mi-pam-yan-gyen-gay-bor-jay (mi pham dbyangs canrges [or dgey] pa’i rdo rje). He wrote sixteen volumes of works. This work is dependent on teachings received from Gi-deng Lo-sang-bel-den (gsi stong blo bzang dpal ldan) over more than eight months beginning in October/November of 1928 plus earlier teachings received from the same teacher over three years on the Naturelessness School. In the colophon he humbly says that he was setting down what this master taught.*

*e ‘ba, or ‘gar tie nyin, in reb gong gier mo ljongs.*
is so bound to Jam-yang-shay-ba’s and Gung-tang’s expositions. Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s text, on the other hand, is a massive synthesis.

In July 1996, when the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, born in Am-do Đak-tser in 1935, came to Gethsemani in Kentucky for a Buddhist-Christian dialogue, I reported to him that I had twenty commentaries on Đzong-ka-ba’s text and was using eighteen. The next day, when he asked me what commentary I thought was best, I answered, “Gung-tang’s analyses are very good, but Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s text is superb.” He quickly got up, went to his suitcase, and took out the green Kalimpong edition of *The Essence* that he always has with him. He opened it to reveal that the margins were filled with notes in his own hand which he explained were mostly from Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s commentary. He said he cut out blank pages for notes when the margins were not sufficient.

Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s contributions are such that he could be called the “scholar of scholars” of Đzong-ka-ba’s *The Essence of Eloquence*.

1. He covers all four sections of Đzong-ka-ba’s text in detail in two volumes—the Prologue and the Mind-Only School (356 folios), and the Autonomy School and Consequence School (299 folios)

   Unlike almost all of the other commentators from across the full breadth of the Tibetan cultural region, he did not desist from commenting on the sections on the Autonomy School and Consequence School, the omission usually being excused on the grounds that these schools are covered respectively in textbooks on Maitreya’s *Ornament for Clear Realization* and Chandrakirti’s *Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle.”* Although there are three texts from the Se-ra Jay College that treat the entire text, they are not nearly as expansive. That by Nyel-dön Bāl-jor-hlun-drup does not even consider a great many issues. That by Šer-shul Lo-sang-pūn-tsok gives an intriguingly unbiased treatment of difficult points in the Mind-Only section but offers only a “word commentary” on the rest. That by Dādrin-rap-den is simply a word commentary. (The latter two are discussed below.) It is reported that Gung-tang Gön-chok-den-

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\(^{a}\) *bsin ’dzin rgya mtsho.*

\(^{b}\) *stag mtshar,* southeast of sku ’bum, where Đzong-ka-ba was born.

\(^{c}\) The total now is twenty-six.

\(^{d}\) *ser shul dge bshes blo bzang phun tshogs.*

\(^{e}\) *tshig’ grol.*


\(^{g}\) By Geshe Thupten Gyatso.
bay-drön-may's seventh incarnation was supposed to finish his commentary, but he is now seemingly too old to do so.

2. He does not use the facade of defending the textbook literature he originally studied

All of the other post-sixteenth-century commentaries (except Ser-ṣül in places) play the game of pretending to re-explain the subtleties of their own textbook literature, but Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso does not shy away from frequently and openly criticizing Jam-ṭang-shay-ba and even Gung-tang Gön-chok-den-bay-drön-may. It is reported that twenty ge-ṣhays from Drashti-kyl sought to proceed to Rep-gong to debate with Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso after publication of his text in order to defend Jam-ṭang-shay-ba but the debate never took place.

3. He lists and analyzes the opinions of more Ge-luk authors

His biographer, Tsay-den-shap-drung Jik-may-rik-ḥay-lo-drö, says without exaggeration that he studied around forty such texts.

4. He pays close attention to the commentary by the seventh-century Korean scholar, Wonch'uk, on the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought

In the Mind-Only section, he cites Wonch'uk's commentary at least twenty-two times. He uses it for explanation of terms, for revealing the sources of several of Dzong-ka-ba's and Gung-tang Gön-chok-den-bay-drön-may's points, for including the opinions of Paramārtha, and as a vehicle for developing topics.

5. He gives more definitions and etymologies than other authors do

For these reasons Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso's massive commentary is most helpful in organizing and penetrating the plethora of opinions on topics within Ge-luk circles. By giving his own independent opinions he keeps from falling into the deadness of a mere list of others' positions.

His weakness is that he does not consider in detail the works of the scholar-yogi that Dzong-ka-ba marked out as his chief opponent, Döl-bo-ba Şhay-rap-gyel-tsen’s (see p. 47ff.) Detailed analysis of Şhay-rap-gyel-tsen’s Ocean of Definitive Meaning, Fourth Council, and so forth, would have fleshed out the context of The Essence of Eloquence. This failing is particularly intriguing since

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a By Geshe Thupten Gyato.
b she bzab drung 'jigs med rigs pa’i blo gros in mkhas dbang 'jigs med rigs pa’i blo gros kyi gung rson pod dang po (msho sngon: mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1987), 228.13.
c For discussion of Wonch’uk’s commentary, see p. 39ff.
d dol po pa’i shes rab rgyal mshon; 1292-1361.
Gung-tang Gon-chok-den-bay-drön-may does do this to some extent. Also, Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso does not consider the opinions of non-Ge-luk scholars subsequent to Dzong-ka-ba, such as the intriguing Sa-gya scholar, Shākyā-chok-den. Thus, his range is limited even if he is indeed a scholar of scholars.

Two twentieth-century commentaries from the Jay College of Se-ra Monastic University also are particularly helpful. The first is a remarkably unbiased synthetic commentary by Ser-shiul Lo-sang-pün-tson, called Notes on (Dzongka-ba’s) “Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive”; Lamp Illuminating the Profound Meaning.” In a genre called “separate annotations,” Ser-shiul Ge-shay makes reasoned choices among many of the above-mentioned commentaries on a plethora of key issues about the prologue and Mind-Only sections—allegiance to his college not dictating his preferences. The text’s lack of bias is a tribute to the author’s towering intellect and dedication to content. Still, being a series of disconnected annotations, it has to be read along with The Essence and, preferably, with the major commentaries since his annotations are historically rooted. For the sections on the Autonomy and Consequence Schools Ser-shiul Ge-shay gives a fleshed out “word commentary” embedded within The Essence, thereby serving as a helpful entry to those parts of The Essence.

Another twentieth-century work on Dzong-ka-ba’s entire text, a “difficult points” commentary by Da-drin-rap-den, does not evince Ser-shiul Ge-shay’s lack of bias, but I found it very helpful in reading the text and preparing a translation—much of the bracketed material in my translation being from this work. It provides helpful rephrasings, inserted into Dzong-ka-ba’s text, drawn from Bel-jor-hlin-drup’s and the Second Dalai Lama’s commentaries and also including the extensive outline found in Ge-shay Lo-sang-ge-lek’s Mirror Illuminating the Meaning of the Thought of (Dzong-ka-ba’s) “Treatise Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive: The Essence of Eloquence.” Ser-shiul Ge-shay’s and Da-drin-rap-den’s works are synthetic representatives of different genres aimed at providing easier access—the former to central issues and the latter to the organization, syntax, flow of ideas, and so forth.

Much like the famed twenty-one Indian commentaries on Maitreya’s Ornament for Clear Realization, the number of commentaries on Dzong-ka-ba’s The Essence of Eloquence written over the last six centuries signifies both the seminal importance of the text in the Tibetan cultural region and the vibrancy of the scholarly tradition. To make Dzong-ka-ba’s often cryptic text more accessible, I have used eighteen of the twenty-six commentaries I have located, citing seventeen in the Translation as sources for annotation in brackets and in notes.

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\[a\] _gsar mdog pa\textsuperscript{\textcircled{\text{a}}} \text{chen i\textsuperscript{\textcircled{\text{b}}}kya \text{mchog ldan}, 1428-1509.}
\[b\] zur mechen.
\[c\] _dge bshes blo bzang dge legs._
\[d\] Ge-shay Ye-shay-tap-kay has assembled a list of fifty-six commentaries.
\[e\] See p. 59ff. for an alphabetical list with college identifications where appropriate.
3. The Worldview

Dzong-ka-ba’s text is often so brief with abrupt, unannounced shifts of topic, unspecified references, omissions, and seeming contradictions that it has been subjected to continuing, briskly argued analysis over the last six centuries by persons committed both to ferreting out its meaning and to maintaining diversity of opinion. It is virtually impossible to plunge right into it without becoming lost. The seemingly endless investigation of his system—performed by his followers through juxtaposing various facets of it and through probing enigmatic remarks hinting at penetration of profound issues—takes place within a worldview that is the floor for inquiry. Thus, in preparation for approaching the steel bow and arrow, it is necessary first to gain an overview of the issues involved, the theater for grand and petty dramas.

Three Natures

In Buddhism in general, suffering is viewed as being induced by actions\(^a\) motivated by afflictive emotions,\(^b\) which, in turn, are grounded in misperception of the nature of phenomena. More specifically, the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought, on which the Asaṅga based his system to a great degree, frames this process as stemming from the superimposition of a false status—called an imputational nature—on impermanent phenomena. These phenomena are called “other-powered natures”\(^c\) because they are objects under the influence of something other than themselves—that is, under the influence of causes and conditions. Other-powered natures do not have the power to stay for a second moment. No matter what they are—bodies, minds, tables, chairs, houses—most beings see them falsely, as if they were solid and could remain, as if they were under their own power, whereas actually they cannot remain even for a second moment since they are under the influence of the force of causes and conditions outside themselves. More specifically, those causes and conditions are predispositions, internal seeds, etchings on the mind by former perceptions that, when activated, produce an appearance of an object and a consciousness that pays attention to it. The same seed causes the appearance of the object and the appearance of the subject, much as in a dream.

\(^{a}\) las, karma.
\(^{b}\) nyan mong, klesa.
\(^{c}\) kun btags pa’i rang bzhin, parikalpitāsabhāvā.
\(^{d}\) gzhan dbang gi rang bzhin, paratantrasabhāva. For a thorough analysis of the three natures in the Yogic Practice (that is, Mind-Only) School in India, see Ake Boquist, Tīrīvakāra: A Study of the Development of the Three-Nature-Theory in Yogācāra Buddhism, ed. Tord Olsson, Lund Studies in African and Asian Religions, 8 (Lund, Sweden: University of Lund, 1993). See also Reflections on Reality, chaps. 3 and 11-15.
The imputational nature that is falsely imputed to them is often described as the superimposition that subject and object are different entities—distant and cut off—whereas actually they are not. It is not being said that a table, for instance, appears to be a table but is not a table; rather, a table falsely appears to be distant and cut off from, for instance, the eye consciousness that is perceiving it. The table exists, but not in the manner in which it appears to exist. For example, during a magical display created by putting a salve on a small object such as a pebble and using a mantra that affects the eye consciousness of all present, a pebble appears to be a horse but is not; similarly, a table appears to be distant and cut off from an eye consciousness perceiving it but is not. Nonetheless, it seems external through the power of unreal ideation.a This is not necessarily current conceptuality thinking, “This is a different entity from my eye consciousness.” Rather, through past repeated misperception of objects, predispositions were established for the false appearance of objects. By the power of these predispositions, phenomena presently appear to be distant and cut off from the perceiver even in raw sensation.

Another important mode of the imputational nature is the establishment of phenomena by way of their own character as the referent of a conceptual consciousness or of a word.b Imputation is done in terms of entities and attributes. The entity is, for example, a table; its attributes are, for instance, that it is large and scratched, old but serviceable. A nonexistent imputational nature of the table is that it is established by way of its own character as an object expressed by words for entities and attributes and as the referent of thoughts about entities and attributes.

Those are the most crucial imputational natures, belief in which produces all the ills of cyclic existencec and failure to know all that can be known. Contrary to such superimpositions, the final mode of being of other-powered natures, their emptiness of these imputational natures, is called the “thoroughly established natures.”d The distinguishing feature of a thoroughly established nature is that it is a final object of observation by a path of purification. It must be something cognizance of which will remove obstructions built on unfounded misperceptions; thus, it is thoroughly established. Through reflecting on the thoroughly established nature, one overcomes misconceptions with respect to phenomena. Also, the thoroughly established nature is permanent, in the sense that it does not change moment by moment. In addition, although a thoroughly established nature—an emptiness—itself is not a virtue, the consciousness that pays attention to it is the supreme of all virtuous phenomena; the quality of the consciousness is extended to the object of the consciousness,

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a For discussion of this term, see p. 307ff.
b rang 'dzin rong pa'i shen gzhir rang gi mthban nyid kyi grub pa; also, gzung gzung shes rgyud pa'i sgra' jug pa'i jug gzhir rang gi mthban nyid kyi grub pa.
c 'khor ba, samsāra.
d yongs su grub pa'i rang bzhin, parinibbānabhāva.
and thus in this sense the thoroughly established nature is the supreme virtue.

In this way, the three natures are three aspects, so to speak, of each and every phenomenon. The object itself is an other-powered nature which is the basis of the falsely imaged imputational nature and is the basis of thoroughly established nature, which is the other-powered nature's emptiness of that imputational nature. The thrust of the theory when applied in this way is liberative, first identifying a false status (the imputational nature) of objects (other-powered natures) belief in which induces suffering and finitude, and then, in order to gain liberation, realizing the emptiness (the thoroughly established nature) of that status (the imputational nature) falsely imputed to objects (other-powered natures). In this way the three natures can be applied to each and every phenomenon.

Hence, it can be seen that the question of the status of subjects and objects is central to the view of emptiness in the Mind-Only School and that realization of emptiness, in turn, is central to the process of overcoming the afflictive emotions that bind persons in cyclic existence and obstruct them from full altruistic expression. The issue is not merely a matter of how subject and object are conceptualized in treatises but whether the apprehended-object is innately experienced as an entity external to the apprehending-subject. Not merely speculative, the topic is at the heart of the process of release from suffering, for pain is viewed as being induced by actions motivated by afflictive emotions which, in turn, are grounded in this misconception of the nature of phenomena.

In the seventh chapter of the Sutra Unraveling the Thought, Buddha is depicted as saying:15

Superimposing the imputational nature onto other-powered natures and thoroughly established natures, sentient beings designate the convention that other-powered natures and thoroughly established natures are of the character of the imputational nature. In just the way that they designate such conventions, their minds are thoroughly infused with such designations of conventions, and due to relation with the designation of conventions or due to the dormancies of designations, they manifestly conceive other-powered natures and thoroughly established natures to be of the character of the imputational nature. In just the way that they manifestly conceive this, in that same way—due to the causes and conditions of manifestly conceiving other-powered natures as being of the imputational nature—in the future other-powered natures are thoroughly generated.

On that basis, they become thoroughly afflicted by the afflictions that are the afflictive emotions. Also, they are thoroughly afflicted by the afflictions that are actions and by the afflictions that are the production of a lifetime. For a long time, they transmigrate as hell-beings,
animals, gods, demi-gods, or humans and travel about within these transmigrations, not passing beyond cyclic existence.

Misconception of the nature of phenomena leads to an afflictive process that binds beings within a round of suffering.

Dzong-ka-ba, in *The Essence of Eloquence* (220), succinctly summarizes the import of the sūtra:

The *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* says that through manifestly conceiving the imputational nature in other-powered natures, [all] afflictive emotions are produced and, due to that, karmas are accumulated whereby one revolves in cyclic existence. Also, it says that if one sees other-powered natures as without the nature of the character of the imputational character, those are overcome in that order.

Release from suffering is viewed as a process of perceiving the actual nature of phenomena such that the superimposition that serves as the basis of the round of suffering is eradicated. In the seventh chapter of the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*, Buddha is depicted as saying to the Bodhisattva Paramārthaśāmaputra:

Because, hearing these doctrines, they do not conceive other-powered natures in the manner of the imputational character, they believe, thoroughly differentiate, and realize properly that [other-powered natures] are [self-]production-non-natures, character-non-natures, and ultimate-non-natures....Moreover, on this basis, they thoroughly develop aversion toward all compositional phenomena, become completely free from desire, become completely released, and become thoroughly released from the afflictions that are the afflictive emotions, the afflictions that are actions, and the afflictions that are births.

With respect to that, Paramārthaśāmaputra, through just this path and through just this procedure, even sentient beings who have the lineage of the Hearer Vehicle attain the unsurpassed accomplishment and blissful nirvana. Through just this path and through just this procedure, sentient beings who have the lineage of the Solitary Realizer Vehicle and those who have the lineage of the Vehicle of a One Gone Thus attain the unsurpassed accomplishment and blissful nirvana. The path of thorough purification of Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Bo-

\* It seems that this phrase has to be explained as meaning that they realize that other-powered natures are not established—in the manner of the imputational nature—by way of their own character. Otherwise, it would be indicating that other-powered natures themselves are not established by way of their own character, a position that would contradict the sūtra itself in the same chapter, as will be cited later (pp. 97 and 292, and *Reflections on Reality*, chap. 7), where Buddha says that whatever does not exist by way of its own character is not produced.
dhisattvas is only this one, and their purification is also one—there is no second.

The sutra clearly calls for overcoming suffering by removing a false superimposition that induces the afflicting emotions driving the process of cyclic existence. Aśaṅga describes this afflicting psychological process in the "Chapter on Suchness" in his *Grounds of Bodhisattvas*; and Ďzong-ka-ba (221) summarizes Aśaṅga in order to make the material more accessible:

Conceptualization [that factors imputed] in the manner of entity and attribute [are established by way of their own character] and conceptualization apprehending amorphous wholes generate the foundations of [fictional] proliferations—the things that are the objects observed by conceptuality. In dependence upon that, the view of the transitory [as substantially established I and mine] is generated, and through this the other afflicting emotions are produced, whereby one travels in cyclic existence. However, if through the four examinations and the four thorough knowledges one understands the objects apprehended by conceptuality as nonexistent, those [afflicting emotions and so forth] are overcome.

The process is as follows:

- First, phenomena are misconceived in a false way to be established by way of their own character as the referents of designations for entities ("body") and attributes ("beautiful")
- That leads to improper thought mis-imagining qualities of cleanliness, happiness, permanence, and self
- That, in turn, engenders the perception that the self is substantially established and that mind, body, and so forth belong to a substantially established self
- That leads to the afflicting emotions of desire, hatred, and so forth; these produce actions which establish potencies in the mind—perpetuating the process of suffering in a round of painful existence

Since the afflicting emotions that bind beings in the beginningless round of birth, aging, sickness, and death are based on a false conceptualization of entities and their attributes, to understand the path of purification in the Yogic Practice School it is imperative to investigate what this false conceptualization is. It is also crucial to explore whether, as Ge-luk-ba scholars claim, it involves a misconception of a difference of entity between subject and object.

Such false conceptualization has come to be understood in Ge-luk-ba interpretations as follows:

Although objects are not established by way of their own character as the referents of terms or of conceptual consciousnesses and although
subject and object are not different entities, they appear even in raw sensation to be so established. Due to assenting to this seeming status, beings are drawn into afflictive emotions—misconceiving themselves and others to be substantially established in the sense of being self-sufficient and then, as a consequence of this, generating desire, hatred, confusion, enmity, jealousy, and so forth. These afflictive emotions, in turn, result in actions, which establish potencies in the mind that keep beings bound in cyclic existence.

Seen in the perspective of this worldview, the central issue of this inquiry is not merely theoretical. Rather, in this interpretation, it is undeniable that objects appear to be established by way of their own character as the referents of terms or of conceptual consciousnesses and appear to be different entities from the consciousnesses that perceive them. Thus this is an investigation into whether these appearances are true or false and hence whether the emotions founded upon assumptions of the status of phenomena based on these appearances are false. The aim of the system is for practitioners to engage in reasoned analysis, such that a decision that phenomena appear falsely is reached, whereupon, in combination with profound concentration, they can overcome the pull of this false appearance and thereby undo the psychological processes that give rise to the afflictive emotions and consequent contaminated actions. Hence, the basic issue is the unhealthy psychology of cyclic existence and the process of liberation from such unhealthy states.

The perspective is of a worldview of bondage due to misconception and liberation by way of knowledge. Developing over time, beginning most likely with early strata of the Grounds of Bodhisattva and culminating in Asanga’s Summary of the Great Vehicle, there came to be a view that the sufferings of sentient beings are founded on a misperception of the nature of phenomena in such a dualistic way. Specifically, phenomena falsely appear to be established by way of their own character as the referents of the imputations of entities and attributes in such a manner that namer and named—subject and object—seem to be different entities, whereas they are not. By assenting to this false appearance, beings are drawn into a series of detrimental mental states, exaggerating the status of phenomena, such that counterproductive emotions are generated. These lead to actions that, in turn, deposit predisposing potencies in the mind in latent form, which, when activated, perpetuate further the round of powerlessness suffering.

Because the process of becoming afflicted with suffering is built on ignorance—both a lack of knowledge of the true status of phenomena and an active assent to false appearance of phenomena—the situation of beings is fraught with potential, both for more pain in the future and for release from bondage.

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* See Reflections on Reality, chap. 21.
* I do not mean to suggest that there were not other such views prior to this period.
through the acquisition of wisdom. That wisdom is the earth-shattering knowledge that phenomena are not established by way of their own character as the referents of the imputations of entities and attributes and hence that namer and named, subject and object, are not different entities. The overcoming of innate tendencies, ingrained over countless lifetimes, to assent to false appearance requires that wisdom be teamed with powerful, one-pointed concentration to the point where the true nature of objects can be perceived in non-conceptual, totally non-dual cognition, which must be reentered again and again. The psychology of limited, counterproductive states is thus transformed through philosophical penetration of the true status of things, thereby undoing an afflictive process built on the failure to analyze appearances. In this way, the philosophical enterprise has powerful ramifications for psychological improvement—theoretical study leading to transformation of character.

Artificial And Innate Superimpositions

According to Đzong-ka-ba and his followers, the conception that other-powered natures such as mind, body, and house are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them in the manner entities and attributes is the chief superimposition explicitly treated in the seventh chapter of the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought, the “Questions of Paramārthaśamudgata.” Other-powered natures’ emptiness of such a superimposed nature is their thoroughly established nature. The superimposed factor itself is an imputational nature.

Consciousnesses engaged in such superimposition are of two types, artificial (that is, intellectually acquired) and innate. The former are delusive consciousnesses that have as their basis the reasonings and/or the scriptures of a mistaken system. No matter how ingrained or habitual these become and no matter how much one becomes unaware or unconscious of them, as long as the initial impetus comes from reasonings and/or scriptures, the mistakenly conceiving consciousness is called “artificial.” The innate, on the other hand, is not dependent on reasoning and scripture or on training in a mistaken system or even on learning language and thus exists even among babies, animals, insects, and so forth.

About the artificial, Đzong-ka-ba (194) identifies the systems that assert such a status as being true:

With respect to superimposition, there are two, artificial and innate, and within the artificial there are the systems of Others’ Schools and of

\footnotesize{\textit{\textsuperscript{a}} kun btags, parikalpita.\textit{\textsuperscript{b}} dban skyes, saktaja.}
the two Proponents of [Truly Existent External] Objects among our own schools [the Great Exposition\(^a\) and the Sutra Schools\(^b\)].

He identifies (1) non-Buddhist schools that, as the late Đa-drin-rap-đen says,\(^c\) have many modes of assertion that terms and conceptual consciousnesses operate through the power of the things which are their referents and (2) what are, in this tradition, held to be the two Lesser Vehicle\(^c\) schools. These are systems that assert the tenet that objects are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses. Later, in the context of stating the Mind-Only position that objects are not established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses, Đzong-ka-ba (201) adds:

For this reason, even the Hearer schools have assertions of tenets that are superimpositions opposite to this—that is, holding that forms and so forth are established by way of their own character as imputed by names as entities and attributes.

It is as follows: In refuting this, Asaṅga’s *Grounds of Bodhisattvas* refutes it also with [Buddhist] scripture, and since it is not suitable to refute Other Schools [Non-Buddhists] with the scriptures of one’s own teacher, our own schools also must exist among those who are being refuted, and since the Proponents of Non-Nature\(^c\) or a specific type of Yogic Practitioner are not being refuted, [these have to be Buddhist] Hearer schools. Hence, [on the occasion of refuting this, Asaṅga] does not quote passages from the *Sutra Unraveling the Thought* but refutes them with three passages\(^c\) established for them.

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\(^a\) *bye brag smra ba, vaiśākhīika.*

\(^b\) *mdo sde pa, sastrāntika.*

\(^c\) *theg dmam, hinayāna.* The term “Lesser Vehicle” (theg dmam, hinayāna) has its origin in the writings of Great Vehicle (theg chen, mahāyāna) authors and was, of course, not used by those to whom it was ascribed. Substitutes such as “non-Mahāyāna,” “Nikāya Buddhism,” and “Theravāda” have been suggested in order to avoid the pejorative sense of “Lesser.” However, “Lesser Vehicle” is a convenient term in this particular context for a type of tenet system or practice that is seen in Tibetan scholarship to be surpassed but not negated by a “higher” system. The “Lesser Vehicle” is not despised, most of it being incorporated into the “Great Vehicle.” The monks’ and nuns’ vows are Lesser Vehicle, as is much of the course of study in Ge-luk-ba monastic universities—years of study are put into the topics of Epistemology (*tshad ma, pramāṇa*), Manifest Knowledge (*choi mgon pa, abhidharma*), and Discipline (*’dul ba, vinaya*), all of which are mostly Lesser Vehicle in perspective.

\(^d\) *ngo bo nyid med par smra ba, viśvaśāṅkhavāśādin.* These are the so-called Proponents of the Middle (*dbu ma pa, mādhyamikā*), but the Proponents of Mind-Only consider themselves to be the Proponents of the Middle since they propound a middle free from the two extremes, and thus Đzong-ka-ba often refers to this school by a name acceptable to all schools.

\(^e\) For the three passages see p. 202, footnote a.
That Buddhist schools are being refuted by Asaṅga is known, not because he cited them by name but because he used Buddhist scriptures to refute this notion, it being the custom not to make use of scriptural citation from other than the opponent’s own tradition.

At the point where we left the preceding quote, Đzong-ka-ba (194) says about innate superimpositions:

With respect to the innate [type of superimposition], since the superimposition of a self of persons will be shown later [in the section on the Consequence School, I] will explain [here the innate] superimposition of a self of phenomena. This is because the imputation of a self of phenomena by [other schools of] tenets is for the sake of confirming the self of phenomena that is conceived innately and because the main of the objects of reasoned negation is also that [innately conceived self of phenomena].

The innate superimposition being refuted is one that beings engage in without stimulus from formal systems of any sort but, nevertheless, is supported by certain systems, in this case both non-Buddhist and Low Vehicle Buddhist schools. This inborn error cannot be one that requires education for its inception or one that would be either obviously silly or refutable by reasoning in the Low Vehicle schools of tenets; Great Vehicle reasoning is required to refute it.

The innate erroneous conception being identified here is not that the name of the object is the object or that the object is its name, since even the Low Vehicle schools realize that such is not the case, and it is obvious that anyone endowed with common sense can understand that saying, “gold,” does not produce gold. Rather, it is the conception that objects are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses or of words. A consequence of such would be that a person who had not learned the name of an object would know its name merely from seeing the object; however, the conception that the name of the object is the object or that the object is its name is not innate, no matter how great the impact of understanding this can be. Rather, the absurd consequences are reasons refuting that objects are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses or of words; thus, the reasons should not be confused with the status of objects that the reasons refute.

Also, what is being refuted is not merely that objects are the referents of a conceptual consciousness or that objects are the referents of terms. For objects are indeed the referents of a conceptual consciousness and of terms. Put more simply, we can think about objects, and our terms can indeed refer to objects (how else could we ever ask for noodle soup and get it?). Hence, what is being refuted is that objects are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses and of terms. Đzong-ka-ba (195) makes this point clearly:
Those imputational factors—which are such that a consciousness conceiving imputational factors to be established by way of their own character is asserted to be a consciousness conceiving a self of phenomena—are the nominally and terminologically imputed factors [in the imputation of] the aggregates and so forth as entities, “This is form,” and as attributes, “This is the production of form,” and so forth. Since the aggregates and so forth do exist as just those [entities of such nominal and terminological imputation], the [mere] conception that they exist as those [entities of nominal and terminological imputation] is not a superimposition; rather, the conception that the aggregates and so forth exist by way of their own character as those entities [of nominal and terminological imputation] is a superimposition.

His point is that objects are indeed referents of our conceptions and terminology but are not established as such by way of their own mode of being. Assert that such referentiality inheres in objects themselves is what must be stopped.

Three Non-Natures

In chapter 7 of the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought the Bodhisattva Paramārtha-samudgata questions Buddha about his saying in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras that “All phenomena are natureless.” On the surface, Buddha’s statement appears to be nihilistic—denying that any phenomenon has “nature.”

In response, Buddha explains that when he said that all phenomena are natureless, he was not making a blanket statement with respect to each and every phenomenon but was referring to the three types of phenomena and their respective three types of non-nature. Exhibiting the typical Indian delight in esthetically stimulating word-play complications, he identifies the three types of phenomena that are natureless as the three natures—imputational natures, other-powered natures, and thoroughly established natures. Again cryptically, the three different types of non-nature that the three natures have are identified as character-non-nature, production-non-nature, and ultimate-non-nature.

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\[a\] mthang ngyid sgo bo ngyid med pa ngyid, lkarphanisvabhāvata (Étienne Lamotte, Sanbhini-nirmocanasūtra: L’Explication des mystères [Louvain: Université de Louvain, 1935], 67 [3], n. 3).

\[b\] skye ba ngyid sgo bo ngyid med pa ngyid, utpattiniisvabhāvata (ibid., 67, n. 4).

\[c\] don dag sgo bo ngyid med pa ngyid, paramārthanisvabhāvata (ibid., 67, n. 5). This term has two meanings. My general translation is "ultimate-non-nature" since this mirrors the Sanskrit and the Tibetan and is sufficiently ambiguous to allow its two meanings. The first meaning is the actual ultimate-non-nature, the thoroughly established nature, which is both (1) the ultimate as the object of observation by a path of purification and (2) the very non-nature, that is, the absence of the opposite of emptiness, in phenomena. The second meaning refers to fact that other-powered natures are not the ultimate; just as other-powered natures are natureless in terms of production, so they are natureless in terms of the ultimate—that is to say, they lack being that nature which is the ultimate. (The Sūtra Unravel-
And to make the puzzle more complicated, both other-powered natures and thoroughly established natures are said to have the ultimate-non-nature.

To start to solve the puzzle (even without knowing the meaning), one first has to line up the three natures with three non-natures—the last of the three non-natures having two types:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Three Natures</th>
<th>Three Non-Natures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imputational natures</td>
<td>Character-non-natures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other-powered natures</td>
<td>1) Production-non-natures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2) Ultimate-non-natures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thoroughly established natures</td>
<td>Ultimate-non-natures</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Then, based on statements in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought, it is possible to identify the meaning of the three non-natures:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Three Natures</th>
<th>Three Non-Natures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imputational natures</td>
<td>Character-non-natures, in the sense that they are posited by names and terminology and do not exist by way of their own character</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other-powered natures</td>
<td>1) Production-non-natures, in the sense that they arise through the force of other conditions and are not self-produced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2) Ultimate-non-natures, in the sense that they are not objects of observation of paths of purification, that is, are not objects of the ultimate, purifying consciousness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thoroughly established natures</td>
<td>Ultimate-non-natures, in the sense that they are the ultimate and the very absence of a difference of entity of subject and object and the very absence of establishment by way of a phenomenon's own character as the referent of terms and conceptual consciousnesses</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this way, in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought Buddha interprets the statement in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras that “All phenomena are natureless,” so that it is not nihilistic.

The Sūtra Unraveling the Thought itself says that sharpest Bodhisattvas can, without relying on other sūtras, understand these (superficially nihilistic) statements as referring to the three natures and the three non-natures. As the Sūtra says:97

With respect to this, thinking of just these three types of non-nature, the One Gone Thus, by way of the aspect of setting forth sūtras of interpretable meaning, taught the doctrine in this way, “All phenomena are natureless; all phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow.” Regarding that, when sentient beings who have generated great roots of virtue, have purified the obstructions, have ripened their continuums, who have great faith and have accumulated great collections of merit
and wisdom—hear this doctrine, they understand—just as it is—this which I explained with a thought behind it, and they develop belief in that doctrine. They also realize, by means of their exalted wisdom, the meaning just as it is.

Thus, Ge-luk-apa scholars hold that even for the Proponents of Mind-Only the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras are the supreme of sutras, even though their literal reading must be interpreted.

Compatibility Of Emptiness And Idealism

There are many fascinating topics to be considered with respect to the various interpretations of idealism in Europe, and so forth:

- Locke (1632-1704), who leaves an external object as "substance" devoid of secondary qualities such as color, taste, and smell
- Berkeley (1685-1753), who does away with external objects altogether, even as substance, using the mind of God as the mechanism for positing a continuously perceiving consciousness and thus continuity of objects
- Hume (1711-1776), who does away with such a God, to be replaced by the association of ideas, and so forth.

In Buddhism, as expounded by Ge-luk-apa scholars, there are other idealist tendencies including:

- the common tenet of all Buddhist schools (as presented in Ge-luk-apa scholarship) that the definition of an existent as that which is observed by valid cognition, *
- the common tenet that the mind is predominantly important among all phenomena, and
- denial that external objects generate perceptions but affirmation that other beings are different entities from oneself.

Here I use the term "idealism" in the last sense, only to mean the "absence of external objects"—specifically that an object such as blue does not exist as a separate entity from a consciousness apprehending blue and that a consciousness apprehending blue does not exist as a separate entity from that blue. This is commonly called subjective idealism. It is important to note that subjective idealism in this Buddhist system does not entail that all objects are the same entity as one particular subject and thus does not entail solipsism—there are other consciousnesses and their percepts. (Ge-luk-apa scholars "handle" the solipsistic tendencies through reference to Dharmakirti's proof of the existence of

* tshad ma dnges pa.
other beings in his Proof of Other Continuums, the very title of which recognizes the idealist nature of his philosophy and its possible mis-interpretation as solipsism.)

Such idealism also does not necessitate the positing of a permanent, pure consciousness that is the ultimate truth, or absolute reality. This would be to overload idealism with notions that it necessarily entails the assertion of a permanent pure consciousness as the ultimate truth and then to propose that Asaṅga in these texts does not propound idealism since it is clear that for him emptiness is the ultimate truth. Asaṅga does indeed propound that emptiness is the ultimate truth, for when he speaks about the path of seeing, for instance, he says not that a meditator sees just mind but that a meditator sees emptiness. Hence, it is unwarranted to take this type of Buddhist idealism to be absolute idealism, which would indeed entail that on the path of seeing a yogi would have to realize just mind; such is not the case.

Although the object of non-conceptual wisdom is not a consciousness but emptiness, this does not entail that mind-only is not a final doctrine. In most Ge-luk-ba delineations of the Mind-Only School’s view of emptiness, the emptiness of a difference of entity between subject and object is the ultimate truth, the object of direct perception on the path of seeing and the path of meditation. According to their standard presentations of the path structure in the Mind-Only School, the emptiness that is directly seen on the paths of seeing and meditation is the absence of a difference of entity between subject and object or the absence of objects’ being established by way of their own character as the referents of terms or conceptual consciousnesses. Thus, emptiness so defined not only does not cancel out mind-only but confirms mind-only, the very absence of a difference of entity between subject and object upon which such idealism depends. Understood this way, idealism and emptiness are compatible in one system.

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* Thus it is unfounded to claim that, since Asaṅga teaches that the mind-basis-of-all (kun gshis nam par shes pa, dālayāvijñāna) is impermanent, he could not have taught it in any way other than provisionally, that is to say, merely to lead trainees. Janice D. Willis presents this notion in her On Knowing Reality: The Tattvārtha Chapter of Asaṅga’s Bodhiśāntvabhiṣamī (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979; reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1982), 21-24. See Reflections on Reality, chap. 21.

* For others, see Reflections on Reality, chap. 14.
4. The Context

In the section on Mind-Only, Đzong-ka-ba presents how the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought differentiates which of Buddha’s scriptures require interpretation and which are definitive. He does this within the fourfold context of:

- Refining the Korean scholar Wonch’uk’s seventh-century presentation
- Criticizing the eclectic syncretism of the fourteenth-century Tibetan scholar-adept Jo-nang-ba Shay-rap-gyel-tsen (1292-1361), who died four years after Đzong-ka-ba’s birth
- Presenting Indian Mind-Only scholarship in such a way that the architecture of the system can be engaged
- Distinguishing the Mind-Only School from the Consequence School and thus setting the stage for his later exposition of Chandrakīrti’s criticism of the Mind-Only School and the Autonomy School

Wonch’uk’s Influence In Tibet

Tibetan scholarship on the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought is strongly influenced by the Extensive Commentary on the "Sūtra Unraveling the Thought" written in Chinese by the seventh-century Korean scholar Wonch’uk and translated into Tibetan. Wonch’uk was born in 612 or 613 in Hsin-lo, a descendant of a prince of the Silla kingdom (the other two kingdoms being Paekje and Koguryo); eighty-two years after the Silla court officially adopted Buddhism.

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a The only extant version of the Chinese is in the supplement to the Kyōto edition of the canon, Dainihon Zokuzōkyō (Kyōto, 1905-1912; also Hong Kong Reprint, 1922, 134.d. 555.a) and is available in a Chinese version of an ongoing tripiṭaka that includes many texts, mostly Chinese works: Da Zang Jing (Taipei: Xin Wen Fong Ltd.), 1977, vol. 34, 581-952, and vol. 35, 1-100. It is missing the first portion of the eighth fascicle and all of the tenth fascicle of the original text. These have been reconstructed from the Tibetan by Inaba Shōju: Enjiki Gejinmikkyōshi Sanitsuuban no kanbuukaku (Kyōto: Hōzōkan, 1949). See Shōtarō Iida, “The Three Stūpas of Ch’ang An,” in Papers of the First International Symposium Commemorating the 30th Anniversary of Korean Liberation (Seoul, Academy of Korean Studies: 1975), 489, and John C. Powers, Hermeneutics and Tradition in the Samdhinirmocana-sūtra (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 1993), 17, n. 34. For discussion of the number of chapters in Wonch’uk’s commentary, see appendix 2 (p. 457)

b Tib. rdzogs gsal / wen steg / wen stegs / wanyideg, Ch. Yüan-ti’ı’e, 613-696. See also Iida, “Three Stūpas of Ch’ang An,” 484-497.

Wonch’uk was ordained as a novice at the age of three, and at fifteen, in 627/628 he traveled to Ch’ang-an, China, capital of the T’ang Dynasty (618-908), where he remained for the rest of his life. He became a master of Mind-Only Buddhism, which was introduced into China in three phases:

- The initial phase began in the first year of the reign of Emperor Hsüan-wu of the Northern Wei dynasty (508) with the arrival of three masters from India—Ratnamati, Bodhiruci, and Buddhahânta. The system that developed was called the Dashabhûmika School (Ch. Ti-lun), based on Buddhahânta’s translation of Vasubandhu’s Treatise on the “Sûtra on the Ten Grounds” (daśabhûmikasûtraśâstra).

- During the second phase, a Mahâyânasamgraha School (Ch. She-lun) formed, based on the translation of Asaṅga’s Summary of the Great Vehicle (mahâyânasamgraha) by the Indian monk and sage Paramârtha, who was born in Ujjain, India, in 499, arrived in Guanjou in 546, and remained in China until his death in 569. His translations had a profound effect on forms of Buddhism in China. Wonch’uk, studying under Seng-pien (568-642) and Fa-ch’ang (567/645) at Yuan-fa Monastery, became conversant with the Mind-Only School as transmitted by Paramârtha during the latter’s twenty years of teaching in China. His studies emphasized Vasubandhu’s Treatise on the “Sûtra on the Ten Grounds” (the primary first-phase text) and Asaṅga’s Summary of the Great Vehicle (the primary second-phase text). Wonch’uk was strongly influenced by the expositions of Mind-Only doctrines by Sthiramati.

- In 645, at age thirty-three, prompted by dreaming that “a brahmaṇa gave him fruit until he was completely satisfied,” Wonch’uk went to meet Hsüan-tsang upon the latter’s return from India. Hsüan-tsang’s return marked the beginning of the third phase of the dissemination of Mind-Only Buddhism into China, the school being called Fa-hsiang (dharmaśana, Character of Phenomena) or Wei-shih (vijñaptimātra, Cognition-Only), this name being based on Hsüan-tsang’s influential composition of a text based primarily on Dharmapāla’s commentary on Vasubandhu’s Thirty Stanzas on the Establishment of Cognition-Only (viṣṇiṣṭhāpāḥ).  


* Presently called Xian.
called the Ch'eng wei-shih lun. In his own text, Hsüan-tsang makes use of ten Indian commentaries on Vasubandhu’s Thirty Stanzas on the Establishment of Cognition-Only (Dharmapāla, Shiiramati, Chitrabhāṇu, Nanda, Guṇamati, Hinamitra, Jñānachandra, Bandhushri, Shuddhachandra, and Jinapura). Later the school came to be called the “New Yogācāra,” in contradistinction to Paramārtha’s “Old Yogācāra.”

Hsüan-tsang (600-664) is renowned for his arduous trip to India in 629 through Central Asia (begun close to the time that Wonch’uk left Korea for China), during which he:

- survived an attempt on his life by his guide,
- became lost in the desert,
- threatened a hunger strike after the King of Turfan would not let him leave and thereby was granted safe travel to India through the king’s letters,
- was captured on the Ganges by bandits who wanted him as a human sacrifice,
- was tutored at Nālandā in Mind-Only doctrines by the 106-year-old scholar-abbot Shīlakīrṇa, who had been a disciple of Dharmapāla, himself a disciple of Dignāga, who was a disciple of Vasubandhu, half-brother of Asaṅga,
- traveled to Shīr Laṅka, and
- returned to Nālandā where he mainly studied Indian philosophy.

He became so famous in India that when he called on Harsha, emperor of India, the Emperor bowed to the ground and kissed his feet. Harsha convened a grand debate for eighteen days so that Hsüan-tsang could “dissipate the blindness of the Hinayāna and...shatter the pride of the Brahmans.” In 645, after an absence of sixteen (or seventeen) years, the triumphant Hsüan-tsang returned to Ch’ang-an, for a tumultuous welcome and an audience with Emperor T’ai-tsung.

Resisting the Emperor T’ai-tsung’s request that he renounce his vows so that he could serve as an adviser to him, Hsüan-tsang put his energies into translating some of the 657 texts he brought back with him from India. In time, he translated 74 of them, including the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought. As mentioned above, he composed the influential Ch’eng wei-shih lun, based mainly on Dharmapāla’s Commentary on (Vasubandhu’s) Thirty Stanzas on the Establishment of Cognition-Only” but also incorporating, where he found them useful, the views of the nine other Indian commentators given above. At the emperor’s request, he also wrote a record of his journey, “a storehouse of information on Central Asia and India.

After Emperor T’ai-tsung again requested that Hsüan-tsang give up his vows and he again resisted, the emperor took a deep interest in Buddhism and
had nine copies of Hsüan-tsang’s newly translated texts distributed to each of the nine divisions of the empire and allowed the ordination of five monks in each of the 3,716 monasteries. In addition, in 648, a year before Emperor T'ai-tsu's death, 300 monks were ordained at the spectacular ceremony dedicating the magnificent Ta-tz’u-en Monastery built by the Crown Prince, Li Chih (soon to become Emperor Kao-tsung). A library and an Institute for the Translation of Scriptures were established within the monastery.

During the reign of Emperor Kao-tsung other monasteries were established, and thus, through his service to two emperors, Hsüan-tsang had great influence on the course of Buddhism in China, it being said that he had 3,000 disciples. When Hsüan-tsang died in 664, the Emperor Kao-tsung canceled his audiences for three days out of respect for the “Jewel of the Empire.” However, immediately thereafter, the emperor ordered the cessation of all translation activities, showing that, as Stanley Weinstein says:

his primary concern was for Hsüan-tsang as an individual—a monk of unusual talent who served the T’ang ruling family loyally—rather than for the Buddhist teachings to which Hsüan-tsang had dedicated his life....This simple, unadorned edict brought to an abrupt close the activities of the most remarkable and productive group of Buddhist translators and scholars ever assembled on Chinese soil.

Hsüan-tsang’s two most famous disciples were K’uei-chi (632-682) and Wench’uk. Hsüan-tsang selected K’uei-chi, born in a noble family in Ch’ang-an, as the chief transmitter of the Mind-Only Buddhism that he brought back from India. Thus, K’uei-chi served as Hsüan-tsang’s assistant during the translation of the Establishment of Cognition-Only late in his master’s life, and he himself wrote four commentaries on the text. K’uei-chi came to be revered as the first patriarch and founder of the sect. As Weinstein says:

The Yogācāra Buddhist movement of Hsüan-tsang and Ts’u-en [K’uei-chi] dominated the Buddhist world of their day, completely overshadowing the other schools of Buddhism, and when in the latter half of the T’ang Dynasty it finally began to decline, it had already been firmly planted in Japan, where it has continued to the present day as the Hossō Sect, always giving a strong impetus to the Buddhist world.

K’uei-chi’s noble lineage and importance in the sect set the stage for conflict with Wench’uk, whose previous training in Paramārtha’s “Old Yogācāra” both

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gave him background for easy access to the new doctrines of Hsüan-tsang and distanced him from the orthodoxy of the new school. It is renowned that his quick wit was such that when Hsüan-tsang showed him his new translations of Asaṅga’s *Grounds of Yogic Practice* and Dharmapāla’s *Establishment of Cognition-Only*, Wonch’uk understood them immediately and clearly. Undoubtedly, his quick penetration was aided by his previous study, which gave him so much confidence that “he was not overwhelmed by Hsüan-tsang’s enormous prestige” and even pointed out a mistranslation by the master.¹ Wonch’uk’s vast scholarship enabled him to formulate a synthesis of Old and New Yogācāra, and thus he came to be branded as non-orthodox by Hsüan-tsang’s and K’uei-chi’s followers.

Based on the *Lotus Sūtra* (*saddharmapundarīka*), the *Flower Garland Sūtra* (*avatamsaka*), and so forth, Wonch’uk drew the conclusion that all beings would eventually become fully enlightened and hence there are not three final vehicles (Hearer, Solitary Realizer, and Bodhisattva vehicles) but just one. The notion of one final vehicle was popular in Korean Buddhism at that time and “was used as a symbolic philosophical and religious basis for the unification of the three kingdoms” when Silla, allied with the T’ang Dynasty, defeated the other two Kingdoms—Paekche in 660 and Koguryo in 668—unifying Korea. The single-vehicle interpretation put Wonch’uk at odds with the teachings of Hsüan-tsang and K’uei-chi as well as their followers, the Korean being considered to be an outsider.² When Wonch’uk’s disciples in China and Silla established their own school, the Korean school debated against the Chinese school of Hsüan-tsang, K’uei-chi, and Hui-chao (650-714).

The intense rivalry between K’uei-chi and Wonch’uk—at least on the level of their chief disciples—led to accounts, discredited by Hatani Ryotai,³ Stanley Weinstein,⁴ and Shōtarō Iida,⁵ that Wonch’uk bribed a guard at the gate of the temple where Hsüan-tsang was teaching Dharmapāla’s *Establishment of Cognition-Only* to K’uei-chi so that he himself could write a synopsis and, preempting K’uei-chi, give a lecture on the work. Given the extremely high level of erudition that Wonch’uk evinces in his commentary on the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*, this account (as well as another similar to it) seems fabricated to discredit him.

Still, it is said that to calm his ambition Wonch’uk took pleasure in mountains and streams and lived in retreat for eight years. Later, as the principal teacher of Hsi-ming Monastery, he wrote a commentary on the *Establishment of Cognition-Only*, but it, along with all but three of twenty-three works

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¹ It also puts him at odds with Ge-luk-ba scholars’ interpretations of the Mind-Only School following Asaṅga, though it accords with their interpretations of the Mind-Only School following Dharmakīrti as well as the Middle Way Autonomy School and their own final view as represented in the Middle Way Consequence School.

² The three works are his commentary on the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*, a *Commentary on the Benevolent King Sūtra*, and an *Essay on the Heart Sūtra*; see Kye-hyon, *Buddhism*
in 108 fascicles, has apparently not survived. The Emperor Kao-tsong appointed him the leader of a group translating eighteen titles (in 34 fascicles) of scriptures brought to Ch'ang-an around 680 by the Indian monk Divākara. Later Wonch'uk lectured on and assisted in the translation of the Flower Garland Scripture, but before the task was completed, he passed away at Fo-shou-chi Monastery on August 25, 696, at the age of eighty-four. A White Stūpa was erected at Hsiang-shan Monastery, in a valley to the north of Mount Lung-men, to commemorate his life, his relics also being distributed to other monasteries associated with him. Another stūpa was built in 1114 at Hsing-chiao Monastery of Ch'ang-an, to the left of Hsüan-tsang's stūpa, where there was also one commemorating K'uei-chi, which was renovated at that time. Wonch'uk and K'uei-chi are also portrayed together in the Wild Goose Pagoda in Ch'ang-an. These are fitting commemorations of the impact of these two scholars, stemming to a great extent from their being the two main disciples of Hsiian-tsang at Ta-tzu-u-en Monastery.

In 735 a pilgrim named T'an-kuang (died c. 788) from Ho-his, near Tun-huang, traveled to Ch'ang-an, where he stayed at Hsi-ming Monastery—which had been Wonch'uk's monastery a half-century earlier. When T'an-kuang returned to the Tun-huang area in 774, he carried with him Wonch'uk's ten-fascicle commentary on the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought. T'an-kuang became a famous teacher, and not long thereafter a renowned scholar in T'an-kuang's lineage, Fa-ch'eng (c. 755-c. 849) became the chief translator under the Tibetan king, Rel-ba-jen (who reigned 815-841) during the eighty-six-year-period when Tibet controlled the area of Tun-huang. The eventual result was that Wonch'uk's text was translated into Tibetan, probably sometime between 815 and 824. Through this set of circumstances, Wonch'uk's commentary on the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought became part of the Tibetan cultural milieu when, early in the fifteenth century, Dzong-ka-ba composed The Essence of Eloquence.

Dzong-ka-ba explicitly refers to Wonch'uk's text nine times—three by his name, five by "Chinese Great Commentary," and once within "the commen-

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\[\text{footnotes:}

\begin{itemize}
\item Or 99 or 93, according to Iida, "Mukung-hwa in Ch'ang-an," 233; for a partial listing of Wonch'uk's works, see the same, 233-237. A copy of Wonch'uk's commentary and notes on Hsüan-tsang's Chen Wei Shi Lun entitled Chen Wei Shi Lun Ch. Shu, published early in this century from wood blocks, was found in a Taipei used bookstore and republished by Ci Ji Gong De Hui in 1989 with notes by Chen Hui Jian; my thanks to Chen Shu-chen for the reference.
\item chos grub.
\item ral pa can.
\item Twice as wen tseg (Translation, 119/ Text, 387; 125/389) and once as sde smod grum pa wen tseg (Tripiṭaka Wonch'uk, 123/388).
\item It is apparent that Dzong-ka-ba was unaware that Wonch'uk was born in Korea; it is
\end{itemize}
taries." There are also two times when, without attribution, he uses Wonch'uk's text as a source for outlines of passages from the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought. The number of references and the fact that he does so by name or title of his text eight times are particularly significant, since Đöng-ka-że only obliquely refers to one other text written in Chinese—a commentary on the sūtra by Paramārtha that, most likely, he knew only through Wonch'uk's commentary. Also, he does not even mention the name of any Tibetan scholar, including the one whom he is principally refuting, Shay-rap-gyel-tsen (1292-1361), whose opinions he frequently rebukes. Đöng-ka-že's open references to Wonch'uk most likely derive from deference to his wide-ranging scholarship and from a wish to correct the opinions of an influential, if temporally distant, scholar.

Among the eleven references, Đöng-ka-že disagrees with Wonch'uk four times, refines his opinion five times, and agrees two times. In the course of the section on the Mind-Only School, he:

1. disagrees with Wonch'uk's assertion that "own-character" means the unique character of an object, saying that it means establishment by way of its own character; "the Chinese Great Commentary," p. 78;
2. disagrees about the meaning of "the various and manifold constituents": included in "the commentaries," p. 80;
3. implicitly agrees with Wonch'uk's division of the description of the character-non-nature into a (rhetorical) question, answer, questioning of the reason, and answer to that question: p. 86;
4. agrees about the meaning of "permanent, permanent time" and everlasting, everlasting time" as former time and later time, respectively: "the Chinese Great Commentary," p. 98;
5. refines Wonch'uk's resolution of an apparent conflict between the Sūtra

likely that by using the nomenclature of "the Chinese Great Commentary" (rgya nag gi 'grel chen; 78/370, 98/381, 101/382, 123/388, 126/389), he intends to distinguish Wonch'uk's commentary from another long commentary extant in Tibetan (for discussion of its authorship see appendix 1, p. 453ff.). Đöng-ka-że cites this commentary only once, in order to refute it (see p. 156). Đöng-ka-že does not cite Jñānagarbha's commentary (Peking 5535, vol. 109), which is only on the eighth chapter, nor does he mention a short one attributed to Asaniga (Peking 5481, vol. 104). His attention is clearly on Wonch'uk's text.

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*  'grel pa rnams; 80/370.
  b 86/373 and 118/387.
  c See below, p. 54ff.
  d rang gi mshan nying, svalakṣaṇa.
  e tha dād pa, nānātva.
  f du ma, anekatva.
  g Đöng-ka-że copies Wonch'uk's structuring (Peking 5517, vol. 116, 130.5.4ff).
  h rag pa rig pa'i dū.
  i ther zug ther zug gi dū.
Unraveling the Thought and Asaṅga’s Summary of Manifest Knowledge: “the Chinese Great Commentary,” p. 101;
6. implicitly refines (that is, abbreviates) Wonch’uk’s outline of a sūtra passage: p. 118;
7. refines Wonch’uk’s presentation of the four qualities of the first wheel of doctrine: “Wonch’uk,” p. 119;
8. praises Wonch’uk’s translation of a term in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought (this being “in a non-manifest manner” in place of “through the aspect of speaking on emptiness”) but refines the meaning: “the Chinese Great Commentary,” p. 123;
9. disagrees with Wonch’uk for merely saying the four qualities of the middle wheel are so “in relation to the third wheel” and suggests that Wonch’uk should have criticized Paramārtha’s explanation: “Tripitaka Wonch’uk,” p. 123;
10. laconically faults the first part of Wonch’uk’s twofold interpretation of the second of the four qualities of the third wheel of doctrine: “Wonch’uk,” p. 125; and
11. refines Wonch’uk’s nomenclature for the three wheels of doctrine, agreeing that the first wheel is to be called “the wheel of doctrine of the four truths” and that the second is to be called “the wheel of doctrine of no character,” but not agreeing that the third is to be called “the wheel of the ultimate, the definitive”; Dzong-ka-ba insists on “the wheel of good differentiation”: “the Chinese Great Commentary,” p. 126.

Also, it is highly likely that through Wonch’uk’s text Dzong-ka-ba became aware of the scholarship of Bodhiruci, Dharamāśā, Paramārtha, and Hsüan-tsang, all of whom the Tibetan scholar mentions in his separate presentation of the mind-basis-of-all and afflicted intellect, written in his twenties.9

Ernst Steinkellner10 cogently speculates that the Tibetan technique of employing elaborate sectioning and subsectioning of texts may stem from similarly elaborate sectioning in Wonch’uk’s commentary. If this is so, Wonch’uk also gave rise to a predominant style of scholarly organization in Tibetan texts that was employed to greater and lesser degrees by scholars in all of the major sects. In any case, through his extensive and erudite commentary on the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought Wonch’uk served to stimulate Dzong-ka-ba (and perhaps others who preceded him)6 and thereby the various Ge-luk-ba traditions that de-

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9 Extensive Commentary on the Difficult Points of the Mind-Basis-of-All and Afflicted Intellect: Ocean of Eloquence (yid duṅ kun gebz’i dka’ ba’i gnas rgya cher grel pa legs par byod pa’i rgya msho). See the excellent translation by Gareth Sparham in collaboration with Shōtarō Iida, Ocean of Eloquence: Tsong kha pa’i Commentary on the Yogācāra Doctrine of Mind (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1993). In that text, Dzong-ka-ba cites Wonch’uk with regard to the history of Great Vehicle masters (pp. 48-49) and the number of consciousnesses asserted by Mind-Only masters (pp. 153-156).

10 Research is needed to determine this.
veloped in the vast Tibetan cultural region. It is clear from the tone of these scholars’ comments that they admired Wonch’uk’s intelligence and erudition.

Šhay-rap-gyel-tsen’s Innovative Syncretism

The situation is far more complicated with Đong-ka-ba’s near contemporary Döl-bo-ba Šhay-rap-gyel-tsen, one of the most influential figures of fourteenth-century Tibet—so influential that much of the Mind-Only section of The Essence of Eloquence is framed as a rebuttal to his views.4 As Cyrus Stearns says:

Without question, the teachings and writing of Dol po pa, who was also known as “The Buddha from Dol po” (Dol po sangs rgyas), and “The Omniscient One from Dol po who Embodies the Buddhas of the Three Times” (Dus gsam sangs rgyas kun mkhyen dol po pa), contain the most controversial and stunning ideas ever presented by a great Tibetan Buddhist master. The controversies which stemmed from his teachings are still very much alive today among Tibetan Buddhists, more than 600 years after Dol po pa’s death.

Šhay-rap-gyel-tsen was born in 1292 in a family that practiced tantric rites of the Nying-ma order.5 After receiving tantric initiation at the age of five, he had a vision of Red Mañjuśrī, and subsequently his intelligence burgeoned. At twelve he was ordained and at seventeen fled, against his parents’ will, to study with Gyi-dön Jam-yang-drak-ba-gyel-tsen in Mustang, where, in a month, he learned the doctrinal language of the (1) path-structure studies associated with the Perfection of Wisdom teachings, (2) epistemology and logic, and (3) phenomenology.6 His new teacher was called to Ša-gya, then the greatest learning

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4 Wel-mang Gön-chok-gyel-tsen’s Notes on (Gön-chok-jik-may-ùang-bo’s) Lectures (399.3) states that Šhay-rap-gyel-tsen is Đong-ka-ba’s main opponent in The Essence of Eloquence.


6 skyi ston ’jam dbyangs grags pa rgyal mthban.

7 chos skad.

8 tshad ma, pramāṇa.

9 chos mngon pa, abhidharma.
center in Tibet, and two years later Šhay-rap-gyel-tsen joined him, where he continued studies on the three above-mentioned topics, as well as Shāntideva’s Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds—simultaneously mastering them in a year and half.

From his master Ġyi-dön he also received teachings on the Kālachakra Tantra and related sūtras and commentaries that shaped his practice and teachings. After receiving many other teachings, when he was twenty-one his parents, “who had now forgiven him for running away,” made an offering for his own first teaching—this being on the Perfection of Wisdom, epistemology and logic, phenomenology, and discipline. “His teachings were received with unprecedented acclaim, although some criticized him for teaching too many texts at once.” At the age of twenty-two, while making a tour of western and central Tibet to learn at other institutions, he first came to be called “Omniscient,” an epithet that even his opponents still use. As Stearns says about the his extremely broad learning and about the importance of Ġyi-dön Jam-γyang-drak-ba-gyel-tsen to him:

Up until the age of twenty-nine (1321) he had studied with more than thirty teachers, the most important of whom, Skyi ston 'Jam dbyangs Grags pa rgyal mtshan, had bestowed upon him some seventy initiations and teachings.

At twenty-nine in 1321, however, he was completely humbled when he visited the monastery of Jo-nang and saw “that every man and woman who was seriously practicing meditation had realized the nature of reality through meditation.”

In 1322 he returned to Jo-nang, where he received in-depth instruction on the Kālachakra Tantra and entered into retreat. During a second retreat for one year (or two or three, depending on the account), he realized the first four branches of the six-branched yoga of the Kālachakra system—individual withdrawal, concentration, stopping-vitality, retention, subsequent mindfulness, and meditative stabilization. Stearns says (brackets mine):

On the basis of both pratīyāhāra [withdrawal] and dhyāna [concentration], he beheld immeasurable figures of the Buddhas and pure lands.

On the basis of prāṇāyāma [stopping-vitality] and dhāranā [retention], exceptional experience and realization was born due to the blazing of blissful warmth.

During this retreat Šhay-rap-gyel-tsen realized the view of “other-emptiness” (which Đzong-ka-ba seeks so strongly to refute in The Essence of Eloquence) but did not speak about it for several years.

In 1326 he was installed as the head of the Jo-nang Monastery and in 1327 began work on a gigantic monument—the Glorious Stūpa of the Constella-
tions—which was completed in 1333, restored by Tāranātha in 1621, and recently refurbished in 1990. Either during or after the building of the stūpa, for the first time he taught that conventional phenomena are self-empty, in the sense that they lack any self-nature, whereas the ultimate is other-empty, in the sense that it is empty of the relative but has its own self-nature. This latter realization Shay-rap-gyal-tsen himself stated to be previously unknown in Tibet and spoke of it this way:66

I bow in homage to the gurus, buddhas and kalkis by whose kindness the essential points which are difficult for even the exalted ones to realize are precisely realized, and to their great stūpa.b

During this period Shay-rap-gyal-tsen wrote and taught a great deal, while also working on the monument. Even “his magnum opus [The Mountain Doctrine: Ocean of Definitive Meaning]” was completed well before the final consecration of the stūpa on October 30, 1333.67

His view of “other-emptiness,” based largely on his profound understanding of the Kālachakra Tantra and commentary by Kalki Puṇḍarika and bolstered by the Lion’s Roar of Shrīmālādevī Sūtra, and so forth, was received (soon thereafter or after a passage of time, according to different accounts) with amazement and shock. However, he also was highly lauded and received great offerings from exalted figures of the day, among whom he indeed was one of the greatest. He gave teachings sometimes to thousands of persons and at other times to the luminaries of his period. He was invited, along with Bu-dōn Rinchen-drup—a another great master of Kālachakra—to China by the Yüan dynasty (Mongolian) Emperor Toghon Temūr. Neither of them went, and to

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a dpal ldan rgyu skar gi mchod rten.
b In his promise to compose The Essence of Eloquence Dzong-ka-ba (p. 68) similarly says that his realization of the view is special:

Many who had much hearing of the great texts,
Who worked with much weariness also at the path of reasoning,
And who were not low in accumulation of the good qualities of clear realization
Worked hard at but did not realize this topic which,

Having perceived it well through the kindness of the smooth protector and guru [Mahījushri],
I will explain with an attitude of great mercy.

The similarities may not be coincidental.
c ri chos nges don rgya mtsho (Gangtok, Sikkim: Dodrup Sangye Lama, 1976).

* bu ston rin chen grub, 1290-1364.
avoid the emperor's displeasure Šhay-rap-gyel-tsen "stayed in different isolated areas for four years."  

Concerned about the damage to religious centers and so forth that ensued from a protracted power struggle, Šhay-rap-gyel-tsen decided "to travel to Lha-sa and make prayers to the Jo bo image there, which he felt to be the same as the Buddha himself."  

Dol po pa had become increasingly disturbed by the extensive damage to the Buddhist communities, temples, and shrines in Tibet due to the great political turmoil that had swept through the land during the protracted power struggle between the Sa skya pa in Gtsang [the western province of Tibet] and the newly arisen Phag mo gru in Dbus [Central Tibet].

Thus, in 1358, at the age of sixty-six, he departed from Jo-nang. Along the way, he gave teachings to the Fifteenth Patriarch of Sa-gya, Sö-nam-gyel-tsen, a who requested that he compose The Great Calculation of the Doctrine, Which Has the Significance of a Fourth Council; along with his own commentary, Šhay-rap-gyel-tsen audaciously entitled his work this way because he considered this doctrine to be a presentation suitable to be likened to an addition to the famous three councils in India.

He also gave lectures "that were often so large that people at the edges could not hear the teaching, so it had to be relayed through an interpreter." In the Hla-śa area he was thronged with teachers and others requesting teachings, to the point where "There were so many people listening to the teachings that doors were broken and stairways collapsed."  

After six months, when leaving Hla-śa to return to Jo-nang, he was thronged by believers and, again, along the way he taught huge crowds and received the praise of monastic leaders. When he stopped in Sha-lu to debate with Bu-dön, the latter sought to avoid the confrontation, but when Šhay-rap-gyel-tsen nevertheless made "the opening exclamation for debate (thal 'ikad), the force...produced a crack in the wall of Bu-ston's residence."  

In the eleventh month of mouse year (the end of 1360), Šhay-rap-gyel-tsen gave a teaching on his Ocean of Definitive Meaning and the next day passed away in deep meditation.

When the corpse was offered into the fire, the smoke rose up only about the length of a spear, then went to the stūpa like a streaking arrow, circled it many times, and finally disappeared to the west.

After the crematorium was opened, many clear, crystal-like formations appeared among the ashes, and "ashes from the cremation were gathered and put

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\a bsd med byams mtha\_han.
\b bkis 'kri ba\_i don byas rtis chen po.
\c zha lu.
along with other relics into an image of Dol po pa that was in the great stūpa he had built.”

Less than fifteen years after Shay-rap-gyel-ten's death, the influential Śa-gya scholar Ren-da-wa Shōn-nu-lo-drō (1348-1413), who became Dzong-ka-ba’s chief teacher, raised strong objections to Shay-rap-gyel-ten’s teachings, even refuting “the validity of the Kalachakra Tantra.” Dzong-ka-ba similarly disagreed strongly with Shay-rap-gyel-ten’s doctrine of “other-emptiness” but, along with a vast number of opinions that differed from those of Ren-da-wa, did accept the Kalachakra Tantra, as is evidenced by the fact that both of his foremost students wrote texts on the Kalachakra system and several of his students wrote short essays of notes on his teachings on this system.

Shay-rap-gyel-ten developed a new doctrinal language through an amalgamation of the classical texts of the Mind-Only and Middle Way systems into a Great Middle Way, and he also intertwined the particular vocabulary of the Kalachakra system. As he says:

Tantras should be understood by means of other tantras.
Sūtras should be understood by means of other sūtras.
Sūtras should also be understood by means of the tantras.
Tantras should also be understood by means of the sūtras.
Both should be understood by means of both.

In what are usually considered the classical texts of separate systems, he saw presentations of multiple systems crowned by the Great Middle Way. For instance, he considered separate passages of the sūtra Unraveling the Thought, usually considered to be Mind-Only, to present the views of Mind-Only and the Great Middle Way, the latter being concordant with Ultimate Mind-Only, or Supramundane Mind-Only, which is beyond consciousness. In his Ocean of Definitive Meaning, he takes the following passage from chapter 9 of the sūtra Unraveling the Thought to evince the view of the Great Middle Way:

That which brings about definite emergence [from obstructions] by means of the middle path upon having abandoned the extreme of superimposition and the extreme of deprecation is their wisdom. Moreover, by way of that wisdom they thoroughly and correctly know also, just as it is, the meaning of the doors of liberation with respect to the

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a Among these are three texts on the six-branched yoga, and so forth: one very short (Peking 6058), another fairly short (6206), and one a bit longer (6168).
b dbu ma chen po.
c He attacks the notion that sūtra Unraveling the Thought has merely a Mind-Only perspective (Ocean of Definitive Meaning, 205.2ff.)
d don dam pa'i sems tsum: ibid., 213.1. Also, “Final Mind-Only” (mthar thug gi sems tsum: ibid., 213.4).
e 'jig rten las 'das pa'i sams tsum: ibid., 213.6.
f rnam shes las 'das pa: ibid., 213.2.
three doors of liberation—emptiness, wishlessness, and signlessness. They also thoroughly and correctly know, just as it is, the meaning of the natures with respect to the three natures—imputational, other-powered, and thoroughly established.

Not just in sūtras and tantra but also in Indian treatises—usually taken to be strictly Mind-Only—he found passages teaching Mind-Only but others teaching the Great Middle Way.

Thus Šhay-rap-gyel-tsen’s synthesis was by no means a collage drawing a little from here and a little from there and disregarding the rest. Rather, he had a comprehensive, thorough, and overarching perspective born from careful analysis. For him, others had just not seen what the texts themselves were saying and, instead of that, read into the classical texts the views of single systems. For instance, he says that the mere fact that the three natures and the eight collections of consciousness are taught in Maitreya’s *Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes* does not make it a Mind-Only text, since these are also taught in sūtras and tantras of the Great Middle Way. He adds:

Moreover, the meaning of the statement in Maitreya’s *Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes*, “All are just name-only,” contradicts the view of the Proponents of Mind-Only.

He quotes many sūtras to the same end:

The *Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra* says that, for the time being, one is taught mind-only, but finally having thoroughly passed beyond that, one is taught the middle without appearance, and that having also passed beyond this, one is taught the middle with appearance and that if one does not arrive at that, one has not seen the profound meaning of the Great Vehicle. It says:

Relying on mind-only,
One does not imagine external objects.
Relying on non-appearance,
One passes beyond mind-only.
Relying on observing reality,
One passes beyond non-appearance.
If yogis dwell in non-appearance,
They do not perceive the Great Vehicle.

In this way, Šhay-rap-gyel-tsen’s perspective was syncretic, in that he drew from a great variety of sūtras, tantras, and treatises. It was synthetic perhaps only in the sense that he found within these an exposition of a view beyond the traditional schools. It was not a mere putting together of pieces from here and there.

He also criticized the then (and still) popular notion that recognition of
conceptions themselves as the Truth Body of a Buddha “would alone bring about enlightenment,” without requiring abandonment of any misconceptions. He complains:44

These days the majority maintains that this very mind itself [samsāra] is dharmakāya, self-arisen pristine awareness, and mahāmudrā, and many maintain that the concepts are dharmakāya, the afflicting emotions are pristine awareness, samsāra and nirvāṇa are indivisible.

Indeed, the works of Shay-rap-gyel-tsen’s contemporary, the Nying-ma master Long-chen-rap-jam, are replete with such statements. For instance, in his Precious Treasury of Tenets: Illuminating the Meaning of All Vehicles, Long-chen-rap-jam says:

On the path of the Definition Vehicle one finally becomes tired and exhausted by the asceticism of abandoning [non-virtues] and adopting [virtues]. However, in Mantra everything shines as a help-mate, and thus entities to be abandoned and entities to be adopted are naturally pure.45

In Mantra the secrecy of mind is that memories and thought dawn as the sport of reality, whereby the mind shines as self-illuminating self-arisen pristine wisdom.46

Since afflicting emotions are naturally purified without abandoning them, the two collections are amassed quickly and completed; thereby, liberation is achieved in one lifetime.47

Shay-rap-gyel-tsen considered such teachings to be the secret work of devils.48 Thus he was bucking two popular trends—(1) separation of the classical texts of the Great Vehicle into isolated systems and of sūtra and tantra into isolated camps and (2) reduction of the final path to self-recognition of basic mind.

Dzong-ka-ba reacted to Shay-rap-gyel-tsen’s dynamic synthesis with his own analysis of the classical texts that yielded evidence opposing such an amalgamation. To make this point, he emphasized philosophical controversies between schools that are evident in these texts, thereby evolving his own synthesis. Based on this, he considered Shay-rap-gyel-tsen’s positing of Mind-Only, Middle Way, and Great Middle Way to be unfounded. This appears to be the chief impetus behind his writing a text under the rubric not of intertwining texts but

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a chos sku, dharmakāya.
b For a clear and concise exposition of this position, see Stearns, The Buddha from Dol po, 151-156; also 171-174.
c For an excellent study of doctrines of enlightenment through seeing basic mind, see David Jackson, Enlightenment by a Single Means (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1994).
d klong chen rab 'byams, 1308-1363.
of distinguishing them and entitling it *Treatise Differentiating Interpretable and
Definitive Meanings: The Essence of Eloquence*—even the name of which I see as
being in response to Shay-rap-gyel-tsen's magnum opus, entitled *The Mountain
Doctrine: Ocean of Definitive Meaning*. Dzong-ka-ba's sense that the separate-
ness of many texts needed to be emphasized is understood only in the context
of his reaction to Shay-rap-gyel-tsen's synthesis. Still, the vast amount of dis-
tinctions that he had to make in order to "find" his own grand overview of
these systems indicates that his perspective is, in its own way, just as creative,
synthetic, and synthetic.

The overall structure of the Mind-Only section of *The Essence of Eloquence*
and the relationship of each part to Shay-rap-gyel-tsen's views is:

- to show how the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* presents the ultimate as a
  mere absence and thus to undermine Shay-rap-gyel-tsen's view that the ul-
timate is positive;
- to demonstrate how the founder of the Mind-Only system, the fourth-
century north Indian sage Asaṅga, relied primarily on the *Sūtra Unravel-
ing the Thought* and thus to undercut Shay-rap-gyel-tsen's notions that Asaṅ-
ga's texts could differ from the presentations in this sūtra;
- to detail the objections—found in chief works by Asaṅga—to doctrines of
  the Middle Way School and thereby to refute Shay-rap-gyel-tsen's attempt
to amalgamate parts of the classical texts by Asaṅga—that are usually rec-
ognized as of the Mind-Only School—with classical texts of the Middle
Way School to form a Great Middle Way;
- to show how texts by Maitreya and Indian scholars, which are prevalently
  recognized as Mind-Only, accord with presentations in the *Sūtra Unravel-
ing the Thought* and in those works by Asaṅga and thereby further to un-
dercut Shay-rap-gyel-tsen's finding multiple systems in their texts; and
- to present how the truth behind false superimpositions contrary to the na-
ture of phenomena is realized through opposing misconceptions about the
status of phenomena and thereby to counter Shay-rap-gyel-tsen's depiction
of manifesting a positive ultimate.\footnote{These "refutations" are discussed in the corre-
spending footnotes, the Synopsis, and *Reflections on Reality*, chap. 17.}

There are ten major refutations that fall into three categories:

1. Pointing out the contradiction that Shay-rap-gyel-tsen asserts that the
   *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* is definitive but does not follow its teaching

\footnote{He did not do this for all texts. For instance, he considered Maitreya's *Ornament for
Clear Realization* to contain passages that represent the opinions of the Consequence School
subdivision of the Middle Way School and others that represent the views of the Autonomy
School subdivision. See Tsong-ka-pa, Kensur Lekden, and Jeffrey Hopkins, *Compassion in
that the thoroughly established nature is a mere absence, a mere negative, and, instead of that, asserts that the final reality is positive: p. 92

2. Pointing out the contradiction that the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought speaks of the thoroughly established nature as other-powered natures' emptiness of the imputational nature, but Shay-rap-gyel-tsen turns this around and, instead of that, holds that the thoroughly established nature is empty of other-powered natures and imputational natures. This involves the assertion that other-powered natures and imputational natures are self-empty but that the thoroughly established nature is other-empty as well as the correlate assertion that all conventional phenomena are only fancied by a mistaken mind and are not established in the slightest whereas the final reality is truly established: pp. 108, 109, 129, 186, 188, 188, 226

3. Pointing out Shay-rap-gyel-tsen's mistake of concluding that when the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought says that the third wheel of doctrine is definitive, it means that all sutras taught during the third period of Buddha's teaching are definitive, including those propounding that a Buddha is already present in the continuums of each being: pp. 129, 130

In sum, throughout the section on Mind-Only in The Essence of Eloquence Đong-ka-ba, without mentioning Shay-rap-gyel-tsen's name, seeks to refute his positions on the nature of reality and thus his differentiation of which scriptures require interpretation and which are definitive. In the process, Đong-ka-ba's own views on the Mind-Only School's description of emptiness and the stages of affliction and release become clear.
PART TWO:

ANNOTATED TRANSLATION

Đzong-ka-ba Lo-sang-drak-ba’s
*Treatise Differentiating Interpretable and Definitive Meanings:*
*The Essence of Eloquence*

Prologue and Section on the Mind-Only School
Remarks

The reader may find it helpful to read the corresponding section in the Synopsis before reading the Translation; thus throughout the Translation there are cross-references to the Synopsis that are indicated by page numbers in parentheses. There are also cross-references to the Text that are indicated by page numbers in curly brackets (braces).

The two section titles and the twelve chapter titles have been added, closely following Đong-ka-ba’s own outline. Many subsections are given in square brackets, drawn from the commentaries; the purpose of these is merely to announce shifts of topic. Thus I have not tried to keep strict rules of subdividing, since a complete rendering would be overbearing.

References to texts are given in the backnotes, whereas other information, more pertinent to the reading of the translation, is given in the footnotes. Footnote references in italics indicate that the note includes a linkage to a chapter in Reflections on Reality or an issue treated in Absorption in No External World.

Seventeen Tibetan commentaries on Đong-ka-ba’s The Essence of Eloquence are cited in the notes. These are listed below alphabetically by author’s name with the shorter title used in the notes, the author’s dates, the largest Tibetan colleges using the text (if applicable), and the full translated title of the text (for the Tibetan title, and other information, see the bibliography).

- A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso’s Precious Lamp (Gung-tang Lo-drö-gya-tso; 1851-1930): Dre-bung Go-mang and Dra-shi-kyil
  Commentary on the Difficult Points of (Đong-ka-ba’s) “Treatise Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive Meanings, The Essence of Eloquence”: A Precious Lamp

- Bel-jor-hlun-drup’s Lamp for the Teaching (1427-1514): Že-ra Jay
  Commentary on the Difficult Points of (Đong-ka-ba’s) “The Essence of Eloquence”: Lamp for the Teaching

- Đa-drin-rap-đen’s Annotations (1920-1986): Že-ra Jay
  Annotations for the Difficult Points of (Đong-ka-ba’s) “The Essence of Eloquence”: Festival for the Unbiased Endowed with Clear Intelligence

- Dön-drup-gyal-tsen’s Four Intertwined Commentaries (fl. late eighteenth and early nineteenth century): Dre-bung Go-mang and Dra-shi-kyil
• Dra-di Ge-shay Rin-chen-dön-drup’s *Ornament for the Thought* (fl. mid-seventeenth century): Sé-ra Jay
  *Ornament for the Thought* of (Dzong-ka-ňa’s) “Interpretable and Definitive: The Essence of Eloquence”

• Gung-ru Chö-jung’s *Garland of White Lotuses* (fl. most likely in the sixteenth century since he refutes positions like those of Pan-chen Sö-nam-drak-ňa and Jay-dzün Chö-gyi-gyel-ten): Dre-bung Go-mang and Dra-shi-kyil
  *Decisive Analysis of (Dzong-ka-ňa’s) “Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive, The Essence of Eloquence”: Garland of White Lotuses*

• Gung-tang’s *Annotations* (Gung-tang Gü-n-chok-den-bay-drön-may, 1762-1823): Dre-bung Go-mang and Dra-shi-kyil
  *Beginnings of Annotations on (Dzong-ka-ňa’s) “The Essence of Eloquence” on the Topic of Mind-Only: Illumination of a Hundred Mind-Only Texts*

• Gung-tang’s *Difficult Points* (Gung-tang Gü-n-chok-den-bay-drön-may, 1762-1823): Dre-bung Go-mang and Dra-shi-kyil

• Jam-ňaŋ-shay-ňa’s *Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive* (Jam-ňaŋ-shay-ňa Nga-wang-dzön-drü, 1648-1722): Dre-bung Go-mang and Dra-shi-kyil
  *Decisive Analysis of (Dzong-ka-ňa’s) “Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive”: Storehouse of White Lapis-Lazuli of Scripture and Reasoning Free from Error: Fulfiling the Hopes of the Fortunate*

  *General Meaning of (Dzong-ka-ňa’s) “Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive”. Eradicating Bad Disputation: A Precious Garland*

• Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s *Port of Entry* (1898-1946)
  *Treatise Distinguishing All the Meanings of (Dzong-ka-ňa’s) “The Essence of Eloquence,” Illuminating the Differentiation of the Interpretable and the Definitive: Port of Entry to “The Essence of Eloquence”*

• Ke-drup’s *Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate* (Ke-drup-ge-lek-bel-sang, 1385-1438): used by all colleges
  *Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate: Treatise Brilliantly Clarifying the Profound Emptiness*
• Lo-sang-wang-chuk’s *Notes* (1901-1979): Še-ra Jay
  Notes on (Dzong-ka-ba’s) “Interpretative and Definitive, The Essence of Eloquence”: Lamp for the Intelligent

• Pan-chen Sö-nam-drak-ba’s *Garland of Blue Lotuses* (1478-1554): Dre-bung Lo-šel-ling and Gan-den Šhar-dzay
  Distinguishing through Objections and Answers (Dzong-ka-ba’s) “Differentiating the Interpretative and Definitive Meanings of All the Scriptures, The Essence of Eloquence”: Garland of Blue Lotuses

• Second Dalai Lama’s *Lamp Illuminating the Meaning* (Gen-dün-gya-tso, 1476-1542): used by all colleges
  Commentary on the Difficult Points of “Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive” from the Collected Works of the Foremost Holy Omniscient [Dzong-ka-ba]: Lamp Thoroughly Illuminating the Meaning of his Thought

• Šer-šül’s *Notes* (Šer-šül Ge-šhay Lo-sang-puṅ-tsok, fl. in early twentieth century): Še-ra Jay
  Notes on (Dzong-ka-ba’s) “Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive”: Lamp Illuminating the Profound Meaning

• Wel-mang Gön-chok-gyel-tsen’s *Notes* on (Gön-chok-jik-may-wang-po’s) Lectures (1764-1853): Go-mang tradition
  Notes on (Gön-chok-jik-may-wang-po’s) Lectures on (Dzong-ka-ba’s) “The Essence of Eloquence”: Stream of the Speech of the Omniscient: Offering for Purification

It would be gullible to hold that the commentaries present all of Dzong-ka-ba’s meaning, just as it would be arrogant to hold that they present none of it. In this translation, my intention is to provide a plethora of clearly marked annotations to show how various Tibetan and Mongolian scholars attempted to pry open Dzong-ka-ba’s often cryptic but much-lauded text on the final nature of phenomena.
TREATISE DIFFERENTIATING INTERPRETABLE AND DEFINITIVE MEANINGS: THE ESSENCE OF ELOQUENCE

* See Absorption, #1-3.
Prologue

Nama guro mañjuḥoṣṭya (Homage to guru Mañjusri). *

[Expression of Worship to the Teacher, Šākyamuni Buddha] *

(251) [363]

Homage to the Lord of Subduers, śīṣṭa god of gods,
As soon as whose body was seen by those
High-and-mighty with presumptions proclaiming
In the mundane world a great roar of arrogance —

[The gods known as] Bliss-Arising, Cloud Mount, Golden Womb,
Bodiless Lord, Garlanded Belly, and so on —

a See Reflections on Reality, chap. 5. Mañjuṣṭha, or Mañjuśri, is the physical manifestation of the compassion of all Buddhas.

b Bel-jor-hlun-drup’s Lamp for the Teaching. 4.6. See Reflections on Reality, chap. 5.

c thub dbang, munindra. Buddhaghūṭa (sangs rgyas gnyan ho) explains that the term muni (thub pa) means that the person has restrained body, speech, and mind (las las sogs pa sdam pa ni thub pa zhes bya d); see his Commentary on the “Concentration Continuation Tantra” (bsam gyan phyi ma rim par phyé ba rgya cher bshad pa, dhyānāturalālātā), Peking 3495, vol. 78, 70.1.5. Tibetan oral traditions also take thub pa as referring to one who has overcome the enemy that is the afflictive emotions. Many translators render muni as “sage,” but I choose “subduer” because it conveys the sense of conquest that the term has in Tibetan, for thub pa means “able,” with a sense of being able to overcome someone else. (Śākya, the name of this Buddha’s clan, also means “able” or “potent,” this probably being the reason why the name Šākyamuni was translated into Tibetan as śākya thub pa, with the first part of the compound in transliterated Sanskrit and the second in Tibetan.) The term dbang po (indra) means “supreme one,” “powerful one,” “lord,” and more loosely “king”; Šākyamuni is depicted as the supreme among Subduers.

d Lo-sang-wang-chuk (Notes, 84.9) finds possible references to the triad of body, speech, and mind; he takes:

• “high-and-mighty” (gying) as referring to a physical quality (probably since the term can refer to a lion’s manner of sitting);
• “roar” (nga ra) as referring to a quality of speech, and
• “presumptions” (rim po) and “arrogance” (dreg pa) as referring to a quality of mind.

"Bliss-Arising" (bde 'byung, śambhā) is also known as maheśvara or isva. Gung-tang (Difficult Points, 3.14, 4.11) reports that Maheśvara (Great Lord) is called "Bliss-Arising" not because he himself becomes blissful in dependence upon the goddess Uma but because his body is so supremely satisfying that when others see it, all virtues, including liberation, as well as temporary happiness arise. This is why Maheśvara is called a source of joy.

Gung-tang is refuting the first part of a dual explanation by Bel-jor-hlun-drup (Lamp for the Teaching, 5.1) who says:

Ishvara is called Bliss-Arising because bliss arose in him in dependence upon the goddess Uma. Or, in another way, it is also suitable to take this in accordance with the explanation that he is so called because he has a supremely satisfying body.
Even they became like fireflies [overwhelmed] by the sun and thereupon
Paid respect with their beautiful crowns to his lotus feet.

**[Expression of Worship to the Upholders of the Teaching]**
Respectful homage to Māñjughoṣha and the Regent [Maitreya], great like oceans—
The depth of whose wisdom and mercy is very hard to fathom,*
Whose great waves of Bodhisattva deeds ripple widely,**

Gung-tang prefers the latter explanation and adds more detail.

"Cloud Mount" *(sprin la zhon, meghavāhana)* is also known as *indra or lākra*. Gung-tang *(Difficult Points, 5.5)* reports that Shakra is called "Cloud Mount" because of being mounted on an elephant that, like a cloud, is very large and moves about gently, with magnificent bearing.

"Golden Womb" *(yar gyi mngal, hiranyakāra)* is also known as *brahmā*. Gung-tang *(Difficult Points, 5.10)* reports that Brahmā was born from a golden lotus in the shape of an egg in the midst of a sphere of fire; the egg arose from water, the two halves of which, when they split, became the sky and the earth. See *Absorption*, #6 and 7.

"Bodiless Lord" *(las med bsdag po, anangpaṅ)* is the God of Desire ('dod lha, kāmādeva), the demonic Lord of Love *(dga' rab dbang phyug)*. According to Gung-tang *(Difficult Points, 6.5)*, he shot his five arrows—which cause arrogance, dullness, thorough obscurcation, fainting, and mindlessness (Gung-tang gives various renditions of these five, 6.9-7.3)—while Maheshvara was dwelling in asceticism in union with the goddess Uma, thereby causing Maheshvara to fall from his practice. Understanding that this was done by a demon, Maheshvara angered and emitted fire from his third eye of fire—the other two being sun and moon—burning away the body of the Sinful Demon *(bdud phyag can, an epithet of the God of Desire)*, who thereby came to be called the "Bodiless Lord."

"Garlanded Belly" *(tha gu'i ldo, dāmodara)* is also known as *viṣṇu*. Gung-tang *(Difficult Points, 3.17)* reports that during his youth Viṣṇu wore a garland of flowers around his waist and that according to one story his wife wanted to put a garland of flowers around his head, but the garland reached only his waist, this being why he is called "Garlanded Belly."

* Gung-tang (ibid., 1.14.1-15.1) says that the words translated here as "depth" *(ging mtba)* can be taken in two ways—one as indicating the limit of the depth, meaning that the depth of both the wisdom and the mercy of Māñjughoṣha and Maitreya is difficult to fathom. However, in the other interpretation the two syllables are separated:

- Since Māñjughoṣha's wisdom is of one taste with the profound suchness, its depth *(ging)* is difficult to fathom
- Since Maitreya's mercy extends into the limitless *(mtba' yas pa)* techniques of altruism *(gshesan phan gyi thukh)*, its extent is difficult to comprehend

Gung-tang's exegesis, at first blush appearing to be overdone, reflects a long tradition of esthetic appreciation for creatively expounding on even single words in ways consonant with the topics of the text.

** Gung-tang (ibid., 1.14.6-14.14) takes "Bodhisattva deeds" as referring to Bodhisattvas' taking on the task of presently displaying—while still Bodhisattvas—the twelve deeds of a Buddha in order to help others. He cites Maitreya's *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras*, "Knowing the aspects of reaching the circle of a Buddha," and the sūtra passages (in the Per-
Those jewel treasures of eloquence.¹

I bow down with the top of my head to the feet
Of the honorable Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga who, like the sun, illumined
The supreme teaching of the Conquerors² for beings below, on, and
above the earth
Through opening well chariot-ways for the two modes³ of the script-
tures⁴ of the One Gone to Bliss.⁵

Respectful obeisance to the kings among scholars—

¹ According to Gung-tang (Difficult Points, 14.14-15.1), just as oceans are treasures of
jewels (pearls and so forth), so Mahāyāna and Maitreya are treasures of all the eloquence
of the Buddha, and, implicitly, this indicates that Dzong-ka-ba’s own eloquence has come in
stages transmitted from its source, the Buddha. Gung-tang says that through this illustration,
it is indicated that any true preceptual instruction must come through an unbroken trans-
mission of holy persons, like a river having its source in snow.

² Gung-tang (Difficult Points, 16.8) takes “supreme teaching of the Conquerors” (rgyal
ba’i bitan pa mchod) as referring to Buddha’s teaching in general but even more so to the
Great Vehicle of inseparable wisdom and method, since the profound emptiness and the vast
Bodhisattva deeds are, respectively, the transmissions (bka’ rab) of Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga.

³ Gung-tang (ibid., 15.17-16.8) takes “two modes” (tsheg gnyis) as referring to two differ-
ent great ways of positing what requires interpretation and what is definitive—as found in
the two systems of the Middle Way School and the Mind-Only School for commenting on
the final thought of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras. Jay-dzün Chö-ṣgyi-gyel-tsen’s General-
Meaning Commentary (3a.7) has a similar explanation.

⁴ gung rab, pravacana; more literally, “high sayings.” Rather than the written word, the
main field of reference of this term is the spoken word.

Gung-tang (Difficult Points, 15.1-15.17) explains that in this context of paying homage
to Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga for differentiating the interpretable and the definitive among Bud-
ha’s scriptures, this term refers to Buddha’s scriptures in general and mainly refers to the
Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras since not only the Proponents of the Middle but also the Pro-
ponents of Mind-Only hold the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras to be the chief of all sūtras. For
the Proponents of Mind-Only hold that the intended trainees of the Perfection of Wisdom
Sūtras are sharper than the intended trainees of the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought, since they
can understand the three natures and three non-natures just from hearing the Perfection of
Wisdom Sūtras, without having to rely on an explanation such as that given in the Sūtra
Unraveling the Thought.

The Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras are the treasury that is the basis for the differentiation
into what requires interpretation and what is definitive, whereas the Sūtra Unraveling the
Thought and the Sūtra of the Teachings of Akiṣhayamati are the keys to that treasury, in that
they show how to make the differentiation. Gung-tang therefore concludes that here “scrip-
tures” refers not to those two sūtras but to Buddha’s scriptures in general and mainly the
Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras.

⁵ bde gshogs, sugata; an epithet of Buddha.
Āryadeva, Shūra,\(^a\) Buddhapālita,
Bhāvaviveka, the honorable Chandrakirti,
The honorable Vasubandhu, Sthiramati, Dignāga,
The honorable Dharmakirti,\(^b\) and so forth—
Supreme of those holding the banner of the non-disappearance of the
Subduer’s teaching,
Those ornaments of Jambudvīpa\(^c\) who through assuming well the two
systems of the great openers of the chariot-ways
Opened the eyes of hundreds of hundred thousands\(^d\) of the world’s
clear-minded.

[Promise of Composition]\(^e\) (251) (364)
Many who had much hearing of the great texts,
Who worked with much weariness also at the path of reasoning,
And who were not low in accumulation of the good qualities of clear
realization
Worked hard at but did not realize this topic\(^f\) which,
Having perceived it well through the kindness of the smooth\(^g\) protector and guru [Mañjuśrī],
I will explain with an attitude of great mercy.

[Exhortation to Listen]\(^h\)
Listen intently, O you who wish to be unmatched proponents [of
doctrine]\(^i\)
With discriminating analysis realizing the suchness of the teaching.

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\(^a\) Tibetan scholars with whom I have worked identify Shūra (dpa’ bo) as Ashvaghosha; for references to controversy about such an identification, see David Seyfort Ruegg, *The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India* (Wiesbaden, Germany: Otto Harrassowitz, 1981), 119-121.

\(^b\) Of these eight scholars, the first five are the main upholders of the Middle Way School, and the last five, of the Mind-Only School; see Gung-tang, *Difficult Points*, 16.14. They are in chronological order within their respective groups.

\(^c\) ‘\text{\textit{dzam gling}} jambudvīpa. Jambudvīpa is the southern continent from among the four continents of this world system but now is taken as referring to this world.

\(^d\) bye ba. “ten millions”; the word has the sense of “countless.”

\(^e\) Bel-jo-hūn-drup’s *Lamp for the Teaching*, 7.2. See *Reflections on Reality*, chap. 5.

\(^f\) See *Absorption*, #4.

\(^g\) According to Śer-shül (Notes, 3a.6.3b.1), “smooth” (\textit{jam} mañju) indicates that Mañjuśrī is devoid of the roughness of the obstructions to liberation from cyclic existence and the roughness of the obstructions to omniscience. This is not the Bodhisattva Mañjuśrī but the one that is the physical manifestation of the wisdom of all Buddhas.

\(^h\) Bel-jo-hūn-drup’s *Lamp for the Teaching*, 4.5, 7.4. See *Absorption*, #5.

\(^i\) That is, Buddhas.
Prologue

[Indicating The Great Importance Of Differentiating Which Scriptures Require Interpretation And Which Are Definitive] (251) {365}

The Superior Sūtra of the Questions of Rādhapāla [contained in the Pile of Jewels Sūtra] says:¹

Due to being endowed with compassion,
Through hundreds of skillful means and reasonings
You cause transmigrating beings who wander due to not knowing
The modes of emptiness, quiescence, and no production
To enter [into understanding these three doors of liberation].²

Thus, it is said that the Compassionate Teacher—perceiving that the thusness of phenomena is very difficult to realize and that, if it is not realized, one [can]³ not be released from cyclic existence—brings about the thorough understanding of that [suchness] through many modes of skillful means and many approaches of reasoning.⁴ Therefore, those having discrimination must work at a

¹ 'phags pa yul 'khor skyon gi phyi pa zhe bya ha thog pa chen po'i mdo, āryaśrāpataparascchānāmamahāyānasūtra; Peking, 760, vol. 23, chap. 17. For Gung-tang’s identification of the sūtra and for the Sanskrit, see p. 365, footnote a.
² I translate de ba’hin nyid (sattata) as “thusness” and de nyid (sattva) or de kho na nyid (sattva) as “suchness.” That these are equivalent is clear from Jay-dzin Chö-ji-gyel-ten’s interchangeable usage of them in his General-Meaning Commentary (4b.1):

Those discriminating persons who seek release [from suffering] should strive at techniques for understanding just what the suchness (de kho na nyid) of phenomena is because it is said that our Teacher, endowed with compassion, upon perceiving that the thusness (de ba’hin nyid) of phenomena is very difficult to realize and that if it is not realized, one is not released—that is to say, cannot be released—from cyclic existence, causes trainees to understand suchness (de kho na nyid) thoroughly through many modes of skillful means, such as giving and so forth, and many approaches of reasoning, such as dependent-arising and the lack of being one or many.

(For Gung-tang’s different interpretation of “many modes of skillful means,” see the next footnote.) I translate another equivalent term, chos nyid (dharmata), as “real nature,” and another, yang dag (samyak), in a similar context as “reality.”
³ Gung-tang (Annotations, 9.5-9.6) identifies the “many modes of skillful means” as Buddha’s temporarily teaching merely a coarse form of selflessness and identifies the “approaches of reasoning” as the reasonings of dependent-arising and so forth used to establish the emptiness of inherent existence. In his Difficult Points (35.11), Gung-tang makes an important distinction between thabs (upāya) as compassion and thabs (upāya) as skillful means used to lead trainees by way of various techniques; he speaks from a tradition that distinguishes these two. It appears that in many Great Vehicle traditions, especially in East Asia, the two are conflated. See Reflections on Reality, chap. 9.
⁴ They are discriminative because they want liberation (Jay-dzin Chö-ji-gyel-ten’s General-Meaning Commentary, 4b.1; also, Da-drin-rap-den’s Annotations, 4.5).
technique for thoroughly understanding how suchness is.

Moreover, this depends upon differentiating those meanings that require interpretation and those that are definitive within the scriptures of the Conqueror.* Furthermore, the differentiation of those two cannot be done merely through scriptures that state, "This is a meaning to be interpreted; that is a meaning that is definitive." For, [Buddha spoke variably in relation to the thoughts of trainees and]† (1) otherwise the composition of commentaries on [Buddha’s] thought differentiating the interpretable and definitive by the great openers of the chariot-ways [Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga] would have been senseless; (2) also, scriptures [such as the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought and the Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra]* set forth many conflicting modes of positing the interpretable and the definitive; and (3) through scriptural passages merely saying [about a topic], "This is so," such cannot be posited, and if, then, in general it is not necessarily [suitable to accept whatever is indicated on the literal level in sūtras]," mere statements [in sūtra] of, "This is [interpretable, and that is definitive]," also cannot establish about specifics, the interpretable and the definitive, [that such is necessarily so]."

Therefore, one must seek [Buddha’s] thought, following the [two] great openers of the chariot-ways [Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga], who were prophesied as differentiating the interpretable and the definitive in [Buddha’s] scriptures and who commented on the thought of the interpretable and the definitive and, moreover, settled it well through reasoning that damages the interpretation of the meaning of definitive scriptures as anything else and establishes that, within their being unfit to be interpreted otherwise, [the final mode of subsistence]*

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* rgyal ba'i giung rab kyi drang ba dang nges pa'i don. Gung-tang makes a critical difference between giung rab kyi drang nges byed pa and giung rab la drang nges 'byed pa; I translate the former as "differentiating the interpretable and definitive within the scriptures" and the latter as "differentiating the interpretable and definitive with respect to the scriptures"; admittedly, the English is no clearer than the Tibetan. According to him (Difficult Points, 38.4), the former, "differentiating the interpretable and definitive within the scriptures," means to identify what are interpretable and what are definitive scriptures from among the scriptures (giung rab kyi nang nas drang don gyi giung rab dang nges don gyi giung rab gang yin so sor nges bsung ba la byed) whereas the latter "differentiating the interpretable and the definitive with respect to the scriptures," means to differentiate the interpretable and the definitive with respect to the meaning of the scriptures, this requiring extensive delineation of the presentation of the two truths, which itself requires realization of emptiness. Therefore, the latter cannot be required for realization of emptiness, whereas the former can. The latter is called (37.7) "differentiating the interpretable and the definitive on the level of the meaning that is expressed within the scriptures" (briod bya don gyi drang nges 'byed pa) whereas the former is called (38.5) "differentiating the interpretable and the definitive on the level of the words that are the means of expression" (rjod byed thig gi drang nges 'byed pa). See Reflections on Reality, chap. 9.

† That is, contradicts or invalidates.

c gnas lugs mthar thug. Among the many meanings of "subsistence," here it means "exis-
explained in them] is definite as [just] that meaning. Therefore, in the end, the differentiation [between the interpretable and the definitive] must be made just by stainless reasoning, because if a proponent asserts a tenet contradicting reason, [that person] is not suitable to be a valid being [with respect to that topic]\(^9\) and because the suchness of things also has reasoned proofs which are establishments by way of [logical] correctness.

It is from perceiving the import of this meaning [that differentiation of the interpretable and the definitive cannot be made by scripture alone and that reasoning is required,\(^{10}\) that Buddha] says:*

Like gold [that is acquired] upon being scorched, cut, and rubbed,
My word is to be adopted by monastics and scholars
Upon analyzing it well,
Not out of respect [for me].\(^6\)

Thus, with respect to differentiating the interpretable and the definitive, there are two parts: the position relying on the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought and the position relying on the Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra. The presentation of the position relying on the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought has two parts: stating what is said in the sūtra and exegesis of its meaning.

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* For the Sanskrit, see p. 367, footnote a. A goldsmith performs three operations on gold before acquiring it or taking it to be true gold. It is first scorched to test for telltale discolorations (bīregga, sāpa). Then it is cut; and finally it is rubbed to determine whether it leaves a gold-identifying streak.

The first step could not be, as some claim, that the gold is melted, since melting would reveal all internal impurities and thus the next step, cutting it, would not be needed. As a last step, it is rubbed most likely on a touchstone, since nīkaṇā (brda) also means "touchstone" and "a streak or line of gold made on a touchstone" (Vaman Shivaram Apte, Sanskrit-English Dictionary [Poona, India: Prasad Prakashan, 1957]).

\(^{6}\) See Reflections on Reality, chap. 6.
THE SŪTRA UNRAVELING THE THOUGHT
ON DIFFERENTIATING
THE INTERPRETABLE AND THE DEFINITIVE

With regard to stating what is said in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought (255) {368} about differentiating the interpretable and the definitive, there are four parts: a question about dispelling contradiction in the sūtras, the answer dispelling that contradiction, identifying the entities of the three natures, and [Paramārthasamudgata's] offering [to Buddha] the meaning established by these.
1. Questioning Apparent Contradiction

Question About Dispelling Contradiction In The Sūtras (257) {368}

[In the "Questions of Paramārthaśamudgata Chapter" of] the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought, [Paramārthaśamudgata] says:

The Bodhisattva Paramārthaśamudgata is questioning Buddha, the Supramundane Victor, about apparent contradictions in his teaching. Ďōzōng-kā-ba paraphrases and condenses the sūtra; the actual passage (Étienne Lamotte, Sandhinirmocanasūtra: L'Explication des mystères [Louvain: Université de Louvain, 1935], 65-66 [1], and 192-193; Dün-drup-gyel-ten’s Four Intertwined Commentaries, 4.2-6.2; and John C. Powers, Wisdom of Buddha: Sandhinirmocana Sūtra [Berkeley, Calif.: Dharma, 1995], 95) [the material in bold type has been condensed or omitted in Ďōzōng-kā-ba’s citation]:

Then, the Bodhisattva Paramārthaśamudgata asked the Supramundane Victor:

Supramundane Victor, when I was here alone in a solitary place, my mind generated the following qualm. The Supramundane Victor spoke, in many ways, of the own-character of the aggregates. He also spoke of [their] character of production, character of disintegration, abandonment, and thorough knowledge. Just as he did with respect to the aggregates, so he also spoke with respect to the sense spheres, dependent-arising, and the foods. The Supramundane Victor also spoke, in many ways, of the own-character of the truths as well as speaking of thorough knowledge, abandonment, actualization, and meditation. The Supramundane Victor also spoke, in many ways, of the own-character of the constituents, as well as speaking of the various constituents, manifold constituents, [their] abandonment, and thorough knowledge. The Supramundane Victor also spoke, in many ways, of the own-character of the four mindful establishments, as well as speaking of [their] classes of discorances, antidotes, meditation, production of that which has not been produced, the abiding of that which has been produced, non-loss, [their] arising again, and increasing and extending. Just as he did with respect to the mindful establishments, so he spoke with respect to the thorough abandonings, the legs of magical manifestation, the faculties, the powers, and the branches of enlightenment. The Supramundane Victor also spoke, in many ways, of the own-character of the eightfold path of Superiors, as well as speaking of [their] discorances, antidotes, production of that which has not been produced, the abiding of that which has been produced, recollection, [their] arising again, and increasing and extending.

Also, the Supramundane Victor said [in the middle wheel of the teaching], “All phenomena are natureless; all phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow.”
The Supramundane Victor[c] (initially) spoke, in many ways, of the own-character[d] of the aggregates [of forms, feelings, discriminations, compositional factors, and consciousnesses, these being that in which one travels in cyclic existence]. He also spoke of their character of production [through the force of contaminated actions and afflicting emotions],[e] their character of disintegration, abandonment of the contaminated actions and afflicting emotions that are the causes of the

Therefore, I am wondering of what the Supramundane Victor was thinking when he said, "All phenomena are natureless; all phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow." I ask the Supramundane Victor about the meaning of his saying, "All phenomena are natureless; all phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow."

Lamotte, in his translation into French (p. 192), divides these teachings into five groups in accordance with whether their features are explicitly mentioned—(1) the aggregates, the sense-spheres, the dependent-arising, and the foods; (2) the truths; (3) the constituents; (4) all of the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment, except the eightfold path of Superiors; and (5) the eightfold path of Superiors. It should be noted that this division is merely semantic, that is, based on whether their features are explicitly mentioned. A more meaningful division is into the seven categories themselves—(1) the aggregates, (2) the sense-spheres, (3) the dependent-arising, (4) the foods, (5) the truths, (6) the constituents, and (7) the harmonies with enlightenment.

Lamotte identifies the first mention of "constituents" as referring to the eighteen constituents; this accords with Wonch‘uk’s reading but not with Dzong-ka-ba’s. See Absorption, #16.

a  bcom ldan 'das, bhagavan. This term is translated in accordance with the etymology favored in Tibet, where it is recognized that bhagavan also can be etymologized as “one who possesses the six goodnesses” (leg na drug dang ldan pa), which seems to fit the more widely used translation as “Blessed One.” For Sanskrit sources, see the excellent note in Donald S. Lopez, The Heart Sūtra Explained (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1988), 196, no. 46.

b  rang gi mthun nyid, svalokana (Lamotte, Samdhinirmocana, 67 [1], n. 7). Ge-luk-ba scholars identify "own-character" as referring either to objects' establishment by way of their own character (rang gi mthun nyid kyi grub pa) or to establishment by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses (rang ’dzin rig pa'i zhen gshir rang gi mthun nyid kyi grub pa) or both.

Dzong-ka-ba identifies this "own-character" with the "character" that in Buddha’s answer is denied with respect to imputational natures and that unquestionably refers to their being established by way of their own character, since Buddha says in his answer:

Those [imputational characters] are characters posited by names and terminology and do not subsist by way of their own character. Therefore, they are said to be "character-non-natures."

See Absorption, #27-51 and the following conclusion on the topic.

c  See ibid., #13.
contaminated aggregates], and thorough knowledge [that the entities of the aggregates are like a disease or are not established as a substantially existent self]. Just as he did with respect to the aggregates, so he also spoke with respect to [the mode of suffering of] the sense-spheres [the six objects—visible forms, sounds, odors, tastes, tangible objects, and other phenomena—and the six senses—eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mental sense powers], dependent-arising, and the [four] foods [that is, morsels of food, contact, intention, and consciousness]. In a similar fashion, he also spoke of the own-character of the [four] truths; thorough knowledge [of true sufferings as impermanent and miserable], abandonment [of the sources of suffering, contaminated actions and afflictive emotions], actualization [of true cessations], and meditation [cultivating true paths, which are the means for attaining true cessation of suffering] as well as the own-character of the constituents, the various [eighteen] constituents, and manifold [six] constituents; their abandonment, and thorough knowledge as well as the own-character of the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment [which are the antidotes to those objects of abandonment, their] discordances [that is, what is to be abandoned], the antidotes [to those objects of abandonment], production of [virtues or antidotes] that have not been produced, the abiding of those that have been produced, non-loss [of antidotes that have been produced], their] arising again [when one has familiarized with them again and again], and increasing [those antidotes through the power of familiarity] and extending [them limitlessly].

Also, the Supramundane Victor said [in the middle wheel of the teaching], "All phenomena are natureless; all phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow."

Therefore, I am wondering of what the Supramundane Victor was

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*a* skye mchad, *āyatana*. I have, in other works, translated this term as "sources" since the six types of objects and the six sense powers are sources of consciousness. However, "sources" by itself is not evocative, and thus I have opted for "spheres," which strikes me as better than "fields" (often used by translators), because the term refers not just to the six objects but also to the six senses.

*b* See Absorption, #14.

*c* See ibid., #25.

*d* See ibid., #16.

*e* A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso (*Precious Lamp*, 53.4) explicitly identifies the "manifold" as the six.

*f* See Absorption, #17.

*g* See ibid., #18.

*h* See ibid., #10-12, 22.

*i* For the Sanskrit, see p. 369, footnote c. See ibid., #26.
thinking when he said [in the middle wheel of the teaching], "All phenomena are natureless; all phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow." I [explicitly] ask the Supramundane Victor about the meaning of his saying [in the middle wheel of the teaching], "All phenomena are natureless; all phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow."

This asks the following question:

If the statements in some sūtras [that is, in the middle wheel of the teaching] that all phenomena are natureless, and so forth, and the statements in some sūtras [in the first wheel of the teaching] that the aggregates and so forth have an own-character, and so forth, were left as they are verbally, they would be contradictory. However, since [the Supramundane Victor] must be without contradiction, of what were you [Buddha] thinking when [in the middle wheel of the teaching] you spoke of non-nature, and so forth?

Through that, [Paramārthaśamudgata] implicitly asks of what [Buddha] was thinking when [in the first wheel of the teaching] he spoke of the existence of own-character and so forth.

In the Chinese Great Commentary on the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought by the Korean scholar Wонch’uk, and so forth, (259) (370) "own-character"

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a See ibid., #56.
b See ibid., #21-24.
c See ibid., #8.
d Wонch’uk (Peking 5517, vol. 106, chap. 5, 128.5.7) cites scripture, "'Own-character' is the specific character as in, for instance, the explanation, 'Form is obstructive ... Consciousness is the knower.' The uncommon character (shun mong ma yin pa'i mthun na yi), or specific character (bye brag gi mthun na yi), is the defining characteristic of an object that belongs to it alone.

A-ku Lo-dro-gya-tso (Precious Lamp, 54.6) reports that a text entitled zur bko’i bzhis zin bbris holds that the Great Commentary and Wонch’uk’s text are not the same since the former has seventy chapters and the latter has sixty-three, but he explains that even though the current edition of Wонch’uk’s text has only sixty-three chapters, Gung-tang takes the "Chinese Great Commentary" and Wонch’uk’s text to be the same.

e Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 140.2) speculates that "and so forth" includes the Explanation of the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought (dga’gims ’grel rum bzhad / ’phags pa ’gugs pa’i rdo’i rnam par bzhad pa, a’rjasamdhinirmocanatraya svākkhya), listed in the table of contents of the Translation of the Treatises (bstan ’gyur) of the sde dge edition and so forth. He says that this text—which is (also) called Great Commentary and is (mistakenly) reputed to be by Asanga—refers to the fourth chapter of the sūtra and clearly speaks of the specific character of an object. For discussion of the authorship of this commentary, see appendix 1, p. 453ff.
f See Absorption, #27-55, 94.
here [in this passage in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought] is explained as the unique character [of the aggregates and so forth], but this is not right. For the sūtra itself at the point of [speaking about] imputational factors clearly speaks of establishment by way of [the object's] own character [and does not speak of the unique character], and since even imputational factors have a unique characterization, there would be the fallacy that the character-non-nature could not be explained with respect to imputational factors.

a See ibid., #48, 39.
b See ibid., #50.
c As will be cited in the Translation (p. 86), the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought says:

Those [imputational characters] are characters posited by names and terminology and do not subsist by way of their own character. Therefore, they are said to be “character-non-natures.”

Dzong-ka'-ba’s well-taken point is that the sūtra, when describing how imputational natures are character-non-natures, says that they “do not subsist by way of their own character” (rang gi mthun nyid kyi rsam par gnas pa ni ma yin pa, svalaksanena ayatanastam: Lamotte, Sāndhivinirmeṣa, 68 [4], n. 1), that is to say, they are not established by way of their own character; the sūtra does not speak about the defining character of an object.

This clear identification in the sūtra itself is the pivot of Dzong-ka'-ba’s argument (in his chapter on the Autonomy School) that when Bhāvaviveka says, in the context of criticizing the Mind-Only interpretation of this earlier passage, that to deny “character” of imputational natures is a depreciation, he indicates that he holds that existent imputational natures, such as uncompounded space, are established by way of their own character. Once Bhāvaviveka holds that even imputational natures are established by way of their own character, he must hold that all phenomena are established this way. It then becomes crucial to determine what Bhāvaviveka means by “establishment by way of its own character,” Dzong-ka'-ba’s answer being that it means that an object is established from its own side, with the consequence that when it is sought among its bases of designation, it is found.

d Imputational natures have the unique characteristic or definition of being just imputed by conceptuality (rog pas brag tsam; Gung-ru Chö-jung’s Garland of White Lotuses, 20a.4). Therefore, if the absence of “character” mentioned in Buddha’s answer to Paramārthaśamudgata’s question when discussing imputational natures merely referred to the non-existence of a unique characterization, such an absence could not be posited with respect to imputational natures, since they do indeed have a unique characterization. However, as is obvious in the next chapter, one of the main points of the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought is that imputational natures are non-natures in terms of “character,” and thus “character” in that context cannot refer to a unique or uncommon character.

Dzong-ka'-ba’s point is well taken, but he makes the extension that, therefore, here in this passage when Paramārthaśamudgata questions Buddha, “own-character” also cannot refer to the unique characteristic of an object; he sees a necessary equivalence between the “own-character” mentioned here in the question and the “character” mentioned in the answer. However, it seems to me that the “own-character” mentioned in the question could indeed refer to the entity, the unique character, of an object, since such a meaning appears frequently in Buddhist literature and since the format of an entity (such as a form) and its attributes (such as production and disintegration) is so important in this sūtra. See Absorption, #48.
The commentaries [by Wönch’uk and so forth]* explain "the various and manifold constituents" [mentioned in passage from the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought cited above] otherwise, but when these are put together with a later

* Gung-tang’s Annotations, 15.4; and Dón-drup-gyel-tsen’s Four Intertwined Commentaries, 41.2. Wönch’uk (Great Commentary, Peking 5517, vol. 106, chap. 5, 129.3.2) says:

The eighteen constituents in the character of the one being different from the others are called the "various constituents." Just those eighteen constituents as specifics of limitless sentient beings are called the "manifold constituents."

In chapter 4 of the Explanation of the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought, vol. 205, 110.2, when these topics are first introduced, the term is defined in a way better translated as "constitution":

"Various constitutions" refers to the whole range from variously abiding in the lineages of Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Ones Gone Thus through to the 84,000 behaviors of sentient beings by way of divisions of desire and so forth...."Manifold constitutions" refers in brief to four forms of constitutions with respect to those various constitutions: naturally abiding constitutions, constitutions from previous conditioning, constitutions suitable for purification, and constitutions not suitable for purification, and furthermore to there being limitless forms of each of these.

See also Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tsho, Port of Entry, 141.4.

b See Absorption, #16.

c Later in this chapter, Paramārthaśamudgata, following the order of the seven topics, speaks about the three natures in terms of the aggregates, sense spheres, dependent-arising, constituents, and foods and then mentions the six and eighteen constituents. He says: (Lamotte, Samdhinirmocana, 81 [25], and 204; and John C. Powers, Wisdom of Buddhā: Samdhinirmocana Sūtra [Berkeley, Calif.: Dharma, 1995], 131)

Just as this is applied to the form aggregate, so this also should be applied similarly to the remaining aggregates. Just as this is applied to the aggregates, so this also should be applied similarly to each of the sense-spheres that are the twelve sense-spheres. This also should be applied similarly to each of the limbs of existence that are the twelve limbs of existence. This also should be applied similarly to each of the foods that are the four foods. This also should be applied similarly to each of the constituents that are the six constituents and the eighteen constituents.

That in the very same chapter of the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought the constituents are listed as the six and the eighteen constituents provides good evidence that "the various constituents and manifold constituents" must be these. Still, the order must be reversed to accommodate Dzong-ka-ba’s statement that these refer to "the eighteen constituents and the six constituents." Indeed, when Gung-tang (Difficult Points, 87.7-87.11/37b.3) makes this point, he (or his scribe) unintentionally edits Dzong-ka-ba’s text so that it reads "the six constituents and the eighteen constituents" (kham grub dang kham lugs bvyud). However, since the Delhi NG dka shis hun po (484.3), Guru Deva old zhöl (448.6), Zi ling sku ‘bum (342.17), and Sarnath gsang (6.4) editions all read kham lugs bvyud dang kham grub, this is clearly not a variant reading, but I doubt that Gung-tang intended to edit Dzong-ka-ba’s text (even though it conveniently makes the sūtra and Dzong-ka-ba agree) since Gung-tang goes to some length to indicate why only the six constituents (that is, the manifold) are mentioned
occurrence in the *Sūtra [Unraveling the Thought]*, they are to be taken as the eighteen constituents and the six constituents.

"Non-loss" (260) [370] [in the passage from the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* cited above] is non-forgetfulness.¹

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¹ *mi bkyud pa, aumprameṣṭā* (Lamotte, *Sandhinirmocana*, 67 [1], n. 26). "Non-forgetfulness" is *mi bryed pa*.

² See *Absorption*, #18.
2. Buddha’s Answer

The presentation of [Buddha’s] answer dispelling that contradiction has two parts: explaining the modes of non-nature in consideration of which [Buddha] spoke of [all phenomena as] natureless [in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras] and explaining that in consideration of which he spoke of [all phenomena as] unproduced and so forth [in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras]. (261) [371]

Explaning The Modes Of Non-Nature In Consideration Of Which [Buddha] Spoke Of [All Phenomena As] Natureless [In The Perfection Of Wisdom Sūtras] (261) [371]

This section has three parts: a brief indication, an extensive explanation, and showing examples for these.

Brief Indication Of The Modes Of Non-Nature In Consideration Of Which [Buddha] Spoke Of [All Phenomena As] Natureless [In The Perfection Of Wisdom Sūtras] (261) [371]

The Sūtra Unraveling the Thought [when Buddha identifies what was behind his saying in the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras that all phenomena are natureless]¹⁸ says:

Paramārthasamudgata, thinking of three non-natures of phenomena—character-non-nature,² production-non-nature,³ and ultimate-non-

¹ In the last chapter Ðzong-ka-ba quoted Paramārthasamudgata’s question, and here he quotes Buddha’s answer. He has skipped Buddha’s introduction to the answer (Étienne Lamotte, Samdhinirmocana Sūtra: L’Explication des mystèes (Louvain: Université de Louvain, 1935), 67 [2], and 193; Don-drup-gyel-tsen’s Four Intertwined Commentaries, 6.2-6.5; and John C. Powers, Wisdom of Buddha: Samdhinirmocana Sutra (Berkeley, Calif.: Dharma, 1995), 97):

² Having been asked that, the Supramundane Victor said to the Bodhisattra Paramārthasamudgata, "Paramārthasamudgata, the thought in your mind, properly generated virtue, is good, good. Paramārthasamudgata, you are involved in asking this in order to help many beings, to [bring] happiness to many beings, out of compassionate kindness toward the world, and for the sake of the aims, help, and happiness of all beings, including gods and humans. You are good to think to ask the One Gone Thus about this meaning. Therefore, Paramārthasamudgata, listen, and I will explain in consideration of which I said, ‘All phenomena are natureless; all phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow.’"  
³ mṣyan nyid ngo bo nyid med pa nyid, lakṣananiḥsvabhāvatā (Lamotte, Samdhinirmocana, 67 [3], n. 3).

⁴ skye ba ngo bo nyid med pa nyid, utpattiniḥsvabhāvatā (ibid., 67 [3], n. 4).
nature—I taught [in the middle wheel of the teaching], \[^{129}\] "All phenomena are natureless." \[^{130}\]

In consideration of all three non-natures, [Buddha] spoke of non-nature [in the middle wheel of the teaching]. \[^{6}\]

Moreover, Asaṅga's *Compendium of Ascertainties* says: \[^{131}\]

**Question:** Thinking of what did the Supramundane Victor say [in the middle wheel]\[^{132}\] that all phenomena are natureless?

**Answer:** Here and there\[^{6}\] he said such through the force of taming\[^{6}\] [trainees], \[^{133}\] thinking of three types of non-nature.

Also, Vasubandhu's *The Thirty* (stanza 23) says: \[^{134}\]

Thinking of three types of non-nature
Of the three types of natures [respectively], \[^{135}\]
The thought in the *Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras* \[^{136}\]
That all phenomena are natureless.

Hence (262) (372) [it is contradictory for some, namely, Döl-bo-ṣa and others]\[^{1}\] to explain that the statements in the *Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras*, and so forth, that all phenomena are natureless are in consideration [only]\[^{137}\] of all conventional phenomena [which, according to them, are self-empty in the sense of being empty of their own true establishment]\[^{138}\] but do not refer to the ultimate [which, they say, is itself truly established and empty of being any conventional phenomenon]. \[^{139}\] They thereby contradict the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* as well as the texts of Asaṅga and his brother [Vasubandhu] and are also outside the system of the Superior father [Nāgārjuna], \[^{140}\] his spiritual sons, and so forth.

\[^{1}\] *don dam pa ngo bo nyid med pa nyid, paramārthaniḥsvabhāvata* (ibid., 67 [3], n. 5). See p. 35, n. c.

\[^{6}\] See Absorption, #57, 58, 61, 61.

\[^{6}\] Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (*Port of Entry*, 160.4) cogently suggests that "here and there" (de dang der) may mean either "in this and that sūtra" (mdo de dang der) or "to this and that trainee" (gdul bya de dang der).

\[^{6}\] Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (ibid., 164.2) reports that Ąra-di Ge-shay Rin-chan-don-drup (*pra sī dge bshes rin chen don grub, Ornament for the Thought*, 18.16) interprets "through the force of taming" (dul ba'i dbang gi) as "through the force of taming trainees having the lineage of the Middle Way School by means of the literal reading" (gdul bya dbu ma pa'i rigs can yigas rin de 'dul ba'i dbang gi). However, Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso points out that Dzong-ka-ṣa himself in the section on the Consequence School glosses "through the force of taming" (dul ba'i dbang gi) with "through the force of trainees' thought" (gdul bya'i bsam pa'i dbang gi; Sarnath gsang edition, 207). It seems to me that both interpretations are suitable.

\[^{6}\] See Absorption, #61.

\[^{6}\] Da-drin-rap-ṣen's *Annotations*, 12.5. Wel-mang Gön-chok-gyel-tsen's *Notes on (Gön-chok-jik-may-wang-bo)*'s *Lectures* (399.3) reports that Shay-rap-gyel-tsen is called "Döl-bo-ṣa" (dol po pa) because his family lineage is Döl-bo (mu dol po yin pa).
It is thus: [When Paramārthasamudgata] asks about that in consideration of which [Buddha] spoke of non-nature, he is asking (1) about what [Buddha] was thinking\(^2\) when he taught non-nature and (2) about the modes of non-nature.\(^3\) Also, the answer indicates those two respectively. From between those two, let us explain the first\(^4\) [that is, what Buddha had as the basis in his thought when in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras he taught that all phenomena\(^5\) are natureless. There, Buddha] said that the limitless divisions of instances of phenomena ranging from forms through to exalted knowers-of-all-aspects have no nature\(^6\) or inherent nature.\(^7\) These phenomena are included in the three non-natures [that is, three natures—imputational, other-powered, and thoroughly established natures].\(^8\) Thinking that when it is explained how those are

\(^2\) Dzong-ka-ba glosses ci la dgongs nas with ci la bsams nas. This evidence shows that he considers dgongs to be a synonym of bsams and justifies the translation of dgongs as "thinking" or "having thought" or "in consideration of." Hence, here dgongs should not be translated as "intention," since this is too close to dgos pa ("purpose" or "intention") in the interpretive triad of dgongs gzhi, dgos pa, dgos la gnod byed ("the basis in [Buddha's] thought, the purpose, and damage to the explicit [teaching on the literal level]"); see p. 234ff.

\(^3\) According to Ye-shay-tup-den (oral teachings), the latter refers to the reasons for the respective non-natures.

\(^4\) The second topic, the modes of naturelessness, is set forth in the "extensive explanation" that follows after two paragraphs. That section is entitled "extensive explanation of the modes of non-nature in consideration of which [Buddha] spoke of [all phenomena as] natureless [in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras]." It might seem that Dzong-ka-ba has begun a subsection that has two parts and has failed to announce either the second topic or the detailed explanation, but he has not; the second topic is covered in the detailed explanation that follows. In

Also, the answer indicates those two respectively. From between those two, let us explain the first (dan gyis kyi de gnyis rim pa bzhin ston pa las dang po "chad pa ni; Text, p. 372; Delhi NG dgra shis lhan po, 485.4),

the agent of "indicates" (ston) is "the answer" (dan gyis), not Dzong-ka-ba. He is stating that while the answer lays out these two points, he is here explaining only the first.

\(^5\) The Tibetan word I translate as "phenomena" is chos (dharma) which, from among its ten meanings, is said in Ge-luk scholasticism to mean "that which holds its own entity" (rang gi ngo bo 'dzin pa) in this type of context. Even the ultimate is listed as a phenomenon (chos), and thus even the final nature of things, or perhaps noumenon, is a phenomenon.

\(^6\) ngo bo nyid.

\(^7\) rang bzhin.

\(^8\) It is noteworthy that Dzong-ka-ba uses the term "three non-natures" (ngo bo nyid med pa grum) when the term "three natures" (ngo bo nyid grum) would have been more appropriate; indeed this is how Da-rin-rap-den (Annotations, 13.4) glosses the term. Dzong-ka-ba's usage of "non-natures" suggests that for him the individual three non-natures and the three natures are equivalent (see Absorption, #101), as long as the actual ultimate-non-nature is restricted to thoroughly established natures (see ibid., #147, 148). To me, it indeed is the case.

\(^b\) See Absorption, #73, 72, 101.
natureless, it is easy to understand [the individual modes of thought that were
behind his statement in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras], he included [all
phenomena] into the three non-natures [that is, three natures. For] all ultimate
and conventional phenomena are included within those three. Also, with re-
spect to the need for [Buddha’s] doing thus, in the Mother Sūtras [that is, the
Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras] and so forth, all phenomena—the five aggre-
gates, the eighteen constituents, and the twelve sense-spheres—are described as with-
out thingness, without an inherent nature, and natureless. In particular,
mentioning all the terminological variants of the ultimate—emptiness, the
element of [a Superior’s] qualities, thusness, and so forth—he said that these
are natureless. Therefore, who with a mind would propound that the ultimate
is not among the phenomena about which it is said that phenomena are
natureless!

Extensive Explanation Of The Modes Of Non-Nature In Consideration
Of Which [Buddha] Spoke Of [All Phenomena As] Natureless [In The
Perfection Of Wisdom Sūtras] (263) {373}

[Character-Non-Nature] (263) {373}

Question: If the phenomena that are said to be natureless are included

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a Shriramati’s Commentary on (Vasubandhu’s) “The Thirty” (Peking. 5565, vol. 113
311.3.8), similarly says in commentary on stanza 24, “All phenomena are of the nature of
the imputational, the other-powered, and the thoroughly established.”

b Dzong-ka-ba is referring to Buddha’s explanation—in the Sūtra Unraveling the
Thought—of the three types of naturelessness in relation to the three natures. According to
Ser-shül Lo-sang-pün-tsok (Notes, 14b.6-15a.3), Dzong-ka-ba’s point is that since the Per-
fecion of Wisdom Sūtras speak of all phenomena as being natureless, it was necessary for
Buddha to explain the basis in his thought for all of those phenomena, and thus he grouped
them into the three natures and their respective non-natures.

c dngos po med pa.
d rang bzhin med pa.
e ngor bo nyid med pa.
f stong pa nyid, śūnyatā.

b cho yi dbyings, dhammaṁśātmā. The translation as “element of [a Superior’s] qualities” is
based on a note by Nga-wang-bel-den (Annotations, dbu 8b.8): khyod la dmigs nas sgom pas
phags cho rgya byed pas cho dbyings abe bya ba. “It is called the element of [a Superior’s]
qualities (dhammaṁśātmā, cho dbyings) because meditation within observing it acts as a cause of
the qualities (dharma, cho) of Superiors (ārya, phags pa).” Emptiness, being uncaused, is not
itself a cause (element), but meditation on it causes the development of marvelous qualities;
thus, emptiness comes to be called a cause, an element producing those qualities.

b de bzhin nyid, tathātā.
i See Absorption, #63-65.
j See ibid., #59.
within the three non-natures, what are those three and what are their modes of non-nature?

Answer: To explain the first non-nature [that is, the character-non-nature, which is posited with respect to imputational natures], the Śūtra Unraveling the Thought says:142

Concerning that, what are character-non-natures of phenomena?4 Those which are imputational characters.5

Why? It is thus: Those [imputational characters] are characters posited by names and terminology and do not subsist by way of their own character.6 Therefore, they are said to be “character-non-natures.”

The question and answer in the first two sentences explain that imputational factors are character-non-natures. Then, “Why?” questions the reason for that. In answer to that question, a reason from the negative side—their not being posited by way of their own character—and a reason from the positive side—their being posited by names and terminology—are stated. Through this clear delineation,7 the latter two [descriptions of non-nature in the sutra with respect to other-powered natures and thoroughly established natures]8 also should be understood.

The nature of character that imputational factors9 do not have is to be taken as establishment, or subsisting, by way of their own character.10 Here, the measure indicated11 with respect to existing or not existing by way of [an object’s] own character is: not to be posited or to be posited in dependence upon names and terminology.12

Furthermore, that which is posited [in dependence upon names and terminology] is not necessarily existent [since, for instance, the horns of a rabbit or a difference of entity between subject and object are posited in dependence upon names and terminology but do not exist]. Moreover, the mode of positing [something in dependence upon names and terminology in this Mind-Only

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1 Roughly, this means, “What are without the nature of being established by way of their own character?”
2 “Imputational character” (kun btags kyi mthun nyid, parikalpita-kula) and “imputational nature” (kun btags kyi rang bo rin / kun btags kyi ngo bo nyid, parikalpita-svabhāva) are synonymous.
3 See Absorption, #104.
4 As was mentioned earlier (p. 79, footnote c), this line is crucial for identifying that the “character” that imputational natures lack is subsistence, or establishment, by way of their own character.
5 See Absorption, #59, 60.
6 See ibid., #83.
7 See ibid., #29, 94.
8 bstan lshod; see ibid., #96.
9 See ibid., #105-109.
system] is very different from the Consequence School's positing existents through the force of nominal conventions [even if the terminology is similar]. Therefore, the meaning of existing and not existing by way of [the object's] own character [here in the Mind-Only School] also does not agree [with the interpretation of the Consequence School]. However, if one has the conception of [an object as] existing by way of its own character [as described] in this Mind-Only system, one also has the conception of its being established by way of its own character [as described] in the Consequence School. Nevertheless, there are cases in which, though [Proponents of Mind-Only] did not conceive certain bases [that is, imputational natures] in accordance with the former [description], they would be conceiving such in accordance with the latter [description by the Consequence School, since the Mind-Only School, for instance, holds that anything existent is findable when the object imputed is sought and this is the meaning of "establishment of an object by way of its own character" for the Consequence School].

[Production-Non-Nature] (264) [374]

With respect to the second non-nature, the Sutra Unraveling the Thought says:

What are production-non-natures of phenomena? Those which are the other-powered characters of phenomena.

Why? It is thus: Those [other-powered characters] arise through the force of other conditions and not by themselves. Therefore, they are said to be "production-non-natures."

The nature of production, or intrinsic production, that other-powered natures do not have is production by themselves, since it says, "not by themselves."

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a  See ibid., #113-116.

b  In the Consequence School, objects that are posited through names and terminology do not exist from their own side; also, establishment from an object's own side, for the Consequentialists, requires establishment of the object by way of its own character. The Mind-Only School, however, holds that objects can be posited through names and terminology and still exist from their own side.

c  See Absorption, #110-112.

d  Roughly, this means, "What phenomena are without the nature of self-production?" See ibid., #76, 77. About "phenomena," see ibid., #71.

e  Text, p. 87. The Sanskrit (Lamotte, Samdhinirmocana, 68 [5], n. 1) is: idam pratay-ubha bhaṃ ubhā na svatahas. Gung-tang (Difficult Points, 125.4) finds great significance in the Tibetan rendering in the agentive (bday nytig kyi) instead of the ablative (bday nytig las). It would seem that the Sanskrit could have been translated into Tibetan either way. See Absorption, #67.

f  ngyo bo nytig kyi skye ba.
That is production under their own power; it is as Asaṅga's *Compendium of Ascertainties* says:153

Because compositional phenomena are dependent-arisings, they are produced through the power of conditions and not by themselves.
This is called "production-non-nature."

This [Mind-Only School] is a system that says that other-powered natures are natureless since they are without the nature of such inherent production; it does not say that other-powered natures are natureless because of not being established by way of their own character [as the Consequence School holds].4

[Ultimate-Non-Nature]154 (264) {375}

From between the two modes of positing the third non-nature, [the first to be discussed is] the positing of other-powered natures as without the nature of the ultimate. About this, the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* says:155

What are ultimate-non-natures? Those dependently arisen phenomena—which are natureless due to being natureless in terms of production—are also natureless due to being natureless in terms of the ultimate.

Why? Paramārthaśamudgata, that which is an object of observation of purification in phenomena I teach to be the ultimate, and other-powered characters are not the object of observation of purification. Therefore, they are said to be "ultimate-non-natures."

Because other-powered natures do not exist as the ultimate nature, they are said

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* See *Absorption*, #66-70.
** See ibid., #75.
*** rang ba lba'i khyis skye ba.
**** See *Absorption*, #74.
***** See ibid., #128.
****** Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso's *Port of Entry* (182.6) points out that this question is not limited to the first mode of positing the ultimate-non-nature but is concerned with both modes, since there is no rhetorical question at that point (see p. 90).
******* *Rnam par dag pa'i dmigs pa, viṇuddhālabhāna* (Lamotte, *Samdhinirmocana*, 69 [6], n. 1). Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (*Port of Entry*, 183.4) takes this term to mean "object of observation that is purified [that is, devoid] of contamination" (*bca'i bskyen bca'i khabs pa'i rnam par dag pa'i lams gyis dmigs pa*). However, other scholars more cogently take the term as referring to an object that is such that meditation upon it purifies obstructions. For instance, Jam-yang-shay-ba (*Notes*, 506.5), in speaking about the ultimate that is explicitly indicated at this point, qualifies the term "object of observation of purification" (*Rnam dag gi dmigs pa*) with the phrase, "that which is such that, when it is observed and then is meditated upon, the obstructions to omniscience become purified." (*gang la dmigs nas bzhin ma shes gyi sgrub dag pa'i gyar ba*).
to be "ultimate-non-natures."* For the ultimate is that through observation of which and familiarization with which obstructions‡ are removed, but obstructions cannot be removed through observing and familiarizing with other-powered natures.

* Question: Why are imputational factors not also posited [at this point in the Sutra Unraveling the Thought]† as ultimate-non-natures?

* Answer: If [something] were posited as [an ultimate-non-nature]‡ merely through not being an object of observation of purification, that would be true [that is, imputational natures also would have to be posited as ultimate-non-natures]. However, in the context of refuting a misconception, other-powered natures are posited as ultimate-non-natures due to not being objects of observation of purification, whereas imputational factors are not posited [as ultimate-non-natures].††

†† Question: How is that?

†† Answer: When one understands that obstructions are purified through meditation observing other-powered natures' emptiness of the imputational factor [—for example, through meditating on other-powered natures' emptiness of being established by way of their own character as the referents of words and of conceptual consciousnesses—], there arises the qualm that since, in that case, [the pure exalted wisdom]‡‡ must also observe the other-powered natures that are the substrata [of the quality of emptiness, those other-powered natures] also would be objects of observation of purification, due to which they would be ultimates. [Thus, such a qualm needs to be alleviated with respect to other-powered natures.]†† However, such a qualm does not occur with respect to imputational factors.†

The fault of that qualm does not exist. It is like the fact that just as all...

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* See Absorption, #127-152, 169.

‡ Notice that Đzong-ka-ba speaks merely of "obstructions," without specifying these to be the obstructions to omniscience. This leaves open the possibility that both the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phenomena are actual thoroughly established natures. However, as will be seen below (p. 90), when speaking about the second mode of positing the ultimate naturelessness, he limits the discussion to the selflessness of phenomena. See Absorption, #153-167.

‡‡ See ibid., #129-138, 140, 141.

‡‡ According to Jam-jiang-shay-ba (81.1), when Đzong-ka-ba says, "The fault of that qualm does not exist," his meaning is that it is not the case that whatever is an object of observation by a path of purification is necessarily its final object of observation, that is, a thoroughly established nature. According to Jam-jiang-shay-ba's follower Gung-tang (Difficult Points, 130.11) however, Autonomists and Consequentialists would have the qualm that since, in the Mind-Only School, other-powered natures are truly established, other-powered natures' status of being established as objects of observation of a path of purification would have to become their final mode of subsistence, in which case they would not be anything other than the final object of observation (that is, that which is comprehended) by a path of purification. A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso (94.3), also a follower of Jam-jiang-shay-ba, says the same...
though the conception\footnote{In this context, “conception” (’dzin) means “consciousness conceiving.”} that sound is permanent is overcome by ascertaining sound as impermanent, it is not contradictory that the conception of permanence is not overcome through merely observing sound.\footnote{Given Đêng-ka-ba’s wording in this sentence, it strikes me that when he says, “The fault of that qualm does not exist,” his meaning may be that it is not the case that taking cognizance of other-powered natures would eliminate obstructions. Jam-γyang-shay-ba’s rendition, given two footnotes above, comes down to the same point.}

Although other-powered natures are not established as the ultimate when [the term] ultimate is taken as [referring to] the object of observation of purification, it will be explained later whether or not they are established as another [type of] ultimate.\footnote{See p. 144 but mainly p. 158 through the end of the chapter. Other-powered natures are ultimate in the broader sense of being ultimately established.}

\[((\text{Actual} \text{ Ultimate-Non-Nature}) \uparrow 265 \{376\}\]

Furthermore, with respect to the second mode of positing the ultimate-non-nature, the \textit{Sūtra Unraveling the Thought} says:\footnote{Đê-drin-rap-den (21.4) takes “ultimate” as the self of phenomena, as did Ge-shay Gé-dzin Lo-drö in an oral discussion, in which case this phrase should be rendered, “Moreover, that which is the thoroughly established character of phenomena is also called the non-nature of the ultimate.” However, I think that the following discussion of “ultimate” here in the sūtra and in Đêng-ka-ba’s commentary, as well as the preceding discussion about why other-powered natures are not the ultimate, makes their interpretation problematic, as is confirmed by Gung-tang’s \textit{Difficult Points} (135.12). For “ultimate” here refers not to the object of negation, the self of phenomena, but to the ultimacy of the thoroughly established nature.}

Moreover, that which is the thoroughly established character of phenomena is also called “the ultimate-non-nature.”\footnote{Here, Đêng-ka-ba specifies the thoroughly established nature as being the selflessness of \textit{phenomena}, seeming to exclude the selflessness of persons; however, in other places he}

Since the thoroughly established nature of phenomena—the selflessness of phenomena—is the object of observation of purification, it is the ultimate. Also, as Gung-tang and A-ku Lo-drö-ṣa-tso cite the Omniscient Chō-jung (chos byung), the author of the old (that is, prior to Jam-γyang-shay-ba) textbook literature of Gomang College, as their source (Gung-ṣu Chō-jung’s \textit{Garland of White Lotuses}, 33b.5-34a.6), thereby showing that they feel free to adopt interpretations other than those of their leader. Jam-γyang-shay-ba’s interpretation seems closer to Đêng-ka-ba’s meaning, whereas the other is more inventive. See Absorption, #131.
since it is distinguished by, that is to say, is posited by way of the mere naturlessness of a self in phenomena, it is also called "the non-nature of phenomena," whereby it is called "the ultimate-non-nature."

Also, (266) [376] the Śūtra Unraveling the Thought says: "If the character [that is, entity] of compositional things and the character of the ultimate were different [entities], then just the mere selflessness and the mere naturlessness [of the self of phenomena] of compositional things would not be [their] ultimate character.

Also, when giving examples [of the three non-natures, the Śūtra Unraveling the Thought] says that just as space is posited as the mere absence of form [that is, seems to include both. See Absorption, #153-167.

a Dzong-ka-ba glosses the frequently used technical term rab tu phyé ba with bzhag pa, which merely has the sense of "posit"; his reading, therefore, runs contrary to Lamotte's translation (194.6) as "est manifesté par l'irréalité de toutes les choses."

b Notice that Dzong-ka-ba uses the phrase chos rmam kyi bdag rather than chos kyi bdag; taken by itself, this phrase seems to leave open the possibility that the self of persons could also be included; however, the previous sentence seems to mitigate against its inclusion.

c See Absorption, #169.

d As background to this point, Da-drin-rap-den (22.3) inserts:

Someone might wrongly think that an other-powered nature and its thoroughly established nature are different entities just because those two are mutually exclusive, as indeed they are. However, even though they are mutually exclusive, this does not entail that they are different entities.

However, I doubt that Dzong-ka-ba's main concern is with establishing that an other-powered nature and its thoroughly established nature are not different entities. Rather, his concern here is to offer more evidence that a thoroughly established nature is a "mere selflessness" and a "mere naturlessness," that is to say, only an elimination of an object of negation, and not something positive, as the Jo-nang-bas (and some contemporary American, European, and Japanese scholars) claim. This is confirmed by Bel-jor-hlun-drup (19.2), who divides this section into two parts—showing that the thoroughly established nature is a non-affirming negative and refuting, through this, the assertion that it is a positive entity.

e 'du byed, samśkāra. In this context, the term may have a wide meaning that also includes permanent phenomena such as uncompounded space; in that case, it would mean "all phenomena," rather than just compositional things, which are necessarily impermanent. However, Wel-mang Gön-chok-gyel-tsen's Notes on (Gön-chok-jik-may-wang-bo) Lectures (402.1) glosses "compositional things" ('du byed) with "compounded things" (du byas).

f The passage from chapter 7 of the Śūtra Unraveling the Thought, cited later in this chapter (p. 94), is: Paramārthasamudgata, it is thus: just as, for example, space is distinguished by the mere naturlessness of form [that is, as a mere absence of forms] and pervades everywhere, so from between those [two] ultimate-non-natures, one [that is, the thoroughly established nature] is to be viewed as distinguished by the selflessness of phenomena and as pervading everything.

Lamotte, Samdhinirmocana, 69 [7], and 194-195; Dön-drup-gyel-tsen's Four Intertwined
a mere absence of obstructive contact,\textsuperscript{162} so the thoroughly established nature is posited as selflessness. Therefore, it is very clear that the thoroughly established nature, which is the selflessness of phenomena,\textsuperscript{a} is posited as the non-affirming negation\textsuperscript{b} of [dualistic] proliferations that is a mere elimination of a self of phenomena, with compounded phenomena\textsuperscript{c} as that which possesses the quality of emptiness.\textsuperscript{d} It is contradictory [for the Jo-nang-bas],\textsuperscript{e} while asserting the teaching of the meaning of suchness in this sutra to be definitive, not to posit the immutable thoroughly established nature by way of an elimination-isolate— which is the mere elimination of an object of negation—but rather to assert it as a positive, self-powered [uncontaminated wisdom],\textsuperscript{f} whose appear-

Commentaries, 8.3-8.4; and Powers, Wisdom of Buddha, 101.

\textsuperscript{a} Again, Dzong-ka-ba qualifies "thoroughly established nature" with "selflessness of phenomena." Does his specification limit the thoroughly established nature to the selflessness of phenomena, or does it merely give an example of a thoroughly established nature and thus suggest that the selflessness of persons is also a thoroughly established nature? See Absorption, #153-167.

\textsuperscript{b} med dgag, prasajapratidadha.

\textsuperscript{c} Since each and every phenomenon is a basis or substratum of emptiness, Dzong-ka-ba's specification of compounded phenomena (which does not include such phenomena as uncompounded space) as the substrata has given rise to creative attempts to explain it. Don-drup-gyal-tsen (Four Intertwined Commentaries, 64.6) explains that since the Jo-nang-bas assert that compounded phenomena are the objects of negation, Dzong-ka-ba deliberately turns this around by asserting that compounded phenomena actually are the bases of negation and that the object of negation is an imputational nature. At minimum, the commentary elegantly fits with Dzong-ka-ba's system and with the tenor of the next sentence.

\textsuperscript{d} Da-drin-rap-den (23.2) adds:

Hence, it is clear that the final reality and [its] substratum [that is, an other-powered nature and its thoroughly established nature, or a phenomenon and its ultimate truth] are one entity.

However, as mentioned above, the point of the section is not so much that the two truths are one entity but that the thoroughly established nature is a mere elimination of the self that is the object of negation. Dzong-ka-ba, in the next sentence, refers to this mere elimination as an "elimination-isolate" (kha'd ldog), that is to say, a conceptually isolatable factor that is a mere elimination. This is in opposition to the Jo-nang-bas' consideration of the thoroughly established nature to be a positive entity. A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso (107.6) correctly sees these two points as connected.

\textsuperscript{e} Wel-mang Gön-chok-gyal-tsen's Notes on (Gön-chok-jik-may-wang-ba's) Lectures, 402.1; Don-drup-gyal-tsen's Four Intertwined Commentaries, 65.2; and Da-drin-rap-den's Annotations, 23.2. Shay-rap-gyal-tsen considers the issue of the interpretable and the definitive in his Ocean of Definitive Meaning, 173.4ff.

\textsuperscript{f} For a discussion of isolates (or conceptually isolatable phenomena), see Daniel E. Perdue, Debate in Tibetan Buddhism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1992), 695-771; and Georges B. J. Dreyfus, Recognizing Reality: Dharmakirti's Philosophy and its Tibetan Interpretations (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1997), see his index under "distinguisher."

\textsuperscript{g} Gung-tang's Annotations, 32.3. About the ultimate, Shay-rap-gyal-tsen's Fourth Council
Buddha’s Answer

ance as an object of awareness does not depend on the elimination of an object
of negation.  

Since this thoroughly established nature is the mere elimination of the na-
ture of self in phenomena, it is called “the ultimate-non-nature of pheno-
mena.” However, this is a system that does not assert that the thoroughly es-
blished nature is natureless due to the entity of the negation itself not being es-
blished by way of its own character [for in the Mind-Only School emptiness,
the thoroughly established nature, is ultimately established by way of its own
character. The Auotnomists and Consequentialists, however, assert that empti-
ness is not ultimately established by way of its own character].

Showing Examples For These (251) {377}

With respect to examples with which those three non-natures are similar, the
Sūtra Unraveling the Thought says:

It is thus: for example, character-non-natures [that is, imputational
natures] are to be viewed as like a flower in the sky. Paramārthasamud-
gata, it is thus: for example, production-non-natures [that is, other-
powered natures] are to be viewed as like magical creations. From be-
tween the [two] ultimate-non-natures, one [that is, other-powered
natures] is also to be viewed that way. Paramārthasamudgata, it is

sends:

It is gnosis, never consciousness.
It is pure, never impure….
It is immaculate, never stained.

See Cyrus R. Stearns, The Buddha from Dol po and His Fourth Council of the Buddhist Do-
ctrine (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, 1996), 203-204.

See Reflections on Reality, chaps. 14 and 15; also Absorption, #62-65.

chos rnam kyi bdag gi ngo bo. Notice that here Ḍzung-ka-ba does not confine the thor-
oughly established nature to the absence of a self of phenomena (which would be chos bdag gi
ngo bo or chos kyi bdag gi ngo bo and not chos rnam kyi bdag gi ngo bo) but speaks of it as an
absence of self in/of phenomena, and hence it is open to the interpretation that for him not
just the absence of a self phenomena but also an absence of a self of persons could be the
thoroughly established nature. See Absorption, #153-167.

Given the points Ḍzung-ka-ba has made above, this sentence cannot, in my opinion, be
used to show that the term “ultimate” in “the ultimate non-nature of phenomena” refers to
the object of negation, as some contemporary Tibetan scholars hold.

See Absorption, #168.

Jam-yang-shay-ba’s Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive, 84.3-84.4.

The example of a magician’s illusions is to be applied not only to production-non-
natures—these being other-powered natures—but also to the first of the two ultimate-non-
natures—these again being other-powered natures, which are posited as ultimate-non-
natures since they are not the ultimate. This excellent explanation of the sentence is from Jik-
may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s Port of Entry, 199.3.
thus: just as, for example, space is distinguished by the mere naturelessness of form [that is, as a mere absence of forms] and pervades everywhere, so from between these [two] ultimate-non-natures, one [that is, the thoroughly established nature] is to be viewed as distinguished by the selflessness of phenomena and as pervading everything.

The similarity of imputational factors with a flower in the sky* is an example of their merely being imputed by conceputality and is not an example of their not occurring among objects of knowledge [that is, existents; hence, the exemplification does not indicate that all imputational factors do not exist].

The stog Palace edition (48.6) has a markedly different (and perhaps skewed) reading:

de dag las geig kyang don dam pa ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du bla’o

In literal translation, this is: "Something other than those is to be viewed as the ultimate-non-nature" and might be rendered more loosely as, "The ultimate-non-nature is, moreover, to be viewed as other than those." The separation of de dag las from ngo bo nyid med pa nyid suggests that de dag las refers to the other two natures or other two examples. However, the other reading, with Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso's interpretation of it, is preferable.

Đa-drin-rap-den (Annotations, 24.5), with strained inventiveness, gives an entirely different interpretation:

The non-nature of the ultimate [when "ultimate" is taken as] the object of negation is equivalent to the thoroughly established nature. Not only that, but also the two natures other than the thoroughly established nature must be viewed as empty of a self of phenomena; they are to be viewed also [in that way].

In Tibetan, with the sūtra (as Dzong-ka-ba cites it) in bold print his commentary reads:

dgag bya’i don dam pa ngo bo nyid med pa nyid de ni yongs grub dang don geig yin la de tang ma zad yongs grub de las gzan ngo bo nyid gzan gnyis kyang chos kyi bdag gis stong bar bla’i dgos pa ni geig kyang bla’i bar bya’o

Taken this way, the sentence in the sūtra would read, "[The two natures other] than that ultimate-non-nature are also to be viewed in another way." This interpretation strikes me as unnecessarily identifying the ultimate as the object of negation and thus is not elegant. (The lack of a nominative case ending in Tibetan allows for ambiguity in situations such as this.)

Lamotte's critical edition (Samdhinirmocana, 69 [7]) reads don dam pa ngo bo nyid med pa nyid de las geig kyang bla’i bar bya’o, eliminating one kyang.

As Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 198.4) says, due to an eye disease (rab rib) the figure of a flower appears in the sky in the perspective of such a perception, but in fact there is no flower in the sky; just so, imputational natures are established as merely imputed by conceputality. He identifies this explanation as from Wonch’uk’s commentary (Golden Reprint, vol. 128, 820.1).

* As Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 198.5) says, if there were no imputedly existent phenomena, then all objects of knowledge would absurdly have to be substantially existent. See Absorption, #88, 108.

A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso (Precious Lamp, 112.4) points out that in the Mind-Only School and Consequence School a flower in the sky is taken as an example of conceptual imputation.
It will be explained later how other-powered natures are similar to a magician's illusions (see 176ff.). The meaning of the example for thoroughly established phenomena is clear as it is.

[The Damage To 'Taking Literally The Statements Of Non-Nature][106] (267) (378)

[According to the Mind-Only School] the modes of the non-nature in the statements [in the middle wheel that all phenomena are] natureless are as explained above [to be in consideration of the three non-natures]. If, unlike that, one explained [in accordance with the Consequence School] that [the meaning of] non-nature is that all three natures are not established by way of their own character, one would be adhering literally to the [Perfection of Wisdom] Sutras' statements of non-nature. In that case, [according to the Mind-Only School] one would be incurring a view of nihilism, or a view of annihilation. For one would be deprecating all three natures, due to which one would come to have the view that character [that is, establishment of objects by way of their own character] does not exist. For, this [Mind-Only School] is a system in which, if other-powered natures are not established by way of their own character, production and cessation are not feasible due to which [other-powered natures] would be deprecated, and it is a system in which if the thoroughly established nature does not exist by way of its own character, it could not be the basic disposition of things.

*Question:* Even if it is allowed that the view of no establishment by way of own character deprecates the other two natures, how does it come to deprecate imputational factors?

*Answer:* If the other two natures do not exist by way of their own character, they become nonexistent, in which case even the bases of imputing imputational factors and the conventions that are the imputers' [that is, terms and conceptual consciousnesses] would not exist, whereby imputational factors would be utterly nonexistent. This is the reason.

Moreover, in this vein the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* says:[176]

Even though they have interest in that doctrine [of the profound thoroughly established nature], they do not understand, just as it is, the

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*a* The *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* says (see p. 97):

That which does not exist by way of its own character is not produced. That which is not produced does not cease.

*b* *dngu po'i ghis.*

*c* *'dags pa po'i tha snyad.*
profound reality that I have set forth with a thought behind it.\footnote{Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso \textit{(Port of Entry, 202.2)} points out that as the reason why they do not understand it, Wonch’uk says that “they do not have a nature of honesty and just dwell in their own view”; Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso takes these to mean that they are not unbiased and are attached to their own view.} With respect to the meaning of these doctrines, they adhere to the terms as only literal: “All these phenomena are only natureless. All these phenomena are only unproduced, only unceasing, only quiescent from the start, only naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow.” Due to that, they acquire the view that all phenomena do not exist and the view that [establishment of objects by way of their own] character does not exist. Moreover, having acquired the view of nihilism and the view of the non-existence of [establishment of objects by way of their own] character, they deprecate all phenomena in terms of all of the characters—deprecating the imputational character of phenomena and also deprecating the other-powered character and thoroughly established character of phenomena.

Why? Paramārthaśamudgata, it is thus: If the other-powered character and the thoroughly established character exist [by way of their own character],\footnote{He \textit{(202.1)} glosses “set forth with a thought behind it” \textit{(dgongs te bshad pa)} with “set forth non-literally” \textit{(igra ji bzhin pa min par bshad pa).}} the imputational character is known [that is, is possible]. However, those who perceive the other-powered character and the thoroughly established character as without character\footnote{This is a source showing that according to the \textit{Sūtra Unraveling the Thought} thoroughly established natures are established by way of their own character.} [that is to say, as not being established by way of their own character] also deprecate the imputational character. Therefore, those [persons] are said to deprecate even all three aspects of characters.

In “With respect to the meaning of [these] doctrines, they adhere to the terms as only literal,” the terms are the statements in sūtras [such as the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras]\footnote{\textit{\textit{The Essence of Eloquence: Translation}}} teaching non-nature—that all phenomena are ultimately empty of inherent existence, empty of [establishment] by way of their own nature, and empty of [establishment] by way of their own character. This [Mind-Only school] is a system in which holding what is literally indicated in those passages is asserted to be [mistaken] adherence to the literal reading.

[Wrongly] perceiving other-powered and thoroughly established characters to be without character is to view those two as not being established by way of their own character. The passage from “Why?” on through to the end of that citation indicates the reason why all three natures come to be deprecated. It should be known that even if one holds [a position] in accordance with the statement that production and cessation do not exist by way of their own character, one [explicitly]\footnote{\textit{\textit{The Essence of Eloquence: Translation}}} deprecates other-powered natures, and thereby one also
comes to deprecate the other two [natures—the imputational and the thoroughly established]. For, this [Mind-Only School] is a system in which if production and cessation are not established by way of their own character, production and cessation become nonexistent [since they would not be established in any other way, in which case the bases of imputation of imputational factors and the substrata of the thoroughly established nature would not exist].

Explaining That In Consideration Of Which [Buddha] Spoke Of [Phenomena As] Being Unproduced And So Forth [In The Perfection Of Wisdom Sūtras] (269) (380)

Question: If such is the mode of non-nature, in consideration of what did [Buddha] speak of [phenomena as] unproduced and so forth?

Answer: These were set forth in consideration of the first and last non-natures [that is, character-non-natures and ultimate-non-natures, these being imputational natures and thoroughly established natures respectively].

[Buddha’s Speaking Of Phenomena As Being Unproduced And So Forth In Consideration Of Imputational Natures] (269) (380)

With regard to the first, the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought says:

Concerning that, thinking of just character-non-natures [that is, thinking of just imputational factors which are not established by way of their own character], I taught that all phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow.

Why? Paramārthaśamudgata, it is thus: That which does not exist by way of its own character is not produced.² That which is not produced does not cease. That which is not produced and does not cease is from the start quiescent. That which is quiescent from the start is naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow [that is, naturally devoid of the afflicting emotions without depending on an antidote].²⁸ It is quiescent from the start is naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow does not have the least thing to pass beyond sorrow.

[Buddha] states as the reason why imputational factors do not have production and cessation the fact that they are not established by way of their own character. Therefore, this also indicates that if production and cessation exist, they [must]²⁷ be established by way of their own character and indicates that other-powered natures have production and cessation that are established by way of their own character.

² This sentence clearly sets forth the position that all products are established by way of their own character (jik·may·dam-chö·gya·tsö’s Port of Entry, 208.3).
Since what are devoid of production and cessation are uncompounded, such are unfit to be phenomena of the thorough afflictions, due to which they are indicated as being quiescent from the start and naturally passed beyond sorrow. For sorrow here is the afflictions.\textsuperscript{a}

\textbf{Buddha's Speaking Of Not Being Produced And So Forth In Consideration Of The Thoroughly Established Nature} \textsuperscript{b} (269) \{381\}

Also, with respect to the second, the \textit{Sūtra Unraveling the Thought} says: \textsuperscript{c}

Moreover, thinking of just the ultimate-non-nature, which is distinguished by the selflessness of phenomena, I taught, "All phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, from the start quiescent, and naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow."

Why? It is thus: Just the ultimate-non-nature which is distinguished by the selflessness of phenomena only subsists in permanent, permanent time and everlasting, everlasting time.\textsuperscript{a} It is the uncompounded final reality of phenomena, devoid of all affective emotions. Because that uncompounded [nature] which subsists for permanent, permanent time and everlasting, everlasting time in the aspect of just that reality is uncompounded, it is unproduced and unceasing. Because it is devoid of all affective emotions, it is quiescent from the start and naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow.

The Chinese \textit{Great Commentary} [by Wonch'uk] explains that "permanent, permanent time" is former, former time and "everlasting, everlasting time" is later, later time.\textsuperscript{c}

\textsuperscript{a} \textit{mya ngan}.

\textsuperscript{b} The afflictions are identified in the \textit{Sūtra Unraveling the Thought} as threefold—the affective emotions, actions (\textit{las, karma}) and the production of a lifetime; see p. 220, footnote a. The affective emotions are commonly identified as the six root afflictions (desire, anger, pride, ignorance, doubt, and affective view) and the twenty secondary afflictions (belligerence, resentment, concealment of faults, verbal spite, jealousy, miserliness, deceit, dissimulation, haughtiness, harmfulness, non-shame, non-embarrassment, lethargy, excitement, non-faith, laziness, non-conscientiousness, forgetfulness, non-introspection, and distraction). See Jeffrey Hopkins, \textit{Meditation on Emptiness} (London: Wisdom, 1983; rev. ed., Boston, Ma.: Wisdom, 1996), 255-266.

\textsuperscript{c} \textit{rgag pa\textsuperscript{2}} \textit{rgag pa'i dus (ni\textit{ityam ni\textit{itya}-k\textit{ālam}) and sher zug sher zug gi dus (dhr\textit{uvam dhr\textit{uvak\textit{ālam})},} (Noriaki Hakamaya, "A Consideration on the Byams Shis ky\textit{i Le\textit{u}}," \textit{Indobukkyo-gaku Kenkyu}, 14, no. 1 [Dec. 1975]: 28). My thanks to John C. Powers for the citation. Lamotte (\textit{Samdhinirmocana}, 70 [9], n. 2) has \textit{ni\textit{ityak\textit{ālam} and lā\textit{ivatuk\textit{ālam}}.

\textsuperscript{d} \textit{chos nyid, dharma-tā}.

\textsuperscript{e} In his commentary on this section, Wonch'uk (Peking 5517, vol. 106, chap. 5, beginning at 133.2.1; Golden Reprint, vol. 128, 791.2) cites these expressions several times but does not gloss the terms. However, as \textit{Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso} (\textit{Port of Entry}, 210.5) points
out, in Wonch'uk's commentary on a passage in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought near the
end of the "Subhūti Chapter" (see also Powers, Wisdom of Buddha, 63):

For permanent, permanent time and everlasting, everlasting time, whether Ones
Gone Thus appear in the world or do not appear in the world, the abiding of the
real nature (chos nyid, dharmañā) of phenomena and the element of a [Superior's]
qualities (chos dbyings, dharmañāna) just exists.

Wonch'uk (Peking 5517, vol. 106, 100.3.4; Karmapa sde dge, vol. 118, 416.5; and Golden
Reprint, vol. 128, 610.2) says:

The thusness (de bzhin nyid, tathata) which is of one taste has not been a oneness
in the past from the very start and hence [the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought
speaks of] "permanent, permanent time," and in the future also it will not be a
oneness, and hence [the sūtra speaks of] "everlasting, everlasting time." During
such times the reality of phenomena abides as the element of a [Superior's]
qualities (ro gcig pa'i de bzhin nyid good ma nas sngar yang gcig pa nyid ma yin pas raag pa
raag pa's dus zhes bya' 'o phyis kyang gcig pa nyid ma yin pas ther zug ther zug gi dus
zhes bya ste dus 'di lia bu mmus chos mmus kyi chos nyid chos kyi dbyings la mmus par
gnas pa').

(What Wonch'uk means by the thoroughly established nature's not being a oneness in
the past and in the future is unclear to me.)

Another occurrence of these phrases is in the "Guṇākara Chapter" (see also Powers,
Wisdom of Buddha, 85-86):

Guṇākara, it is like this: For example, other-powered characters should be viewed
as being (under the influence of) the predispositions for conventions that are
the imputational nature, like a very clear crystal that is in contact with a color. It
is like this: For example, other-powered characters that are apprehended as the
imputational character should be viewed as being like the mistaken apprehension
of the very clear crystal as a sapphire, a great sapphire, a ruby, an emerald, or gold.
Guṇākara, it is like this: For example, the very clear crystal should be viewed as an
other-powered character. Guṇākara, it is like this: For example, just as the very
clear crystal is not thoroughly established as having the character of a sapphire, a
mahāñila, a ruby, an emerald, or gold, and is without those natures in permanent,
permanent time and in everlasting, everlasting time, so other-powered charac-
ters are not thoroughly established in permanent, permanent time and in everlast-
ing, everlasting time as having the imputational character, and are without that
nature; just that non-establishment or naturelessness is to be viewed as the thor-
oughly established character.

Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 210.1), who says that he is drawing from
Wonch'uk, points out that in general "permanent time" (raag pa'i dus) and "everlasting
time" (ther zug gi dus) have various meanings according to context. Both terms refer to
the past in Asaṅga's Activity of the Grounds when it says, "In permanent time and everlasting
time effects are just not fit to exist in causes," whereas in Vasubandhu's Principles of Expla-
nation in the context of a discussion of permanent, stable, and everlasting form, permanent
means not impermanent; stable (bstan pa) means not disintegrating momentarily; and ever-
lasting means the non-disintegration of the continuum, and thus all three refer to the future.
Paramārtha (Wonch'uk, Golden Reprint, vol. 128, 609.2) says that everlasting has the sense
of naturally existing from before [and] even during future states of the path (lam gyi mdun rol
Question: Here [in this passage in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought],
gyi gnas bskabs [sic] na ying/ nga na rang bzhin gyi yod pa'i phyir ther sug), and permanent refers to this mode of reality unceasing even during intermediate and final states of the path (lam gyi bar dang/ tham ma'i gnas skabs na ying/ don gyi ishul 'di 'gag pa med pa'i phyir rtag pa).
However, in the context of the "Subhūti Chapter" of the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought Woonch'uk delimits the meaning of "permanent" to the past and "everlasting" to the future, and this same context applies to the "Paramārthaśamudgata Chapter."

The qualification "this" is used to accord with Gung-tang (Difficult Points, 167.14-168.15) who points out that what Dzong-ka-ba is about to say is true only with respect to this part of the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought. For the sūtra contains another passage that refers to all three non-natures as being the bases in consideration of which Buddha spoke—in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras—of phenomena as unproduced and so forth. That passage is exactly opposite to Dzong-ka-ba's point that although Buddha identifies all three nature as being the bases in consideration of which he spoke—in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras—of non-nature, he did not identify all three natures as being the basis in consideration of which he spoke—in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras—of phenomena as being unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally being passed beyond sorrow. Instead of this, he identified only imputational natures and thoroughly established natures and their respective non-natures as being behind this teaching. Hence, Gung-tang makes the point that Dzong-ka-ba's reference should not be to the sūtra in general but just to the present section on the question and answer concerning the thought behind Buddha's teaching that all phenomena are unproduced, and so forth. Indeed, one can understand that this is Dzong-ka-ba's concern.

The passage that treats all three non-natures as the bases in Buddha's thought when he taught in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras that all phenomena are unproduced, and so forth, occurs later in the seventh chapter, when Buddha explains how various types of trainees understand his teaching in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras (Lamotte, Samdhinirmocana, 75 [17], and 199; and Powers, Wisdom of Buddha, 115):

Paramārthaśamudgata, with respect to this, thinking of just those three types of non-nature, the One Gone Thus, by way of the aspect of setting forth sūtras of interpretable meaning, taught doctrine in this way, "All phenomena are natureless; all phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally passed beyond sorrow."

Here, Buddha explicitly explains that he taught that all phenomena are natureless, unproduced, and so forth, "thinking of just those three types of naturelessness."

By calling attention to this passage, Gung-tang shows that Dzong-ka-ba's statement that Buddha does not do this needs to be limited to the present context of his answer to Paramārthaśamudgata's question, and he also indicates a possible sūtra source for Asaṅga's explanation in his Summary of Manifest Knowledge of the teaching of non-production and so forth in consideration of all three non-natures. Nevertheless, it strikes me that this later passage in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought could be read in the light of Buddha's own earlier explanation, and thus when he says that "thinking of just those three types of naturelessness," he taught that "all phenomena are natureless; all phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally passed beyond sorrow," he does mean that all three
having treated all three [natures] as the bases [in consideration of which he spoke] of non-nature [in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras, Buddha] then did not take the middle non-nature [that is, production-non-natures, or other-powered natures] as the basis [in consideration of which he spoke in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras of all phenomena as] being unproduced and so forth [but mentioned only imputational natures and thoroughly established natures]. However, about the basis [in consideration of which Buddha spoke of not being produced and so forth], Asaṅga’s Summary of Manifest Knowledge also says:

[In the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras it is said that all phenomena are natureless] by reason of the fact that imputational factors are natureless in the sense of not having character [that is, establishment by way of their own character], other-powered natures are natureless in the sense of not having [self]-production, and thoroughly established natures are the ultimate-non-nature.

What is the thought giving rise [to the statements that all phenomena are] “unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow”?

In just the ways that they are natureless, so they are not produced. In just the ways that they are not produced, so they do not cease. In just the ways that they are not produced and do not cease, so they are quiescent from the start. In those ways, they are naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow.

Thus, what is the meaning of [Asaṅga’s] explaining not being produced and so forth in terms of all three characters [whereas the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought at this point relates these only to imputational and thoroughly established natures]?

**Answer:** Concerning this, the Chinese Great Commentary [by Wonch’uk] explains that:

- the Sūtra [Unraveling the Thought]’s not mentioning other-powered natures as the basis in [Buddha’s] thought [when he spoke] of not being produced and so forth [in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras] is in order to indicate that dependently arisen objects are not nonexistent, whereas

were the bases with respect to which he made each of these five teachings but that, as he explained earlier, the bases in consideration of which he made the individual statements are found within the three non-natures. For extended discussion, see Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s *Port of Entry*, 214.6-218.1.

\* Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (*Port of Entry*, 218.1) calls for analysis of what “also” (kyang) might mean.

\* In Wonch’uk’s treatment of the thoughts behind Buddha’s teaching of no production and so forth in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras (Peking 5517, vol. 106, chap. 5, 132.5.1-135.1.5), the reference here (134.2.6) is found in his lengthy and extremely well-
The explanation in Asaṅga’s *Summary of Manifest Knowledge* is in terms of the non-existence of production by itself and of causeless production.

Our own system’s answer: Since other-powered natures have production and cessation that exist by way of their own character, the statements concerning no production and no cessation are not in consideration of other-powered natures. Also, since most other-powered natures are included within [the class of] thoroughly afflicted phenomena, at this point in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* they are not treated as the basis of the latter two terms [that is, “quiescent from the start” and “naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow.”]

That is the thought of this sūtra passage. A documented discussion of this specific point (Peking 5517, vol. 106, chap. 5, 133.3.6; and Golden Reprint, vol. 128, 832.6). He says:

The teaching, in dependence upon imputational natures, in treatises such as the *Very Extensive One Hundred Stanzas* and so forth (*bstan bcos shing tu rgyas pa brgya pa la sogs pa*) that all phenomena are natureless, unproduced, unceasing, and so forth indicates that dependently arisen objects are not nonexistent. Therefore, these sūtras also, thinking of the three natures in general, teach that all phenomena are natureless and, thinking of the first and last natures, teach [that all phenomena] are unproduced, and so forth.

In the next sentence Dzong-ka-ba implicitly criticizes Wonch’uk for referring to the mere existence of dependent-arising and not their “existence by way of their own character.” Dzong-ka-ba’s procedure is typical; first, he gives Wonch’uk credit for the general point but then reexplain the issue to improve the presentation. (The remainder of Dzong-ka-ba’s explanation—“whereas...causeless production”—accords exactly with Wonch’uk’s text.)

1. Da-drin-rap-den’s *Annotations* (33.1) glosses “production by itself” (*bdag nyid kyi skye ba*) with “autonomous production” (*rang dbang gi skye ba*).

2. Wonch’uk (Peking 5517, vol. 106, chap. 5, 134.2.7; and Golden Reprint, vol. 128, 833.2) says:

Because other-powered entities are produced in dependence upon others but do not have the meaning of being produced by themselves and of being produced causelessly, [Asaṅga’s] *Summary of Manifest Knowledge Treatise* and so forth say that stemming from the three aspects of natures, [Buddha] taught that all phenomena are natureless, unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow.

I agree with Gung-tang (Difficult Points, 125.4.) that “production by itself” (*bdag nyid kyi skye ba*) means intrinsic production as in the Nihiliṣṭa School, but it is intriguing to note that Dzong-ka-ba does not criticize Wonch’uk for describing Asaṅga’s view of the production that other-powered entities lack as “being produced by themselves and being produced causelessly.” Wonch’uk indeed seems not to be giving two ways of referring to causeless production but to offer two different explanations (autonomous production and causeless production) since, at least in the Tibetan translation, he uses the term “by” (*kyi*) for the first type and connects the two with “and” (*dang*)—*bdag nyid kyi skye ba dang rgya med las skye ba*. When Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso recapitulates Wonch’uk’s meaning (Port of Entry, 212.40), he gets around the problem by switching “and” to “or” (*iam*), thereby making the second explanation into a gloss of the first. See Absorption, #68.
[On the other hand] Asaṅga was thinking that—in terms of the [type of] non-nature that does not exist with respect to each of the three natures—just as they are natureless so they also are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and primordially passed beyond sorrow. Thus, he explained it that way in his Summary of Manifest Knowledge. [Hence, since the two modes of exposition serve different purposes, they do not conflict in essential meaning.]

* The meaning is clearly stated in Bṣa-jor-hūn-drup’s Lamp for the Teaching (23.7-24.5): There is a basis in [Buddha’s] thought for explaining in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras that [all] phenomena are unproduced, and so forth, because [Buddha said such] thinking of all three [natures]—imputational, other-powered, and thoroughly established natures.

* Imputational natures are said to be “unproduced” because they are unproduced by way of their own character. They are said to be “unceasing” because they do not cease by way of their own character. They are said to be quiescent from the start and naturally passed beyond sorrow because they are not afflicted phenomena [since, as Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 213.6) adds, they are uncompounded]

* There is a reason for saying that other-powered natures are “unproduced, unceasing,” for they are not produced by their own power without depending on conditions and do not cease by their own power. [As Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 214.2) fleshes out the remaining two, other-powered natures are said to be “quiescent from the start and naturally passed beyond sorrow,” because without depending on conditions they do not exist as thoroughly afflicted phenomena.]

* There is a reason for saying that thoroughly established natures are “unproduced, unceasing” because they are not produced and do not cease as the nature that is a self of phenomena. [Or, as Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 213.2) puts it, thoroughly established natures are “unproduced, unceasing” because they are the suchness that is not produced and does not cease as either a self of persons or a self of phenomena.] They are said to be “quiescent from the start” and “naturally passed beyond sorrow” because they are without afflictions that are the nature of a self of phenomena [that is, that are established by way of their own character as referents of conceptual consciousness]. There is entailment because, on this occasion, it is fitting to take “sorrow” as the affective emotions [Or, as Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 214.3) puts it, thoroughly established natures are said to be “quiescent from the start” and “naturally passed beyond sorrow” because of being naturally passed beyond the afflictions in the sense of being established as either of the two selves.]

b Ōzong-ka-pañ is showing that the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought itself at this point differs in its presentation from Asaṅga and so forth but that the latter have good reason for treating it the way they do. Da-drin-rap-den (Annotations, 33.5) indicates that Vasubandhu’s The Thirty and so forth accord with Asaṅga’s presentation.
3. The Three Natures

Identifying The Entities Of The Three Natures (271) {383}

[Imputational Nature Of A Form]om (271) {383}

_**Question:**_ If imputational factors are character-non-natures, what are imputational factors themselves?

_Answer:_ About that, in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* [the Bodhisattva Paramārthaśasmudgata says during his rerendering of the meaning of Buddha’s answer]:

That which is posited by names and terminology—a—with respect to [other-powered natures which are] (1) the objects of activity of conceptuality, b (2) the foundations of imputational characters, c and (3) those which have the signs of compositional phenomena—in the character of entities or particulars [such as, “This is”] d a form aggregate, and that which is posited by names and terminology in the character of entities or the character of particulars [that is, attributes, such as] “the production of the form aggregate,” “the cessation of the form aggregate,” “the abandonment and thorough knowledge of the form aggregate” are imputational characters. b

The three phrases [that is, “the objects of activity of conceptuality,” “the foundations of imputational characters,” and “those which have the signs of compositional phenomena”] e indicate the bases of the imputation of imputational factors [—these being other-powered natures].

The rest of it indicates the mode of imputation. The imputation as, “This

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a Jik-mas-dam-chö-gya-tso (*Port of Entry*, 228.4) identifies the meaning of “That which is posited by names and terminology” as:

establishment by way of its own character as an entity for imputation by terms and conceptual consciousnesses (nyon ma rgyud gi brag pa'i ngo bo rang gi mthun nyo gis grub pa).

b rnam par rgyud pa'i sphyod yang, vikalpa-gocara (Étienne Lamotte, *Samdhinirmocanasūtra: L'Explication des mystères* (Louvain: Université de Louvain, 1935), 81 [25], n. 12).

c kun brtags pa'i mthun nyo kyi gnas, parikāpa-talakṣaṇa-rāya (ibid., 81 [25], n. 13).

d 'du byed kyi mthun ma, samkāramittta (ibid., 81 [25], n. 14).

e ngo bo nyo kyi mthun nyo, svabhāvalakṣaṇa (ibid., 81 [25], n. 16).

f “This is a form aggregate” is an illustration of the mode of imputation of entities, whereas the rest are illustrations of the mode of imputation of attributes.

g bye brag gi mthun nyo, viṣesalakṣaṇa (Lamotte, *Samdhinirmocana*, 81 [25], n. 17).

h Da-drin-rab-'den (*Annotations*, 34.5) adds that although these are imputed as form and so forth, they are not actual form and so forth.
is a form aggregate," is the mode of imputation of an entity, and the imputation as "[This] is the production of a form aggregate," and so forth is the mode of imputation of particulars, or attributes. These will be explained in detail later (195).

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a  "di gzugs phung ngo zhes.

b  gzugs phung skye o shes.

c  Wonch’uk (Golden Reprint, vol. 129, 141.5ff) seeks to explain the meaning of the sūtra’s speaking of both entity and particular on the occasion of both entity and particular:

That which is posited by names and terminology...in the character of entities or particulars [such as, “This is a form aggregate” and that which is posited by names and terminology in the character of entities or the character of particulars [that is, attributes, such as] “the production of the form aggregate,” “the cessation of the form aggregate,” and “the abandonment and thorough knowledge of the form aggregate” are imputational characters.

Following Wonch’uk, Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 227.6, 236.2) posits two types of imputation each with respect to entity and attribute:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Imputation of just the entity that is an imputation of entity (ngo bo la kun btags pa ’i kun btags su gyun pa ’i ngo bo nyid la kun btags pa)</th>
<th>“This is a form” (’di ni gzugs so)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imputation of a particular that is an imputation of entity (ngo bo la kun btags pa ’i kun btags su gyun pa ’i bye brag la kun btags pa)</td>
<td>“This is a contaminated form” (’di ni zag bas kyi gzugs so)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imputation of just the entity that is an imputation of attribute (khyad bar la kun btags pa ’i kun btags su gyun pa ’i ngo bo nyid la kun btags pa)</td>
<td>“Form is produced” (gzugs skye ’o)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imputation of a particular that is an imputation of attribute (khyad bar la kun btags pa ’i kun btags su gyun pa ’i bye brag la kun btags pa)</td>
<td>“Form is produced momentarily” (gzugs skad cig la skye ’o)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This is an ingenious way to explain why the sūtra mentions both entity and particular for each type.

d  Gung-ru Chö-jung (23b.5) points out that, with regard to the imputation of an entity and an attribute, what is being refuted is not merely the imputation of that which is bulbous, flat based, and capable of holding fluid (which is the defining nature of a pot) as a pot and the imputation of such as the production of a pot. Rather, what is being refuted is that what is bulbous, flat based, and capable of holding fluid is established by way of its own character as the object expressed by the term “pot” and that what is bulbous, flat based, and capable of holding fluid is established by way of its own character as the object expressed by the term “production of pot.” As Drong-ka-ba says in chap. 9 (p. 195):

Those imputational factors—which are such that a consciousness conceiving imputational factors to be established by way of their own character is asserted to be a consciousness conceiving a self of phenomena—are the nominally and terminologically imputed factors [in the imputation of] the aggregates and so forth as entities. “This is form,” and as attributes, “This is the production of form,” and so forth. Since the aggregates and so forth do exist as just those [entities of such nominal and terminological imputation], the [mere] conception that they exist as
[Other-Powered Nature Of A Form]™ (271) [383]

Question: If other-powered natures are natureless in terms of production, what are other-powered natures?

Answer: About that, in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought [the Bodhisattva Paramārthaśasumudgata says during his rerendering of the meaning of Buddha’s answer]:

Those which are the objects of activity of conceptuality, the foundations of imputational characters, and have the signs of compositional phenomena are other-powered characters.

The first [that is, “those which are the objects of activity of conceptuality”] indicates of what [type of consciousness other-powered natures] are objects. The

those [entities of such nominal and terminological imputation] is not a superimposition; rather, the conception that the aggregates and so forth exist by way of their own character as those entities [of such nominal and terminological imputation] is a superimposition.

Hence, it is not the act of imputation that is being refuted, nor the mere existence of entities and attributes. Rather, it is being refuted that objects are established by way of their own character as the referents of terms for entities and attributes and of conceptual consciousnesses thinking of such.

As Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 225.6) points out, Wonch’uk (Golden Reprint, vol. 129, 140.6) says that conceptuality refers to both (conceptual) main minds and mental factors. Wonch’uk offers two explanations on how other-powered natures are the objects of activity of conceptual consciousnesses:

• the form aggregate and so forth are the objects of conceptual consciousnesses
• the form aggregate and so forth are observed-object-conditions of conceptual consciousnesses

Wonch’uk himself prefers the first explanation. Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso refers to the fact that Gung-tang, in his Annotations, indicates that forms and so forth could only be taken as observed-object-conditions in the sense of appearing to conceptual consciousnesses (snang ba’i dmigs rkyen) or as imputed observed-object-conditions (dmigs rkyen brag pa ba)—his meaning being that they could not be actual conditions generating consciousnesses, since they would then be external objects. Gung-tang himself, as Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 265.2) points out, takes object of activity (spyod yul) to mean object of observation (dmigs yul), with the caveat that whatever is the object of observation of an awareness is not necessarily an object of activity of that awareness:

• since otherwise all conventional phenomena would have to be the objects of activity of an exalted wisdom of a Superior’s meditative equipoise directly realizing emptiness (because it is held that the objects of observation of a consciousness directly realizing emptiness are all phenomena, since they are the bases of emptiness even though they are not perceived), and

• since otherwise an omniscient consciousness would have to be an object of activity (that is to say, in the sphere) of a common consciousness of an ordinary being (because an ordinary being can think about an omniscient consciousness).
second [that is, "the foundations of imputational characters"] indicates that they are the bases of imputation of the imputational factor. The third [that is, "those that have the signs of a compositional phenomenon"] indicates their own entities.∗

[Thoroughly Established Nature Of A Form]∗∗ (272) (383)

Question: If the thoroughly established nature is the ultimate-non-nature, what is it?

Answer: About that, in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought [the Bodhisattva Paramārthaśasamudgata says during his rerendering of the meaning of Buddha’s answer].∗∗

The thoroughly established character is that which is:

• the thorough non-establishment—of just those [other-powered

∗ According to Da-drin-rap-den (Annotations, 35.6), this phrase merely indicates that other-powered natures are "compositional phenomena"—a term which sometimes is equivalent to "compounded phenomena" (du byas, samkhyā) but also may refer to all phenomena (see also p. 91, footnote e).

Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 226.5) refers to the fact that Woonch’uk (Golden Reprint, vol. 129, 141.3) prefers the second of two interpretations of the phrase "(having) the signs of a compositional phenomenon":

• Having the signs of an object of a consciousness observing a compositional phenomenon
• Having the signs of the aspects of a compounded phenomenon

Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso praises the fact that Gung-tang prefers the first in order to include all phenomena. This must be because the looser meaning of "compositional phenomenon" includes permanent phenomena whereas "compounded phenomenon" does not. Still, the term "compositional phenomenon" also could be taken in its stricter sense as compounded phenomenon if we say that the sūtra is referring to the main bases of emptiness; see Ser-thöl’s Notes, 20a.2.

∗∗ Chap. 7; Lamotte, Samdhinirmocana, 81 [25], and 204; Dön-drup-gyen-ten’s Four Intertwined Commentaries, 21.6; and John C. Powers, Wisdom of Buddha: Samdhinirmocana Sūtra (Berkeley, Calif.: Dharma, 1995), 131-132. The passage is basically saying that a thoroughly established nature is the non-establishment of the imputational nature in an other-powered nature and that this non-establishment is what must be comprehended in order to bring about purification. The thoroughly established nature is, therefore, not the other-powered nature seen under a different light; it is not the other-powered nature empty of the imputational nature; rather, it is just the absence of the imputational nature in the other-powered nature. The thoroughly established nature is a mere absence, a mere negative, of a falsely imagined status; it is not an other-powered nature devoid of that imagined status. This is a central point in Dzong-ka-ā’s interpretation, and he has good sources here and elsewhere in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought itself. See Reflections on Reality, chap. 15.

∗∗∗ It is clear from this usage of "thorough non-establishment" that the term "thoroughly established nature" refers not to something achieved by spiritual practice but to a character of
natures which are\textsuperscript{a} the objects of activity of conceptuality, the foundations of imputational characters, and those which have the signs of compositional phenomena—as that imputational character,\textsuperscript{a}

- just the naturelessness of only that [imputational] nature,
- the absence of self in phenomena,
- thusness,\textsuperscript{b} and
- the object of observation of purification.\textsuperscript{c}

"[The absence of self] in phenomena..." identifies as the thoroughly established nature just that selflessness of phenomena called "thusness" through observation of and meditation on which obstructions are purified.\textsuperscript{d} What is the selflessness of phenomena? It is "just the naturelessness [of the imputational nature that is the object of negation in the view of selflessness]."\textsuperscript{e} "Just" means "only that."\textsuperscript{e}

What sort of nature is nonexistent? With "of only that [imputational] nature," it speaks of the imputational nature mentioned before."Only" eliminates anything else; therefore, it does not refer to the naturelessness [that is, the absence] of the other two natures [that is, other-powered natures and imputational natures as the Jo-nang-bas say]\textsuperscript{b} but means that the non-existence of the phenomena that is so.

\textsuperscript{a} It is clear that "imputational character" here refers to the object of negation in selflessness, for example, an object's being established by way of its own character as the referent of a conceptual consciousness. Here, the term does not refer to existent imputational characters, such as uncompounded space.

\textsuperscript{b} \textit{de} \textit{dzin} \textit{nyid}, \textit{tathatā} (Lamotte, \textit{Samdhinirmocana}, 82 [25], n. 32).

\textsuperscript{c} \textit{rnam par dag pa’i damg pa}, \textit{vāsuddhālambana}.

\textsuperscript{d} See \textit{Absorption}, #153-167.

\textsuperscript{e} \textit{ngo bo nyid} ma mchis pa nyid ni de kho na zhes pa’i don no; see the Text, p. 384. The first de is a continuative after an implicit yin and is not the first syllable of the word de nyid. Đöng-ka-ba is saying that nyid in ma mchis pa nyid means de kho na. He emphasizes that the thoroughly established nature is only this absence of the imputational nature, that is, of self, which, in terms of the self of phenomena, is identified here mainly as an object's establishment by way of its own character as the referent of a conceptual consciousness. The mere non-establishment or non-existence of this imputational nature in an other-powered nature is a thoroughly established nature. Đöng-ka-ba makes this point in order to set up his refutation of the Jo-nang-ba assertion, which will follow soon. (It should be noticed that, for similar reasons, the thoroughly established nature is not the other-powered nature empty of the imputational nature but the other-powered natures' emptiness itself of the imputational nature.) Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (\textit{Port of Entry}, 233.5) refers to chapter 6 of the \textit{Stūra Unraveling the Thought}, the "Questions of Guṇākāra"; see \textit{Absorption}, #97.

\textsuperscript{f} See ibid., #169.

\textsuperscript{g} Shay-rap-gyel-ten’s \textit{Ocean of Definitive Meaning} (11.1) says:

Just that final Buddha, the matrix of One Gone Thus, the ultimate clear light, basic element of [superior] qualities, self-arisen exalted wisdom, great bliss, partless
nature of only the imputational factor\textsuperscript{a} is taken as the thoroughly established nature.

With respect to what is explained by the previous "just those,"\textsuperscript{b} the statement "of just those [other-powered natures] which are (1) the objects of activity of conceptuality, (2) the foundations of imputational characters, and (3) those which have the signs of compositional phenomena"\textsuperscript{c} indicates that other-powered natures are the bases of emptiness. Then, "non-establishment as the imputational character" very clearly [indicates] that the emptiness of the imputational factor in just those [other-powered natures]\textsuperscript{d} is the thoroughly established nature.

[Refuting The Jo-nang-\textsuperscript{bas}' Position]\textsuperscript{e} (272) (384)

Hence, it is contradictory [for the Jo-nang-\textsuperscript{bas}]\textsuperscript{e} to assert that this sūtra's teaching on the mode of emptiness is of definitive meaning and to assert that the last nature's emptiness of the first two natures is the thoroughly established nature\textsuperscript{f} [that is to say, that the thoroughly established nature's emptiness of the imputational and other-powered natures is the thoroughly established nature].\textsuperscript{g} Also, with respect to the mode of emptiness, it is not [as in the Jo-nang-
The negation of something that exists somewhere else, like a place's being empty [or devoid] of a pot. Rather, just as a person is without substantial existence, so other-powered natures are empty of being established as the imputational nature. Therefore, the sūtra speaks of "the thorough non-establishment of just those [other-powered natures]...as that imputational character."

With respect to the imputational factor of which [other-powered natures] are empty, on both occasions of identifying the imputational factor in the sūtra it does not speak of any other imputational factor than just factors imputed in the manner of entities and attributes. I will explain the reason for this later.

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1 Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s *Port of Entry*, 232.2. In this vein, Shāy-rap-gyel-tsen’s *Ocean of Definitive Meaning* (188.3) speaks of the ultimate as being other-empty without being self-empty as in the examples of a horse not existing in a bull and a bull not existing in a horse. Also, his *Fourth Council says* (Stearns, *The Buddha from Dol po*, 215), “Not empty of self-nature, but empty of other, was stated by means of similes such as an empty village and an empty vase.” The people of an empty village exist somewhere else, as do water and flowers.

2 According to Pān-chen Şō-nam-drak-ba (*Garland of Blue Lilies*, 28a.4) and Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (*Port of Entry*, 232.0), the first occasion is constituted by Buddha’s answer to Paramārthaśamudgata, when he says:

Concerning that, what are character-non-natures of phenomena? Those which are imputational characters.

Why? It is thus: Those [imputational characters] are characters posited by names and terminology and do not subsist by way of their own character. Therefore, they are said to be "character-non-natures."

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This was discussed in the previous chapter (p. 86). The other is that discussed in this chapter (p. 104):

That which is posited by names and terminology—with respect to [other-powered natures which are] (1) the objects of activity of conceptuality, (2) the foundations of imputational characters, and (3) those which have the signs of compositional phenomena—in the character of entities [such as, "This is"] a form aggregate, or the character of particulars [that is, attributes, such as] "the production of the form aggregate," "the cessation of the form aggregate," "the abandonment and thorough knowledge of the form aggregate" are imputational characters.

However, Śer-shül (*Notes*, 49b.5) identifies the first as the latter of these two and the second as the similar discussion with respect to true sufferings. It is likely that his reason is that in the earlier passage entity and attributes are not mentioned; nevertheless, I prefer Pān-chen Şō-nam-drak-ba’s and Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s identification, since those two passages are not repetitive.

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Pan-chen Şō-nam-drak-ba (*Garland of Blue Lilies*, 28b.2) and Jik-may-dam-chö-gyatso (*Port of Entry*, 233.2) identify the later explanation as (p. 217):

Although among imputational factors in general there are many, such as all generally characterized phenomena, space, and so forth, the reason why these are not [explicitly] mentioned in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* is that they are not relevant on the occasion of the imputational factor, the emptiness of which is posited as the thoroughly established nature.
[The Three Natures Of Other Phenomena]^{385} (273) {384}

[Paramārthaśāmudgata]^{386} says that in just the way that [the three natures]^{387} are applied to the form aggregate, three natures each are applied also with respect to each of the remaining four aggregates, the twelve sense-spheres,^{4} the twelve limbs of dependent-arising, and the four foods, as well as the six and eighteen constituents.^{5} With respect to true sufferings, [Paramārthaśāmudgata] speaks of the bases of imputation^{4} as before, [that is, as the objects of activity of concep-

The other type of imputational nature of which phenomena are empty is a difference of entity between subject and object. In chapter 12 (p. 194), Dzong-ka-ba explains the connection between these two types of objects of negation and their emptiness. At the beginning of that discussion he says:

In many texts of this [system] there is no explanation of a consciousness conceiving a self of phenomena other than that a consciousness conceiving apprehended-object and apprehending-subject as other substantial entities is a consciousness conceiving a self of phenomena. However, the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought explains that other-powered natures are not established by way of their own character as factors imputed in the manner of entity and of attribute and that, therefore, the absence of [such] a nature of character is the selflessness of phenomena. Thus, implicitly it teaches that a consciousness conceiving that factors imputed in the manner of entity and attribute are established by way of their own character in other-powered natures is a consciousness conceiving a self of phenomena.

Concluding that section in the same chapter (p. 217), he says:

Therefore, it is also not that a negation of an otherness of substantial entity between apprehended-object and apprehending-subject is absent in the statements in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought that the emptiness of imputational factors imputed in the manner of entities and attributes is the thoroughly established nature.

[Not only that, but also,] in that sūtra on the occasion of [discussing] calm abiding [in the “Questions of Maitreya Chapter”], a refutation of external objects is clearly set forth.

For discussion of the latter point, see Reflections on Reality, chap. 20; and Absorption, #52, 53 (for another point, see Absorption, #87).

{4} As Gung-tang ([Difficult Points, 207.11-207.13]) says, Buddha is the one who applies the three natures to each phenomenon in his answer to Paramārthaśāmudgata’s question, and Paramārthaśāmudgata is the one who says or reports this back to Buddha to demonstrate his understanding. Thus, the agents of “apply” (ṣbyar) and “say” (gungs) are different, Buddha and Paramārthaśāmudgata respectively.

{5} See Absorption, #139-152.

{5} It is intriguing that Paramārthaśāmudgata uses the standard list of phenomena as presented in the Lesser Vehicle in his layout of the three natures, rather than the list of 108 phenomena gleaned from the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras.

{4} A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso ([Precious Lamp, 137.2]) points out that the term “basis of imputation” here refers to the basis of imputation of the imputational nature; as in the case of a person, the basis of imputation of the imputational nature is the person itself. The term here does not refer, as it usually does, to the mental and physical aggregates, for instance, that are
tuality, (2) the foundations of imputational characters, and (3) those which have the signs of compositional phenomena, that is to say, as the other-powered natures themselves. He says that those that are posited by names and terminology as the entity, "true suffering," and as particulars, "thorough knowledge of true sufferings [as objects to be abandoned]," are imputational factors. Also, [Paramārthasamudgata] speaks of other-powered natures, as before, to be objects of activity of conceptuality, foundations of an imputational factor, and those which have the signs of compositional phenomena. Also, the thoroughly established nature is as before; he says that it is "the non-nature of just that imputational nature." [Paramārthasamudgata says that] such is also likewise to be applied to the remaining truths [that is, true sources, cessations, and paths].

[Three natures each] are also applied to the seven groups of the [thirty-seven] harmonies with enlightenment. [Paramārthasamudgata] speaks of the basis of imputation as before; the imputational factors are factors imputed in the manner of entity [such as] "right meditative stabilization" and of attributes [such as] their respective discordances, antidotes, and so forth mentioned earlier. He speaks of the other two natures [other-powered and thoroughly established natures] in the same way as he did about those of true sufferings.

[Summary]

These [statements] are Paramārthasamudgata's presentation to the Teacher [Buddha] within a style of positing three characters each with respect to each of [the phenomena] ranging from the form aggregate through the branches of the basis of imputation of a person.

* About the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment, the Śūra Unraveling the Thought says:

The Supramundane Victor also spoke, in many ways, of the own-character of the four mindful establishments, as well as speaking of their classes of discordances, antidotes, production of that which has not been produced, the abiding of that which has been produced, non-loss, their arising again, and increasing and extending. Just as he did with respect to the mindful establishments, so he spoke with respect to the thorough abandonings, the legs of magical manifestation, the faculties, the powers, and the branches of enlightenment. The Supramundane Victor also spoke, in many ways, of the own-character of the eightfold path of Supremes, as well as speaking of their discordances, antidotes, production of that which has not been produced, the abiding of that which has been produced, recollection, their arising again, and increasing and extending.

For Dzong-ka-βa's abridgment of this passage, see p. 77.
path, which were mentioned earlier on the occasion of his question about dispelling contradiction. [The context of Paramārthasamudgata’s remarks is that he is saying] “I understand the Teacher’s explanation of the three non-natures within thinking of such.”

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\[1\] *bdag gi* go’i; Text, p. 385; Delhi NG *de ra shis lhan po*, 499A. Dzong-ka-ba is glossing the term *‘shal* in the sūtra (Lamotte, *Samdhinirmocana*, 80-81 [25]): *bdom ldan ’das bcom ldan ’das kyi bka’ stsal pa’i don bdag gi’ di ltar *‘shal* te. In general, *‘shal* has many meanings, among which is “to understand”; Lamotte (*Samdhinirmocana*, 81 [25], n. 11) gives the Sanskrit as *pratyṣā* and translates it into French (203) as *comprends*. 
4. The Overall Meaning

The presentation of [Paramārthasamudgata’s] offering [to Buddha] the meaning established by these [passages] has two parts: citing the sūtra and explaining its meaning a little.

Citing The Sūtra (274) [386]

Thus, in [Buddha’s] scriptures, there are three sets of sūtras:

- [A first wheel] teaching that phenomena exist by way of their own character
- [A middle wheel] teaching that phenomena are not established by way of their own character
- [A final wheel] differentiating well whether phenomena are or are not established by way of their own character

Furthermore, these are twofold—(1) that [final set of sūtras] which does and (2) those [first two sets of sūtras] which do not differentiate well the existence and non-existence of nature [with respect to the three natures]. That which does is of definitive meaning since it is not to be interpreted otherwise, and those that do not are of interpretable meaning since they must be interpreted otherwise.

Moreover, since the latter are of two types, it is known through the force of the previous explanation [on the occasion of Paramārthasamudgata’s question about dispelling contradiction and of Buddha’s answer] that two sets of sūtras [that is, the first and middle wheels] require interpretation and one [that is, the final wheel] is of definitive meaning. Paramārthasamudgata offers to the Teacher the mode in which just the meaning implicitly abiding [in the question and answer and the presentation of the three natures] becomes [a differentiation of] the interpretable and the definitive in connection with the three wheels of doctrine by way of a temporal series. In the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought

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1. As Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 286.6) says, these are the passages associated with the three previous sections—the question about dispelling contradiction in the sūtras, the answer dispelling that contradiction, and identifying the entities of the three natures.

2. Gung-tang specifies what is explicitly indicated in a much more developed way (paraphrasing Difficult Points, 232.15):

Buddha has explicitly described the mode of pronouncement in the first and middle wheels as:

- not differentiating from within the three natures what are and are not established by way of their own character, and
- pronouncing in the first wheel that all phenomena equally are established by way of their own character and in the second wheel that all phenomena are
[Paramārthaśamudgata does this by saying to Buddha]:

Initially, in the area of Varaṇasi in the Deer Park called “Sage’s Propounding,” the Supramundane Victor thoroughly turned a wheel of doctrine for those engaged in the Hearer Vehicle, fantastic and marvelously established by way of their own character.

Buddha has also explicitly indicated the damage to such positions and has explicitly indicated the thought behind the middle wheel (and hence has implicitly indicated the thought behind the first wheel). Through the force of these points, it is implicitly indicated that:

* the first two wheels of doctrine require interpretation,* and there is another definitive wheel of doctrine (for example, the Śūra Unraveling the Thought) that differentiates what is and is not established by way of its own character and is definitive

* since these were set forth in a temporal series, a convention of three wheels of doctrine as well as names and meanings of all three wheels are to be associated with the three types of sūtras.

These latter points are what are implicitly indicated here.

* “Over Gung-tang’s open objection, this clause cogently is added by Jik-may-dam-chö-gyatso’s Port of Entry (280.2) with the justification (281.5-282.5) that even if the means of differentiating what requires interpretation and what is definitive are explicitly and extensively set forth in the question and answer, and so forth, it is not explicitly indicated that two types of sūtras require interpretation and that one type is definitive, much as when it is proven that a sound is momentary because of being a product, it is not explicitly proven that a sound is impermanent, even though momentariness is the meaning of impermanence.

Jik-may-dam-chö-gyatsō (Port of Entry, 280.3ff) lists various opinions on what is implicitly indicated:

* Jam-γang-shay-βa’s Decisive Analysis of the Perfections: the delimitation of the wheels of doctrine to three

* An unidentified text mentioned in Jam-γang-shay-βa’s Decisive Analysis of the Perfections: a question about the final wheel

* Jang-gyatsa’s Presentation of Tenets: that there are three categories of sūtras to be explained as requiring interpretation or being definitive

* Gung-tang’s Annotation: associating the conventions (that is, names) of the three wheels with whether they require interpretation or are definitive

* Gung-tang’s Difficult Points: (see above minus the additional clause)

a) drag song smra ba, rgyud lag rgyan (Étienne Lamotte, Samdhinirmocanaśīla: L’Explication des mystères (Louvain: Université de Louvain, 1935), 85 [30], n. 3). A-ku Lo-drö-gyatsö (Precious Lamp, 141.5) cites an explanation in the Great Exposition (rje lde bshad mdzad chen mo, mahāsūkha) that it is called Sage’s Propounding because it is a place where Buddha, the supreme of sages, propounded doctrine.

b) nyan thos kyi thig pa la yang dag par zhug pa, rdo rje lde bshad dge legs pa, sam, rgyud lag rgyan (Lamotte, Samdhinirmocana, 85 [30], n. 5). Jik-may-dam-chö-gyatsö (Port of Entry, 228.4) explains that “vehicle” here means the scriptural collections of the Hearers, these being the Hearer vehicle as verbalizing words (rje lde bshad dge legs gi thig pa).

c) ngo mthar, ācārya (Lamotte, Samdhinirmocana, 86 [30], n. 8).
velous⁴ which none—god or human—had previously turned in a
similar fashion in the world, through teaching the aspects of the four
noble truths.⁵ Furthermore, that wheel of doctrine thoroughly turned
by the Supramundane Victor is surpassable,⁶ affords an occasion [for
refutation],⁷ requires interpretation,⁸ and serves as a basis for contro-
versy.⁹

Based on just the naturelessness of all phenomena and based on
just the absence of production, the absence of cessation, quiescence
from the start, and naturally passed beyond sorrow, the Supramund-
ane Victor turned a second wheel of doctrine, for those engaged in
the Great Vehicle,¹⁰ very fantastic and marvelous, through the aspect
of speaking on emptiness.¹¹ Furthermore, that wheel of doctrine turned
by the Supramundane Victor is surpassable, affords an occasion [for
refutation], requires interpretation, and serves as a basis for contro-
versy.

However,¹² based on just the naturelessness of phenomena and
based on just the absence of production, the absence of cessation, quie-
scence from the start, and naturally passed beyond sorrow, the Su-
pramundane Victor turned a third wheel of doctrine for those engaged
in all vehicles,¹³ possessed of good differentiation,¹⁴ fantastic and marvel-
ous.¹⁵ This wheel of doctrine turned by the Supramundane Victor is

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Footnotes:

1. rmad du byung ba, adbhuta (ibid., 86 [30], n. 9).
2. See Absorption, #19, 20.
3. bla na mchis pa, sa-uttara (Lamotte, Samdhinirmocana, 86 [30], n. 14).
4. skabs mchis pa, sa-atavakā (ibid., 86 [30], n. 15).
5. drang ba'i don, neyārtha (ibid., 86 [30], n. 16).
6. rtogs pa'i bzhi'i gnas, vivādādhi-karunā (ibid., 86 [30], n. 17).
7. brisams, arabhya (ibid., 86 [30], n. 18). Gung-tang (Difficult Points, 236.10) explains
   that brisams here means "taking such and such as substrata" (khyad gzhir bzung ba),
   although in other places it means that "the thought comes down to such and such" (dgon; pa der 'bab
   pa tsam).
8. For the Go-mang tradition of Gung-ru Chö-jung, Jam-yang-shay-ba, Gung-tang, and
   A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso, the second wheel—taking these as its substrata—teaches on the literal
   level that all phenomena are not established from their own side.
9. stong pa nyid smos pa'i rnuam pas, tāṇyatāvādākārana (ibid., 86 [30], n. 20).
10. Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 294.2) points out the disjunctive function of
    the Tibetan lag'i kyi that follows the description of the middle wheel but not the first, since
    both require interpretation; it serves to separate out the third wheel.
11. Jeg par rnuam par phyre ba dang idan pa, swuabhakṣa (ibid., 86 [30], n. 22).
12. The stog Palace edition of the sutra (70.4) reads "extremely fantastic and extremely
unsurpassable, does not afford an occasion [for refutation], is of de-
finitive meaning, and does not serve as a basis for controversy.

Explaining A Little The Meaning Of That [Passage In The Sūtra
Unraveling the Thought] (274) (387)

There are two parts: explaining a little the meaning of the words of the sūtra
marvelous" (ba cang yang ngo mighar la/ ba cang yang rma’am du byung ba). Gung-tang (Dif-
cicult Points, 247.1-247.5) rejects similar readings (shin tu ngo mighar rma’am du byung ba) in:

• the rgyud bstan edition (this most likely being an early-seventeenth-century block-print
edition prepared at rgyud bstan phun tshogs gling Monastery built by the great Jo-nang-ba
master Taranātha, who was second only in importance to Shay-rap-gyel-tsen to the Jo-
nang-ba School; the monastery was taken over by the Ge-luk-ba order in 1650); and

• in Wonch’uk’s commentary. (Although Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso, 307.5, reports that
Wonch’uk’s text does not have this reading, the Peking [5517, vol. 106, chap. 5,
170.1.8] does.)

Gung-tang says that he rejects such readings because they contradict many other editions as
well as the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought as it is cited in Asaṅga’s Compendium of Ascertai-
ments. I would add that calling the final wheel of doctrine "extremely fantastic and extremely
marvelous" goes against the basic Ge-luk-ba position that even for the Proponents of Mind-
Only the middle wheel is the supreme teaching for the Bodhisattvas who are sharper than
those for whom the third wheel was specifically taught. This is because these sharp Bodhi-
sattvas can understand the doctrine of the three natures and the three non-natures just from
hearing the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras, and so forth (see Gung-tang’s Difficult Points,
245.10-247.1). For this reason, the version of sūtra accepted in Ge-luk-ba circles speaks only
of the middle wheel as being "very fantastic and marvelous."

In the seventh chapter of the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought, Buddha speaks about the
various types of sentient beings to whom he teaches doctrine, among whom the supreme are
these sharp Bodhisattvas (Lamotte, Samdhinirmocana, 75 [17], and 199; and Powers, Wis-
dom of Buddha, 115):

Paramārthaśāmudgata with respect to this, thinking of just these three types of
non-nature, the One Gone Thus, by way of the aspect of setting forth sūtras of
interpretable meaning, taught the doctrine [of the middle wheel] in this way, "All
phenomena are natureless; all phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent
from the start, and naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow." Regarding that,
[when] sentient beings who have generated roots of virtue, have purified the ob-
structions, have ripened their continuums, have great faith, and have accumulated
great collections of merit and wisdom hear this doctrine, they understand—just as
it is—this which I explained with a thought behind it, and they develop faith in
that doctrine. They also realize, by means of their exalted wisdom, the meaning
just as it is. Also, through cultivating their realization they very quickly attain the
very final state.

It is said that these sharp Bodhisattvas can realize the meaning of the middle wheel of doc-
trine—that is, the three natures and three non-natures—without relying on an exposition
such as that found in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought.

* nges pa’i don, niṣṭārtha (Lamotte, Samdhinirmocana, 86 [30], n. 23).
and explaining a little the mode of the interpretable and the definitive.

*Explaning A Little The Meaning Of The Words Of The Sutra (274)*

[The First Wheel] (274) {387}

About this, the **place** where the first wheel was turned is indicated by “in the area of Varanasi in the Deer Park [called] ‘Sage’s Propounding.’” The **trainees** are indicated by “for those engaged in the Hearer vehicle.” “Thoroughly turned a wheel of doctrine, fantastic and marvelous which none—god or human—had turned in a similar fashion in the world, through teaching the aspects of the four noble truths” indicates the **entity** of the wheel. The **subjects of expression** from which it stems are indicated by “through teaching the aspects of the four noble truths.” A **praise** of that [wheel]**” is indicated by “fantastic and marvelous which none—god or human—had turned in a similar fashion in the world.” That it is **not of definitive meaning** is indicated by “Furthermore, that wheel of doctrine thoroughly turned by the Supramundane Victor is surpassable, affords an occasion [for refutation], requires interpretation, and serves as a basis for controversy.”

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a The text (24.12) merely refers to “the first phrase” in this sentence, and “the second phrase” in the next sentence; I have supplied the appropriate material.

b Unlike Dzong-ka-ba’s sixfold division of the sūtra passage about the first wheel of doctrine—place, trainees, entity, subjects of expression, praise, and its not being of definitive meaning—Wonch’uk divides a slightly longer passage (beginning with an initial statement, “Then, at that time, the Bodhisattva Paramārthaśamudgata also offered this to the Supramundane Victor,” and then continuing through what Dzong-ka-ba cited) into two parts with several subdivisions. Wonch’uk’s twofold arrangement (*Great Commentary*, Peking 5517, vol. 106, chap. 5, 164.1.5-169.2.2) with these subdivisions and their corresponding passages in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* (using the version cited just above which differs slightly from the Tibetan translation of Wonch’uk’s text) is:

1. Indicating that the [first] wheel of doctrine itself is lofty *(yang dag par)*
   a. Indicating the petitioner and the respondent: “Then, at that time, the Bodhisattva Paramārthaśamudgata also offered this to the Supramundane Victor”
   b. Indicating the time when it was spoken: “initially”
   c. Indicating the place where it was spoken: “in the area of Varanasi in the Deer Park [called] ‘Sage’s Propounding’”
   d. Indicating those for whom it was spoken: “for those engaged in the Hearer vehicle”
   e. Indicating the wheel of doctrine: “thoroughly turned a wheel of doctrine through teaching the aspects of the four noble truths”

2. Indicating that the [first] wheel of doctrine is inferior and not of definitive meaning: “fantastic and marvelous which none—god or human—had turned in a similar fashion in the world [but] that wheel of doctrine thoroughly turned by the Supramundane Victor is surpassable, provides an opportunity [for refutation], is of interpretable
With respect to those, Wonch’uk explains:

1. “Surpassable” means that there is a special doctrine higher than this
2. “Affords an occasion” means that there is an occasion of a doctrine more special than this

meaning, and serves as a basis for controversy

Đè̂ng-ka-bā not only does not use Wonch’uk’s twofold division of the sūtra passage but also (1) eliminates the category of indicating the petitioner and respondent as well as that of time and (2) adds the category of praise. He also changes Wonch’uk’s category of “indicating the wheel of doctrine” into two categories, entity and subjects of expression. Đè̂ng-ka-bā does all this without mentioning Wonch’uk. It is only at the point of this final section that he cites Wonch’uk’s explanation; his disagreement here is, as will be seen, with Wonch’uk’s interpretation of one of four qualities.

Đè̂ng-ka-bā gives two versions of the four qualities mentioned in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought to describe the first turning of the wheel of doctrine. In the first list, he paraphrases Wonch’uk’s explanation (Peking 5517, vol. 106, chap. 5, 169.1.6-169.1.8); in the second list, he gives his own interpretation of the four. Wonch’uk himself says:

Because this wheel of doctrine holds back [or hides] emptiness and teaches [everything] as just existent, it (1) is of interpretable meaning. Because it fully teaches the causes and effects of cyclic existence and nirvana as well as the selflessness of persons and does not teach the reasoning of the emptiness of phenomena, this teaching of [the first wheel of doctrine] (2) is a teaching that has a special [doctrine] higher than it. (3) is a teaching in relation to which there is occasion for [realization of a doctrine] more special and is susceptible to destruction by others, and (4) is a source of controversy among the twenty sects [of Hearers].

*This addition is Gun-tang’s interpretation of Wonch’uk’s meaning; see the next footnote.

Wonch’uk puts first what is mentioned in the sūtra as the third quality of this wheel of doctrine—its being of interpretable meaning. As Gun-tang (Difficult Points, 228.13) says, this is because Wonch’uk sees the sūtra’s first, second, and fourth qualities as being consequences of the first wheel’s being of interpretable meaning.

In the first list of four, Đè̂ng-ka-bā essentially paraphrases Wonch’uk, except that he rearranges Wonch’uk’s explanation in accordance with the order of the four points in the sūtra. Then, in his own listing of the four points, he objects only to Wonch’uk’s rendering of the second; however, he rewords all four points. As Gun-tang (Difficult Points, 228.18) says, “Since [Đè̂ng-ka-bā] did not make a refutation of the other three, they accord in meaning with his own system.” Most likely, Gun-tang is suggesting that even if three of Đè̂ng-ka-bā’s list agree with Wonch’uk’s in meaning, the phraseology is markedly different.

It seems to me that Đè̂ng-ka-bā also does not accept the meaning of Wonch’uk’s rendition of the third quality, unless by “exists” Wonch’uk intends not mere existence but existence by way of its own character, since Đè̂ng-ka-bā repeatedly says that the issue is not with existence but with existence by way of its own character. Also, Đè̂ng-ka-bā cannot accept the first part of the fourth quality as Wonch’uk presents it, since Đè̂ng-ka-bā considers the first wheel’s susceptibility to destruction by others through debate to be the meaning of the second quality. He would not, however, have any substantial quarrel with Wonch’uk’s description of the first quality.

In order to avoid redundancy with the first quality, Gun-tang (Difficult Points, 240.6) interprets Wonch’uk’s presentation of this quality as meaning that there is an occasion of
3. Because it does not teach emptiness and teaches [that everything] exists, it requires interpretation.

4. That it has controversy means that it is susceptible to destruction by others'

realization of a doctrine more special than this.

* In Gung-tang’s Difficult Points (238.5-240.12), a hypothetical opponent points out that Wonch’uk himself makes “destruction by others” as part of his explanation of the sūtra’s second quality, that is, “affords an occasion.” According to this hypothetical critic, Dñong-ka-ba has misinterpreted “destruction by others” to be part of the sūtra’s fourth quality due to the ambiguity of the Tibetan translation of Wonch’uk’s rearrangement of these four into his own list. Speaking about the second and fourth qualities of the first wheel (which, in Dñong-ka-ba’s re-ordering of Wonch’uk’s passage, are the third and fourth qualities), Wonch’uk (cited in Gung-tang’s Difficult Points, 238.9; see two footnotes previous for a translation of the complete passage) says:

\[
\text{skabs khyad par can yod pa'i bstan pa dang/ gshen dag gis gshig par bya ba dang/}
\text{sde pa nyo shu po rtod par smra ba dag gi gnas su gyur pa yin no/}
\]

The ambiguity revolves around whether the second phrase, “is susceptible to destruction by others” (gshen dag gis gshig par bya ba) goes with the material before it, “is a teaching in relation to which there is occasion for something more special” (skabs khyad par can yod pa’i bstan pa) or after it “is a source of controversy among the twenty sects [of Hearers]” (sde pa nyo shu po rtod par smra ba dag gi gnas su gyur pa). Putting it with the material preceding it, the passage reads:

(3) is a teaching in relation to which there is occasion for something more special and is susceptible to destruction by others, and (4) is a source of controversy among the twenty sects [of Hearers].

Putting it with the material following it, Dñong-ka-ba takes the passage as saying:

(3) is a teaching in relation to which there is occasion for something more special, and (4) is susceptible to destruction by others and is a source of controversy among the twenty sects [of Hearers].

Dñong-ka-ba puts the second phrase (“is susceptible to destruction by others”) with the material following it, but the hypothetical critic objects that it should be put with the material preceding it, citing as evidence Wonch’uk’s later explanation of “does not afford an occasion” with regard to the third wheel, where there is no grammatical ambiguity in the Tibetan. The critic’s point is extremely well taken, for, about the third wheel, Wonch’uk (Peking 5517, vol. 106, chap. 5, 170.2.2; cited by Dñong-ka-ba, p. 125) does indeed say:

Because this is supremely fantastic and there is no other exceeding it, it is unsurpassable. Because it does not afford an occasion for something more superior later and does not afford an occasion for [later] destruction, it does not afford an occasion. Because it teaches existence and non-existence completely, it is of definitive meaning, and it is not a source of controversy. (’di mchog tu rnam du byung zhi dge las lha gshen med pas bla ma ma mchis pa dang / phyi mchog tu ’gyur ba’i skabs dang gshig pa’i skabs med pas skabs ma mchis pa dang / yod med rdo gnyor par bstan pas nges pa’i don dang / rtod pa smra ba’i gshi gras min pa’o/)

In the middle sentence, Wonch’uk clearly puts “occasion for something more superior later” (phyi mchog tu ’gyur ba’i skabs) and ”occasion for [later] destruction” (gshig pa’i skabs) together in one negative reason clause, from which it can be determined that this is how the
The meaning of the sūtra [concerning these four points] is:

1. There are other [teachings] of definitive meaning higher than this
2. It affords an occasion for [the assessment of] fault by other disputants when its meaning is asserted in accordance with how it is taught. This is even translated as "susceptible to dispute" in [Paramārtha's] Chinese commentary; hence, the meaning is such [and not as Wonch'uk explains it].

earlier passage about the first wheel should be read (but, of course, without the negative).

Gung-tang gives an elaborate "defense" of Dzong-ka-ba's apparent slip with regard to the first wheel. In order to maintain the pretense that Dzong-ka-ba did not make an error (and in order to indicate his own powers of creative interpretation), Gung-tang makes the claim that in Wonch'uk's text "is susceptible to destruction by others" (gzhon dag gi gzhi gzhig par bya ba or gzhon gzi gzhig nu sdot) does indeed go with what follows it, "is a source of controversy among the twenty sects" (ide pa nyis shu po rtsod...) and not with the preceding, "is a teaching that has a special [doctrine] higher than it" (skabs khyad par can yod pa'i bstan pa), despite the fact that phyi gzhig pa'i skabs med pa goes with skabs med pa. He does this by analyzing Wonch'uk's meaning of "affording an occasion" as being that there is an occasion of a higher realization and thus having nothing to do with external debate. He also thereby has to claim that "does not afford an occasion for destruction" (gzhig pa'i skabs med pa), which is undeniably tied to "it does not afford an occasion" (skabs med pa), refers not to destruction in debate but to the third wheel's not being discarded upon realizing a higher meaning. However, as Gung-tang himself admits, this brings him into conflict with Dzong-ka-ba's statement that except for the former of the two reasons for "notaffording an occasion" his own presentation agrees with Wonch'uk's, for Dzong-ka-ba explains the latter of the two reasons "does not afford an occasion for later destruction" (gzhig pa'i skabs med pa) as not affording an occasion for destruction in debate and not as "not being discarded upon realizing a higher meaning" as Gung-tang holds. Gung-tang thereby admits the weakness of his otherwise ingenious defense of Dzong-ka-ba. The admission can be understood only through realizing that he is self-consciously and humorously operating under the dictum that Dzong-ka-ba somehow has to be made right even when he is not.

a As Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 290.2) explains, "affords an occasion" (skabs mchis pa) means "suitable for the assessment of censure" (khan ka jug rung) and thus allowing for fallacies through reasonings refuting the extreme of superimposition by opponents such as the Proponents of Mind-Only (semi sdam so gsal ba sigo 'dog ki miha 'gog pa'i rigs pa dag gi rgyal ba'i skyon kyi go sgrub yed pa).

b This is the text written by Paramārtha (yang dag bden pa; 499-569), called Commentary on the "Sūtra Unraveling the Words" (sbe dge pa'i 'grel ba'i mdo'i 'grel pa); see Wonch'uk (Peking 5517, vol. 106, chap. 5, 170.2.7, and so forth) for citation of the title. The translation into Tibetan of Paramārtha's explanation, as cited by Wonch'uk (170.3.1 and 170.3.4; see also Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso's Port of Entry, 290.4), uses the term "susceptible to dispute" (rgal ba dang btras pa) in place of "affords an opportunity" (skabs mchis pa). Dzong-ka-ba's own usage of "affords an opportunity" (skabs mchis pa) indicates his preference in terms of the words; he agrees, however, that Paramārtha's version communicates the meaning, and thus he says, "This is even translated as 'susceptible to dispute' in the Chinese commentary.
3. Its meaning must be interpreted otherwise.
4. Since the Teacher [Buddha] did not clearly differentiate the status [of what from among the three natures exists by way of its own character and what does not]." There is controversy disagreeing about the meaning.

[by Paramāṛtha]; hence, the meaning is such [and not as Wonch'uk explains it]."

One might think that by "Chinese commentary" Žang-ka-ba is referring to Wonch'uk's commentary, but in all five instances of referring to Wonch'uk's text without giving his name (there being three others when he refers to him by name and one when the text is included within "the commentaries"—see p. 44) he refers to it as the "Chinese Great Commentary" (rgya nag gi 'grel chen), and furthermore he has just finished listing Wonch'uk's assertions on these four points; thus I have taken "Chinese commentary" as referring to Paramāṛtha's commentary. Indeed, Žang-ka-ba's reference is extremely cryptic, to be deciphered only by searching for "susceptible to dispute" (rgol ba dang bcos pa'i brjed byang) in Wonch'uk's text and finding that it occurs only in Wonch'uk's citation of Paramāṛtha's text. (Wonch'uk repeatedly cites Paramāṛtha's text—sometimes agreeing with it, sometimes disagreeing, and sometimes not expressing an opinion.) In sum, Žang-ka-ba is saying that Wonch'uk should have followed Paramāṛtha on this point.

Paramāṛtha's commentary on the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought seems not to be extant in Chinese, and also a translation into Tibetan is not found in any Tibetan catalogues (thanks to Paul Hackett for the search). Wonch'uk (for example, Peking 5517, vol. 106, chap. 5, 169.4) also refers to a text called "the master Paramāṛtha's Purification of Forgetfulness (slob dpon yang dag bden pa'i brjed byang)—an essay written in order to refresh the memory; this latter text seems to me to be in addition to Paramāṛtha's commentary on the sūtra and not just another name for it, but I could not confirm my hunch, since it was not found either in Tibetan or in Chinese (thanks to Paul Groner for the latter search). Gungtang (for example, 241.8) refers to Paramāṛtha's Purification of Forgetfulness, but it may be that his sole source for this is Wonch'uk's citations.

A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso (Precious Lamp, 172.5) refers to another text by Paramāṛtha called Purification of Forgetfulness which teaches the views of the different sects.

A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso's explanation of these four (Precious Lamp, 153.5) in a way that is applicable to the first two wheels of doctrine is particularly clear since it focuses on the literal reading (gras zin):

1. Due to the mode of teaching the literal reading, there are other sūtras of definitive meaning above it.
2. When asserted in accordance with the literal reading, there are opportunities for the assessment of fault by other disputants.
3. Since the literal reading is not literal (gras ji bzhin pa), it requires interpretation.
4. Since whether the three natures are truly existent is not clarified, there are controversies about the literal reading among followers who assert the literal reading.

The third wheel is the opposite:

1. Due to the mode of teaching the literal reading, there are no other sūtras of definitive meaning above it.
2. When asserted in accordance with the literal reading, there is no opportunity for the assessment of fault by other disputants.
3. Since the literal reading is literal, it is definitive.
4. Since whether the three natures are truly existent is clarified, there are no controversies
The Overall Meaning

[The Second Wheel] (275) {388}

With respect to the second wheel, the subjects of expression from which it stems [are indicated by] “Based on just the naturelessness of all phenomena and based on just the absence of production, the absence of cessation, quiescence from the start, and naturally passed beyond sorrow.” The trainees for whom it was turned [are indicated by] “For those engaged in the Great Vehicle.” The meaning of “through the aspect of speaking on emptiness” is explained by one commentary as teaching the selflessness of phenomena.b

In the Chinese Great Commentary [by Wonch’uk], “in a non-manifest manner” also appears [in his citation of the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought instead of “through the aspect of speaking on emptiness.”]d Wonch’uk] explains that it means holding back [or hiding]e the existent.” That translation is good. The meaning is that while the latter two wheels are similar in teaching stemming from naturelessness as the subject of expression, the difference in the mode of teaching is that the middle wheel does not differentiate [clearly]f what has nature and what does not, as explained before, due to which the sūtra says, “in a non-manifest manner,” whereas since the latter wheel differentiates these, the sūtra says, “possessed of good differentiation.”

Tripitaka Wonch’uk mentions no more than that [the middle wheel]g is

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a Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 292.2) identifies this as the Explanation of the “Sūtra Unraveling the Thought” (djongs 'grel rnam bshad); for a discussion of its author, see appendix 1, p. 453ff.

b Gung-tang (Difficult Points, 244.2) says that this identification is wrong because “emptiness” here just refers to emptiness of establishment by way of its own character.

c Wonch’uk (Peking 5517, vol. 106, chap. 5, 169.2.3): mi mgon pa'i rnam pas. Gung-ru Chö-jung’s Garland of White Lotus'es (64b.4) and Jam-ṭyang-shay-ba’s Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive (133.6), when citing Wonch’uk, add stong pa nyid, making stong pa nyid mi mgon pa'i rnam pas; Wonch’uk’s text itself reads: rang bkizin gyis yongs su myang ngan las ’das pa nyid las btsams nas 'di lar mi mgon pa'i rnam pas yang dag pa’si choi kyi 'khor lo bkser ba.

d stong pa nyid smos pa'i rnam pas. The stag Palace edition of the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought (70.1) has still another reading: “through the aspect of elaborations” (spros pa'i rnam pas). Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 292.2) points out that the skt cagy translation of the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought reads “having elaborations” (spros pa dang kay pas).

e Wonch’uk (Peking 5517, vol. 106, chap. 5, 169.3.2) explains that the first wheel hides emptiness and teaches existence, whereas the second wheel hides existence and teaches emptiness. Dzong-ka-ba considers the rendering of “in a non-manifest manner” preferable to “through the aspect of speaking,” but he does not accept the meaning that Wonch’uk assigns to the expression. Dzong-ka-ba gives his own interpretation two sentences below.

f Wonch’uk is called this because of his great knowledge of the three scriptural collections—discipline, sets of discourses, and manifest knowledge.

gh Da-drin-rap-den (Annotations, 43.5) adds “the first two wheels,” but the topic here is only the middle wheel. Wonch’uk (Peking 5517, vol. 106, chap. 5, 169.5.3) says:
surpassable and so forth in relation to the third wheel. Though he states the explanation\(^a\) by the Indian scholar\(^b\) Paramārtha,\(^c\) it does not appear to be good, and thus I will not write it down. Our own system is as before.\(^d\)

[The Third Wheel] (276) [388]

With respect to the third wheel, the **subjects of expression** from which it stems are similar to those of the middle [wheel]. The **trainees** are those engaged in all vehicles; whereas the former two were those of the Small and Great vehicles individually, this is in terms of both.\(^e\) With respect to its good differentia-

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For those reasons, [the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras] are very profound, fantastic, and marvelous in relation to the wheel of the four truths but in relation to the third are surpassable, providing an occasion, and of interpretable meaning. Because of being of interpretable meaning, they are controversial.

He then cites Paramārtha (see three footnotes below).

\(^a\) Gung-tang (*Difficult Points*, 229.4) cogently takes the reference here as just to the middle wheel, whereas Jik-may-dam-cho-gya-tso (*Port of Entry*, 293.2) interprets Dzong-ka-ba as referring to Paramārtha's explanations of all three wheels.

\(^b\) mkhan po; this word often means "abbot," but it also refers to someone versed in a topic.

\(^c\) With respect to the middle wheel, Wönch'uk (Peking 5517, vol. 106, chap. 5, 169.5.4) cites Paramārtha's *Purification of Forgetfulness* (*bri bjes byang*), which says:

Because this middle wheel teaches a Great Vehicle separate from the Small Vehicle, it is not of definitive meaning. Because there is still one vehicle, it is surpassable. Because it is separate from those of the Small Vehicle, there is quarrel and controversy with those of the Small Vehicle. Because it is destroyed by one vehicle, it is susceptible to dispute.

Wönch'uk does not comment on Paramārtha's presentation. For Gung-tang's speculations on why Paramārtha's presentation is not "good," see *Difficult Points*, 229.4-230.7.

\(^d\) Dzong-ka-ba's reference is to his own list of the four qualities, given above with respect to the first wheel of doctrine (p. 121). His reference is not to Wönch'uk's explanation—just before his own—of the four qualities in terms of the first wheel, as is evident from the fact that he reworded and criticized it.

\(^e\) Jay-drünn Cho-ä-gyi-gyel-ten holds that this means that the intended trainees of the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* are both the Lesser Vehicle and the Great Vehicle, and thus it is a sūtra common to the Lesser Vehicle and Great Vehicle. Jam-äng-shay-ba and so forth hold that the intended trainees of the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* are Great Vehicle practitioners who explicitly realize that a presentation of the three natures in terms of the selflessness of phenomena is the thought of the middle wheel and implicitly realize that a presentation of the three natures in terms of the selflessness of persons is the thought of the first wheel, and thus it is a Great Vehicle sūtra. According to this interpretation, an intended trainee of the first wheel of doctrine is able to understand mainly a presentation of the three natures in terms of the selflessness of persons in dependence upon the first wheel—this being what the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* means by "those engaged in the Hearer Vehicle." An intended trainee of the middle wheel of doctrine is able—without relying on the final wheel of doc-
tion, it, as explained earlier, presents three characters each with respect to each phenomenon—forms and so forth—and differentiates three modes of non-nature with respect to those.

The usage of the proximate term “this” in “this wheel of doctrine turned [by the Supramundane Victor]” refers to the wheel of good differentiation just described—the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought and those that make such differentiation. It does not refer to sūtras that, although they were spoken in the final period, do not differentiate between the existence and non-existence of nature in this way. The greatness of this wheel is indicated by “unsurpassable, does not afford an occasion [for refutation], is of definitive meaning, and does not serve as a basis for controversy.” Wonch’uk explains:

Because this is supremely marvelous and there is no other exceeding it, it is unsurpassable. Because it does not afford an occasion for some more superior [realization] later and does not afford an occasion for [later] destruction, it does not afford an occasion. Because it teaches existence and non-existence completely, it is of definitive meaning, and it is not a source of controversy.

Except for [Wonch’uk’s unsuitable explanation of] the former [of the two meanings] of no occasion [that is, “it does not afford an occasion for some more superior (realization) later”), his explanations [of the other three qualities]

trine—to understand mainly a presentation of the three natures in terms of the selflessness of phenomena that is the thought behind the middle wheel—this being what the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought means by “those engaged in the Great Vehicle.” See A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso’s Precious Lamp, 142.4-143.4; also, 145.2. Dzong-ka-ba seems to support this latter view when he says (p. 201):

In refuting this, Asaṅga’s Grounds of Bodhisattvas refutes it also with [Buddhist] scripture, and since it is not suitable to refute Other Schools [Non-Buddhists] with the scriptures of one’s own teacher, our own schools also must exist among those who are being refuted, and since the Proponents of Non-Nature or a specific type of Yogic Practitioner are not being refuted, [these have to be Buddhist] Hearer schools. Hence, [on the occasion of refuting this, Asaṅga] does not quote passages from the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought but refutes them with three passages established for them.

The last sentence suggests that, for Dzong-ka-ba, the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought is not common to the Lesser and Great Vehicles.

a See Absorption, #73, 72.

b Wonch’uk (Peking 5517, vol. 106, chap. 5, 170.2.2) has a second “later” (phyi), as is confirmed by Gung-tang’s Difficult Points (240.14), whereas Dzong-ka-ba omits the second, citing only phyis mchog tu ’gyur ba’i skabs dang gzhih pa’i skabs med pas.

Gung-tang cogently says that the type of destruction mentioned here does not refer to being overwhelmed in debate, because there would be no sense in using the temporal reference “later,” since if the position were so susceptible, it would always be so; rather, destruction refers to developing higher realization that overwhelms one’s earlier realization.
appear to be similar in meaning with the opposite of my earlier explanation of the meaning of surpassable and so forth [with respect to the first wheel (see p. 121) and thus are suitable].

The reason why the literal meaning of the two former sets of sūtras affords an occasion of fault but this does not is that the literal meaning [of the former two sets] must be interpreted otherwise whereas this does not need to be. With respect to involving controversy or not, [that the last wheel does not involve controversy] should be taken as that since these sūtras indicate the existence or non-existence of nature [that is, establishment or non-establishment by way of its own character with respect to the three natures], there is no room for controversy when scholars analyze whether the meaning of those sūtras is or is not delineated that way. However, this does not indicate that there are not other controversies [such as the Proponents of the Middle objecting that even though the meaning of the sūtra definitely is what the Proponents of Mind-Only say it is, the sūtra was spoken with a particular intention, and hence does not represent the final system].

Explanations A Little The Mode Of Interpretability And Definitiveness (278) (389)

[Identifying The Conventions For The Three Wheels Of Doctrine And Positioning The Three Wheels As Interpretable Or Definitive] (278) (389)

The Chinese Great Commentary [by Wonch’uk] designates such a first wheel of doctrine as the wheel of doctrine of the four truths; the second, as the wheel of doctrine of no character; and the third as the wheel of the ultimate, the definitive. However, in accordance with the words of this sūtra itself, the third is to

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a Gung-tang admits that his interpretation of Wonch’uk’s explanation of the second part of the second quality (see p. 119, footnotes b and a) makes it not accord in meaning with Dzong-ka-ba’s presentation. Thus, he wonders whether Dzong-ka-ba is referring merely to the fact that both he and Wonch’uk explain that the third wheel is not susceptible to destruction, even if they disagree on what this means. However, since Dzong-ka-ba clearly says, “his explanations [of the other three qualities] appear to be similar in meaning,” it is likely that Gung-tang is politely saying that Dzong-ka-ba erred.

b Wonch’uk (Peking 5517, vol. 106, chap. 5, 164.1.5) says, “This indicates the first, the wheel of doctrine of the four truths.”

c Wonch’uk (ibid., 169.2.3) says, “indicates the second, the wheel of doctrine of no character.”

d don dam rnam par nges pa ’i ’khor lo, which could also be translated as “the wheel ascertaining the ultimate.” I could not find this designation in the Peking edition of Wonch’uk’s text at the point in his discussion of the third wheel that corresponds to where he gives the names of the first two wheels (Peking 5517, vol. 106, chap. 5, 169.5.7). Later in the chapter (175.1.1-175.1.4), Wonch’uk quotes Buddha’s name for this teaching, this being “the teaching of the ultimate, the definitive meaning” (don dam nges pa’i don bstan pa), but I did not find where he speaks of “the third as the wheel ascertaining the ultimate.” See the next
be called "the wheel of good differentiation."

Concerning that, this suttra’s positing [scriptures] as interpretable and definitive is by way of the two, non-differentiation or good differentiation. The bases being posited as interpretable or definitive are the three—the statements [in the first wheel] that phenomena equally have nature in the sense of being established by way of their own character, the statements [in the middle wheel] that phenomena equally do not have such, and the good differentiation [in the final wheel] of those [phenomena] that have [such establishment] and those that do not. That this is so is very clear from:

footnote for more discussion of Wonch’uk’s source for the name.

a Gung-tang (Difficult Points, 226.4) says:

The last [wheel] is designated "the wheel of doctrine of the ultimate, the definitive meaning" in the Chinese Great Commentary, but the Foremost Lama [Dzong-ka-ba] calls it "the wheel of good differentiation." (tha ma la rgya nag 'rgel chen las don dam rnam par rges pa'i chos 'khor zhes bskgs kyangs rje bla ma legs par rnam par phyel ba'i 'khor lo zhes giungs so)

When Dzong-ka-ba says that the name he uses accords with the "words of the suttra itself," his reference is to the passage in the Sutra Unraveling the Thought when Buddha, speaking of the third wheel, says, "The Supramundane Victor turned a third wheel of doctrine for those engaged in all vehicles, possessed of good differentiation, fantastic and marvelous."

However, as Gung-tang (Difficult Points, 226.6) points out, the Sutra Unraveling the Thought itself is also the source for Wonch’uk’s calling the third wheel "the wheel of the ultimate, the definitive." Near the end of chapter 7, Paramārthaśamudgata questions Buddha about the name of the teaching that Buddha has been giving (see also John C. Powers, Wisdom of Buddha: Sarvādhiratana Sūtra [Berkeley, Calif.: Dharma, 1995], 145):

Bodhisattva Paramārthaśamudgata said to the Supramundane Victor: "Supramundane Victor, what is the name of this teaching in this form of doctrine, which comments on the thought behind your teachings? In what way should we apprehend this?"

The Supramundane Victor said: "Paramārthaśamudgata, this is 'the teaching of the ultimate, the definitive meaning.' This is to be apprehended as 'the teaching of the ultimate, the definitive meaning.'"

Gung-tang speculates that, according to Dzong-ka-ba, Buddha here gives the particular name of this chapter of the suttra and not the name of the third wheel of doctrine, which, as "the wheel of good differentiation," is more parallel to the names of the other two wheels.

b See Absorption, #44, 55.

c Jam-yang-shay-ba (33.5) offers another interpretation of this sentence:

The bases being posited as interpretable or definitive are the three—the statements equally [present throughout the suttras of the first wheel] that phenomena have nature in the sense of being established by way of their own character, the statements equally [present throughout the sutras of the middle wheel] that phenomena do not have such, and the good differentiation [in the final wheel] of those [phenomena] that have [such establishment] and those that do not.

See Absorption, 108.
• [Paramārthasamudgata's] question concerning dispelling contradictions in the sūtras
• the answer to that
• [Paramārthasamudgata's] presentation of three natures with respect to each phenomenon and thereupon offering how [Buddha] set forth naturelessness in consideration of that, and
• [Paramārthasamudgata's] offering, in dependence upon those, [a presentation of] the interpretable and the definitive from among the three wheels spoken at earlier and later times.

[Identifying The Scriptures Being Posited As Definitive And Requiring Interpretation][236] (278) [390]

Therefore, the first wheel in which—stemming from the four truths—[Buddha] said, during the first period [of his teaching], that [phenomena] exist by way of their own character and so forth is indicated as requiring interpretation. Such is not indicated with respect to all scriptures spoken during the first period; for example, there is no need here [in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought] to eliminate qualms with respect to [Buddha's] setting forth points of training such as in his statement to the five [ascetics] at Varanāsī during the first period, "The lower robe should be worn in a circular fashion."

Likewise, [the explanation that] the second [wheel of the teaching requires interpretation] is also in reference to those that set forth naturelessness and so forth. For, sūtras that, although spoken in the second period, do not stem from naturelessness and so forth do not give rise to qualms as in Paramārthasamudgata's question about dispelling contradictions; hence, there is no need here [in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought for Buddha] to indicate that these require interpretation.

Furthermore, the explanation that the third wheel is of definitive meaning is [in reference to] those of good differentiation as explained before, and not all [doctrines spoken during that period]. This is very clear in the Sūtra [Unraveling the Thought] itself. For example, when [Buddha] was about to pass beyond sorrow [that is, die], he said that it would be suitable to use his earlier declarations concerning similar [ethical] situations as a basis for deciding new issues that he had not addressed, this teaching being called the "condensed discipline," but [even though that instruction occurred during the final period of his teaching] this Sūtra [Unraveling the Thought] does not indicate that it is of definitive meaning.

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2. The bracketed material that clarifies the example is from oral commentary by Ye-shay-tup-đen.
3. 'dul ba mdo rNam.
[The Purpose Accomplished Through Dividing The Three Types Of Sūtras Into The Interpretable And The Definitive] 229 (279) [390]

**Question:** What was [Buddha] seeking to accomplish through this Sūtra [Unraveling the Thought] 230 by differentiating the interpretable and the definitive from among the wheels of doctrine?

**Answer:** He was seeking for the trainees of this [sūtra] to overcome taking literally the teaching [in the first two wheels of doctrine] 231 that phenomena, without differentiation, are established by way of their own character or are not so established and therefore to teach them (1) that imputational factors are not established by way of their own character, (2) that the other two natures are established by way of their own character, and (3) that the emptiness which is the emptiness of the imputational factor in other-powered natures is the final ultimate that is the object of observation of the path. Hence, the first two wheels are said to require interpretation, and the final is said to be of definitive meaning.

[Indicating That This Refutes Others’ Systems] 232 (279) [390]
Therefore, some [earlier Tibetan scholars, specifically the Jo-nang-bas, wrongly] establish in dependence upon this Sūtra [Unraveling the Thought] 233 that all sūtras spoken during the third period are of definitive meaning and then [mistakenly] assert as literal some [sūtras actually] spoken for the sake of leading those having the lineage of Other [Non-Buddhist] Schools who adhere to the propounding of self.* Also, they make the differentiation that except for the real nature, all substrata [that is, all conventional phenomena]—aside from being fancied by a mistaken awareness—do not have entities that are established in the slightest, whereas the real nature is truly established. They assert this differentiation of no true establishment and true establishment to be the meaning of the good differentiation [by the final wheel of doctrine] 234 mentioned earlier.

Some others [that is, Bu-dön Rin-ch'en-drup and so forth] refute them.

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* See Reflections on Reality, chaps. 16 and 17.

b *cho nyid, dharmatā.*


A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso adds that the main opponent, however, is Yar-drö-kha Rin-ch'en-dok (yar 'brag pa rin chen tog); see also Gung-tang's *Difficult Points*, 293.17. Yar-drö-kha Rin-ch'en-dok reverses the final two wheels of doctrine, holding that the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras are the definitive third wheel and the sūtras of the matrix of One Gone Thus are the second wheel, which requires interpretation.
thinking, "If the differentiation of the interpretable and the definitive were in accordance with this Sūtra [Unraveling the Thought]," it would be as pronounced by the opponent [that is, by the Jo-nang-bas, and that would be unsuitable]," and thus they say that this mode of [differentiating] the interpretable and the definitive [as presented in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought] is not [to be taken] literally.\(^{a}\)

It appears that, without analyzing in detail:

- the way in which the question about dispelling contradictions in the sūtras arose [this being with regard to the seemingly contradictory teachings in the first wheel that all phenomena are established by way of their own character and in the middle wheel that all phenomena are not established by way of their own character].\(^{b}\)
- the way the Teacher answered it [this being to indicate the bases in his thought and how it would be extremist to hold that those two wheels of

\(^{a}\) That is to say, all sūtras spoken in the final period would absurdly be definitive. Ge-luk-ba scholars, however, hold that there is a difference between the ten sūtras of the matrix of One Gone Thus and the Sūtra of the Matrix of One Gone Thus that Buddha himself cites in the Descent into Lanka Sūtra as requiring interpretation since it speaks of a fully developed Buddha already present in the continuums of sentient beings. As A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso (Precious Lamp, 169.1, 170.2) puts it, both the Jo-nang-bas and Bu-don have as the source of their confusion the notion that the matrix of One Gone Thus and the fully developed Buddha-essence—called the permanent, stable matrix of One Gone Thus (rtag brtan snying po)—are the same. Thus, for Ge-luk-ba scholars, the ten sūtras of the matrix of One Gone Thus do not teach this latter type of Buddha-essence which is taught in a different sūtra that is known in Tibet only through the mention of it in the Descent into Lanka Sūtra. They hold that the ten sūtras are actually sūtras concordant with the middle wheel of doctrine because they teach one final vehicle and they teach that all phenomena are without true establishment. They also assert that the thought of the ten sūtras is Consequentialist and that even Asaṅga’s commentary on Maitreya’s Great Vehicle Treatise on the Sublime Continuum (theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma'i bstan bcos, mahāyānottaratantrāstra; Peking 5525, vol. 108) is Consequentialist, not Mind-Only. For Shay-rap-gyel-ten’s radically different interpretation of the sūtra passage that Buddha discusses in the Descent into Lanka Sūtra, see Reflections on Reality, chaps. 16 and 17.

\(^{b}\) Gung-tang (Difficult Points, 293.12) cites Ke-drup’s General Presentation of the Tantra Sets:

Bu-don Rin-bo-chay [wrongly] asserts that those ten sūtras are sūtras of the final wheel, and, [wrongly] assuming that those sūtras teach as the Jo-nang-bas say they do, he asserts that they require interpretation. Taking the Nature Body (ngo bo rnyid sku, svaḥāvākāśa) and the matrix of One Gone To Bliss (bde gshigs snying po, sugatagarbha) as being equivalent, he asserts that [the matrix of One Gone To Bliss] does not exist in the continuums of sentient beings. He asserts that only the middle [wheel of Buddha’s] word is of definitive meaning.

The Overall Meaning

document are literal, the first being an extreme of permanence and the second being an extreme of annihilation.\(^{237}\) and

- the way [teachings] are posited as interpretable and definitive in dependence upon this [that is to say, the division not being made by way of time but being made by way of differentiating or not differentiating among the three natures in terms of which are truly established and which is not].\(^{298}\)

even both of these [that is, the Jo-nang-bas and Bu-dön, and so forth]\(^{299}\) appear to be debating merely [about whether all sūtras that were spoken during the third period are definitive or not, in dependence]\(^{300}\) upon the [summary]\(^{311}\) passage [in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought] that makes the division into what requires interpretation and what is definitive.*

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* From Đrön-ka-ba's viewpoint, both the Jo-nang-bas and Bu-dön, and so forth, mistakenly consider the matrix of One Gone Thus and a Buddha's Nature Body to be identical. Shay-rap-gyel-tsen holds that even a Buddha's Nature Body exists in the continuums of sentient beings, whereas Bu-dön holds the converse, that is, that even the matrix of One Gone Thus does not exist in the continuums of sentient beings (see the previous footnote). Hence, the Jo-nang-bas take all sūtras spoken during the third period to be definitive, whereas Bu-dön and so forth hold that the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought is not to be taken literally in its differentiation of what is definitive and what requires interpretation with respect to the three wheels of doctrine. (This depiction needs to be researched.)
EXPLICATIONS OF THE
SŪTRA UNRAVELING THE THOUGHT
ON DIFFERENTIATING
THE INTERPRETABLE AND THE DEFINITIVE
5. The Importance of the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought

The presentation of exegesis of the meaning of the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought on differentiating the interpretable and the definitive (284) \( \text{[392]} \) has two parts: how the master Asaṅga mainly relied upon the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought and how suchness is settled in dependence upon that sūtra.

How The Master Asaṅga Mainly Relyed Upon The Sūtra Unraveling the Thought (284) \( \text{[392]} \)

In his Compendium of Ascertainments Asaṅga quotes the chapters on the ultimate\(^a\) in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought.\(^b\)

Furthermore, the ultimate possessing five characteristics\(^c\) should be known in accordance with how it occurs in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought.

\(^a\) These are the first four chapters of the sūtra. When Dzong-ka-ba says that Asaṅga "quotes the chapters," he means just what he says, for, except for the introductory chapter, Asaṅga cites the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought in its entirety in his Compendium of Ascertainments (Peking 5539, vol. 111, 83.2.6-107.5.1).

\(^b\) Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 356.5) identifies the five:

1. Inexpressible, because it cannot be expressed exactly as it is by terms and conceptual consciousnesses: taught in chapter 1
2. Non-dual, because there are no dualistic phenomena such as the compounded and the uncompounded in the face of meditative equipoise directly perceiving the ultimate: taught in chapter 1
3. Thoroughly transcending the sphere of argumentation, because of not being an object of direct perception by common beings: taught in chapter 2
4. Thoroughly transcending difference and non-difference, because of not being a different entity from the thing that is empty and not being the same conceptual isolate (that is, not being exactly the same) as the thing that is empty: taught in chapter 3
5. Of one taste in everything, because of being the same taste as the mere elimination of the object of negation in selflessness: taught in chapter 4.

Later (p. 159) Dzong-ka-ba cites a set of five from Maitreya's Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras that differ from these. Bel-jor-hlun-drup (Lamp for the Teaching, 37.4) mistakenly identifies those as the five mentioned here. Šer-thül (Notes, 22a.3-23b.3), based on Gung-tang, cogently argues that Bel-jor-hlun-drup is indeed mistaken, since Asaṅga's Compendium of Ascertainments itself identifies them as they are here. (Šer-thül's argument effectively answers a challenge by Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso [Port of Entry, 363.6] to Gung-tang's claim that Bel-jor-hlun-drup is mistaken.)

Dā-drin-rap-den (Annotations, 49.3-50.2) gives both versions.

\(^c\) Dzong-ka-ba is paraphrasing Asaṅga, who, after indicating that the ultimate has five
Also, he quotes the chapters¹ on the characters that teach the three characters:³⁴³

The characters of phenomena should be viewed in accordance with what occurs in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought.*

Also, he quotes the chapter² on non-nature that teach about the question and answer concerning dispelling contradictions in the sūtras, the interpretable and the definitive, and so forth:³⁴⁴

The character of naturelessness in phenomena should be viewed in accordance with what occurs in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought.*

Similarly, about the eight collections of consciousness³ and definiteness with characteristics (inexpressible, non-dual, thoroughly transcending the sphere of argumentation, thoroughly transcending difference and non-difference, and of one taste in everything), says that “The characteristics of inexpressibility and non-duality should be viewed in accordance with the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought,*” whereupon he cites chapter 1 of the sūtra in toto. Prior to citing chapter 2 (84.2.2), Asanga says, “The characteristic of thoroughly transcending the sphere of argumentation should be viewed in accordance with the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought.*” Prior to citing chapter 3 (84.5.2), he says, “The characteristic of thoroughly transcending difference and non-difference should be viewed in accordance with the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought.*” Prior to citing chapter 4 (86.1.5), he says, “The characteristic of being of one taste in everything should be viewed in accordance with the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought.*”

¹ Dzongs-kha-'ba speaks of plural chapters (*mthun nyid gum ston pa'i mthun nyid kyi le'u rnam*), but the passage he cites precedes only Asanga’s citation of chapter 6. A-ku Lo-dro-gya-tso (*Precious Lamp*, 175.6), based on Gung-tang’s *Annotations,* suggests that the plural is intended also to include chapter 5 which teaches the character of mind. This seems far-fetched, since “that teach the three characters” (*mthun nyid gum ston pa'i*) restrictively modifies “the chapters on the characters” (*mthun nyid kyi le'u rnam*); however, it does serve to draw chapter 5 into Dzongs-kha-'ba’s discussion, which jumped from the first four chapters to the sixth; still, chapter 5 is not absent, since the teaching on the eight collections of consciousness (which is about to be mentioned) is in chapter 5. Jik-ma-dam-chö-gya-tso (*Port of Entry*, 366.4) takes the plural marker here as referring to the entire chapter.

² Da-khrin-rap-rden’s *Annotations* (50.2), in what is likely a scribal error, misidentifies these as chapters 1 through 4.

³ Again Dzongs-kha-'ba speaks of plural chapters (*ngo bo nyid med pa'i le'u rnam*), but the passage he cites precedes only Asanga’s citation of chapter 7, the “Questions of Paramārthaśamudgata.” A-ku Lo-dro-gya-tso (*Precious Lamp*, 175.5), based on Gung-tang’s *Annotations,* makes the questionable suggestion that the plural marker also includes chapter 8, since it explains that the teaching of external objects requires interpretation. Jik-ma-dam-chö-gya-tso (*Port of Entry*, 366.4) takes the plural marker here as referring to the entire chapter.

⁴ The eight sets of consciousnesses are the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mental consciousnesses, as well as the afflicted mentality and mind-basis-of-all. With respect to the next item, “definiteness with respect to final lineages,” the reference is to the teaching of lineages of practitioners—as Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Bodhisattvas. According to the Mind-Only School following Asanga, since—among these—some Hearers and Solitary Realizers
respect to final lineages, he also quotes the statements in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought.*

Moreover, in the “Chapter on Suchness” in the *Grounds of Bodhisattvas,* its *Ascertainment,* and the *Summary of the Great Vehicle,* Asaṅga settles through many various explanations just the statement in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* that other-powered natures’ emptiness of factors imputed in the manner never proceed on to the Great Vehicle, there are three final lineages. Others switch from one path to the other, while still others are in a condition beyond hope of escape from cyclic existence. In this way, there are five lineages of persons and three final lineages of practitioners; see *Reflections on Reality,* chap. 4.

Chapter 5 of the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* which treats the character of mind (sems kyi mthun nyid, citta-ākāśa) and thus the eight collections of consciousness, is cited in Asaṅga’s *Compendium of Ascertainment,* Peking 5539, vol. 111, 87.2.1-88.2.1. The material on three final lineages is found in chapter 7, cited in Asaṅga’s *Compendium of Ascertainments,* Peking 5539, vol. 111, 89.2.2-93.4.2. Again, Đöng-ka-ba uses a plural marker (dgon grol nas gungs pa rnam), which A-ku Lo-dro-gya-tso cogently explains refers to the respective passages within those chapters.

* de kho na'i le'u, tattvārtha-pata. This is the fourth chapter of the first section (gzi'i rnal 'byor gni gnas, adhārāyogavāstā) of Asaṅga's *Grounds of Bodhisattvas,* which is the fifteenth section of his *Grounds of Yogic Practice* (rnal 'byor spyod pa'i sa, yogācārabhūmi). For a translation of this chapter into English, see Janice D. Willis, *On Knowing Reality: The Tattvārtha Chapter of Asaṅga’s Bodhisattvabhumi* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979; reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1982). As Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 361.5) points out, Đöng-ka-ba’s reference is to the whole fourth chapter. He (369.1) also makes the observation that Asaṅga does not quote the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* in the *Grounds of Bodhisattvas.*

* de'i rnam par gnas la ddb pa; in the Peking catalogue the title is given as rnal 'byor spyod pa'i sa rnam par gnas la ddb pa bsdus ba. According to Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 361), the reference is to the entire exposition—in the *Compendium of Ascertainments*—of the chapter on reality in the *Grounds of Bodhisattvas* (byang ba de kho na nyid kyi le'u bsdus ba yongs zdog). He identifies this as beginning with de kho na'i don rnam par shes par 'dod pa mdo' bsdud na and going through de ni rnam par mi rtag pa shes bya'o. This is the subsection of Asaṅga’s *Compendium of Ascertainments* entitled Ascertainment of the Chapter on the Meaning of Suchness (de kho na'i don gnyi le'u'i rnam par gnas la ddb pa; Peking 5539, vol. 111, 72.1.6-76.1.5), which explains the three natures. It is part of a larger section entitled Ascertainment of the Grounds of Bodhisattvas (byung chub sems dpa'i sa'i rnam par gnas la ddb pa; Peking 5539, vol. 111, 60.2.6-118.5.8), which the Peking lists as the tenth section and the Tokyo lists 8th section (sems nam, vols. 8-9) lists as the fifteenth section of Asaṅga’s *Compendium of Ascertainments.* (The material cited in Đöng-ka-ba’s chapter 8, on the *Compendium of Ascertainments,* is within this larger section but outside the subsection entitled Ascertainment of the Chapter on the Meaning of Suchness that is the reference here.)

ner of entities and attributes is the thoroughly established nature. Furthermore, the essential points of the explanation of the meaning of suchness in Maitreya’s *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras*, *Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes*, and so forth as well as of the teachings in the commentaries on those are in very great agreement with this sūtra. Therefore, in this [Mind-Only] system, delineation of the meaning of this sūtra appears to be the root [of its delineation of suchness].

How Suchness Is Settled In Dependence Upon The Sūtra Unraveling the Thought (287) [393]

This section has three parts: a general indication of how the two extremes are abandoned, refutation in particular of the extreme of superimposition, and

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Chapter 7.
Chapter 3.

The Second Dalai Lama identifies “and so forth” as including Maitreya’s *Differentiation of Phenomena and the Final Nature of Phenomena* (chos dangchos nyid nam par byed pa, dharmadharmanābhiṣāga; Peking 5524, vol. 108); Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (*Port of Entry*, 362.2) questions this—presumably because it is considered in Ge-luk-ba scholarship to be a text of the Naturelessness School—but he does not suggest what “and so forth” does include. Neither Maitreya’s *Great Vehicle Treatise on the Sublime Continuum* nor his *Ornament for Clear Realization* (abhisamayalankāra, mgon par rigos pa’i rgyan; Peking 5184, vol. 88) could be Đong-ka-ba’s referent because he considers the former to evince the view of the Consequence School and the latter to evince the views of mainly the Consequence School and, from time to time, the Autonomy School. Thus, what “and so forth” includes remains a question.

Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (*Port of Entry*, 362.3) specifies these as:

- The commentaries on Asaṅga’s *Grounds of Bodhisattvas* by Guṇaprabha (Peking 5545, vol. 112) and Sāgaramegha (Peking 5548, vol. 112)
- The commentaries on Asaṅga’s *Summary of the Great Vehicle* by Vasubandhu (Peking 5551, vol. 112) and by Aśvabhāva (Peking 5552, vol. 113)
- The commentary on Maitreya’s *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras* by Vasubandhu (Peking 5527, vol. 108) and explanation of that commentary by Sthiramati (Peking 5531, vols. 108-109) and Aśvabhāva (Peking 5530, vol. 108)
- The commentary on Maitreya’s *Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes* by Vasubandhu (Peking 5528, vol. 108) and explanation of that commentary by Sthiramati (Peking 5534, vol. 109)

The order of the treatises mentioned in this paragraph mirror the order of those considered in the seventh through tenth chapters of Đong-ka-ba’s *The Essence* (taking into account that the *Summary of the Great Vehicle* does not have a separate chapter).

Dra-di Ge-shey Rin-chen-dön-drup’s *Ornament for the Thought*, 47.7. A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso’s *Precious Lamp* (176.3) cogently comments that it is the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*, rather than other sūtras such as the *Descent into Lanka*, and so forth, that is the root of this system’s delineation of suchness.
how, by means of this, [Buddha's] scriptures are differentiated into the interpretable and the definitive.

*General Indication Of How The Two Extremes Are Abandoned (287) {393}*

The first has three parts: the explanations (1) in Asaṅga's *Grounds of Bodhisattvas*, (2) in Asaṅga's *Compendium of Ascertainments*, and (3) in texts other than those.
6. Asaṅga's *Grounds of Bodhisattvas*

The explanation of how the two extremes are abandoned in Asaṅga's *Grounds of Bodhisattvas* has two parts: the modes of superimpositional and deprecatonal views and how those two are refuted.

**How Views Superimpose Or Deprecate (287) [393]**

*Question:* Asaṅga's *Grounds of Bodhisattvas* says:26

How does [the ultimate nature of phenomena] exist?26 It exists abandoning both the improper estimation that superimposes what does not exist and the improper estimation that deprecates the real.4

In his statement that it exists in the manner of abandoning superimposition and deprecation, what are superimposition and deprecation?

*Answer:* About those two, Asaṅga's *Grounds of Bodhisattvas* says:267

There are those who adhere [to things] upon superimposing a nonexistent own-character, to the nature of imputational words to the phe-

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2 The bracketed material is taken from the sentence (which Dzung-ka-ba does not cite) in Asaṅga's text following the quote, namely, "the ultimate nature of all phenomena" (chos thams cad kyi don dam pa'i ngo bo nyid). The subject of the previous sentence is, similarly, "the nature of all phenomena" (chos thams cad kyi ngo bo nyid). Ser-shul (Notes, 23b-4) likewise suggests that the subject is "the mode of existence of phenomena, that is, of other-powered nature and so forth" (gehan dbang sogs chos rnam yod tshul), but A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso (Precious Lamp, 177.1) identifies the subject as "the path of the middle way abandoning the two extremes," which appears to follow Sāgaramège's commentary (Peking 5548, vol. 112). Strangely, Ser-shul cites Sāgaramège's commentary in apparent confirmation of his own reading even though he does not mirror that commentary; thus, perhaps he is pointing out a different interpretation. Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 370.6) gives both interpretations and also (377.2) lists many others.

3 *yod, vidyate.* Since *vidyate* has the sense of "being found by valid cognition," it is often translated into Tibetan as *yod* ("exist"), but in other places it is translated as *snyed* ("find"). From the translation-choice here, we can see the translators saw the issue as being not the process by which the essential nature of things is found but the manner of its existence.

4 According to A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso's *Precious Lamp* (177.2), such an improper estimation is made by the Proponents of the Great Exposition and the Proponents of Sūtra, and so forth, who have gone too far on the positive side.

5 According to A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso's *Precious Lamp* (177.3), such an improper estimation is made by the Autonomists and Consequentialists who have gone too far on the negative side.

6 *dogy pa'i tshig, prajñaptivāda.* Since words are sounds and thus are other-powered natures that necessarily do have "own-character," this term is glossed as the nature imputed by words (tshig gi btsug pa'i ngo bo) by Dra-di Geshay Rin-chen-don-drup (Ornament for the Thoughts, 49.10) and Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 371.3).
nomina of forms and so forth and to the things of forms and so forth.

This sets forth the mode of superimposition. [With respect to deprecation, the same text continues:]

and there are those who ruin [the doctrine of the Great Vehicle\textsuperscript{a} and the correct delineation of suchness by]\textsuperscript{b} making deprecation—of [other-powered natures, that is to say,] real things ultimately existing with an inexpressible essence,\textsuperscript{c} which serve as the bases of the signs of imputed words, the supports of the signs of imputed words—as "not existing in each and every way." These two are to be known as having thoroughly fallen away from this disciplinary doctrine.\textsuperscript{c}

The earlier part of that indicates the mode of deprecation, and the rest about ruination indicates that this is a case of having fallen from the profound doctrine of the Great Vehicle.

"The phenomena of forms and so forth and the things of forms and so forth" indicate the bases of imputational factors. "Nature of imputational words" is to be taken as the nature imputed by words [that is, imputational natures]\textsuperscript{d} and should not be taken as the words that are the means of imputation; this is clearly explained in Asaṅga’s Compendium of Ascertainments and so forth. Such also should be known with respect to occurrences on other occasions in the Grounds of Bodhisattvas. Conceiving that the nature imputed by words is established by way of its own character, whereas [actually] it does not exist by way of its own character, is a superimposition.

"Bases of the signs of imputational words" is explained [in the citation above] by "supports of the signs of imputational words"; this [refers to other-powered natures which are] the bases of imputation of imputational factors. Conceiving that those [other-powered natures] do not exist in all ways, whereas [actually] they ultimately exist in an inexpressible manner, is a deprecation. In that case, that imputational factors ultimately exist is a superimposition and that the other two natures [that is, other-powered and thoroughly established natures] do not ultimately exist is a deprecation, because the first conventionally exists and the other two ultimately exist.

\textsuperscript{a} Śer-shül (Notes, 24a.5-26a.2), after listing the interpretations of inexpressibility by the Second Dalai Lama, Jam-yang-shay-ba, Gung-tang, Tsay-den-hla-ram-ba (tshe brtan lha ram po), and unnamed others, gives his own interpretation cogently based on the context of the Chapter on Suchness in Asaṅga’s Grounds of Bodhisattvas, as well as its commentaries. For him, inexpressibility is an object’s not being established by way of its own character as the referent of verbalization, that is to say, of terms and conceptual consciousnesses. Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 380.5-383.3) lists even more interpretations.

\textsuperscript{b} For discussion of this phrase see p. 394, footnote d.

\textsuperscript{c} That is to say, doctrine, such as the Śūtra Unraveling the Thought, that tames afflictive emotions (A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso’s Precious Lamp, 181).

\textsuperscript{d} Words themselves, being sounds, are other-powered natures.
When one draws out the counterpart of [Asaṅga’s] explanation that viewing that what ultimately exists does not ultimately exist is a depreciation, then viewing that what does not ultimately exist does exist [ultimately] must be explained as a superimposition. On this occasion [in Asaṅga’s *Grounds of Bodhisattvas*] it is said that conceiving imputational factors to exist by way of their own character is a superimposition, but it is not clearly indicated in words that conceiving imputational factors to exist ultimately [is a superimposition]. However, it is the meaning of the text that if something exists by way of its own character, it ultimately exists; therefore, this is a position that the ultimate existence of imputational factors goes as a superimposition.

The foundations of imputational characters, those which have the signs of a compositional phenomenon, and the bases of imputation in the manner of entities and attributes [explicitly mentioned] in the Śūtra Unraveling the Thought refer [mainly] to other-powered natures. Hence, it is other-powered natures that are explicitly indicated by the statement in this passage [in Asaṅga’s *Grounds of Bodhisattvas*] that “conceiving] the supports of the signs of imputational words—as ‘not existing in all ways’” [is a depreciation]. However, if those [other-powered natures] did not ultimately exist, [their real nature] that is, their thoroughly established nature also would not ultimately exist, whereby there is no fault in explaining [this passage in Asaṅga’s *Grounds of Bodhisattvas* as referring] to both [other-powered and thoroughly established natures]. For Asaṅga’s *Grounds of Bodhisattvas* says:

When the mere things [or entities] that are the phenomena of forms and so forth are depreciated, suchness does not exist, and imputation [that is, imputational natures] also do not exist; [thereby] both of those [that is, thoroughly established natures and imputational natures] also are not feasible.

The mode of depreciating other-powered things is not [constituted by considering them] "not to exist conventionally" or "not to exist in general" [as the extreme of depreciation is described in the Consequence School]; rather, it is in accordance with the earlier explanation [by Asaṅga] that [conceiving] the

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\textsuperscript{a} Gung-tang (Annotations, as cited in Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s *Port of Entry*, 374.3) cogently speculates that Asaṅga uses the vocabulary of ultimate existence with respect to the extreme of depreciation, since Proponents of Non-Nature themselves frequently speak of the extreme of existing ultimately and the extreme of not existing conventionally. Similarly, he speculates that Asaṅga uses the vocabulary of “own-character” with respect to the extreme of superimposition since, as in the *Śūtra Unraveling the Thought*, imputational natures are said to be natureless in terms of character (*mshan nyid ngo bo nyid med pa*).

\textsuperscript{b} Ser-shül’s *Notes*, 271.3, and Da-drin-rap-den’s *Annotations*, 56.5. A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso (*Precious Lamp*, 183.1) glosses this clause (‘*dogs pa yang med do*’) as “the bases of imputation and [the words that are] the means of imputing also would not exist.”

\textsuperscript{c} The reference is to Asaṅga’s clear statement in the *Grounds of Bodhisattvas* cited above (p. 141):
ultimately existent not to exist [ultimately] is a deprecation.

How To Refute Views That Superimpose Or Deprecate (288) {396}

Question: If those are the modes of superimposition and deprecation, how are those two abandoned?

Answer: Concerning this, the extreme of superimposition is refuted by the teaching that phenomena are ultimately empty of factors imputed in the manner of entity and attribute. This will be explained in detail later [in chapters 10-11].

Deprecation is refuted through the statement in Asaṅga’s Grounds of Bodhisattvas quoted just above and by a passage just after it:264

It is thus: to the Autonomists and Consequentialists who say that all phenomena—the aggregates and so forth—exist conventionally and do not exist ultimately, the Proponents of Mind-Only reply:265

For example, if the aggregates of form and so forth exist [by way of their own character], the person is suitable to be imputed [in dependence upon them],266 whereas if they did not exist [by way of their own character], then, when the things [that are the basis of imputation]268 are nonexistent, a person is not suitable to be imputed [in dependence upon them].269 Similarly, if the mere things [that is, the other-powered natures]270 that are the phenomena of forms and so forth exist [by way of their own character, the imputational natures]271 that are imputations of entity and attribute by272 the words imputing the phenomena of forms and so forth are suitable to be imputed [in dependence upon them],273 whereas if they do not exist [by way of their own character],274 there is no imputation when the things [that are the basis of imputation]275 are nonexistent. Concerning that, [there is entailment because]276 if the bases of imputation did not exist [by way of their own character], since the bases are nonexistent, the imputing [words]277 also would be nonexistent.

Here there is no way that those who assert the opponent’s position in [Asaṅga’s] refutation of deprecation could be from other schools [that is to say, non-Buddhist schools]. Also, within our own schools, among the Hearer

There are those who ruin [the doctrine of the Great Vehicle and the correct delineation of suchness by] making deprecation—of [other-powered natures, that is to say] real things ultimately existing with an inexpressible essence, which serve as the bases of the signs of imputed words, the supports of the signs of imputed words—as “not existing in each and every way.”

Ser-shül (Notes, 2714) takes this clause (’bogs pa yang med par ’gnyur rd) to mean “imputational natures would be nonexistent.”
schools [that is, the Great Exposition School and the Sūtra School] there are none who assert that the things of forms and so forth, which are the bases of the imputation of conventions by way of names and terminology, do not exist by way of their own character. Therefore, in accordance with the explanation in Asaṅga’s *Compendium of Ascertainties*, the opponents are proponents of Great Vehicle tenets. Furthermore, they are the Proponents of Non-Nature who propound that phenomena are not established by way of their own character.\(^a\)

Since the Proponents of Non-Nature do not at all assert that in general other-powered natures and so forth do not occur or do not exist conventionally, they propound that these are not ultimately established. Therefore, the refutation “if mere things do not exist”\(^c\) is, as explained earlier, a refutation of the non-occurrence of ultimately existent real things.

In this [Mind-Only] system, if imputational factors are not established by way of their own character or do not ultimately exist, they do not have to be nonexistent.\(^d\) However, if the other two natures [that is, other-powered and thoroughly established natures] are not established ultimately or by way of their own character, they do not exist.

Since the production of other-powered natures—[such as] minds and

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\(^a\) See p. 149ff.

\(^b\) Ser-shül (Notes, 27a.5-27b.4) cogently points out that in Asaṅga’s *Grounds of Bodhisattvas* and *Compendium of Ascertainties* those who hold a view of deprecation and who are being explicitly refuted are just the Consequentialists, who propound that phenomena are not established by way of their own character, and do not include the Autonomists, since their system of tenets propounding that phenomena are not ultimately established arose after these texts. To the objection that the Consequence School was not established (by Chandrakīrti) until after these texts, he answers that, nevertheless, prior to these Mind-Only texts there were many followers of Nāgārjuna who propounded that phenomena are not established by way of their own character. He cogently says that this is the reason why Dzong-ka-ba uses the term “Proponents of Non-Nature who propound that phenomena are not established by way of their own character” (and not “Consequentialists”).

\(^c\) As Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 399.4) admits that the same can be said for Autonomists, and thus in general the proponents of the extreme of deprecation here include both Consequentialists and Autonomists. Still, striving to have his cake and eat it too, he says that the *Grounds of Bodhisattvas* takes only the Consequentialists to be the opponents and that through refuting them the Autonomists are perforce refuted.

\(^d\) Da-drin-tap-den (Annotations, 58.6) holds that the reference is specifically to the Consequentialists and adds that, from the viewpoint of the Mind-Only School, since even the Autonomists assert that phenomena do not truly exist, that is, are not established as their own mode of subsistence, they also abide in an extreme of deprecation.

\(^b\) As Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 390.5) points out, these exact words (*dnges po snam med na*) do not appear in the *Grounds of Bodhisattvas*; thus although Dzong-ka-ba puts the material in quotes, he is paraphrasing.

\(^c\) Uncompounded space, for instance, is not established by way of its own character and does not ultimately exist but conventionally exists.
mental factors—in dependence upon their own causes and conditions is production established by way of its own character, it becomes ultimately existent production. This [Mind-Only] system thinks that if it were otherwise [that is, if production were not established by way of its own character or ultimately], it would be reduced to merely the imputation "production" upon the mind's fancying production, and the things that are minds and mental factors would not have [actual] production.

Therefore, it does not hit the mark [for Consequentialists] to answer, "Since the production and cessation of other-powered natures is in the perspective of a mistaken awareness's mere conception of production and cessation, production and cessation exist conventionally, whereby there is no deprecation." For, it is like saying, "A rope is a snake in the perspective of a mistaken consciousness that conceives a rope to be a snake, but in general a rope is never established as a snake." One would be asserting that:

- other-powered causes and effects are causes and effects for a mistaken consciousness that conceives causes and effects to be truly established; but
- other-powered natures themselves [actually] are not established as causes and effects.

Though they assert such, it comes to be that there is no way for them to posit [a presentation of actual] actions and their effects, which are such that virtues produce pleasures and ill-deeds produce pain, and hence the Consequentialists are not able to avoid deprecation.

If one asserts causes and effects that are not like this, then these are causes and effects established by way of their own character, due to which they are established as ultimately existent objects. Thinking this, [Asaṅga] explains that, if the bases of imputation did not exist [by way of their own character], imputing also would not exist, whereby both [claims by the Consequentialists] (1) that phenomena are merely imputed [by mistaken consciousnesses] and (2) that just this is the meaning of suchness are not possible. Hence, such is the chief of annihilatory views. Asaṅga's _Grounds of Bodhisattvas_ says:

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\[a\] Da-drin-rap-den (Annotations, 59.6). It is important to note that these are Consequentialists only as the Proponents of Mind-Only see them, not actual ones, since, according to Dzong-ka-ba, Consequentialists would hold not that production is posited merely in the face of a mistaken awareness but that production is validly established, even if it appears to be inherently existent to the valid consciousness that certifies its existence.

A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso (Precious Lamp, 187.3) identifies the respondents as both Autonomists and Consequentialists.

\[b\] Da-drin-rap-den's Annotations (60.3) adds: "Since the Consequentialists do not know how to posit cause and effect that are established by way of their own character and thus posit mere cause and effect for a mistaken consciousness, these cannot function as actual cause and effect."

\[c\] *las, karma.*
Therefore, some persons [that is, only Consequentialists], who have heard sūtras that are difficult to understand, profound, imbedded with the Great Vehicle, endowed with the profound emptiness, and taught with a meaning in [Buddha’s] thought [that is other than the literal reading] do not know, just as it is, the real meaning that is expounded. This being so, they make improper imputations and, with mere conceptions produced from illogicality upon improper analysis, view and propound, “Whoever view that all these [phenomena] are exhausted as mere imputations [by conceptuality] and that this is suchness are correctly viewing [the nature of phenomena].”

Since, according to them, even the mere things that are the bases of imputation do not exist [by way of their own character], the imputing [persons, conceptual consciousnesses, and terms] themselves also come to be nonexistent in all ways, in which case how could a suchness that is a mere imputation exist! Thereby, through this avenue, they deprecate both suchness and imputed [phenomena]. Since through that format they deprecate imputation and suchness, it is said that they are to be known as the chief of those having nihilistic views.

Also:

In consideration of that, [the Supramundane Victor] said, “The view of persons [as substantially existent in the sense of being self-sufficient] is preferable; the misapprehension of emptiness is not.” The former [that is, those viewing the substantial existence of persons] are merely obscured with respect to objects of knowledge; they do not deprecate all objects of knowledge and, through that, are not born in a hell. Moreover, they do not ruin others who want the doctrine, and they do not neglect the points of the trainings. However, the latter are the opposite of those. This is the reason [why the former are preferable].

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'a dogs pa, praśnāpti.

b Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s Port of Entry, 393.3. Sher-thül (Notes, 28b.6) takes the reference to be to imputational factors (kun brtags).

c btags pa, praśnāpti. Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 393.5) takes the term as referring to all phenomena in the assertion by the Proponents of Non-Nature that all phenomena are (just) imputed. This may be the reason why the translators chose here to change the Tibetan term for praśnāpti from 'dogs pa to btags pa.

d A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso’s Precious Lamp (187.5) and Döng-drup-gyel-tsen’s Four Interwined Commentaries (117.1) identify the scripture as the Pile of Jewels Śūtra, which says:

Kāśyapa, even a huge mountain (ri rab, mera) of viewing [the substantial existence] of persons is preferable; the viewing of emptiness by one with the pride of conceit (mgon pa'i nga rgyal can) is not.
Thus, the *Grounds of Bodhisattvas* says that: (289) [400]

- the non-existence of something [that is, the imputational nature] (290) in whatsoever [other-powered nature] (302) is [the thoroughly established nature which is] the emptiness of that [imputational nature],

- the remainder [that is, the other-powered nature] (301) exists [ultimately], and

- one who perceives such is non-erroneously oriented to emptiness. (302)

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*a* Paraphrasing Peking 5538, vol. 110, 144.5.6-144.5.8; see also Willis, *On Knowing Reality: The Tattvārtha Chapter of Asaṅga’s Bodhisattva-bhūmi* [New York: Columbia University Press, 1979; reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1982], 18, 44, and 163; for the Sanskrit, see p. 400, footnote a. For a similar discussion in the context of Maitreya’s *Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes*, see p. 183.

*b* The identification of other-powered natures as the remainder that ultimately exists follows Dzong-ka-ba’s commentary below. A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso (*Precious Lamp*, 188.6) identifies the remainder as both the bases of emptiness (other-powered natures) and emptiness (thoroughly established natures). As Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (*Port of Entry*, 400.3-400.6) points out, the latter type of identification accords with that presented in the first two stanzas of chapter 1 of Maitreya’s *Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes* (see p. 182); he draws the cogent conclusion that it must be said that in the explicit teaching at this point in the *Grounds of Bodhisattvas* nothing other than other-powered natures appears, whereas in general this type of passage in Asaṅga’s Five Treatises on the Grounds teaches that thoroughly established natures are also among the remainder. A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso adds that meditative equipoise sees emptiness and that the wisdom of subsequent attainment sees the bases of emptiness and emptiness as truly existent.


*c* Da-drin-rap-den (62.6) explains this as meaning: The non-existence of the entity of the imputational nature that is the object of negation—establishment of objects by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses—in other-powered natures which are the bases of imputation is the thoroughly established nature that is the emptiness of that. The remainder—the mere things that are the bases of imputation and the imputing [words]—exist. Those who perceive such are non-erroneously oriented with regard to emptiness because they understand a composite of appearance and emptiness that clears away the two extremes.

Šhay-rap-gyel-tsen (*Ocean of Definitive Meaning*, 203.3-205.2) cites similar passages from the *Sūtra of the Great Emptiness* and explains them as teaching other-emptiness. He also cites a similar passage from Asaṅga’s *Summary of Manifest Knowledge* to establish that Asaṅga sets forth the view of the Great Middle Way. It is safe to assume that Dzong-ka-ba implicitly is seeking to refute his interpretation.
The emptiness—in the things of forms and so forth—of the entities imputed to them by words is the meaning of the earlier phrase ["the non-existence of something, that is, the imputational nature in whatsoever other-powered natures is the thoroughly established nature which is the emptiness of that imputational nature"]. The remaining [ultimate] existence is the [ultimate] existence of the mere things that are the bases of imputation and the mere imputing [words].

That of which [phenomena] are empty is the imputational factor; the bases that are empty are other-powered natures; the emptiness that is the latter’s emptiness of the former is the thoroughly established nature. The meaning of the existence and non-existence of those is as explained before [that is, existing ultimately and not existing ultimately].

In this way, through abandoning the extreme of superimposition, the extreme of [reified] existence is abandoned, and through abandoning deprecation the extreme of non-existence is abandoned, due to which this is distinguished as non-dualistic, and such an emptiness is described as the final ultimate. Asaṅga’s *Grounds of Bodhisattvas* says:299

Those things included within the characteristic of being phenomena released from existence and non-existence—these two being the former thingness [that is, the extreme of superimposition]294 and non-thingness [that is, the extreme of deprecation]295—are non-dualistic. That which is non-dualistic is called the “unsurpassed middle path that has abandoned the two extremes.”

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299 *Da-drin-rap-đen* (*Annotations*, 63.4) qualifies this as the imputational factor that is the object of negation since phenomena are not empty, for instance, of the imputational factor that is their being referents of their respective conceptual consciousness; rather, phenomena are empty of the imputational factor that is their being established by way of their own character as the referents of their respective conceptual consciousnesses.
7. Asaṅga’s *Compendium of Ascertainments*

The explanation of how the two extremes are abandoned in Asaṅga’s *Compendium of Ascertainments* has two parts: (1) stating the opponent’s position along with our questions and the opponent’s answers about its meaning and (2) refuting the positions of the answers given.

Stating The Opponent’s Position Along With Our Questions And The Opponent’s Answers About Its Meaning (291) (402)

Asaṅga’s *Compendium of Ascertainments* says:296

Some of the Great Vehicle [that is, Proponents of Non-Nature],b due to their own misconception [of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras as being literally acceptable], say, “Conventionally all exist; ultimately all do not exist.”

The Proponents of the Middle speak of a differentiation of the existence and non-existence of phenomena by propounding that “All phenomena do not ultimately exist, but conventionally exist.”

Then, the *Compendium of Ascertainments* says:297

Those [Proponents of Non-Nature]c are to be asked, “Venerable Ones, what is the ultimate (don dam, paramārtha) [truth]?299 What is the concealer (kun rdzob, samvriti) [in the face of which conventional phenomena are posited as true,300 that is to say, as concordant in how they appear and how they exist]?”

When asked this, [the Proponents of Non-Nature]d answer, “That which is the naturelessness [that is, absence of ultimate existence]302 of all phenomena is the ultimate [truth].303 That which observes [and apprehends]304 those phenomena—which are without the

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*a* Dzong-ka-ba usually refers to the text as “the *Compendium*” (*buddha samgrahani*).

*b* A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso’s *Precious Lamp*, 191.3. Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (*Port of Entry, 404.4*) identifies the opponents as the Consequentialists and points out that the epithet “some of the Great Vehicle” (*tshag pa chen po la la*) indicates that this text, like Asaṅga’s *Grounds of Bodhisattvas*, does not deny that Consequentialists are proponents of Great Vehicle tenets but still holds them to be the chief of annihilationists, much as Consequentialists assert that Autonomists have fallen to extremes and yet are Proponents of the Middle.

*c* A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso (*Precious Lamp*, 191.3) gives this gloss, whereas Da-drin-rap-den (*Annotations, 64.3*) refers to the “explicit teaching” (*dngos bstan*) as not being literally acceptable. The latter does not seem to be sufficient, since, according to many Ge-luk-ša interpretations, the Proponents of Mind-Only hold that the *explicit teaching* of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras does not require interpretation and that only the literal reading (*gras zin*) does.

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nature [of true establishment]—as having such a nature is the concealer [that is, the concealing consciousness]. Why? Because it conceals [the reality of] what do not [truly] exist [through misconceiving them to truly exist], imputes [true existence], verbalizes [or conceives true existence again and again], and makes designations [of true existence in speech]."

The answer that [the Proponents of Non-Nature] give, upon being asked what the two truths are, is treated [in Asanga’s Compendium of Ascertainments] as the opponent’s position.

Concerning that, the question here about what the ultimate is concerns an illustration of ultimate truth and not that nonexistent nature due to their non-existence as which [objects] are said not to exist ultimately. Otherwise, it would not be reasonable [for the Proponents of Non-Nature] to profess [in answer to the above question] that the naturelessness of phenomena is the ultimate because the Proponents of the Middle do not posit something as existing ultimately due to existing as the selflessness of phenomena which they assert to be the ultimate.

Also, the question about what the concealer (kun rdzob, samnyi) is concerns the concealer [that is, ignorance], in “truths-for-a-concealer” (kun rdzob bden pa, samnyitshar), in the face of which [phenomena other than emptinesses] are posited as truths [in the sense that ignorance mistakenly takes them to exist as they appear] and is not a question concerning the conventionality [that is, conventional consciousness] in the face of which [phenomena are said] to exist conventionally. Otherwise, it would not be reasonable [for the Proponents of the Middle] to propound [in answer to the above question] that [a consciousness] apprehending what are natureless as having nature is the concealer (kun rdzob, samnyi). For, since [such a consciousness] is one conceiving true establishment, Proponents of the Middle assert that its conceived object does not exist even conventionally. This is because the nonexistent nature in “naturelessness” must be taken as a truly established entity.

Refuting The Positions Of The Answers Given (292) (403)

This section has two parts: indicating contradictions in others’ tenets [namely,

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A-ku Lo-dro-gya-tso (Precious Lamp, 191A and 192.3) treats the first part of the question (the part about the ultimate) as concerning the ultimate truth but takes the second part to be about the concealing consciousness in the face of which objects are (wrongly) posited as being true, that is to say, as having a concordance between how they appear and how they actually exist. Dzong-ka-ba himself gives this interpretation in the next two paragraphs, and thus when he speaks here of the two truths, it seems that he does not mean that the questioner is asking for an illustration of conventional truths but is asking something concerning conventional truths.

Dz-drin-rap-den (65.5) glosses med sa with med rgyu'i ngo bor.
in the system of the Proponents of Non-Nature] and dispelling contradictions in our own tenets [that is, in the system of the Proponents of Cognition].

**Demonstrating Contradictions In Others' Tenets (292) [403]**

[Refuting The Identification Of The Conceler By The Proponents Of Non-Nature] (292) [403]

About this, initially, in Asaṅga's *Compendium of Ascertainments*, the refutation of the identification of the concealer (*kun rdzob, samvrti*) [put forth by the Proponents of Non-Nature] is:

To those [Proponents of Non-Nature] we say this: Do you assert [the concealing consciousness] observing [and apprehending] the nature of true establishment whereas there is no such nature to arise from verbal and conventional causes [that is to say, causes which are of its own similar type], or is it asserted to be mere verbalization and convention? If it arises from verbal and conventional causes, then since [that consciousness conceiving true existence] arises from verbal and conventional causes, it is not suitable to say that [this consciousness conceiving true existence] does not [ultimately] exist.

If [this consciousness conceiving true existence] is verbal and conventional, then it must be only imputed by conceptuality, whereby other-powered natures would be only imputed by conceptuality. In that case, other-powered natures would be nonexistent, and therefore being without a basis [of imputation], it is not suitable to call [that conceptual consciousness] verbal and conventional [that is, it would not be suitable to say that a consciousness conceiving true existence is only imputedly existent].

The meaning of this is: The concealing [consciousness] (*kun rdzob, samvrti*) apprehending that [phenomena] ultimately have nature, whereas they [actually] do not, is also [itself a factor of] internal verbalization. In that case, is it produced by causes that are of its own earlier, similar type, or is it merely imputed by conventional and verbal conceptuality? If it is produced by causes that are of its own earlier, similar type, then, since it is produced by causes, "it is not suitable to say that it does not exist," that is, that it does not **ultimately** exist. [The reference here is to ultimate existence] because this is an occasion of debating about ultimately existing or not ultimately existing and because the opponent [that is, the Proponent of Non-Nature] asserts that [other-powered natures] do not **ultimately** exist and does not propound that they do not exist in general.

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* According to A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso (*Precious Lamp*, 192.6), the latter part of the question means, "or is verbalization [that is, a consciousness conceiving true existence] merely imputed by convention and conceptuality?"
If [you say that the concealing consciousness is merely imputed by conceptuality], then [it is answered that] it is not suitable to be just imputed by conceptuality because [its]36 bases of imputation [that is, other-powered natures]337 do not exist, since if conventionalities and verbalizations [like these]338 are only imputed by conceptuality, then others also will only be such [in which case other-powered natures will be nonexistent].339

[Refuting The Identification Of The Ultimate By The Proponents Of Non-Nature]340 (292) (404)

With respect to refuting the identification of ultimate [truth by the Proponents of Non-Nature], the same text says:341

We also say [to those Proponents of Non-Nature], "Venerable Ones, why [do you claim that] those [things]342 that are observed [by valid cognition to be established by way of their own character]343 are not existent [by way of their own character]?"344

When this is asked, [the Proponents of Non-Nature]345 answer, "[That there is a consciousness conceiving that objects are established by way of their own character does not damage our assertion that objects are not established by way of their own character]346 because [such a consciousness] is an erroneous thing [that is, a wrong consciousness]."347

About that, we ask: "Is that erroneous [consciousness]348 asserted to exist [by way of its own character],349 or is it asserted not to exist [by way of its own character]? If it exists [by way of its own character],350 then it is not suitable [for you]351 to say that the non-nature [that is, the absence of ultimate existence] of all phenomena is the ultimate [since this erroneous consciousness would exist by way of its own character and hence would exist ultimately].352 If it does not exist [by way of its own character],353 then [since it would not exist at all]354 it is not suitable [for you] to say that because [this consciousness]355 is an erroneous thing, what is observed [by it]356 is natureless."

The meaning of that is:

a Da-drin-rap-den's Annotations, 68.3-4. A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso (Precious Lamp, 193.3) renders the meaning as, "While phenomena are observed by valid cognition to be truly established, how could it be right that they do not truly exist?"

b The Tibetan word is gnod pa (Sanskrit, bhadha) which literally means "damage" and "harm." I use this translation-equivalent because, although by extension the term means "refute" or "contradict," I often find Sanskrit and Tibetan philosophical terminology to be far richer in its literal meaning than in its rerendering into what some English-speaking scholars have identified as its philosophical meaning. Much of the psychological punch (pun intended) is lost in such translations.
[The Proponent of the Mind-Only School says to the Proponent of Non-Nature:] While these phenomena are observed to have an own-character, that is to say, establishment by way of their own character, how could it be reasonable to say that establishment of objects by way of their own character does not exist? For, this [proposition] is damaged by valid cognition observing such establishment of objects by way of their own character.

*Objection* [by the Proponent of Non-Nature]: Our assertion that phenomena are not established by way of their own character] is not damaged by an awareness observing such because that awareness is a mistaken thing.

*Answer* [by the Proponent of the Mind-Only School]: Then, if that mistaken [awareness] exists by way of its own character, [since it would ultimately have nature,] the naturelessness of all phenomena would not be suitable [to be propounded] as the ultimate [truth]. If [this awareness] does not exist [by way of its own character], then [since it would be utterly nonexistent] it is not feasible to say that because [this awareness] is mistaken, there is no [fault in holding that such establishment does not exist] even though [establishment of objects by way of their own character] is observed [by it].

Here [in Asaṅga's *Compendium of Ascertainties*], the analysis also should be done in terms of ultimately existing or not ultimately existing [as it was in the *Grounds of Bodhisattvas*, which is the root text for the *Compendium of Ascertainties*]; however, the import of (1) analyzing the ultimate and the concealer and (2) analyzing ultimately existing and not ultimately existing] is similar, and the former analysis [in the *Grounds of Bodhisattvas*] is easier to understand. Therefore, it has been explained that way.

[Reason For Not Demonstrating Fallacies With Respect To Imputational Natures And Thoroughly Established Natures Not Ultimately Existing But Demonstrating Fallacies With Respect To Other-Powered Natures Not Ultimately Existing] {404}

Thus, here [in the *Compendium of Ascertainties* Asaṅga] does not address the fallacies of [the assertion by the Proponents of Non-Nature that] the two,

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4 The bracketed material in this paragraph is drawn from Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso's *Port of Entry*, 408.3–408.5. Ser-shül Lo-sang-pün-tsoṅ’s interpretation (Notes, 28b6–29a3) is markedly different; according to him, Dzöng-ka-ba’s concern is with his own switching back and forth between the vocabulary of ultimate existence and existence by way of an object’s own character; in his view Dzöng-ka-ba wants to make clear that these two are equivalent. Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (*Port of Entry*, 420.5) refutes an assertion similar to Lo-sang-pün-tsoṅ’s by indicating that the referent of “here” in this and in the next paragraph must be to the same text, the *Compendium of Ascertainties*. 
imputational natures and thoroughly established natures, do not exist ultimately and exist conventionally; rather, he demonstrates fallacies upon analyzing whether concealing consciousnesses and mistaken consciousnesses ultimately exist or not. This is a refutation of [the position of the Proponents of Non-Nature that] other-powered natures do not ultimately exist but exist conventionally, for since just these [consciousnesses] which, being impermanent, are necessarily other-powered natures are the subjects possessing the quality of the thoroughly established nature and are the imputers, as well as bases of imputation of imputational factors, scholars mainly debate about whether just these ultimately exist or not.

[Indicating That The Explanation Of The Abandonment Of The Two Extremes In The Compendium Of Ascertainties Has The Same Essentials As That In The Grounds Of Bodhisattvas] (293) (405)

Furthermore, Asaṅga’s *Compendium of Ascertainties* says:

It should be known that adherence to other-powered natures and thoroughly established natures as imputational natures is an extreme of superimposition.

Also:

The extreme of deprecation is deprecation of own-character [by holding] that other-powered natures and thoroughly established natures do not exist [by way of their own character], whereas they do. One should understand thoroughly the mode of the meaning of suchness in the manner of abandoning those two extremes.

[Asaṅga] speaks of the deprecation of own-character in which [it is held] that the last two natures [that is, other-powered and thoroughly established natures] are not established as existing by way of their own character, whereas they are. The *Grounds of Bodhisattvas* and this [Compendium of Ascertainties] have the same way [of positing] the extremes of superimposition and deprecation and [the emptiness which is] the abandonment of them.

[That Imputational Natures Do Not Exist Is Not This System] (293) (405)

Furthermore, the non-existence of imputational factors is so ultimately; it is not that [in general imputational natures] do not exist in conventional terms.

*tha snyad du med pa*. Imputational natures such as uncompounded space exist even though the imputational nature that is the object of negation in the view of selflessness does not exist at all. It is a rule of Tibetan interpretations of the Epistemologists (*shad ma pa*) that since some imputational natures exist, the category of imputational natures exists. The category is expressed in Tibetan in the singular—imputational nature—and thus it is said that in general imputational nature exists.
Asaṅga’s *Compendium of Ascertainments* says: a  

**Question:** Is it to be said that what is posited by way of whatsoever names and whatsoever verbalizations [that is, conceptual consciousnesses] to] those [other-powered things such as] clear realizations is the entity of those? Or is it to be said that it is not the entity of those?  

**Answer:** It is to be said that it is the entity of those conventionally. It is to be said that it is not the entity of those ultimately.

Also, Asaṅga b speaks of “that imputational nature which becomes an object of observation by a consciousness [that is produced] in dependence upon names

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a As Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (*Port of Entry*, 410.5) says, what is posited by terms and conceptual consciousnesses is that other-powered natures are foundations of reference by terms and conceptual consciousnesses.

According to A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso (*Precious Lamp*, 194.3), the question is: Are other-powered natures established or not in accordance with how they appear to consciousnesses of terms conceptual consciousnesses? Also, he does not emend “conceptual consciousnesses” (*mgon par rtags pa*) to “clear realizations” (*mgon par rtags pa*). Thus, to follow him, the translation of the passage should read:

Is it to be said that those [other-powered things such as] conceptual consciousnesses which are posited by way of whatsoever names and whatsoever verbalizations [that is, conceptual consciousnesses] are entities of those [that is, do they exist the way they appear]? Or is it to be said that they are not entities of those [that is, do they not exist the way they appear]?  

Da-drin-rap-den (*Annotations*, 71.4) identifies conceptual consciousnesses as conceptual consciousnesses that associate name and meaning (*ming don ’brul ba’i rtags pa*). His seemingly forced interpretation—adding “to” (*la*)—makes more sense out of the quotation, since Dzong-ka-ba cites the passage to show that imputational natures exist, and thus I have used Da-drin-rap-den’s annotation here.

In A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso’s interpretation, the same point is made, in that if forms are conventionally established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses, then their being such and the appearance of such exists. The meaning of the passage is, in his interpretation, that forms’ appearing to be the referents of conceptual consciousnesses is due to predispositions of verbalization and does not subsist in the object by way of its own character.

As Da-drin-rap-den (71.5) says:

By way of its own nature, without depending on name and conceptuality, form is not established (1) as the form that is the referent of the term “form” or (2) as the basis [of reference] of the term “form” and as the basis of adherence by a conceptual consciousness [comprehending form]. However, it is permissible that it is a basis of those in dependence upon name and conceptuality.

All of these interpretations are basically saying the same thing.

*b* *mgon par rtags pa*. Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (*Port of Entry*, 410.3) identifies these as the six—contemplation, faith, ethics, true knowledge of clear realization, true knowledge arisen from the finality of clear realization, and final clear realization—and thus as the path, which is an illustration of other-powered natures.
[due to the force of] being thoroughly accustomed to verbalization," and then he says, "because it is imputedly existent, not ultimately existent."

Therefore, [since among imputational natures there are some, such as uncompounded space or being a referent of a conceptual consciousness, that exist and others that do not exist], although imputational factors, such as the two selves [of persons and of phenomenal], do not occur among objects of knowledge [that is, do not exist], this mere fact does not make all imputational factors into not occurring [among existents]. Hence, substantial existence and ultimate existence are refuted [with respect to imputational natures], but [imputational natures in general or, more specifically, existent imputational natures] are posited as imputedly existent and conventionally existent.

For that reason, the explanation in a certain Great Commentary on the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought (293) [406] is not the thought of that sūtra when this commentary says:

Imputational factors do not exist as either of the two truths [ultimate or conventional]. The dependent-arisings of other-powered natures of apprehended-objects and apprehending-subjects [which are different substantial entities] exist conventionally [and do not exist ultimately], like magical creations. The thoroughly established nature is the ultimate, and its existence in the manner of naturelessness also ultimately exists.

[This is not the thought of the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought, because] it contradicts the proof of no external objects in Asaṅga’s Summary of the Great Vehicle—that is made within citing the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought—and there-

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A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso cogently holds that Dzong-ka-ba could not be referring to the very short, ten-page commentary on the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought falsely attributed to Asaṅga, even though Dzong-ka-ba mentions a commentary by Asaṅga at the end of this paragraph. Indeed, since Dzong-ka-ba is speaking about a great commentary on the sūtra, he could not be referring to the very short one entitled āryaamdhinirmocanabhāṣya (’phags pa dgyogs pa rgyes pa ’grei pa’i nams pa bshad pa; Peking 5481, vol. 104, 1.1.1-7.5.1), even though the latter is listed by Bu-don in his history as by Asaṅga. For that attribution see E. Obermiller, History of Buddhism (Chos-hgyung) by Bu-ston (Heidelberg: Hef. 1932; Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation, n.d.), 140. It is likely that Dzong-ka-ba either did not or would not put any stock in the attribution to Asaṅga since, at the end of this paragraph, he draws the conclusion that “there also does not appear to be any need for this master’s [that is, Asaṅga’s] composing a separate commentary.” For Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s attempt (Port of Entry, 413.4) to pin down Dzong-ka-ba’s reference, see appendix 1, p. 453ff.

b For the specific references from chapters 2 and 3 of Asaṅga’s Summary of the Great Vehicle (John P. Keenan, The Summary of the Great Vehicle by Bodhisattva Asaṅga: Translated from the Chinese of Paramārtha [Berkeley, Calif.: Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research, 1992], 39ff), where the “Questions of Maitreya Chapter” of the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought is cited, see Reflections on Reality, chap. 20.
upon the explanation of external and internal objects and subjects [which are different substantial entities]** as imputational factors. It also contradicts Asaṅga's *Grounds of Bodhisattvas* and his *Compendium of Ascertainments*.\(^{380}\) Furthermore, a passage of Dharmakīrti's *Ascertainment [of Prime cognition]* is cited in that [above-mentioned *Great Commentary*].\(^{381}\) Hence, one [scholar's]\(^{4}\) saying that it was written by Asaṅga is a case of a great absence of analysis.\(^{4}\) In his *Compendium of Ascertainments* Asaṅga quotes, except for the introductory chapter of the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*, most of the remaining chapters and settles well the difficult points; hence, there also does not appear to be any need for this master's [that is, Asaṅga's] composing a separate commentary.

[It Is Not This System That Imputational Natures Do Not Conventionally Exist And Other-Powered Natures Do Not Ultimately Exist]\(^{382}\) (294) [406]

Furthermore, one later [scholar] explains that it is the thought of Asaṅga and his brother [Vasubandhu] that:

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\(^{a}\) Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (*Port of Entry*, 412.5) identifies the passage, cited by Dzong-ka-ba (p. 142), as:

> When the mere things [or entities] that are the phenomena of forms and so forth are deprecated, suchness does not exist, and imputation [that is, imputational natures] also do not exist; thereby both of those [that is, thoroughly established natures and imputational natures] are also not feasible.

\(^{b}\) Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (*Port of Entry*, 412.5) identifies the passage, cited by Dzong-ka-ba (p. 151), as:

> If [this consciousness conceiving true existence] is verbal and conventional, [then it must be only imputed by conceptuality, whereby other-powered natures would be only imputed by conceptuality. In that case, other-powered natures would be non-existent, and therefore] being without a basis [of imputation], it is not suitable to call [that conceptual consciousness] verbal and conventional [that is, it would not be suitable to say that a consciousness conceiving true existence is only imputedly existent].

\(^{c}\) Dzong-ka-ba most likely draws this critique of an unnamed scholar from Bu-dön's *Catalogue of the Translated Doctrine* (chos byigs dkar chag), which makes this very point to show that the text is not by Asaṅga (see Ernst Steinkeiller, "Who Is Byan chub rdu'z pu?rul?: Tibetan and non-Tibetan Commentaries on the Samdhinirmocanaśāstra—A Survey of the Literature," *Berliner Indologische Studien* 4, no. 5 [1989]: 239). Bu-dön also does not identify who the scholar is; none of Dzong-ka-ba's commentators does either.

\(^{d}\) Dharmakīrti, being an indirect student of Dignāga, who was a direct disciple of Asaṅga's half-brother Vasubandhu, is clearly post-Asaṅga, and thus Asaṅga could not have cited him.

\(^{e}\) See Absorption, #9.

\(^{f}\) Peking 5539, vol. 111, 83.2.6-107.5.1; the *Compendium of Ascertainments* itself runs from vol. 110, 233.1.1-294.5.8 through vol. 111, 121.2.8; thus his citation of almost the entire sūtra is approximately only a seventh of the *Compendium*.

\(^{g}\) Gung-tang (*Annotations, nyo* 94.3) says that the opponent is probably Bu-dön and cites
• the first nature [the imputational nature] does not exist even conventionally,
• although the middle one [the other-powered nature] exists conventionally, it does not exist ultimately, and
• the latter [the thoroughly established nature] ultimately exists.

This also is outside this system [of Mind-Only as commented upon by Asaṅga
and Vasubandhu]. In particular, the [wrong] assertion—that the meaning of
other-powered natures’ existing conventionally is just that a mistaken con-
sciousness conceives that production, cessation, and so forth exist in them,
whereas in fact production, cessation, and so forth do not exist—is the final
deprecation of other-powered natures, due to which the other two natures are
also deprecated. Hence, this is the chief of annihilatory views described earlier
in Asaṅga’s *Grounds of Bodhisattvas* as a deprecation of all three natures. Know
this as an undispellable contradiction in the position of those who assert that
the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* is of definitive meaning [and assert that other-
powered natures are empty of inherent existence].

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*Dispelling Contradictions In Our Own Tenets [That Is, In The System
Of The Proponents Of Cognition] (294) [407]*

[Objection By Someone Not Distinguishing Between Ultimately Existing And
Ultimate Truth] (294) [407]

If, in accordance with statements in Asaṅga’s *Grounds of Bodhisattvas* and *Com-
pendium of Ascertainments*, other-powered natures ultimately exist, then how
does this not contradict [the many statements that other-powered natures are
not ultimates, such as]:

1. The statement in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* that whatever is a
compounded phenomenon is not ultimate:

   If, just as the eight branches of the path of Superiors are of mutually
different character, the thusness of those phenomena—the ultimate,
the selflessness in phenomena—also was different in character, then
thusness, the ultimate, the selflessness in phenomena also would be
causled. If it arose from causes, it would be a compounded phenome-
on. If it were a compounded phenomenon, it would not be ultimate.

2. The statement in Maitreya’s *Differentiation of the Middle and the Ex-
his history (see Obermiller, *History of Buddhism*, 52); A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso (*Precious Lamp*,
195.5) similarly reports that this position is clear in Bu-don’s history. However, Bel-jor-
hln-drup (*Lamp for the Teaching*, 44.7), Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (*Port of Entry*, 415.1),
and Da-drin-rap-den (*Annotations*, 73.6) identify the scholar as Jo-nang-ba, that is, Shay-rap-
gyel-tsen; Ser-thül (*Notes*, 30a.4) similarly thinks it may be Jo-nang-ba Shay-rap-gyel-tsen.

See p. 141ff.
tremes.⁴³ “The ultimate is single,” as well as its commentary [by Vāsūbandhu],⁴³² “The ultimate truth is to be known as the single thoroughly established nature”

3. The explanation that an ultimate truth is without production and disintegration which occurs in Maitreya’s Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras on the occasion of stating that the ultimate truth has five characteristics:⁴³³

[The ultimate is] (1) not existent [in the sense of apprehended-object and apprehending-subject being different substantial entities] and not nonexistent [as a mere negative of a difference of entity of subject and object], (2) not the same [that is, not exactly the same as] and not another [entity from the phenomena that are empty], (3) not produced or disintegrating [when thoroughly afflicted phenomena and pure phenomena are produced and cease and hence] not diminished or increasing, (4) also not purified [because of being naturally pure of defilements from the start], and (5) yet becoming purified [of adventitious defilements]. These are characteristics of the ultimate.

And also the statement in Vāsūbandhu’s commentary that:⁴³⁴

[The ultimate] does not exist by way of the imputational character or

⁴³ theg pa chen po’i mdo’i sde rgyan, mahāyānasūtraśālamkāra; VI.1; Peking 5521, vol. 108, 5.1.1; for the Sanskrit, see p. 408, footnote b. For a translation into French, see Sylvain Lévi, Mahāyānasūtraśālamkāra: Exposé de la doctrine du grand véhicule selon le système Yogācāra (Paris: Bibliothèque de l’École des Hautes Études, 1907, 1911; reprint, Shanghai: 1940), 22. The bracketed commentary in this stanza is from A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso’s Precious Lamp, 197.1-197.4; for another interpretation of the five, see Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s Port of Entry, 425.1, and another’s (perhaps his own) criticism of A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso’s interpretation, 430.3.

Shay-rap-gyel-tsen (Ocean of Definitive Meaning, 195.1) cites this passage as showing that the ultimate is other-empty. He takes:

• “not existent” to mean that imputational natures and other-powered natures do not really exist;
• “not nonexistent” to mean that the thoroughly established nature is not not really existent;
• “not the same” to mean that the three natures are not the same entity;
• “not other” to mean that the three natures are not different entities—the reason for this and the previous point being that imputational natures and other-powered natures do not really have entities;
• since the thoroughly established nature that is the basis empty of imputational natures and other-powered natures is uncompounded, it is “not produced or disintegrating, not diminished or increasing”;
• since the thoroughly established nature is naturally pure, its entity does not have anything that requires purification; and
• to attain the thoroughly established nature it must “become purified” of adventitious defilements.
other-powered character and does not exist by way of the thoroughly established character.

4. Also the statement in Asaṅga’s *Compendium of Ascertainties:* 395

Is it to be said that reasons [that is, mainly the other-powered natures that are the bases of imputation of imputational natures] exist conventionally or that they exist ultimately? They are to be said to exist conventionally.

Also: 396

Is it to be said that conceptual consciousnesses [that is, contaminated minds and mental factors] exist conventionally or that they exist ultimately? It is to be said that they exist conventionally. 398

[Answers Dispelling Those Contradictions] 399 (295) (409)

[Dispelling Contradictions Regarding The First Three Passages] 400 (295) (409)

I will explain how these statements do not contradict [the ultimate existence of other-powered natures]. There are two ways of positing [phenomena] as existing conventionally and as existing ultimately.

The First Mode OfPositing Existing Conventionally And Existing Ultimately (295) (409)

The first is to posit an existent—that is posited through the force of conventions—as existing conventionally and to posit an existent—that is not posited through the force of conventions but exists by way of its own character—as ultimately existing. 4 For instance, there are the many statements in sūtra that such and such is by the force of worldly conventions and is not so ultimately. This [mode of positing ultimately existing and conventionally existing] is the basis of debate about ultimate and conventional existence and non-existence between the Proponents of the Middle and the Proponents of True Existence.

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395 A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso (*Precious Lamp*, 197.4) identifies “reasons” (*rgyus mtshan*) this way and also as all bases of designation of imputational natures, thus including permanent phenomena; see Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (*Port of Entry*, 432.6) for a source in the *Compendium* itself. Less satisfactorily, Da-drin-rap-den (76.3) identifies “reasons” as the names (or phrases), “This is form,” and so forth.

Phenomena are probably called “reasons” (*rgyus mtshan*) because they are reasons, or bases, for verbalizations.

396 Da-drin-rap-den (77.6) says that this mode of positing conventional and ultimate existence is shared by all Buddhist schools.

398 Da-drin-rap-den (78.1) identifies “worldly conventions” (*jig rten gyi tha nyid*) as names (*ming*) and conceptual consciousnesses (*rrog pa*). He points out that the meaning of being posited through the force of names and conceptual consciousnesses differs greatly in the Mind-Only and Consequence Schools.
who are among our own and others’ schools.

In terms of this [mode of positing the meaning of ultimate and conventional, according to the Mind-Only School] the first nature explained earlier [that is, existent imputational natures] exists conventionally but does not exist ultimately, and the other two natures [that is, other-powered and thoroughly established natures] exist ultimately but do not exist conventionally. Therefore, they are as was [explained earlier] in Asaṅga’s *Grounds of Bodhisattvas* and *Compendium of Ascertainments* [where imputational natures are described as not existing ultimately and other-powered natures and thoroughly established natures are described as existing ultimately].

Also, Asaṅga’s *Compendium of Ascertainments* says:

Those which are objects of observation of a consciousness based on names [through the force of] being thoroughly conditioned to verbalization—things having the names of the forms and so forth that exist by way of essences of forms and so forth—both do not substantially exist and do not ultimately exist. Hence, it should be known that whereas those phenomena having the names of forms and so forth do not exist as entities of those [that is, as forms and so forth], those imputations by that [conceptuality] exist imputedly.

It should be known that objects of observation of [non-conceptual] consciousnesses—that have the name of being devoid of thorough conditioning to verbalization—those objects being things having the names of forms and so forth that exist by way of an inexpressible essence, both substantially exist and ultimately exist.

Moreover, with respect to substantial and imputed existence, Asaṅga’s *Compendium of Ascertainments* says:

It should be known that that of which its own character [can] be designated without relying on [apprehending phenomena] other than it and [its apprehension] does not [need to] depend on [apprehension of phenomena] other than it is, in brief, substantially existent. Anything of which its own character [must be] designated in reliance on [apprehending] other than itself and depending on other than it—

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a A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso (*Precious Lamp*, 198.3) adds the qualification “external objects,” but it is difficult to understand how external objects could “exist imputedly” (see the end of the paragraph), since Dzong-ka-ba takes Asaṅga as holding that imputed existence is not just a figment of the imagination. Ser-shül (Notes, 30b.3) does not add such a qualification.

b A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso (*Precious Lamp*, 198.5), again, interprets this as “those imputed external objects exist imputedly,” see the previous footnote.

c A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso (ibid., 200.1) takes this as referring to yogic direction perception, whereas Ser-shül (Notes, 32a.6) takes it as referring to directly perceiving consciousnesses such as eye consciousnesses; the latter objects to those who view the passage as referring to self-consciousness.
self is to be known, in brief, as existing imputedly; it does not substantially exist.

As an example of this, Asaṅga cites the imputation as a self or sentient being in dependence upon the aggregates [since the apprehension of a self or sentient being must depend upon apprehending mental and physical aggregates].

In this [Mind-Only] system, the two—(1) imputed existence in which the object is not apprehendable without relying on apprehension of other phenomena and [the object] must be apprehended in reliance upon apprehending other phenomena and (2) establishment by way of its own character without being posited through the force of conventions—are not contradictory. Therefore, although, for instance, the predispositions of the basis-of-all are said to exist imputedly, it is not contradictory that they exist ultimately [or exist by way of their own character] in the sense explained earlier. However, ultimate existence or existence by way of the object’s own character is contradictory with imputed existence, in the sense of being imputed by names and conceptuality.

[The Second Mode OfPositing Existing Conventionally And Existing Ultimately [That Is, Existing As A Conventional Truth And As An Ultimate Truth]] (295) (410)

Maitreya’s Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes says:

The ultimate is asserted as of three aspects—

Object [that is, thusness], attainment [that is, nirvana], and practice [that is, true paths].

Vasubandhu’s commentary on this says, “The object-ultimate is thusness [that is, emptiness] because of being the object of the highest exalted wisdom.” [In this explanation] the ultimate is taken as the exalted wisdom of uncontaminated meditative equipoise, and since thusness is the object of that exalted wisdom, thusness is called the object of the ultimate or the ultimate object. It is the meaning of selflessness, suchness; it is also the [actual] ultimate that is the object of observation of purification. The other two natures [imputational and other-powered natures] do not exist as that [ultimate], whereas the single thoroughly established nature does, due to which Maitreya’s Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes clearly says [that the ultimate is single].

The objects of activity [of the path] of purification are twofold.

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*a kun gzi, álaya.
*b dam pa, parama.
*c dam pa’i don, paramayārtha.
*d don dam pa, parama-artha.
*e III.12cd; Peking 3522, vol. 108, 20.3.7; for the Sanskrit, see p. 411, footnote a. See Absorption, #154.
Asanga’s Compendium of Ascertainties

[Both] are said to be only the single [thoroughly established nature].

And Vasubandhu’s commentary on that clearly says:

[They are] said to be the thoroughly established nature. The other natures [imputational and other-powered natures] are not objects of the two types of exalted wisdom purifying obstructions.

The two exalted wisdoms are the exalted wisdoms purifying the two obstructions [to liberation and to omniscience].

[Another’s position] (296) (411) Since this [Mind-Only] system asserts that an exalted wisdom is a self-cognizing consciousness, an exalted wisdom also would be an object [of the exalted wisdom itself, whereby it too would be an object-ultimate and hence an ultimate truth].

Answer: [Maitreya’s explanation that the final object observed by the purifying wisdom is the object-ultimate is in consideration of that object in relation to which the meaning of suchness is realized; hence, there is no fault.

a A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso’s Precious Lamp (207.6) identifies the position as that of the “Jo-nang-bas, and so forth,” who hold that the uncontaminated primordial wisdom is the ultimate.

b This question and answer poses problems to Ge-luk-ba commentators because, strictly speaking, they do not call an exalted wisdom, or even an eye consciousness, a self-cognizing consciousness. Rather, a self-cognizing consciousness is a factor accompanying all other-knowing consciousnesses; it is the same entity as those consciousnesses and is itself internally directed. The problem the commentators must unravel is the meaning of the questioner’s calling an exalted wisdom a self-cognizing consciousness. There are many interpretations of the question, among which I find Ser-thul Lo-sang-piin-tsok’s the most cogent. First, let us consider the interpretations of Bel-jor-hlun-drup, Jam-yan-shay-ba, and Jang-gya.

Bel-jor-hlun-drup (Lamp, 48.6) takes the self-cognizing consciousness of the question as an actual one, and thus he has Dzong-ka-ba simply answering that an exalted wisdom is not a self-cognizing consciousness. He re-phrases this passage as:

Qualm: It [absurdly] follows that an exalted wisdom is an object of purification, because this exalted wisdom is a self-knower that experiences itself. If it is accepted [that this exalted wisdom is an object of purification], then since this exalted wisdom would be an ultimate that is an object of observation of purification, it would be a thoroughly established nature.

Reply: Proponents of Cognition do not assert an exalted wisdom to be a self-knower that experiences itself, and an exalted wisdom, merely by virtue of its being the object of exalted wisdom, would not become a thoroughly established nature.

For, this [passage in Maitreya’s Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes]:

The objects of activity [of the path] of purification are twofold.

[Both] are said to be only the single [thoroughly established nature].

is in consideration of the fact that the object in relation to which [a consciousness] is posited as having realized suchness must be a thoroughly established nature.
Therefore, such an ultimate is uncompounded, and in this [Mind-Only system] it is not contradictory that although [an object like an other-powered nature] is not established as such an ultimate, it is ultimately established in the sense of subsisting by way of its own character without being posited through the force of conventions.

It is in reference to the former mode of ultimate existence [that is, existing

Jam-yang-shay-ba (Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive, 166.6-169.1), on the other hand, takes the question as referring to an exalted wisdom of individual self-knowledge (so tor rang rig pa'i ye shes), which the questioner fancies as meaning that it knows itself but which Jam-yang-shay-ba says means that it sees reality directly by itself individually, without any mixture with anything other, such as terminology, conceputality, and so forth (see A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso’s Precious Lamp, 209.6).

Jang-gya (225.1-234.5 and especially 226.10; also cited in A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso’s Precious Lamp, 208.4) rejects this interpretation out of hand because no scholar would mistake the meaning of “individual self-knowledge,” as Jam-yang-shay-ba has the questioner doing. Jang-gya also says that the assertion that an exalted wisdom is a wisdom of individual self-knowledge is not unique to the Mind-Only School and thus there would be no need for Dzong-ka-ba to say “This system asserts…..” He interprets the question as referring to an actual self-cognizing consciousness that accompanies an exalted wisdom, and thus the questioner’s qualm is that since an exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise is an object found by an uncontaminated, unmistaken, self-cognizing consciousness, it would have to be an ultimate truth.

A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso (Precious Lamp, 208.6) rejects Jang-gya’s interpretation, based on the fact that the sense in which the Mind-Only School asserts that the self-cognizing consciousness that accompanies a consciousness is uncontaminated is that it is not infected with dualistic appearance. Using this fact, he turns Jang-gya’s criticism of Jam-yang-shay-ba back on him by pointing out that even the self-cognizing consciousness that accompanies a wrong consciousness is uncontaminated—in the sense that it is not infected with dualistic appearance—but no scholar would wonder whether a wrong consciousness is an ultimate truth.

Amidst these and other interpretations, I find Sher-riul’s exposition (Notes, 35a.6-35b.5) to be the most cogent. He views Dzong-ka-ba as using the vocabulary of “self-cognizing” (rang rig) loosely. He says that even though an exalted wisdom itself is not an actual self-cognizing consciousness, the Mind-Only School asserts that with respect to each and every consciousness the self-cognizing consciousness that experiences it, aside from being merely a factor of luminous knowledge, is not another entity from the consciousness that it knows, due to which the conveniences that a consciousness experiences and knows itself by itself are used. He cogently says that it is in the context of such coarse conventions that the question and answer are framed. The answer means that even though an exalted wisdom is an object of itself, only that object in relation to which a consciousness is posited as an exalted wisdom realizing suchness—that is to say, emptiness—is posited as a thoroughly established nature; thus, since an object is not posited as a thoroughly established nature merely because of being an object of an exalted wisdom, there is no fault that the exalted wisdom itself would be an ultimate truth.

For a listing of various interpretations of this passage, see Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s Port of Entry, 461.5-470.6.
ultimately or by way of its own character] \(297\) \(411\) that [Āryadeva]\(^a\) says in his *Compilation of the Essence of Wisdom*:\(^a\)

That a consciousness which is released
From apprehended-object and apprehending-subject exists ultimately\(^b\)
Is renowned in the texts of the Yogic Practitioners
Who have passed to the other shore of the ocean of awareness.

In many treatises of the Middle Way School, there is debate with the Yogic Practitioners, at which time debate on the existence and non-existence of other-powered natures also is not done in terms of existing or not existing conventionally but is about existing or not existing ultimately. Therefore, those two ultimates [that is, existing ultimately and existing as the ultimate] must be distinguished well. In the texts of the master [Asaṅga] and his brother [Vasubandhu], there are many presentations of the ultimate based on the latter interpretation [that is to say, as existing as the ultimate truth].

[Dispelling Contradictions Regarding The Fourth Passage]\(^c\) \(297\) \(412\)

With respect to how the first two natures exist conventionally [that is, as conventionalities], Asaṅga’s *Compendium of Ascertainments* gives rationales for why reasons [that is, phenomena that are foundations of verbalizing words]\(^c\) and conceptual consciousnesses [that is, minds and mental factors that involve dualistic appearance]\(^d\) exist conventionally. That text says:\(^c\)

\(^a\) Stanza 26, *ye shes snying po kun la btsus pa, jñānasārasamuccaya*; Peking 5251, vol. 95, 144.2.8. Pan-chen Šō-nam-drak-ba (Utpala Garland, 43a.5) refers to a commentary on this text by Bodhibhadra (*byung chub bzang po*; Peking 5352). Šer-thül (*Notes, 36a.1*) points out that a similar passage appears in Jetāri’s *Differentiating the Sugata’s Text* (*bde dkar gzhung pa’i gzhung rnam par byed pa, sugataavibhanga*; Peking 5867).

\(^b\) Dzong-ka-ba’s point is that this should not be read as:

That a consciousness which is released
From apprehended-object and apprehending-subject exists *as the ultimate* (*dam pa’i don du*)
Is renowned in the texts of the Yogic Practitioners
Who have passed to the other shore of the ocean of awareness.

Rather, the end of the second line should read ”*exists ultimately,*” and thus this quote cannot be used to demonstrate that in the Mind-Only School a mind beyond dualism is the ultimate truth.

\(^c\) Šer-thül’s *Notes, 36b.1*.

\(^d\) Šer-thül (ibid., 36a.4) takes ”conceptual consciousnesses” (*rtan rtags*) as referring to all minds and mental factors of the Desire, Form, and Formless Realms that involve dualistic appearance. Thus, this is much wider than the more usual sense of ”conceptual consciousness,” as in the division of consciousnesses into direct perception and conceptuality. The term also includes the dualistic consciousnesses of both those who are languaged and those
...because of thoroughly giving rise to the afflicting emotions and because of being the bases of imputation.

With respect to the first of those two rationales, when one draws out the opposite of the explanation in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought that objects of observation of purification are ultimates, [a phenomenon] is to be posited as existing conventionally [that is, as a conventionality] due to the fact of thoroughly giving rise to afflicting emotions upon its being observed. This accords with Asaṅga’s Summary of Manifest Knowledge. With respect to the second rationale, [an object] is said to exist conventionally [that is, as a conventionality] due to being an entity imputed through the conventions of names and terminology and due to being a basis of the signs of imputing designations. “Reasons” are described as things that serve as foundations of verbalizing words.

Also, Vasubandhu’s Principles of Explanation says:491

Thinking of the objects of worldly unmistaken consciousnesses and objects of supramundane consciousnesses, Buddha spoke of the two truths, convention-truths and ultimate-truths [respectively]. Because verbalizations are conventions, truths that are objects to be understood by means of them are convention-truths; [they are those objects] to which the verbalizations refer. For example, a ford to be crossed by means of the two feet is called a “foot-ford,” and a ford to be crossed by means of a boat is called a “boat-ford.”

[Explaining a different usage of this terminology.] (298) {413} In Asaṅga’s Compendium of Ascertainments, a Superior’s exalted wisdom of meditative who are not.

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a Ser-thul (ibid., 36b.1) praises Gung-tang’s Annotations for taking the latter explanation as meaning “the main objects found by conventional valid cognitions” (tha ngyud pa’i shad ma’i ngyed don gso bo).

b Dön-drup-gyal-tsen’s Four Interwoven Commentaries (141.2) gives the citation: Why is [an object] posited as existing conventionally? Objects of observation that involve thorough affliction exist conventionally.

This is found in the first section, entitled laksanasamuccaya: Walpola Rahula, La compendium de la super-doctrine (philosophie) (Abhidharma samuccaya) d’Asaṅga (Paris: École Française d’Extrême-Orient, 1971), 23.

c Or, “mistaken consciousnesses”; see p. 412, footnote a.

d Ser-thul (Notes, 37a.1) takes verbalizations (bṛjod pa) as referring both to terms and to conceptual consciousnesses.

e kun rdzob, samurī.

f ko gru, literally, a leather boat.

g The reference is to Peking 5539, vol. 111, 61.5.3 (Tokyo sde dge, sens tsham, vol. 8 [zhī], 289a.4):

Is it to be said that consciousnesses of reality exist conventionally, or is it to be said that they exist ultimately? The first [that is, a Superior’s exalted wisdom of medi-
equipoise [directly] realizing thusness is said to exist ultimately [that is, as an ultimate truth, because the ultimate truth exists as its object of comprehension]; this is in consideration that it does not have the two previous grounds for being posited as existing conventionally. It says that the exalted wisdom attained subsequent to such meditative equipoise exists both conventionally and ultimately [that is, as a conventional truth and as an ultimate truth]; from the viewpoint of its observing conventional signs, it is said to exist conventionally [that is, as a conventional truth].

See Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso's Port of Entry, 474.5.

A-kü Lo-drö-gya-tso's Precious Lamp, 217.2. According to Da-drin-rap-den's Annotations (86.6), it is said to exist ultimately because dualistic appearance has vanished equally for both its appearance and its ascertainment factors.

As explained above, there are two modes of positing something as existing conventionally:

First mode
1. an existent posited through the force of conventions

Second mode
2. an object of observation suitable to give rise to affective emotions
3. a basis of the signs of imputing designations

Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 475.1, 478.2) says that when Dzong-ka-ba speaks of "the two previous grounds for being posited as existing conventionally," these refer to the first two of the three ways of positing something as existing conventionally (items 1 and 2 above, and not the two items in the second mode). He is following Gung-tang's Annotations (tsu 109.4), which criticizes Bel-jor-hlin-drup for lack of clarity on this issue.

Dra-di Ge-shay Rin-chen-dön-drup's Ornament for the Thought (as reported in Ser-thul's Notes, 37a.5) says that it is said to exist ultimately (that is, as an ultimate truth) because emptiness appears to the ascertainment factor (nges ngor stong nysid shat) of an exalted wisdom attained subsequent to meditative equipoise. A-kü Lo-drö-gya-tso (Precious Lamp, 217.4) cogently objects to this because emptiness is an implicit object of comprehension of such a wisdom (and hence does not appear even though it is realized). He is following Gung-tang (Annotations, tsu 110.2), who states that this wisdom is called these two because it realizes both truths—without the qualification "explicitly."

Bel-jor-hlin-drup (Lamp for the Teaching, 50.4) says that such a wisdom exists ultimately because it is established by way of its own character. He thereby weakly skirts the issue of why it is said to exist ultimately in the sense of being an ultimate truth.

Da-drin-rap-den (Annotations, 87.3) says that from the viewpoint of its being unmistaken in its factor of taking emptiness as the object of its mode of apprehension, it is said to exist ultimately, that is, as an ultimate truth. This exposition is subject to the fault adduced by A-kü Lo-drö-gya-tso given above.

Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 480.3-481.4) holds that nothing more need be said than what Dzong-ka-ba says just above, that is, it is said to exist ultimately in consideration that it does not have the two previous grounds for being posited as existing conventionally (see the previous footnote). He says that positing reasons for these two beyond what
[Supporting evidence for the non-contradiction of existing conventionally, that is, as a conventionality, and existing ultimately.] (298) [413] That [an object] exists conventionally [that is, as a conventional truth] due to being a basis of the signs of imputing designations and due to acting as an object of awareness that gives rise to affective emotions is not contradictory with its existing ultimately, in the sense of being established by way of its own character. For Vasubandhu’s Principles of Explanation says:

Object by a Hearer Sectarian [to a Proponent of the Great Vehicle]. If the statement in the Ultimate Emptiness, “Actions and fruits exist but an agent is not observed,” is [in reference to such being so] ultimately, how could all phenomena be natureless [as is said in the literal reading of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras]? If it is [in

Dzong-ka-ba himself says goes against Dzong-ka-ba’s own mode of exposition here. It seems to me, however, that Dzong-ka-ba may have felt that the reasons were obvious and thus did not state them, and thus the reasons need to be expounded in commentary—my own inclination being to agree with Gung-tang and A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso.

This is a paraphrase; according to the Peking edition of Vasubandhu’s text (5562, vol. 113, 283.2-7-283.3.3), the passage reads:

[Object by a Hearer Sectarian:] The Ultimate Emptiness says, “Actions exist, and fruits also exist, but an agent is not observed.” Are these so just ultimately or just conventionally? If just ultimately, how could all phenomena be natureless [as is said in the literal reading of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras]? If conventionally, then since agents exist conventionally, it could not be said that agents are not observed [since agents do indeed exist conventionally].

[Answer by Vasubandhu:] What is this called “conventional”? What is ultimate? Through this, one will understand what exists conventionally and what exists ultimately.

[Response by a Hearer Sectarian:] Names, verbalizations, designations, and conventions are conventionality. The own-character of phenomena [that is to say, establishment by way of own character] is the ultimate.

[Answer by Vasubandhu:] Then, in that case, since actions and fruits exist as names [that is, as conventionality that are the bases of affixing of names] and also exist as [ultimates established by way of] their own character, let them be considered as both [conventionally existing and existing ultimately], in accordance with how you assert these.

A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso (Precious Lamp, 218.1) identifies this as a Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra; Ser-khül (Notes, 55b.1-55b.5), as a text asserted by all Hearer schools except those propounding a self, these being the Sammātis and so forth; Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 482.3), as the Sūtra of the Great Emptiness (stong pa nyid chen po'i mdo); Da-drin-rap-den (Annotations, 88.1), as “a Great Vehicle sūtra.”

In the Mind-Only School actions (las, karma) are the mental factor of intention (sme pa, cetanā); see A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso’s Precious Lamp, 218.6.

According to A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso (Precious Lamp, 218.6), the main fruits (rnam smin, vipāka) are the physical life support (lus rten), feeling, and so forth.
reference to such being so] conventionally, then, since agents exist in that way, how could it be said that they are not observed?

In answer [Vasubandhu] asks, "If one knows what the conventional and the ultimate are, one understands through this [what it means] to exist in those two ways; therefore, what [do you, Hearer Sectarian, take] those two to be?"

[Response by a Hearer Sectarian:] Names, verbalizations, designations, and conventions are conventionalities. The own-character (that is to say, the establishment by way of their own character) of phenomena is [their] ultimate [existence].

[Answer by Vasubandhu:] Then, in that case since actions and fruitions exist as names [that is, as conventionalities that are the bases of affixing of names] and also exist as [ultimates in the sense of being established by way of] their own character, let them be considered as both [conventionally existing, that is, existing as conventionalities, and ultimately existing] in accordance with how you assert these.

The mode of their ultimate existence is the former [that is to say, the first of the two ways of positing the meaning of existing ultimately, this being to exist by way of their own character], and the mode of their existing conventionally is in accordance with the latter [that is, the second of the two ways of positing the meaning of existing conventionally, this being to exist as bases of the imputation of conventions, that is to say, as conventional truths]. The meaning is that [actions and fruitions] exist in both ways.

Although [actions and fruitions] are asserted as existing as that ultimate [that is, as established by way of their own character], in this [Mind-Only system] such is not contradicted by the statement [in sutra] that ultimately all phenomena are natureless because [that passage in sutra] is not asserted as literally acceptable.

Persons exist conventionally [that is, as conventionalities, in that they exist as a basis of the imputation of a convention] but do not substantially exist [because they exist imputedly in dependence on the aggregates]. Actions and fruitions exist conventionally [that is, as conventionalities, in that they exist as bases of the imputation of conventions] and also exist substantially [in that they fulfill none of the three meanings of being imputedly existent]. Since [those

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\(a\) ming.

\(b\) brjod pa.

\(c\) gdags pa.

\(d\) tha snyad.

\(e\) Bel-jor-hlin-drup's Lamp for the Teaching, 51.6, and Da-drin-rap-den's Annotation, 89.2. A-ku Lo-dro-gya-tso (Precious Lamp, 218.3) identifies this as existing as an object found by the reasoning consciousness distinguishing a conventionality (tha snyad dpyod pa'i rigts kyi rnyed don du yod pa).
two, actions and fruitions, are objects of worldly consciousnesses, they do not exist ultimately in the second sense [that is, as ultimate truths, since they are not final objects of observation of a path of purification], and those two are not objects of a supramundane consciousness because an object of [a supramundane consciousness] is [the emptiness that is] the general character [pervading all phenomena in general] and is inexpressible [since its meaning cannot be taken as an object of mind by mere terms].

[That there are two ways of positing conventional and ultimate] is very clear also in the explanation in Vasubandhu’s *Principles of Explanation* that the earlier objection [raised by the Hearer Sectarian] is incurred by certain Proponents of the Great Vehicle [that is, Proponents of the Middle] who propound [as literal] the statement that all phenomena do not exist in the manner of having their own character but exist conventionally.

(*Dispelling another seeming contradiction.* (299) (414) Maitreya’s *Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes* [speaks of three types of conventionalities]:

Imputational, mental, and likewise

The verbal are coarse.

It treats conventional truths, the coarse suchness, as the three—imputational conventionalities, mental conventionalities, and verbal conventionalities. Then

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1. Śer-shūl (Notes, 37b.5) and Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (*Port of Entry*, 490.6), following Gung-tang, interpret this somewhat cryptic sentence this way. However, Beld-jor-hlun-drup (*Lamp for the Teaching*, 53.1–53.4) interprets what is clear not as referring to the two ways of positing conventional and ultimate but as referring to a refutation of Proponents of the Middle; according to his interpretation (in which it is difficult to determine what “also” means) the passage would be translated as follows:

It is very clear that this exposition—in Vasubandhu’s *Principles of Explanation*—of the above debate [raised by the Hearer Sectarian] also applies to certain Proponents of the Great Vehicle [that is, Proponents of the Middle] who propound that it is said [in the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras] that all phenomena do not exist in the manner of having their own character but exist conventionally.

Both interpretations are plausible, but Gung-tang’s suits the context better.

2. That is to say, not just in Asaṅga’s *Compendium of Ascertainties* but also in Vasubandhu’s *Principles of Explanation*; see Śer-shūl’s Notes, 38a.1.


4. The thoroughly established nature is the subtle suchness (Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s *Port of Entry*, 485.2) since it is the final mode of being of phenomena.

5. Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (*Port of Entry*, 485.3) identifies:

- imputational conventionalities (*btags pa’i kun rdzob*) as imputational natures that are imputed by conceptuality to be truly existent whereas they are not truly existent;
- mental conventionalities (*shes pa’i kun rdzob*) as other-powered natures, which are illustrated by unreal ideation (*yang dag pa ma yin pa’i kun rig*) since it is the principal other-powered nature, and thus come to be called “mental”; and
it relates these three with the three natures [that is, imputational, oth-
powered, and thoroughly established—treating thoroughly established natures
as verbal conventionalities, whereas, as explained above, they are ultimate
truths. In treating] the latter [that is to say, thoroughly established natures as
verbal conventionalities], it should be understood that it is explaining the
thought of other sutras that say that thusness and so forth exist conventionally;" [Maitreya is not indicating that thoroughly established natures are actual con-
ventionalities].

Advice That It Is Necessary To Distinguish The Various Modes Of Positing
Substantial Existence And Imputed Existence, And So Forth, In The Higher
And Lower Tenet Systems (300) [415]

If, in that way, you distinguish in detail:

- the different ways substantial existence and imputed existence are posited
- the modes of existing conventionally and existing ultimately in the higher
  and lower tenet systems, and
- the different ways in which these are posited even in one tenet system,

you will be able to delineate well the important tenets. You will also understand
the need for the Proponents of the Middle to prove as not ultimately existent
many things that the Proponents of True Existence assert to exist imputedly
and to exist conventionally. Otherwise, the differentiation of the upper and
lower tenet systems would be reduced to mere whimsy.

• verbal conventionalities (briyod pa'i kun rdzob) as thoroughly established natures which,
  although they ultimately cannot be taken as objects by way of terms and conceptual
  consciousnesses, are suitable to be expressed through many verbal forms such as thus-
  nesses and so forth.

• Bel-jor-hlun-drup (Lamp for the Teaching, 54.1) cogently explains:
  There is a reason for saying that suchness and the thoroughly established nature
  exist as verbal conventionalities, because verbalizations are conventionalities and
  suchness and the thoroughly established nature are referents of verbalizations.

Da-drin-rap-den (Annotations, 90.5) says that the meaning is that the existence of thusness
must be posited by a conventional consciousness.

b That is, one's ranking of systems would be based solely on liking one system and not
liking another, since their respective assertions and criticisms of each other would not be understood.
8. Maitreya's *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras*

The description of how the two extremes are abandoned in texts other than those has two parts: the explanations in Maitreya's *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras* and in his *Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes*.

Explaining How The Two Extremes Are Abandoned In Maitreya's *Ornament For The Great Vehicle Sūtras* (302) [416]

[The Thought Behind The Teaching That Phenomena Are Natureless] [416]

Maitreya’s *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras* says: [404]

Because [things] are not [produced in the future from] themselves
And because [having ceased, past objects are] not [produced again] as having their own nature
And because [present objects] do not abide [for a second moment] in their own entity
And because [the natures of objects] conceived [by childish beings] do not exist,

Naturelessness was asserted [in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras].

It is explained [in Vasubandhu's commentary] [404] that, in consideration of:

- the naturelessness of the three characteristics of compounded things [that is, that things are not produced under their own power, do not abide under their own power, and do not disintegrate under their own power], [404] and
- the non-existence of the natures that are conceived by childish beings [who conceive forms and so forth to be pure, blissful, permanent, and self and to be separate entities from the consciousnesses apprehending them], [405]


Because phenomena depend upon conditions, they do not exist under their own power; therefore, they are natureless. The meaning of this is as explained in Kamalashila’s *Illumination of the Middle*—the non-existence of production by [a thing’s] own essence. [406]

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*Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 502.3) points out that Jam-phang-shay-ba identifies this as causeless production but that it is also suitable to identify it, as Gung-tang's Annotations and other texts do, as production from self, as is asserted by the Sāṃkhya, since*
Since whatever phenomenon has ceased is not produced again in the entity of that phenomenon, it does not exist [after its cessation] in its own entity; therefore, it is natureless. Since that which has been produced but has not ceased is momentary, it does not abide for a second period in its own entity; therefore, it is natureless. In brief, since (1) a future sprout is not produced through its own power, (2) a past sprout is not produced again as the entity of the sprout, and (3) a present sprout does not abide for a second period of time after its own establishment, the phenomena of the three times are explained as natureless.

Vasubandhu explains that since the natures of cleanliness, happiness, permanence, and self or of an ["other imputational character"] as these are conceived by childish beings do not exist, [phenomena] are natureless. "Other" [in "other imputational character" in the previous sentence refers to] object and subject conceived as different substantial entities.

[The Thought Behind The Teaching That Phenomena are Unproduced, Unceasing, Quiescent From The Start, And Naturally Passed Beyond Sorrow]" (303) [417]

Just as [phenomena] are natureless, so they are unproduced; because of not being produced, so they do not cease, and so forth. By using the former ones as reasons, the latter ones are established. Maitreya's Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sutras says:"

Since each serves as the basis of the latter,
Due to naturelessness are established
Non-production, non-ceasing, quiescence from the start,
And naturally passed beyond sorrow.

This has already been explained.

[The Thought Behind The Teaching Of Attaining Forbearance With Respect To The Doctrine Of Non-Production]" (303) [418]

Also, [Maitreya] explains the [eight] modes of non-production of phenomena

Sthiramati and Asvabhāva give both interpretations. Da-drin-rap-den (93.3) identifies this merely as production of things from causes that are the same entity as themselves. In the three non-natures, however, it is more cogent to take causeless production as what is being negated; see Absorption, #68.

* This sentence is Dzong-ka-ba's own summation and not a quotation.

b This sentence is Dzong-ka-ba's own comment on Vasubandhu's meaning and not a quotation.

c See p. 97ff. A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso (Precious Lamp, 221.5) relates this specifically to the explanation in Asanga's Summary of Manifest Knowledge; see p. 101.
in the statements [in sūtra] about attaining forbearance with respect to the doctrine of non-production:

Forbearance with respect to the doctrine of non-production is set forth in terms of a beginning [of cyclic existence], of [phenomena already produced being produced again in that entity] itself, of the other [that is, a sentient being who did not exist earlier in cyclic existence], of the own-character [of imputational natures], of self [that is to say, self-production of other-powered natures], of [thoroughly established natures] becoming other, of the afflictive emotions [in those who have attained knowledge of extinction], and of enhancement [of a Buddha’s Truth Body].

[Vasubandhu’s] commentary explains that in this [stanza]:

- “Beginning” refers to the non-production of a beginning to cyclic existence
- “Itself” refers to the fact that any phenomenon that was produced earlier is not produced again in the entity of that [phenomenon], “itself” meaning an earlier one
- “Other” refers to non-production in an aspect that did not exist earlier, “other” meaning a later one—the meaning of this is as explained in Kamalashila’s Illumination of the Middle that there is no [new] production of a sentient being who did not earlier exist in cyclic existence and that

a XI.52; Peking 5521, vol. 108, 9.1.4; and Lévi, Mahāyānasūtrālāmākāra, vol. 2, 123. For the Sanskrit, see p. 418, footnote c. The bracketed additions in the stanza are drawn from A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso’s Precious Lamp, 222.1: Don-drup-gyel-ten’s Four Intertwined Commentaries, 157.5; and Da-drin-rap-den’s Annotations, 94.4.

A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso (Precious Lamp, 223.2) takes “attaining forbearance with respect to the doctrine of non-production” as referring to attaining forbearance, that is, facility, with respect to the meaning of the selflessness of phenomena. Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 505.6) adds that through ascertaining the meaning of the non-production of phenomena upon taking the eight non-productions as reasons, one attains forbearance with respect to the doctrine of non-production, that is, selflessness.

Gung-tang’s Annotations, a 114.3) explains that Maitreya’s reasons for choosing merely these eight are threefold:

1. To dispel contradictions adduced the Proponents of Truly Existent External Objects who attempt to prove that the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras are not the word of Buddha, by claiming that the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras deprecate the presentations of entry into cyclic existence and reversal into nirvana
2. To refute the Proponents of Non-Nature who claim that the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras are literally acceptable
3. To answer the argument by the Proponents of Non-Nature that the Proponents of Mind-Only deprecate the non-production that is the object with respect to which forbearance is attained

b A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso (Precious Lamp, 222.1) glosses “cyclic existence” with compounded phenomena (diḥ byas).
there is no production of phenomena that did not exist earlier since something of similar type to what ceased earlier is produced\(^a\)
- “Own-character” is in reference to imputational factors; production never exists in them
- “Non-self-production” is in reference to other-powered natures
- “Non-production in the sense of becoming other” is in reference to thoroughly established natures
- “Non-production of affective emotions” is in reference to [Foe Destroyers]\(^b\) who have attained knowledge of extinction

\(^a\) Production is a case of the cause’s ceasing and something of a similar type being produced.

\(^b\) A-k'u Lo-drö-gya-tso’s Precious Lamp, 222.2; and Da-drin-rap-den’s Annotations, 95.5. With respect to the translation of arhant (dgra’ bcom pa) as “Foe Destroyer,” I do this to accord with the usual Tibetan translation of the term and to assist in capturing the flavor of oral and written traditions that frequently refer to this etymology. Arhants have overcome the foe which is the affective emotions (nyon mong, klu’i), the chief of which is ignorance.

The Indian and Tibetan translators of Sanskrit and other texts into Tibetan were also aware of the etymology of arhant as “worthv one,” as they translated the name of the “founder” of the Jaina system, Arhat, as mchod’ od “Worthy of Worship” (see Jam-yang-shay-ba’s Great Exposition of Tenets, ka 62a.3). Also, they were aware of Chandrakirti’s gloss of the term as “Worthy One” in his Clear Words: sadevamānasāsvarā lokāt pāramitāvād arhan-niyuyatate (Mālamadhyamaka-kārikās de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapada Commentaire de Candrakirti, Bibliotheca Buddhica, 4 [Osnabrück, Germany: Biblio Verlag, 1970], 486.5), lha dang mi dang lha ma yin du bcos pa’i ’jig rten gyes mchod par ‘os pa dgra bcom pa zhes brjod la (409.20, Tibetan Cultural Printing Press ed.; also, Peking 5260, vol. 98, 75.2.2), “Because of being worthy of worship by the world of gods, humans, and demi-gods, they are called Arhants.”

Also, they were aware of Haribhadra’s twofold etymology in his Illumination of the Eight Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra. In the context of the list of epithets qualifying the reinitue of Buddha at the beginning of the sūtra (see Unrai Wogihara, Abhisamayālamkārāłoka Prājñā-pāramitā-vyākhyā, The Work of Haribhadra [Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 1932-1935; reprint, Tokyo: Sankibō Buddhist Book Store, 1973], 8.18), Haribhadra says:

They are called arhant [Worthy One, from the root arh “to be worthy”] since they are worthy of worship, religious donations, and being assembled together in a group, and so forth. (Wogihara, Abhisamayālamkārāloka, 9.8-9; sarva eva’rta pājā-dakṣina-gana-parakṣaṇād-pratisthāyārhatasyarvahantah; Peking 5189, vol. 90, 67.5.7: ‘dīr thams cad kyang mchod pa dang il yon dang thog du ’dub la sogs par ’os pa na dgra bcom pa’o).

Also:

They are called arhant [Foe Destroyer arhan] because they have destroyed (hata) the foe (ari). (Wogihara, Abhisamayālamkārāloka, 10.18: hātirīvād arhantah; Peking 5189, vol. 90, 69.3.6. dgra rnam bcom pa na dgra bcom pa’o).

(My thanks to Gareth Sparham for the references to Haribhadra.) Thus, we are dealing with a considered preference in the face of alternative etymologies—“Foe Destroyer” requiring a not unusual i infix to make ari-han, with ari meaning enemy and han meaning to kill, and
The explanation in this way of the mode of non-nature and of the mode of non-production is the system of those [that is, Proponents of the Mind-Only School] who [unlike the Proponents of Non-Nature] do not assert as literal the explanations that all phenomena are ultimately empty of nature and that compounded things are ultimately without production.

Concerning these, the modes of non-nature of:

- the phenomena of the three times, except for that of the present, and
- the former mode of the non-existence of the natures that are conceived by childish beings [that is to say, the conceptions of cleanliness, happiness, permanence, and a substantially existent self]  

are in common with both Hearer schools [the Great Exposition and Sūtra School Following Scripture. The reason why the present is not included is that] the Proponents of the Great Exposition assert that the activity of abiding takes place after [an object] has been produced and that the activity of disintegration takes place after that.  

[Dispelling An Objection By A Proponent Of Non-Nature That It Is Contradictory To Compare Other-Powered Natures To Illusions And Yet Hold That They Truly Exist]  

Objection: The Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* says that other-powered natures "'Fo Destroyer." Unfortunately, one word in English cannot convey both this meaning and "Worthy of Worship"; thus I have gone with what clearly has become the predominant meaning in Tibet. (For an excellent discussion of the two etymologies of Arhat in Buddhism and Jainism, see L. M. Joshi, Facets of Jaina Religiousness in Comparative Light, L.D. Series, 85 [Ahmedabad, India: L.D. Institute of Indology, 1981], 53-58.)

* The latter mode of misconception—childish beings' conception that subject and object are different entities—is not described in the Great Exposition and Sūtra Schools, and thus Dzong-ka-ba specifies "the former mode."

b In the Sūtra School, the Mind-Only School, and the Middle Way School, production, abiding, and disintegration take place not serially but simultaneously, since production is the new arising of a compounded phenomenon that was previously nonexistent, abiding is the remaining of the continuum of the phenomena that were the causes, and disintegration is a compounded phenomenon's not remaining a second moment. Thus, the abiding and disintegration of an object do not require any causes other than those that produce the object. See A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso's Precious Lamp, 223.6; Ser-shül's Notes, 38b.6-39a.3; and Geshe Lhundup Sopa and Jeffrey Hopkins, Cutting through Appearances: The Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism (Ithaca, New York: Snow Lion, 1989), 194-196.

c Dzong-ka-ba cited the passage in chapter 2 (p. 93):

Paramārthasamudgata, it is thus: for example, production-non-natures [that is, other-powered natures] are to be viewed as like magical creations.
tures are like illusions and Maitreya’s *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras* also says that all compounded things are like illusions. Therefore, the meaning of those passages could not allow that other-powered natures are truly established.

*Answer:* There is no certainty that due to describing other-powered natures as like illusions and so forth, these texts do not teach that they are truly established; it depends upon how illusions and so forth are used as examples. Concerning this, Maitreya’s *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras* indicates how illusions are used as examples with:485

Unreal ideation\(^b\) is asserted
To be just like a [basis of a magical] illusion.
The error of duality is said
To be just like an illusory aspect.

A basis of [illusory] mistake such as a clod, a stick, and so forth implanted with

\(^{a}\) The reference is to XL.30, which with bracketed material from Vasubandhu’s *Explanation of (Maitreya’s) “Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras”* (Peking 5527, vol. 108, 75.3.3), is:

The compounded phenomena spoken of by the fully enlightened, supreme Buddhas in this and that [discourse]
Are to be known as like magical illusions, dreams, mirages, reflections, Shadows, echoes, moons in water, and emanations.

[Those compounded phenomena] are asserted as the six [internal sense-spheres, like magical illusions], the six [external sense-spheres, like dreams], the two [minds and mental factors, like mirages], two sets of six [the internal sense-spheres, like reflections, and the external sense-spheres, like shadows], and three [the phenomena related with explanation, like echoes; the phenomena related with meditative stabilization, like moons in water; and taking rebirth in mundane existence according to one’s own thought, like an emanation].

The Sanskrit in S. Bagchi *Mahāyāna-Sūtrālaṃkāra* of Asaṅga (with Vasubandhu’s commentary), Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, 13 (Darbhanga, India: Mithila Institute, 1970), 62, is:

māyāsvapnamaricibimbasadśāh pradbhāsaśrutkopamā
vijñeyodakacandrabimbasadśāh nirmāṇatulyāh punah/
śad śad dvau ca punaśca śad dvayamatā ekaikaśaśca trayāh
saṃskārāḥ khalu tatra tatra kathā buddhairvibuddhottamañāḥ/


The Tibetan, given in A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso (*Precious Lamp*, 224.5):

sang gi rgyas rnam sang gi rgyas mchog rnam kyi de dang de la ‘du b’yas dag/
gzung pa rgyu ma rmi lam smig rgyu gzung bhrvyay dang ’dra mig yor dang/
brag chu lia bu dang ni chu a’i gzung ’dra sprul dang ’dars shes byal/
drug dang drug dang gnyis dang drug tshan gnyis dang gsum por re ’dod/\n
\(^{b}\) For discussion of this term, see p. 307.
the mantra of illusion is similar to ideation, [which by being the main other-powered phenomenon illustrates all] other-powered natures; Vasubandhu explains that this is the meaning of the first two lines. As the meaning of the latter two lines, he explains that appearances in an illusory aspect as the forms of a horse, elephant, and so forth are similar to dualistic appearances of other-powered natures—namely, apprehended-objects and apprehending-subjects—as distant and cut off.\(^{b}\)

Furthermore, Maitreya’s *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras* says:

Just like the non-existence of those [elephants and so forth] in this [illusory appearance],
So the ultimate is asserted [as the non-duality of object and subject in other-powered natures].
Just like the apprehension of these [illusory appearances as the entities of horses, elephants, and so forth],
So conventionalities [are asserted as these forms, sounds, and so forth which appear to have a difference of entity between subject and object].

Vasubandhu’s commentary explains that:\(^{c}\)

Like the non-existence of elephants and so forth in illusory appearances, the absence of duality in apprehended-object and apprehending-subject in other-powered natures is the ultimate, and like the apprehension of illusory appearances as the entities of horses and elephants, so imputations of the unreal [that is, imputations that other-powered

\(^{a}\) According to Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (*Port of Entry*, 497.4), the clods, sticks, and so forth that are the bases of illusion are similar to other-powered natures, and being implanted with the mantra is similar to being polluted with predispositions for mistaken dualistic appearance.

The mantra, according to a Ňying-ma text that I read years ago and cannot now locate, is *thi bi thi bi thi bi*, which, amusingly enough, also could be rendered as *thi vi thi vi vi*, or TV, TV, TV (as in the American abbreviation for "television").

\(^{b}\) Vasubandhu himself does not use the phrase “distant and cut off,” which is Dzong-ka-ba’s psychologically evocative explanatory addition.

\(^{c}\) XI.16; Peking 5521, vol. 108, 8.3.2; and Lévi, *Mahāyānasūtrālatāmākāra*, vol. 2, 109. For the Sanskrit, see p. 420, footnote a. The bracketed material is drawn from the commentary following it and from Šer-shül’s Notes, 39b.2-39b.6. Šer-shül points out that Wéi-mang Gön-chok-gyel-tsen, in his Notes on (*Gön-chok-jik-may-tur-ba’s*) Lectures takes “conventionalities” (*kun rdzob, samnyi*) as referring not to conventionalities but to the concealer of the ultimate, and thus the meaning of the last line is that the appearance of apprehended-object and apprehending-subject as different substantial entities is the concealer (*kun rdzob, samnyi*) of the ultimate. Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (*Port of Entry*, 498.1), following Vasubandhu’s commentary, which Dzong-ka-ba cites just below, takes it as referring to conventional truths. Perhaps Šer-shül and other commentators avoid this interpretation since it seems to suggest that conventional truths do not exist.
natures are established by way of their own character as the referents of conventions or are different substantial entities from the consciousnesses perceiving them\(^{1}\) are apprehended as conventional truths.

[Not only that, but also the example of a magician’s illusion is used in connection with the selflessness of persons, and so forth;\(^{1}\) Maitreya’s *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras*\(^{1}\) explains that:

\[^{1}\] The reference is to XI.30, which with bracketed material from Vasubandhu’s *Explanation of (Maitreya’s) “Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras”* (Peking 5527, vol. 108, 75.3.3), is:

The compounded phenomena spoken of by the fully enlightened, supreme Buddha in this and that [discourse]
Are to be known as like magical illusions, dreams, mirages, reflections,
Shadows, echoes, moons in water, and emanations.

[Those compounded phenomena] are asserted as the six \[internal sense-spheres, like magical illusions\], the six \[external sense-spheres, like dreams\], the two \[minds and mental factors, like mirages\], two sets of six \[the internal sense-spheres, like reflections, and the external sense-spheres, like shadows\], and three \[the phenomena related with explanation, like echoes; the phenomena related with meditative stabilization, like moons in water; and taking rebirth in mundane existence according to one’s own thought, like an emanation\].

For the Sanskrit and Tibetan texts, see p. 177, footnote a.

A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso (*Precious Lamp*, 225.1-226.3) calls Düzhang-ka-ba’s exposition of this stanza an unprecedented good explanation in that earlier Indian and Tibetan commentaries do not offer such a clear exposition. He points out that Asvabhava does not give commentary on the first two examples and that Sthiramati associates them with the non-existence of external objects—with Tibetan commentators following him. A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso calls attention to the resultant redundancy with the second set of internal and external sense spheres that occur later in the fourth and fifth example and says that if different meanings are not assigned to them, they would be repetitive. He puts together the eight examples and their eight meanings such that the first two apply to the selflessness of persons and the last six apply to the selflessness of phenomena:

1. Magical illusion—although the six internal sense spheres do not exist as a substantially established person, they seem to be
2. Dream—although the six external sense spheres do not exist as the objects of use by a substantially established person, they seem to be (A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso points out that there is precedent for this interpretation in Vasubandhu’s commentary, but he seems not to have noticed that there is also precedent for Düzhang-ka-ba’s interpretation of the first, as can be seen in the bracketed translation given above)
3. Mirage—minds and mental factors appearing as external objects having their own substantial entities
4. Reflection—the six internal sense spheres are reflections of karma
5. Shadow—the six external sense spheres arise like a shadow of the six internal sense spheres (see Port of Entry, 499.3)
6. Echo—doctrines explained
7. Moon in water—the appearance of explained meanings to meditative stabilization, or
• The six internal sense-spheres [that is to say, the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mental senses] are said in sūtra to be like illusion from the viewpoint of appearing to be [a substantially established] self, living being, and so forth, whereas they are not; and
• The six external sense-spheres [that is to say, visible forms, sounds, odors, tastes, tangible objects, and other phenomena] are said in sūtra to be like dreams from the viewpoint of appearing to be the objects of use of a self of persons [that is, a substantially established person], whereas they are not.

Thus, these were not set forth as examples showing that external and internal compounded phenomena appear to exist inherently, whereas they are empty of inherent existence.

Moreover, when Asaṅga, in his *Summary of the Great Vehicle,* associates the natural dawning of good qualities related with meditative stabilization in the water-like clarity of meditative stabilization (for the latter, see *Port of Entry*, 499.4 and 508.2-508.4)

8. Emanation—taking rebirth as one wishes in order to help others

Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (*Port of Entry*, 507.4-508.2), feeling uncomfortable with A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso’s suggestion that Dzong-ka-ba has given an explanation with no Indian background, challenges that his explanation is unprecedented since Sthiramati’s commentary on the example of dreams mentions objects of use and Asvabhāva’s commentary mentions that although forms, sounds, and so forth appear as objects of consciousness, they are not and hence are like dreams, and thus both could be interpreted as speaking of a dream as an example of the non-existence of external objects or that things are not the objects of use of a substantially existent person.


Why are other-powered entities indicated as like [a magician’s] illusions as mentioned before? In order to overcome others’ erroneous doubts with respect to other-powered entities.

How do others have erroneous doubts with regard to other-powered entities? It is thus: In order to overcome the doubt of others wondering how a nonexistent could serve as an object of activity [of consciousness], other-powered entities are taught as just like a magician’s illusions. In order to overcome doubt wondering how minds and mental factors arise without objects, other-powered entities are taught as just like mirages. In order to overcome doubt wondering how, if there are no objects, one gets involved in activities of desire and non-desire, other-powered entities are taught as just like dreams. In order to overcome doubt wondering how, if there are no objects, one could accomplish the wanted effects of virtuous actions and the unwanted effects of non-virtuous actions, other-powered entities are taught as just like reflections. In order to overcome doubt wondering how, if there are no objects, the varieties of consciousness arise, other-powered en-
the examples of illusion and so forth mentioned in the Mother Sūtras [the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras] with teachings about other-powered natures, he explains that:

- the example of magical illusion is for the sake of overcoming the thought that if external objects do not exist, how could [a consciousness] observe an object;
- the example of a mirage is for the sake of overcoming the thought that if there are no [external] objects, how could mental factors be produced;
- the example of a dream is for the sake of overcoming the thought that if there are no [external] objects, how could one experience the pleasant and unpleasant;
- and so forth.

Also, with respect to using magical illusions and so forth as examples of truthlessness, the individual modes of using them as examples of truthlessness in the Middle Way School and the Mind-Only School should be differentiated without confusion.

entities are taught as just like hallucinations. In order to overcome doubt wondering how, if there are no objects, the varieties of expressions arise, other-powered entities are taught as just like echoes. In order to overcome doubt wondering how, if there are no objects, the objects of activities of correctly apprehensive meditative stabilization arise, other-powered entities are taught as just like a moon [reflected in] water. In order to overcome doubt wondering how, if there are no objects, Bodhisattvas whose minds are not distorted are born in accordance with their thought to accomplish the aims of sentient beings, other-powered entities are taught as just like emanations.

See also Reflections on Reality, chap. 20.
9. Maitreya’s *Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes* and Other Scholars

How The Two Extremes Are Abandoned In Maitreya’s *Differentiation Of The Middle And The Extremes* (305) {422}

This text says:443

Unreal ideation* [—ideation being the main other-powered nature—] exists [by way of its own character in that it is produced from causes and conditions].

Duality [of subject and object in accordance with their appearance as if distant and cut off] does not exist in that [ideation].

[The thoroughly established nature which is the] emptiness [of being distant and cut off] exists [by way of its own character as the mode of subsistence] in this [ideation].

Also that [ideation] exists [as an obstructor] to [realization of] that [emptiness].

[Thus, other-powered natures and thoroughly established natures] are not empty [of establishment by way of the object’s own character] and are not non-empty [of subject and object being distant and cut off].

Thereby all [of the mode of thought in the teachings in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras, and so forth, of not being empty and of not being non-empty] is explained [thoroughly].

Due to the existence [of the other-powered nature that is the erroneous ideation apprehending object and subject as distant and cut off, the extreme of non-existence is avoided] and due to the non-existence [of distant and cut off object and subject—in accordance with how they are apprehended by that ideation—as their mode of subsistence, the extreme of existence is avoided, and ideation and emptiness]444 exist.

Therefore that [thoroughly established nature which is the emptiness of distant and cut off object and subject and which is the voidness of the two extremes in other-powered natures] is the middle path [that is to say, is established as the meaning of the middle].

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443 *yang dag ma min kun rrog, abhiṣaparikalpa*. For discussion of this term, see p. 307.

444 Shay-rap-gyel-tsen (Ocean of Definitive Meaning, 207.1) cites these stanzas to show that they give a presentation of the three natures in accordance with the “Maitreya Chapter” of the Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra and to demonstrate a complete
The first stanza indicates the character of emptiness, and the second indicates that just this is the middle path.

[How The First Stanza Explains Abandonment Of The Two Extremes] (307) (422)

Correct knowledge, just as it is, of existence and non-existence is said [in sūtra] to be non-erroneous orientation toward emptiness:

consonance of view with the Great Middle Way. For Đōng-ka-ba’s discussion of the “Maitreyas Chapter,” see 225ff. and 243ff.

* In this sentence, Đōng-ka-ba paraphrases Vasubandhu’s commentary (Peking 5528, vol. 108, 121.2.3), which provides this frequently repeated dictum:

  *gang na gang med pa de ni des stong par yang dag pa ji lla ba bzhin du yang dag par rjes su mthong ngol/ ’di la lhag ma yod pa gang yin pa de ni ’dir yod par yang dag pa ji lla ba bzhin du rab tu shes te de liar stong pa nyid kyi mshan nyid phyin ci ma log par btan pa yin nol/*

The Sanskrit from Gadjin M. Nagao, Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya (Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation, 1964), 18.4-18.7, is:

  evam yad yatra nāsti tat tena śānyam iti yathābhūtam samanupajyati yat punar atrāvaiṣṭām bhavati tat sat ihaśīti yathābhūtam paśānātīśy aviparitām śānyatā-lakṣāṇām uddhavātīm bhavati/

See also Ramchandra Pandeya, Madhyānta-vibhāga-lāttre (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1971), 9.15-9.17. Asaṅga’s Grounds of Bodhisattva makes a similar statement; see p. 147. As mentioned above (p. 109, footnote c; and p. 147, footnote c), Shay-rap-gyel-tsen (Ocean of Definitive Meaning, 203.3-205.2) cites similar passages from the Sūtra of the Great Emptiness and explains them as teaching other-emptiness. He also cites a similar passage from Asaṅga’s Summary of Manifest Knowledge to establish that Asaṅga sets forth the view of the Great Middle Way. It is safe to assume that Đōng-ka-ba implicitly is seeking to refute his interpretation.

b Ke-drup’s Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate (José Ignacio Cabezón, A Dose of Emptiness: An Annotated Translation of the stong thun chen mo of mkhas grub dGe legs dpal bsam [Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1992], 46), cited also in Dón-drup-gyel-tsen’s Four Interwoven Commentaries (164.5), seems to identify the reference of “is said” as “in the commentary” (grel par), which refers to Vasubandhu’s commentary, and it does indeed say this (Stefan Anacker, Seven Works of Vasubandha [Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984], 212; David Lasar Friedmann, Shibramati. Madhyāntavibhāgotttika: Analysis of the Middle Path and the Extremes [Utrecht, Netherlands: Rijksuniversiteit te Leiden, 1937], 14; and F. Th. Stcherbatsky, Madhyāntavibhāga. Discourse on Discrimination between Middle and Extremes ascribed to Bodhisattva Maitreyas and Commented by Vasubandhu and Shibramati. Bibliotheca Buddhica, 30 [Osnabrück, Germany: Biblio Verlag, 1970; reprint, Calcutta: Indian Studies Past and Present, 1971], 22). However, A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso’s identification (Precious Lamp, 226.5, following Gung-tang’s Annotations, hu 119.7) of “is said” as referring to a stūra cited in the commentary is more appropriate to Đōng-ka-ba’s context given the following sentence, which speaks of Maitreyas’s text as teaching the real emptiness because it teaches this way—A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso’s point being that Maitreyas’s text would not be teaching in accordance with its commentary. Ser-shül (Notes, 40a.1) similarly identifies the
In something [that is, other-powered natures] the non-existence of something [that is, the imputational nature] is the emptiness of that [imputational nature], and the remainder [that is, the other-powered nature and thoroughly established natures] exist there.

Since this [passage in Maitreya’s Differentiation of the Middle and the Extreme] also indicates this, it teaches the real emptiness.

“In something” [indicates] the bases of emptiness, other-powered natures, [the main of which is] unreal ideation. In the phrase, “the non-existence of something,” that which is nonexistent is the imputational factor, the duality of a difference in substantial entity between object and subject. By saying that it does not exist in that, it indicates that the former [other-powered natures] are empty of this latter [imputational nature].

If that [imputational nature] does not exist, what is there that exists left over after that? [The phrase] “Iedation exists” and the third line indicate that [what are left over after the negation] are the two, other-powered natures and thoroughly established natures. The fourth line eliminates another qualm [concerning the reason why common beings do not realize the emptiness of duality that is the mode of subsistence of forms and so forth, this being because they have the mistaken appearance of duality that serves to obstruct it].

Just this explanation by Vasubandhu in this way of the meaning of what is empty and of that of which it is empty is indicated clearly by Sthiramati, whose reference but more vaguely as “sūtra” (mādo sde). Friedmann (Sthiramati, Madhyānāvibhāga-tikā, 96, n. 113) cites Obermiller (Indian Historical Quarterly, IX, 1028) as indicating that this dictum is found in Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras.

I take Ke-drup’s statement as referring to the general source for the drift of Ödzong-ka-ba’s commentary, which Ödzong-ka-ba himself acknowledges below to be Vasubandhu’s commentary. As Ke-drup’s Opening the Eye of the Fortunate (208.3) says:

[Vasubandhu’s] commentary says that just this is non-erroneous entry into emptiness by way of understanding. “The non-existence of something in its emptiness of that, and what is left over in that really exists in it.”

However, Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 522.4-523.5) defends the literal reading of Ke-drup’s text, in essence pointing out that Ke-drup is saying that Maitreya’s text also teaches such and not that Maitreya’s text teaches in accordance (de kzin) with its commentary.

a In this and the next sentence, Ödzong-ka-ba is putting Vasubandhu’s commentary on Maitreya’s stanza together with the dictum that Vasubandhu cites just after the commentary.

b A-kü Lo-drö-gya-tso (Precious Lamp, 226.5, following Gung-tang’s Annotations, hu 120.3) indicates that “also” means “not only Maitreya’s Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras but also…” Otherwise, the reference absurdly would have to be to Vasubandhu’s commentary.

However, as was indicated at the end of two footnotes above, Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 524.5) holds that the reference is to Vasubandhu’s commentary.

c Sthiramati is renowned as one of four outstanding disciples of Vasubandhu who surpassed their teacher. Sthiramati is said to have surpassed him in Manifest Knowledge (chos
Explanation of (Vasubandhu’s) Commentary says:⁴

In order to refute the deprecation of everything by some who think that all phenomena are utterly, utterly without an inherent nature like the horns of a rabbit, [the text] says, “Unreal ideation exists.” “Inherently”¹ is an extra word [to be added to “exists”]:²

The phrase “ideation exists” is not complete just by itself; therefore, a remainder must be added, and it is this: “inherently.” Thus, ideation is not just existent but is inherently existent or existent in the sense of being established by way of its own character.³ These modes of existence are also similar with respect to thoroughly established natures.

Also, regarding how the second line [of the first stanza—“Duality (of subject and object in accordance with their appearance as if distant and cut off) does not exist in that (ideation),”] removes a qualm, Sthiramati’s Explanation of (Vasubandhu’s) Commentary says:⁴³

**Question:** Thus, since sūtra explains that “All phenomena are empty [of inherent existence],”⁴⁰ does this [inherent existence of ideation, the prime of other-powered natures]⁴⁰ not contradict sūtra?

**Answer:** It does not contradict sūtra, for [the thought of sūtra is that]⁴⁰⁰ "the duality [of subject and object in accordance with their appearance as if distant and cut off] does not exist in ideation.” Since unreal ideation is devoid of the entities of object and subject [as different substantial entities], all phenomena are said to be “empty.” It is not that [ideation] utterly does not have an inherent nature.³ Therefore, this does not contradict sūtra.

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¹ rang bzhin ye med, sarvasthā nihsvabhāvah.
² rang bzhin gyis, stabhāvatas.
³ This qualification of “exists” with “inherently” is a prime source for determining that in the Mind-Only system other-powered natures are established by way of their own character.

⁴ Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 174.6-176.3) points out that since Sthiramati is indicating that other-powered natures such as “unreal ideation” are inherently established, it is implied that (existent) imputational natures are not inherently established, whereas it is widely accepted among Ge-luk-ba scholars that in the Mind-Only School all phenomena, including existent imputational natures, are inherently established. It seems to me that this potential fault is why Dzong-ka-ba, in his commentary just following this quotation, glosses “inherently existent” with "established by way of its own character.”

⁵ See Absorption, #117, 118.
⁶ rang bzhin ye med pa, sarvasthā nihsvabhāvah; for the Sanskrit, see p. 423, footnote c.
In answer to [the objection that] if other-powered natures are inherently established, this contradicts the statement that all phenomena are empty of inherent existence, [Sthiramati] says that [Buddha]—thinking that ideation is empty of the nature of existing in accordance with the appearance of apprehended-object and apprehending-subject as distant and cut off in the appearance of external objects and internal subjects—says [that all phenomena] are empty of nature; it is not that they are utterly without an inherent nature,³ that is, establishment by way of their own character.

The meaning of the brothers’ [that is, Asaṅga’s and Vasubandhu’s] texts accords with just this, and since just this [establishment by way of its own character] also is described as ultimate establishment, the explanation [by the Jo-nang-bas and so forth]⁴ that in this system other-powered natures are empty of themselves is not at all the case.

Furthermore, with respect to how the third line [of Maitreya’s first stanza]—“(The thoroughly established nature which is the) emptiness (of being distant and cut off) exists in this (ideation)”—clears away a qualm, Sthiramati’s Explanation of (Vasubandhu’s) Commentary says:⁵⁶³

Objecion: If in that way the duality [of apprehended-object and apprehending-subject as different entities]⁶ sixty utter does not exist like the horns of a rabbit and if unreal ideation ultimately exists inherently, then emptiness would [absurdly] not exist.

Answer: That is not the case, for [Maitreya’s text says, “The thoroughly established nature which is the] emptiness [of being distant and cut off] exists [by way of its own character] in that [ideation].” Just this which is the non-existence of apprehended-object and apprehend-

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¹ rang bzhin, snyabhava.
² For a description of Shay-rap-gey-ten’s initial teaching of this doctrine, see Cyrus R. Stearns, The Buddha from Dol po and His Fourth Council of the Buddhist Doctrine (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, 1996), 32. A-lu Lo-drö-gya-tso (Precious Lamp, 227.6) explains that this fact also refutes Bu-dön’s position that other-powered natures exist only conventionally.
³ Shay-rap-gey-ten holds simply that conventional phenomena are empty of themselves. When he says that other-powered natures and imputational natures are self-empty, this means that he holds that they simply are empty of themselves and do not have the status of existence. This is clear from his statement (Stearns, The Buddha from Dol po, 127) that if self-emptiness were the only type of emptiness, then the ultimate would be empty of the ultimate—the thoroughly established nature would be empty of the thoroughly established nature. Rather, he considers the object negated with respect to the thoroughly established nature to be something other than itself—other-powered natures and imputational natures. Dzong-ka-ba, on the other hand, qualifies the object of negation such that it is not the object itself but an exaggerated status of other-powered natures, this being a difference of entity between subject and object, or establishment of objects by way of their own character as the referents of terms and conceptions.
ing-subject [as different entities] in unreal ideation is emptiness; therefore, emptiness does not become nonexistent.

Since [Maitreya] says that ideation exists and duality does not exist, the existent is indicated first [that is, in the first line of the stanza], and the nonexistent is indicated next [in the second line]; hence the qualm that emptiness might not [truly] exist arises [since, if emptiness truly exists, it should have been mentioned before the second line and since imputational factors, which do not truly exist, and the thoroughly established nature are similarly uncompounded phenomena]. This qualm is cleared away [by the third line of the stanza].

The objection "if ideation ultimately exists inherently" is a case of [the objector's] assuming the posture [of the Mind-Only School] that if [something] is established by way of its own character, one [also must] assert that it ultimately exists. The answer does not say that such is not asserted; rather, the answer is given in the context of already asserting such.b

Furthermore, this master [Sthiramati] says in his Commentary on (Vasubandhu's) "The Thirty":

Or, in another way, [this] work [that is, The Thirty] was initiated in order to refute two types of proponents: some [that is, Proponents of the Great Exposition and Proponents of Sūtra] who single-pointedly think that, like consciousness, objects of knowledge also [exist] just substantially and (2) others [that is, Proponents of Non-Nature] who single-pointedly think that, like objects of knowledge, consciousness also exists just conventionally but does not exist ultimately.

Therefore, the statement that other-powered natures are not utterly nonexistent refutes, as in the earlier citation from Asanga's Grounds of Bodhisattvas, that ultimately existent things utterly do not exist or in each and every way do not exist. It does not refute an assertion that [other-powered natures] do not occur among objects of knowledge.

The fourth line [in Maitreya's first stanza], "Also that (ideation) exists (as an obstructor) to (realization of) that (emptiness)," clears away the qualm, "If an emptiness of duality exists forever in ideation, why do not [even short-sighted

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a Here Sthiramati clearly frames emptiness as a non-affirming negative when he says, "Just this which is the non-existence...."

b The ultimate existence of ideation and thus of other-powered natures is opposite to Shay-rap-gyal-ten's notion that other-powered natures do not exist.

c See p. 425, footnote b.

d That citation (p. 141) is:

there are those who ruin [the doctrine of the Great Vehicle and the correct delineation of suchness by] making depreciation—of [other-powered natures, that is to say,] real things ultimately existing with an inexpressible essence, which serve as the bases of the signs of imputed words, the supports of the signs of imputed words—as "not existing in each and every way."
beings) realize it? It does this by [indicating that] since they have conceptualization of erroneous dualistic appearance, this obstructs [realization of] that emptiness.

[How The Second Stanza Indicates The Middle Path] (310) [426]

That phenomena are uniformly empty, are uniformly non-empty, [ultimately] exist, and do not [ultimately] exist are just extremes and are not the middle path; therefore, the second stanza was spoken in order to refute these extremes. All—the compounded phenomena of ideation and the uncompounded phenomenon of emptiness—are not empty [respectively] of ideation and of emptiness and are not non-empty of [a difference of entity between] apprehended-object and apprehending-subject. That this explains [*all (of the mode of thought in the teachings in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras, and so forth, of not being empty and also of not being non-empty)*] is to be taken in accordance with Vasubandhu’s explanation that it agrees with the teaching in the Mother Sūtras and so forth that all these are not uniformly empty and are also not uniformly non-empty. The meaning (311) [426] is not to explain [as the Jo-nang-bas do] that the non-empty is the thoroughly established nature and the non-non-empty are the other two natures [that is, other-powered natures and imputational natures].

In accordance with the explanations by the master Vasubandhu and his student [Sthiramati], the existent is ideation; the nonexistent is duality [that is, difference of entity between object and subject]; and the existent [that is, the remainder] is the mutual existence of the two, ideation and emptiness. This should not be taken in accordance with the [Jo-nang-bas'] explanation—which is opposite from that of these masters, Vasubandhu and Sthiramati—that they assert that since, concerning these two [that is, other-powered natures and

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4 It seems to me that Đozong-ka-ba’s meaning is restricted to the shortsighted (zhur mthong), who, by definition, have not realized emptiness even conceptually. However, Da-drin-rap-den (Annotations, 104.5) takes those who do not realize emptiness as referring to beings up until the path of seeing; this would allow the question to be concerned also with those who have realized emptiness by inference.

b Da-drin-rap-den (Annotations, 104.6) has “direct perception of that emptiness.”

c Ser-shül (Notes, 40b.1) cites the passage in Vasubandhu’s commentary:

Thus, this agrees with the statements in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras and so forth, “All these are not empty and are not non-empty.”

d A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso’s Precious Lamp, 230.6. In his Ocean of Definitive Meaning and elsewhere Shay-rap-gyel-tsen repeatedly makes the point that the thoroughly established nature is not self-empty but is only other-empty, whereas other-powered natures and imputational natures are self-empty. See for instance, Ocean of Definitive Meaning, 181.5ff.

e Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s Port of Entry, 515.1. For a clear statement of this by Shay-rap-gyel-tsen see, for instance, Stearns, The Buddha from Dol po, 124-125.
the thoroughly established nature], the one exists as factually other than the other, they are empty [of each other].

The Kāshyapa Chapter, (311) [426] upon setting out each of the two, existence and non-existence, as extremes, says that the middle between these two—which is described as the middle path of individual investigation of phenomena—is the middle path, and Shiiramati explains that [Maitreya's final line, "Therefore that (thoroughly established nature which is the emptiness of distant and cut off object and subject and which is the voidness of the two extremes in other-powered natures) is the middle path,"] is the meaning of this statement [in the Kāshyapa Chapter]. Hence, just this mode of cognition-only is described as the meaning of the middle. Therefore, although according to other Proponents of the Middle [that is, the Proponents of Non-Nature], from between those two the latter [that is, the middle path as explained in the Kāshyapa Chapter] is asserted to be superior to the former [that is, the middle

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1. nāṃ pa rig pa tsam, vijñāpimātra.
2. The Proponents of Mind-Only consider themselves to be Proponents of the Middle since they propound the middle; here, "other Proponents of the Middle" are the Proponents of Non-Nature.
3. Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (526.5-527.3) lists various interpretations of the two:
   - Rin-chen-jang-chup (rin chen byang chub): phenomena's emptiness of being established by way of their own character as the referents of their respective conceptual consciousnesses and object and subject's emptiness of being other substantial entities
   - The lesser Dra-di (pra sti chung ba): the object, that is, emptiness, and the subject, exalted wisdom
   - Gung-tang's Annotations (ce 125.4): the middle path as explained in Maitreya's Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes and the middle path as explained in the Kāshyapa Chapter
   - others: the middle path as taught in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras and the middle path as taught in the Kāshyapa Chapter
   - Sha-mar Ge-dün-DEN-dzin-gya-tso's (zhwa dmar dge 'dan bstan 'dzin rgya mtsho) Notes Concerning Difficult Points in (Dzong-ka-ba)'s "Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive: The Essence of Eloquence", Victorious Clearing Away of Mental Darkness (drang nges legs bshad snying po'i dka' gnas las brtseams pa'i zin bris bcom ldan yid kyi mun sel): cognition-only taught in Maitreya's Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes and the middle path taught in the second stanza.

Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso, himself, follows the last (see the next footnote); I find Gung-tang's explanation to be more cogent.
4. A-ku Lo-dro-gya-tso's Precious Lamp, 231.1; Sēr-shül's Notes, 40b.3; and Da-drin-rap-đen's Annotations, 106.6.

Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 516.1) less cogently takes the latter to be the middle that is taught in the second stanza and takes the former to be the emptiness of subject and object taught in the first stanza; he takes the "other Proponents of the Middle" to be the Yogic Autonomists. According to him, the sentence means that the Yogic Autonomists take the emptiness of true existence to be superior to the emptiness of subject and object as different entities.
path as explained in Maitreya’s _Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes_, this [Mind-Only] system treats those two as equivalent.

[How The Two Extremes Are Abandoned By Scholars Following Asaṅga] (312) (426)

Thus, [I] have mentioned at various points the modes of exegesis by Vasubandhu and Sthiramati [on how the two extremes are abandoned]. Dignāga also comments on the meanings of the Eight Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra in his _Summary Meanings of the Eight Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra_ in agreement with Asaṅga’s _Summary of the Great Vehicle_ [saying that the explanations in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras that phenomena do not inherently exist—that is, do not exist by way of their own character—require interpretation in that they were made in consideration of imputational natures, whereas the final wheel of teaching is of definitive meaning].

Dharmakīrti’s _Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Prime Cognition”_ (314) (426) says that the emptiness of apprehended-object and apprehending-subject as other substantial entities is the suchness of other-powered natures:

With respect to that [existence of apprehended-object and of apprehending-subject], due to the non-existence [of a difference of substantial entity] of one [of them]

Both [that is, the difference of substantial entity of both subject to object and object to subject] also deteriorate [that is, are refuted].

Therefore, that which is the emptiness of duality [of one of them]

Is the suchness of that [other one] also.

He also comments (315) (427) on the meaning of the statements in sūtras that

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^[brogad stong don byas, prajñāpāramitāpindārtha. Śer-thūl (Notes, 40b.5) identifies where this exposition starts in Dignāga’s text, and jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 536.4) cites the lines; for these as well as for the passage in Asaṅga’s _Summary of the Great Vehicle_, see p. 313.

^[thad ma rnam ’grel gyi sbyig ’le’ur byas pa, pramāṇavartikakārikā; III.213; for the Sanskrit, see p. 427, footnote a. The bracketed material in this stanza is drawn from Śer-thūl’s _Notes_, 40b.6-41b.1, where he also offers several interpretations. A-kū Lo-dro-gya-tso (Precious Lamp, 232.2-232.5) takes the first two lines differently:

With respect to that [individual exposition of the emptiness of a difference of entity from the viewpoint of apprehended-object and of apprehending-subject], due to the non-existence of one [of them]

Both also would deteriorate [that is, become nonexistent].

However, A-kū Lo-dro-gya-tso’s interpretation does not seem to represent Dzong-ka-ba’s stated reason for his citation.]
phenomena are without an inherent nature as just this [emptiness of apprehended-object and apprehending-subject]:

[That the production, abiding, and disintegration that characterize] things abide as different [is differentiated in]
Dependence upon [a consciousness having dualistic appearance to which] those [appear as] different.
That [appearance of a difference of entity of subject and object] is just polluted [by predispositions of ignorance].
Hence their difference is also polluted [or false since they are not established in accordance with their appearance as external objects].

Aside from aspects of apprehended-object and apprehending-subject,
There are no defining characters that have an otherness [of entity].
Due to the fact that defining characters are empty,
[The Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras] explain that [phenomena] are without an inherent nature.

The distinction of a thing's production and so forth as being different is not by way of a mere self-cognizing consciousness but is just by a consciousness perceiving dualistically. Since dualistic appearance is also polluted, that is to say, false, what is posited by it is also false. Also, in the aspects of apprehended-object and apprehending-subject there also are no defining characters that are factually other, and furthermore defining characters that appear dualistically do not exist in accordance with how they appear. Due to this, it is explained [in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras] that [phenomena] are without an inherent nature.

Moreover, (315) (428) Dharmakīrti's Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition" says:

The feature of agent [and object involved] in all definitions
In terms of specifics such as aggregates and so forth
Are not suchness [that is, not established by way of their own character].
Due to this also, those [Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras say that] these are devoid of character [that is, establishment by way of their own character].

The form aggregate and so forth, that are stated as definiendums and that are suitable [to be referred to] as form* and so forth, which are stated as definitions,

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* That suitable (to be referred to) as form (gsang su rung ba, rūpāna) is commonly considered in Ge-luk-ba textbooks to be the definition of form. It should be kept in mind that definitions are considered to be the actual things, not verbal descriptions, whereas the words describing, or the words defining, an object would indeed be a different entity from the thing being defined.
are all qualified by being object and agent. Although their bases [that is, their illustrations] substantially exist, from the viewpoint of their being object and agent [that is, the defined and means of defining] they are not established in suchness. Thus, Dharmakirti explains that, in consideration of this, [the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras] say that [all these definitions] are empty of character. This is also in common with the Hearer schools.

Dharmakirti’s Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Prime Cognition” (316) [428] says:

[A Proponent of Non-Nature says:] All are [ultimately] without the capacity [to perform functions].

[Answer by a Proponent of True Existence:] The capacity [to produce] sprouts and so forth is seen in seeds and so forth.

[The Proponent of Non-Nature responds:] That is asserted conventionally.

[Answer by the Proponent of True Existence:] How? Let it be so!

They are object and agent in the sense that definitions characterize or cause understanding of their respective definiendum.

The interpretation of this sentence, which is related with the last line of Dharmakirti’s stanza, is controversial. It likely means, as Jang-gya Röl-bay-dor-jay says in his Presentation of Tenets (129.2-130.3), that Dzong-ka-ba means that the Proponents of Sūtra also assert this type of non-duality. Jam-yang-shay-ba (Great Exposition of Tenets, nga, 13b.6), however, takes it as meaning that Hearer sectarians also (jang) are included, his meaning being that the latter are included in positing the thought behind the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras this way. Jang-gya objects to Jam-yang-shay-ba’s interpretation on the grounds that Devendrabuddhi’s and Prajñākaraṇa’s commentaries as well as those by Dzong-ka-ba’s students Kedrup and Gyel-tsap explain the term also (kyang) in Dharmakirti’s text and the term “also” (jang) in Dzong-ka-ba’s text as referring only to the commonality between the Proponents of Mind-Only and Hearer schools concerning the assertion on the relationship between definition and definiendum, not to a commonality in treating the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras this way. This is despite the fact that is agreed that indeed there are later Lesser Vehicle scholars who, after the appearance of Nāgarjuna, accept the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras as the word of Buddha and thus the frequent statements that there are no Hearer schools who accept the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras as the word of Buddha refer to “most” Hearer sects. For summaries of the controversy, see Nga-wang-bel-den, Annotations, ngoi, 142.6-143.1; Šer-šul’s Notes, 42a.3-42b.2; and Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s Port of Entry, 541.2-545.2). Šer-šul sides with Jang-gya, as apparently Nga-wang-bel-den does.

III.4; for the Sanskrit, see p. 428, footnote g. Translated in accordance with the commentary of Nga-wang-bel-den in his Explanation of the Conventional and the Ultimate in the Four Systems of Tenets (grub mtha’ bzhis’ legs kyi kun rdzo dang don dam pa’i don nnam par bshad pa legs bshad dpal kyi dpal mo’i glu dbyang) (New Delhi: Guru Deva, 1972), 39.2-39.6; see the next footnote and p. 316ff.

As mentioned in the previous footnote, I am following Nga-wang-bel-den’s reading, which for this line is:

Since conventionalities are superimposed factors, how could they be appearing
This makes the same point as what was stated earlier from Asaṅga’s *Compendium of Ascertainments*:\(^*\) Fearing that a detailed commentary on these would be too much, I will not write one.

objects of non-mistaken direct perception! Though [you] use the word “conventionality,” [you Proponents of Non-Nature] have come to assert ultimate establishment. To indicate this response, [Dharmakīrti] says, “How? Let it be so.” (kun rdzob sgro btags yin pas ji ldar mgon sum ma ’khrul ba’i snang yul du ’gyur te/ ming kun rdzob zhes ’dogi kyang don dam par grub pa’i don khas blangs par song ba’i phyir/ zhes pa’i lan ston par! ci ste de ldar ’gyur! zhes so/!)

Nga-wang-bel-den renders this line (which in Sanskrit is āstu yathā tathā) as ci ste de ldar ’gyur, rather than ji ldar de ldar ’gyur, yet he uses ji ldar and not ci ste in his exposition in the first sentence. It strikes me that, rather than seeing correlatives which yathā tathā certainly suggest, he takes ci ste (or ji ldar) as one meaning unit, corresponding to his first sentence, and takes de ldar ’gyur as another meaning unit, corresponding to his second sentence. Though odd at first blush, this interpretation of Dharmakīrti’s multivalent text is probably not so far-fetched. Nga-wang-bel-den at this point is giving the interpretation of Devendrabuddhi, and so forth, who take Dharmakīrti to be a Proponent of Mind-Only; this is not to say that he is representing Devendrabuddhi’s line-by-line explanation of this stanza; see Pe-king 5717, vol. 130, 276.1.7-276.3.3, which offers two interpretations.

\(^*\) See p. 151ff.
10. Superimposition

The refutation in particular of the extreme of superimposition has two parts: identifying the superimposition that is the object of negation and how to refute it.

Identifying The Superimposition—The Object Of Negation (319) [430]

The objects of reasoned negation in this [Mind-Only] system are twofold: [deprecatonal and superimpositional],. The deprecation [that other-powered natures and thoroughly established natures do not ultimately exist or do not exist by way of their own character] is only posited through tenets [and thus is just artificial, not innate]. Furthermore, deprecation here is in accordance with that explained earlier as the system of the Proponents of Non-Nature among our own [Buddhist] schools.

With respect to superimposition, there are two, artificial and innate, and within the artificial there are the systems of Others' Schools and the systems of the two Proponents of [Truly Existent External] Objects among our own schools [that is, the Great Exposition and the Sūtra Schools]. With respect to the innate [type of superimposition], since the superimposition of a self of persons will be shown later [in the section on the Consequence School, I will explain here the innate] superimposition of a self of phenomena. This is because the imputation of a self of phenomena by [other schools of] tenets is for the sake of confirming the self of phenomena that is conceived innately and because the main object of reasoned negation is also that [innately conceived self of phenomena].

In many texts of this system there is no explanation of a consciousness conceiving a self of phenomena aside from saying that a consciousness conceiving apprehended-object and apprehending-subject as other substantial entities is a consciousness conceiving a self of phenomena. However, the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought explains that other-powered natures are not established by

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See the Translation, especially chaps. 6 and 7.

Da-drin-rap-den (Annotations, 110.3) explains that these are non-Buddhist schools that have many modes of assertion that terms and conceptual consciousnesses operate through the power of the things that are their referents.

A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso’s Precious Lamp, 235.3. The reference is likely to the section on “the uncommon features of realizing selflessness, the coarse and subtle conceptions of self, and so forth.” Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 546.2), however, identifies the reference as being within the section on the Autonomy School.

Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 548.1) identifies the passage as occurring in chapter 7 during Paramárthasamudgata’s offering back to Buddha the meaning of what he
way of their own character as factors imputed in the manner of entity and of attribute and that, therefore, the absence of [such] a nature of character is the selflessness of phenomena. Thus, implicitly it teaches that a consciousness conceiving that factors imputed in the manner of entity and attribute are established by way of their own character in other-powered natures is a consciousness conceiving a self of phenomena. Also, Asaṅga’s Grounds of Bodhisattvas, Compendium of Ascerntainments, and Summary of the Great Vehicle with much striving establish that the emptiness of what is conceived by such [a consciousness conceiving a self of phenomena] is the final meaning of the middle and is the thoroughly established nature that is the selflessness of phenomena. Therefore, if you do not know what this imputational factor that is a superimposed factor of a self of phenomena on other-powered natures is, you will not know in a decisive way the conception of a self of phenomena and the selflessness of phenomena in this [Mind-Only] system.

Those imputational factors—which are such that a consciousness conceiving imputational factors to be established by way of their own character is asserted to be a consciousness conceiving a self of phenomena—are the nominally and terminologically imputed factors [in the imputation of] the aggregates and so forth as entities, “This is form,” and as attributes, “This is the production of form,” and so forth. Since the aggregates and so forth do exist as just those [entities of such nominal and terminological imputation], the [mere] conception that they exist as those [entities of nominal and terminological imputa-

That which is:

• the thorough non-establishment—of just those [other-powered natures which are] the objects of activity of conceptuality, the foundations of imputational characters, and those which have the signs of compositional phenomena—as that imputational character,

• just the naturelessness of only that [imputational] nature,

• the absence of self in phenomena,

• thusness, and

• the object of observation of purification

is the thoroughly established character.

For Ďzung-ka-ba’s citation, see p. 107.

See Absorption, #95, 98, 99, 102, and 103.

These presentations are given below in the section on refuting the superimposition, p. 207ff.

See Absorption, #79, 96-98, and 100.

Ďzung-ka-ba here does not delineate how one “will not know in a decisive way the conception of a self of phenomena and the selflessness of phenomena of this [Mind-Only] system” if one does not know this type of superimposition of self, but he gives a hint in the last two paragraphs of the chapter (p. 218).

See Absorption, #79, 96-98, 100, and 93.
tion] is not a superimposition; rather, the conception that the aggregates and so forth exist by way of their own character as those entities [of nominal and terminological imputation] is a superimposition.

[Dispelling Objections To The Presentation That The Establishment Of Forms And So Forth By Way Of Their Own Character As The Foundations Of Name And Conception Is The Self Of Phenomena And That The Negative Of This Is The Subtle Selflessness Of Phenomena]\textsuperscript{a} (321) {431}

[First Objection: This Contradicts The Sutra Unraveling the Thought, And So Forth]\textsuperscript{a} (321) {431}

Objection: If the refutation that forms and so forth being objects of names and terminology is established by way of their own character were a refutation of their being explicit objects of [terms]\textsuperscript{b} that are means of verbalization, then there would be no need to prove—that other-powered natures are empty of that—to the Proponents of [Truly Existent External] Objects. This is because it is already established for them that the explicit object verbalized and the means of verbalization\textsuperscript{b}—meaning-generalities and sound-generalities—are non-[func-

\textsuperscript{a} The headings for the four objections and three of the four answers are drawn from A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso’s Precious Lamp, 237.5ff. He says (239.4) these are hypothetical qualms (dgos pa khong bslang). Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry 564.1, 568.1) also calls them hypothetical disputes (rgol ba khong nas bus pa) and hypothetical qualms (dgos pa khong slong). With regard to various opinions about the number of qualms, see Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s Port of Entry, 568.2-572.5.

\textsuperscript{b} The text (p. 431) reads dngos kyi brjod bya dang rjod byed don spyi dang sgra spyi; Dadrin-rap-den (Annotations, 113.1) annotates rjod byed such that the text reads dngos kyi brjod bya dang rjod byed (kyi dngos yul) don spyi dang sgra spyi. In translation:

This is because it is already established for them that the explicit object verbalized and (the explicit object of) the means of verbalization, meaning-generalities and sound-generalities, are non-[functioning] things.

In this way he takes both meaning-generalities and sound-generalities as objects of verbalization, rather than considering the first as the object of verbalization and the second as the means of verbalization.

More cogently, however, Jam-yang-shay-ba (Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive, 186.5) has rjod byed kyi sgra spyi dang don spyi (read rjod for brjod, since the present is used for the verbal agent noun), and thus it is likely that “means of verbalization” modifies only sound-generalities or both sound-generalities and meaning-generalities, though it is more likely that “means of verbalization” modifies only sound-generalities. Also, the parallelism of Dzong-ka-ba’s construction suggests that meaning-generalities are the explicit objects of verbalization and that sound-generalities are the explicit means of verbalization; this is confirmed by a statement in the next chapter (p. 228):
tioning things. Furthermore, a valid cognition establishing that they are empty of such would not establish the selflessness of phenomena, and through observing and meditating on that [sort of emptiness] the obstructions to omniscience would not be purified. Thereby, one would be contradicting (1) the explanation in the Sutra Unraveling the Thought that imputational factors' emptiness of establishment by way of their own character is the thoroughly established nature that is the selflessness of phenomena and (2) the explanation in Asanga's Grounds of Bodhisattvas that this emptiness is the object of observation for purifying the obstructions to omniscience.

Concerning the explanation in the Conquest Over Objections, it asserts that the appearances to a conceptual consciousness of sound-generalities, which the means of verbalization, and meaning-generalities, which are the objects of verbalization, are the imputational eye.

In this passage, his meaning is clear since he explicitly ties "means of verbalization" with "sound-generalities" and "objects of verbalization" with "meaning-generalities" (jod byed sgra sphyi dang brjod bya don sphyi: see the Text, p. 443). The problem is that it is widely held in Ge-luk-ba colleges that both meaning-generalities and sound-generalities are explicit objects of verbalization, the former being a generic image of an object that appears to one who has a good idea of an object and the latter being a generic image of an object that appears to someone unfamiliar with an object. However, as Nga-wang-bel-den says in his Annotations for (jam-yang-shay-ba's) "Great Exposition of Tenets," sound-generalities also can be considered to be mental reverberations of mere terms; thus, in this sense, they perhaps could be considered "explicit means of verbalization," a term usually reserved for actual sounds expressing meaning.

Again, Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 565.5) identifies the passage as occurring in chapter 7 of the sūtra during Paramārthaśamudgata's offering back to Buddha the meaning of what he has said:

That which is:

- the thorough non-establishment—of just those [other-powered natures which are] the objects of activity of conceptuality, the foundations of imputational characters, and those which have the signs of compositional phenomena—as that imputational character,
- just the naturelessness of only that [imputational] nature,
- the absence of self in phenomena,
- thusness, and
- the object of observation of purification

is the thoroughly established character.

For Dzong-ka-ba's citation, see p. 107.

Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 565.6) identifies the passage as:

What is the suchness that is the object of activity for purifying the obstructions to objects of knowledge? That which prevents knowledge of objects of knowledge is called an "obstruction." That which is the object of activity of knowledge releasing from those obstructions to objects of knowledge is to be known as the suchness that is the object of activity of knowledge purifying the obstructions to objects of
[Second Objection: It Is Not Reasonable To Consider That The Establishment Of Such Imputational Natures By Way Of Their Own Character Is The Subtle Self And Thereupon To Refute It]46 (321) {431}

[Moreover]46 if it were that, in refuting forms and so forth being the conceived objects of [terms that are]46 means of verbalization46 or of conceptual consciousnesses that relate name and meaning,46 it is refuted that the illustration-isolates of conceived objects exist by way of their own character, one would be refuting that other-powered natures are established by way of their own character [since illustration-isolates, or mere illustrations, of the conceived object of a conceptual consciousness apprehending form, for instance, are forms; however, refuting that these are not established by way of their own character is not feasible because forms, according to the Mind-Only School are, in fact, established by way of its own character].46

Also, even if it were being refuted that the self-isolate of the conceived object [of a conceptual consciousness]46 is established by way of its own character, since it is confirmed even for Proponents of Sūtra that the objects of comprehension of an inferential valid cognition are generally characterized phenomena [and]46 do not exist as [functioning] things, this is not feasible.46

knowledge.


a As Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 572.5-573.3) points out, it is odd to speak of conceived objects of terms, since terms are sounds and thus material and cannot conceive anything. The more usual vocabulary is object expressed by a term (sgras'i brjod bya).

b Illustration-isolates (gzhis ldog) are conceptually isolated illustrations, that is to say, illustrations simpliciter; it is a technical term often used to refer to mere illustrations, isolated from the definition and definitionum which they illustrate. A clay pot is an illustration of pot; that which is bulbous, flat bottomed, and capable of holding fluid is the definition, or defining character, of pot; and pot is the definitionum. The term "self-isolate" (rang ldog) is a similarly convenient way of referring just to the object itself, pot, and not any of illustrations, such as a copper pot, or its definition.

c Gung-ru Chö-jung (Garland of White Lotuses, 19b.3) cogently identifies the "objects of comprehension of an inferential valid cognition" as the appearing objects of inferential cognition, these being sound-generalities (sgras sphyi, labdasmāṇyā) and meaning-generalities (don sphyi, arthaśāmāṇyā), which are the appearing objects of conceptual consciousnesses. However, A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso (Precious Lamp, 238.4) identifies this as the factor, for instance, of forms and so forth being objects of name and terminology (gzeugs sgyl ming brda'i yul yin pa'i cha lla bya).

d See Absorption, #125.
[Third Objection: It Absurdly Follows That Proponents Of Sūtra Realize The Subtle Selflessness Of Phenomena Because The Following Passage Is Established For Both The Proponents Of Sūtra and The Proponents Of Mind-Only And An Emptiness Exceeding It Does Not Appear In The Sūtra Unraveling the Thought] 10 (321) [431]

Furthermore, there is the passage in the Transmigration Sūtra:

The objector mistakenly thinks that because this passage appears in a Low Vehicle sūtra, it must be established for them, that is to say, understood by them. However, the Proponents of Mind-Only would not accept that this passage is established for the Proponents of Sūtra because they do not understand its import.


The bracketed additions in my translation, except where noted, are drawn from Śer-thül's Notes, 43a.1-43a.5. Śer-thül says that he is following the Explanation of (Asanga's) "Grounds of Bodhisattvas" (rman 'byor spyod pa'i sa la byang chub sems dpa'i sa'i rnam par bshad pa, yogācāryabhāma bodhisattvatvabhāmaṅkhyā; Peking 5548, vol. 112, 77.4.4-77.5.3) by Sāgaramegha (rgya mtsho sprin) but has tried to rearrange it so that it is more straightforward. Specifically, Śer-thül sees the commentary as giving a contorted explanation of de la de ni (sa [samvidbāte] tatra), and he asks that his readers analyze whether his rendition is correct. To do this, let us reconstruct Śer-thül's reading of the stanza, which would be:

The verbalizations [of "This is such and such" with respect to]
Whatsoever phenomena with whatsoever names
Do not exist in those [phenomena through the force of their mode of subsistence as they are so imputed].
This [non-existence of phenomena by way of their own character as referents of names] is the real nature of phenomena.

Śer-thül clearly identifies de la (tatra) as referring to names (ming) and the other de (sa) as referring to phenomena (chos rnam), but the Sanskrit does not support his reading since nāmā, being neuter, cannot be the antecedent of sa, which is masculine.

Willis (On Knowing Reality, 164) translates the passage correctly as:

Indeed, by whatsoever name whatsoever dharma is mentioned, that dharma is not found therein. For that is the true nature of all dharmas.

She identifies de la (tatra) as referring to the names and de (sa) as referring to dharma, whereas Śer-thül does the opposite.

Sāgaramegha inventively identifies the two correlatives in yo yo dharma 'bhilappate (chos rnam gang dang gang brjod pa) differently; he takes one of them as referring to other-powered natures and the other as referring to imputational natures. He then takes sa (de) as referring to imputational natures and tatra (de la) as referring to other-powered natures. In Tibetan:

chos rnam gang dang zhes bya ba ni gshan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid döl gang brjod
Whatsoever phenomena verbalized with whatsoever names
Do not exist in those [names through the force of their mode of subsistence as they are so imputed].
This [non-existence of phenomena by way of their own character as referents of names]\textsuperscript{191}
Is the real nature of phenomena.

Since this passage is established also for the Hearer Schools, it [absurdly] would not appear that there would be anything exceeding this [emptiness]\textsuperscript{192} in even the real nature in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought that is the emptiness of imputational factors.

[Fourth Objection: It Is Not Feasible To Explain That This Mode Of Emptiness Is The Object Of Observation That, When Meditated, Purifies The Obstructions To Omniscience]\textsuperscript{193} (326) \{431\}

Moreover, this mode of emptiness [that is, other-powered natures' emptiness of the imputational nature as explained in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought]\textsuperscript{194} does not involve the meaning of cognition-only that is the negation of apprehended-object and apprehending-subject as different substantial entities. Hence, how could it be feasible [for Asaṅga's Grounds of Bodhisattvas and so forth]\textsuperscript{195} to describe it as the selflessness of phenomena that is the object observed by [the path] purifying the obstructions to omniscience?

Therefore, explain the reasons why these contradictions do not exist in this system!

\textit{Answer}: They will be explained.

[Answer To The First Objection: The Proponents Of Sūtra Have Not Realized That Such Imputational Natures Are Not Established By Way Of Their Own Character]\textsuperscript{196} (322) \{432\}

In Asaṅga's Grounds of Bodhisattvas, this mode of emptiness [set forth in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought]\textsuperscript{197} is explained as the object observed by the exalted wisdom purifying the obstructions to omniscience and as the middle path abandoning the two extremes of which there is none higher,\textsuperscript{2} and his \textit{Summary}

\texttt{pa zhes bya ba ni kun brtag pa\'ol/ de la zhes bya ba ni gshan gyi dhang gi ngo ho la yod pa ma yin pa\'ol/}

He thereby manipulates the meaning so that it reiterates the common doctrine that the imputational nature does not exist in the other-powered nature, rather than that the other-powered nature does not exist in the imputational nature, this being what the grammar seems to say.

In Gunaprabha's commentary (Peking 5545, vol. 112, 5.4), a detailed explanation of the stanza is not given.

\textsuperscript{1} Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (\textit{Port of Entry}, 574.5) identifies the passages as:
of the Great Vehicle* says that entry by way of this [mode of emptiness] is entry into cognition-only. Therefore, this is not already established by the Hearer Schools [that is, the Great Exposition and Sūtra Schools].

[In Combination With The Above Paragraph, The Answer To The Second Objection: Although The Proponents Of Sūtra Say That The Self-Isolate Of The Conceived Object Of A Conceptual Consciousness—For Instance, The Factor Of Being The Referent Of A Conceptual Consciousness Or Of Being Its Conceived Object—Is Not Established By Way Of Its Own Character, They Assert That Objects Are Established By Way Of Their Own Measure Of Subsistence As The Referents Of Conceptual Consciousnesses, where they come to assert that Objects Are Established By Way Of Their Own Character As The Referents Of Conceptual Consciousnesses]] (322) [432]

For this reason, even the Hearer schools have assertions of tenets that are superimpositions opposite to this—that is, holding that forms and so forth are established by way of their own character as imputed by names as entities and attributes.

[Proof For The Above Two Answers)] (322) [432]

It is as follows: In refuting this, Asaṅga's Grounds of Bodhisattvas refutes it also.

What is the suchness that is the object of activity for purifying the obstructions to objects of knowledge? That which prevents knowledge of objects of knowledge is called an "obstruction." That which is the object of activity of knowledge releasing from those obstructions to objects of knowledge is to be known as the suchness that is the object of activity of knowledge purifying the obstructions to objects of knowledge.

Peking 5538, vol. 110, 142.3.4-142.4.6; for the Sanskrit, see Dutt, Bodhisattvabhūmi, book 1, chap. 4, 26.9; and Willis, On Knowing Reality, 151.

And:

How is emptiness apprehended well?...is called "apprehending emptiness well" and "thorough realization with correct wisdom."

Peking 5538, vol. 110, 144.5.6-145.1.5; and Willis, On Knowing Reality, 163. For Đzong-ka-ba's paraphrase of the beginning of this passage in the present work, see p. 147. By a final "and so forth," Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso indicates that there are more passages.

* Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 574.6) identifies this as:

It is thus: such Bodhisattvas making effort at entering into cognition-only thoroughly understand...Through these, they enter into cognition-only concerning those mental conceptual consciousnesses to which letters and meanings appear.

For the entire quotation, see p. 213ff.

b rog pa'i zhen gzhir rang gi gnas tshod kyi dbang gi grub pa: A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso's Precious Lamp, 240.3.
with [Buddhist] scripture, and, since it is not suitable to refute other schools

The reference is to three passages. The first is that from the Transmigration Sūtra cited above (p. 200):

Whatever phenomena verbalized with whatsoever names
Do not exist in those [names through the force of their mode of subsistence as they are so imputed].
This [non-existence of phenomena by way of their own character as referents of names]
Is the real nature of phenomena.

The second passage is from the Collection of Meanings Sūtra (don gyi ide tshan dag gi mdo, arthavargyasūtra):

All whatever fraudulences (kun rdzob, samṛtī) [put forth by consciousnesses concealing suchness] that exist in the world,
The Subduer does not assert.
Because he does not make [superimpositional and deprecatonal] assertions with respect to what is seen and heard,
He does not assert those. How could he conceive them?

The Sanskrit—as cited in Asanga’s Grounds of Bodhiṣattva—from Unrai Wogihara, Bodhisattvabhumi: A Statement of the Whole Course of the Bodhisattva (Being the Fifteenth Section of Yogācārabhūmi), (Tokyo: Seigo Kenkyūkai, 1930-1936), 48.12, is:

yāḥ kāścana saṃvṛtyayo hi loke
sarvaḥ hi tā munir nopaitī
an-upago hy asau kena upādātī[ Dutt: kena upādātī]
dṛṣṭa-iru te kāntim a-samprakuruṇa.

See also Dutt, Bodhisattvabhumi, 33.10. The Tibetan (Peking 5538, vol. 110, 145.2.3) is:

'jig rten dag nas kun rdzob gang ci yod/
de kun thub pas zhal gyi mi bzhes s collaborated
gezi dang gyan la bzhed par mi mdoa pa/
de ni zhal gyi mi bzhes gang gi 'dzin/

Willis, On Knowing Reality, 120 and 164. About this sūtra, Willis (120) says:

The Arthavargya-sūtra (Tib. don gyi ide tshan dag mdo) exists in the Canon under the title Atthakavya. There it is found as the thirteenth sutta of a larger collection entitled the Mahāvīrya-sutta in the fourth section of the famed Sutta Nipāta. The verse cited here is the third of thirteen verses comprising the Atthakavya.

For the Pāli, and so forth, see the Reality. Wogihara (Bodhisattvabhumi, 48, n. 6) refers to “Verse No. 897 (Atthaka-vaggo in Suttanipāta).”

The third passage is from the Story of Samthakatyāyana Sūtra (stum byed ba 'gyi bu las btsams te bka' stul ba'i mdo, samthakatyāyanaśūtra):

The monk Samtha does not engage in meditation depending on the earth. He does not engage in meditation depending on any of these: water, fire, and wind, the spheres of [limitless] space, [limitless] consciousness, and nothingness, the spheres of non-discrimination and non-non-discrimination, this world and the next, the two—sun and moon, seeing, hearing, differentiation, knowing, finding, searching, mental investigation, and analysis....
Superimposition

[Non-Buddhists] with the scriptures of one’s own teacher, our own schools also must exist among those who are being refuted, and since the Proponents of Non-Nature or a specific type of Yogic Practitioner are not being refuted,4 [these have to be Buddhist] Hearer schools. Hence, [on the occasion of refuting this,61 Asaṅga] does not quote passages from the Sūtra Unraveling the Thoughtb but refutes them with three passages62 established for them.

[Indicating That The Absurd Consequence Of The Third Objection, That Is, That Proponents Of Sūtra Would Have To Realize The Subtle Selflessness Of Phenomena, Is Not Reasonable]63 (323) {432}

Concerning that, let us first identify the innate superimposition. Asaṅga’s Compendium of Ascertainments says:64

About that [superimposition],64 it should be known by way of five reasons4 that childish beings [that is, ordinary worldly beings who have

The Sanskrit—as cited in Asaṅga’s Grounds of Bodhisattvas—from Wogihara (Bodhisattvaśūri, 49.15ff) and Dutt (Bodhisattvaśūri, 33.23) is:

\[ \text{Iha samtha bhikṣu na pratīvīṣa niṣītā dyāyati nāpah na tejo [Dutt: tejha] na vāyum [Dutt: vāyum] nākāśa-viśājānākāśa-cānava-niṣītāni niṣītānājñātātmane ναν- \]

\[ \text{mam lokam na param [Dutt adds: lokam] nabhau suṣrāṇa-candramasau na dhṛta-
\]

\[ \text{ṣīta-mata-viśājām prāptaṃ paryayitam manānaṃvītiṣākram anuvicāritam [Dutt: anuvicāritam]. tat sarvam na niṣītā dyāyati. . . .}
\]

Wogihara (Bodhisattvaśūri, 49, n. 4) identifies this sūtra as being Aṅguttara-Nikāya V, 224.28-329.19. The Tibetan (Peking 5538, vol. 110, 145.3.1) is:

\[ \text{"di na dge sorg dsums byed ni sa la brten cing bsam gnyan mi byed do/ chu dang/ me dang/ rlung dang/ nam mkha’ dang/ ci yang med pa’i skye mchog dang/ ’du shes med ‘du shes med min skye mchog dang/ ’jig rten ‘di dang/ ’jig rten pha rol dang/ nzi ma dang/ da ba ‘di gyis dang/ mthong ba dang/ thos pa dang/ bye brag phyed pa dang/ rnam par shes pa dang/ nged pa dang/ bsal ba dang/ yid kyi rjes su bshis pa dang/ rjes su dpal bya de dag thams cd la brten cing bsam gnyan mi byed do/ . . .}
\]

Willis, On Knowing Reality, 122-123 and 165-166. Franklin Edgerton (Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953; reprint, Delhi: Motilal, 1972]) identifies samtha as the name of a monk.

4 The reason why these schools are not being refuted is that they do not assert that forms and so forth are established by way of their own character as entities of imputation in the manner of entity and attribute; see Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s Port of Entry, 576.2.

b It seems to me that Dzong-ka-ba here indicates that the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought is a scripture of the Great Vehicle and not one common to all vehicles; this accords with the Go-mang tradition’s presentation but not with Jay-bzūn Chö-gyi-gyel-tsen’s, for instance; see p. 124, footnote e.

c See three footnotes above.

d The syntax of the translation follows Śer-thul’s Notes (43a.5-45a.6), who describes the five in detail within citing the Compendium of Ascertainments. A-ku Lo-dröl-gya-tso’s Precious Lamp (244.1-248.2), citing the same source passages, calls these the five factors or processes.
not realized emptiness)\textsuperscript{65} adhere to things, which are verbalized objects, as having nature in accordance with names and verbalizations.

As the first reason [from among the five], he explains that when asked what the entity of a thing [such as a form]\textsuperscript{66} is, one answers, “That entity is form,” and does not answer, “Its name is form.”

The meaning of this is that when asked what the entity of the meaning of the verbalization “form” is, one says, “Its entity is form,” and does not say, “That which is merely nominally imputed with the name ‘form’ is the entity of the meaning of the verbalization ‘form.’” Therefore, when the convention “form” is imputed, if one examines how [for instance]\textsuperscript{67} blue’s being a basis of the imputation of the convention for form appears, it does not appear [to childish beings]\textsuperscript{68} to be posited by names and terminology but appears as if established through the force of [blue’s]\textsuperscript{69} own mode of subsistence. A consciousness conceiving that blue is established in accordance with how it appears is an [innate]\textsuperscript{70} superimpositional consciousness conceiving that blue is established by way of its own character as nominally imputed [to be] “form.” [This is the conception that imputation in the manner of an entity is established by way of its own character in blue.]\textsuperscript{71}

That childish beings have this is confirmed by the above explanation [of how one answers the question, “What is the entity of the meaning of the verbalization ‘form’?” and so forth],\textsuperscript{72} and also the two schools of Proponents of [Truly Existent External] Objects [that is, the Great Exposition School and the Sūtra School] assert that such a mode of apprehension is reasonably founded. Therefore, although [the Sūtra School and Mind-Only School agree that] the self-isolate of the object of verbalization by a term [or phrase such as, “Blue is a form.”]\textsuperscript{73} is imputed by conceptuality, how could this [Mind-Only system] resemble the system [of the Sūtra School] in which the illustration-isolates of the object of verbalization by a term involve own-character [that is, establishment by way of the object’s own character as the referent of terms]\textsuperscript{74}

\textit{(rgya mtshan):} name, reason, conceptuality, thusness, and exalted wisdom (as does Da-drin-rap-den’s Annotations, 117.2, in a different order); however, Ser-shül (Notes, 43a.6) denies that these are to be named this way. Following A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso, the quotation should read:

About that [superimposition], it should be known that—by way of five factors—childish beings adhere to things, which are verbalized objects, as having nature in accordance with names and verbalizations.

Since it takes convoluted commentary to name these as A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso does, I find Ser-shül’s reading preferable. See also Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s Port of Entry, 579.2-586.2, 587.5ff.

\textsuperscript{4} Ser-shül (Notes, 45b.2) and Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 578.4) limit the identification to the Sūtra School. Da-drin-rap-den (Annotations, 119.4) includes also the Great Exposition School.

\textsuperscript{6} This cryptic passage is interpreted differently by various Ge-luk-pa scholars. Jik-may-
dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 586.4) points out that this passage (without the clarifying brackets) gives the impression that the Mind-Only School disagrees with the Sūtra School on both aspects of its assertion:

- The self-isolate (see p. 198, footnote b; and Absorption, #125) of the object of verbalization by a term or phrase such as, "Blue is a form," is imputed by conceptuality (since the meaning-generalities that are the explicit objects of verbalization simpliciter abstracted from the phenomena indicated by those terms are imputed by conceptuality)
- The illustration-isolates of the object of verbalization by a term—or the actual phenomena being verbalized abstracted from the other aspects of the process of verbalization—involve own-character, that is to say, establishment by way of their own character as the referent of terms

If it were Đōzong-ka-ba’s intention to indicate that the Mind-Only School differs with both aspects of the Sūtra School’s position, the passage in question would have to be interpreted as:

How could this [Mind-Only system] resemble the system [of the Sūtra School] in which although the self-isolate of the object of verbalization by a term [or phrase such as, "Blue is a form,"] is imputed by conceptuality, the illustration-isolates of the object of verbalization by a term involve own-character [that is, establishment by way of the object’s own character as the referent of terms]?

As Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso says, the passage might seem to be indicating that the Mind-Only School disagrees with both aspects of the Sūtra School’s assertion, but the Mind-Only School does not disagree with the first part, that is, that the self-isolate of the object of verbalization by a term is imputed by conceptuality; rather, the Mind-Only School disagrees only with the second part of the assertion, namely, that the illustration-isolates of the object of verbalization by a term involve own-character, that is, establishment by way of the object’s own character as the referent of terms. Thus, I have inserted brackets into the sentence to make clear where the disagreement lies.

Now let us consider what “own-character” in Đōzong-ka-ba’s sentence (de’i gzhis ldog tu rang mthban ’eng ba’i lugs dang ga mthun, p. 433) means. If “own-character” is taken merely to mean objects that are established by way of its own character, the second part of the passage seems to be saying:

How could this [assertion of the Mind-Only School] resemble the system [of the Sūtra School] in which there are own-character [that is, objects that are established by way of their own character] among the illustration-isolates of the object of verbalization of a term?

However, since both the Sūtra School and the Mind-Only School accept that there are indeed objects, such as forms, that are established by way of their own character among the illustrations of objects of verbalization, the clause cannot be read this way. Therefore, Ser-shul (Notes, 45a.6ff) accepts Jam-yang-shay-ba’s (Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive, 193.4ff) gloss of the clause, in which “own-character” is taken not as objects that are established by way of their own character but as the object of negation in the selflessness of phenomena—this being the establishment of objects by way of their own character as the referents of terms. As Ser-shul (Notes, 45b.1) says:

The illustration-isolates of the objects of verbalization of the term “form” are actual forms such as blue, and the Proponents of Sūtra assert that those are “own-character” [that is, established by way of their own character] as referents of
Through that, you should also understand the mode of superimposition in the imputation of attributes as well as the mode of superimposition with respect to phenomena other [than forms]. Similarly, when object and subject appear dualistically, the conception that both exist as different substantial entities in accordance with their appearance that way is also a superimposition that is a consciousness conceiving a self of phenomena.

The answers to the remainder of the challenge will be explained later.

How To Refute The Superimposition That Is The Object Of Negation (324) (434)

This section has two parts: the actual refutation and dispelling objections with respect to it.

Actual Refutation Of The Superimposition That Is The Object Of Negation (324) (434)

the term "form." How could [the Mind-Only system] resemble such a system!

To get around the same problem, A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso (Precious Lamp, 243.4) reverses who is disagreeing with whom but ends up with the same meaning:

Although Hearer sectarians say that the self-isolate of the object of verbalization by a term is permanent, they assert that [phenomena] are established by way of their own mode of subsistence as the objects of verbalization by terms, and hence they do not resemble the Proponents of Mind-Only, who assert that although the self-isolate of referent of the conventions of terms and conceptual consciousnesses is permanent, there are illustration-isolates, blue and so forth which are specifically characterized phenomena.

Following this interpretation, Dzong-ka-ba's text would read:

How could this [assertion of the Hearer schools] resemble the system [of the Mind-Only School] in which although the self-isolate of the object of verbalization by a term [or phrase such as, "Blue is a form."] is imputed by conceptuality, there are specifically characterized phenomena among the illustration-isolates of the object of verbalization of a term!

See Absorption, #125, 126.

A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso (Precious Lamp, 240.6) identifies the remainder as:

1. Showing the contradiction with the Sutra Unraveling the Thought and Asanga's Grounds of Bodhisattvas if one accepted the absurd consequence of the first objection, namely, that there would be no need to prove to the Proponents of [Truly Existent External] Objects that other-powered natures are empty (however, it appears that this topic was already covered above, p. 200)

2. Responding to the reason cited in the third objection, namely, the claim that the passage in the Transmigration Sutra is established for both the Proponents of Sutra and the Proponents of Mind-Only; see p. 211.

3. Responding to the fourth objection; see p. 212
[Reasoning Presented In Asaṅga's Summary Of The Great Vehicle] (324) [434]

So that one might realize reasonings proving that other-powered natures are empty of the imputational factor—such reasonings not being set forth in the Śūtra Unraveling the Thought—three reasonings each are set out in Asaṅga's Grounds of Bodhisattvas and Compendium of Ascertainments. Moreover, Asaṅga's Summary of The Great Vehicle states a question: "What [reasonings] make it evident that other-powered entities which appear to be imputational natures are not of such a nature?"

In answer to that question, it says [see the footnote for a fleshing out of the stanza]:

A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso (Precious Lamp, 254.2) points out that if Dzong-ka-ba were merely saying that such reasonings are not set forth (instead of not explicitly set forth) in the Śūtra Unraveling the Thought, then he would be subject to the absurd consequence that these reasonings would not be the meaning of the Śūtra Unraveling the Thought. The Second Dalai Lama (Lamp Illuminating the Meaning of [Dzong-ka-ba's] Thought, 69.5) similarly adds the word "clearly" (gal ba) instead of "explicitly," as does Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 589.5). However, since the Śūtra Unraveling the Thought does not contain even hints of these reasonings and only has pronouncements on the nature of reality, it can be seen that consideration of explicit and implicit teachings can be, according to circumstance, devices for reading into a text a later perspective. Later Indian Buddhism and much of Tibetan Buddhism moved away from mere reliance on Buddha's call to meditative insight and toward reasoned support that both leads to and certifies meditative experience.

Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 589.6) identifies the passage as beginning with:

gal te ngo bo nyid gang gi rgyu mthun nam par bzhag pa de la de dang mthun pa nyid kyi ming nye bar 'dogs par byed pa'i phyir....

Between the question just asked and this stanza there is another sentence, not cited by Dzong-ka-ba, that says the same in prose. With bracketed additions, the meaning of the stanza is clear:

[If, for instance, a bulbous, flat bottomed thing able to hold fluid were established through the force of its own mode of subsistence as the referent of the verbal convention "pot."

1. the imputational nature would exist] the essence of that [bulbous thing], but this is contradicted by the fact that an awareness [of the name of an object] does not exist prior to [learning its] name,

2. [one object that has many names would have to] many entities, but this is contradicted by the fact that many [names are used for one object], and

3. the entities [of many objects that have the same name] would be mixed, but this is contradicted by the fact that [a name is] not restricted to [one object].

Therefore, it is proven [that objects are not established by way of their own character as the referents of terms and conceptual consciousneses].

The bracketed material is drawn from Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations, dngos 186.6-187.4; and Jam-yan-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, nga 44b.6-45a.3.
Because an awareness does not exist prior to name,
Because manifold, and because unrestricted,
There are the contradictions of being in the essence of that, of many
entities,
And of the mixture of entities. Therefore, it is proven.

Establishing [through the first reasoning: that other-powered natures are
empty of the imputational nature due to its being contradictory [for the imputa-
tional nature] to be in the essence of that phenomenon: Let us express—in a way
easy to understand—how this is. If a bulbous thing’s being a referent or foun-
dation of the convention “pot” were established by way of the bulbous thing’s
own mode of subsistence or its own character, it would not be posited through
the force of terminology [that is, language], in which case even an awareness
that has the terminology [“pot”] as its object would not depend upon [making
the connection of] the terminology [to the object through being taught lan-
guage]. Hence, an awareness thinking “pot” with respect to a bulbous thing
would [absurdly] be generated [just from seeing the bulbous thing] prior to
imputing the name “pot” [that is to say, prior to learning that it is called “pot”].

Establishing [through the second reasoning: that other-powered natures are
empty of the imputational nature] by way of the contradiction that just one object
would be many entities of objects: According to the other party [who holds that
an object’s being a referent of the convention of its name is established by way
of the mode of subsistence of the object], the usage of many names such as
Shakra, Indra, Grāmahātaka, and so forth for one object must be by way of
the force of the thing itself [since, according to the other party, this god is es-
established by way of his own character as the referent of those names], and [in
that case] just as [different meanings dependent upon each of those names] appear [individually] to conceptual consciousnesses, so [the one object, the
sole Shakra, would have to] subsist in fact [as individual objects], whereby the
[one] object would [absurdly] become many.

Establishing [through the third reasoning: that other-powered natures are
empty of the imputational nature] by way of the contradiction that the entities of
unmixed objects would be mixed: According to the other party, when the one
name “Upagupta” is used for two beings, there is no difference in [the fact

a bṛgya byin.

b dbang po.

c grong 'joms. Perhaps also Nāgarahātaka; see Mahāvyutpattī (Bon-sā-kun-wa yon'yaku
tai ko Mahāvyutpattī), ed. by SAKAKI Ryōzaburō, 2 vols. [Tokyo: Kokusho kankokai,
1981]; reprint, Quadrilingual Mahāvyutpattī, reproduced by Lokesh Chandra [New Delhi:
International Academy of Indian Culture, 1981]), 3847 and 3848; or Purāṇḍara; thanks to
Christian Lindner for the latter.

d nyer sba. The life story of Upagupta is told in The Alokāvadāna translated and pub-
lished in John S. Strong, The Legend and Cult of Upagupta: Sanskrit Buddhism in North India
that] an awareness thinking, “This is Upagupta,” is generated [with regard to both of them], and [if those two persons of different continuums are established by way of their own character as referents of the one name “Upagupta”] the names of those [two] and the conceptual consciousnesses [that are aware of such would have to] operate with respect to those two [persons] through the force of the things themselves. Therefore, those two objects—the two persons of different continuums—absurdly would be one object [that is, would be one person with one continuum].

Also, even when one conceives that form and so forth being the referents of conceptual consciousnesses is established ultimately or by way of its own character, this is similar to conceiving that form and so forth are established by their own character as the foundations of imputation with a name. Therefore, even those who do not know terminology as in, “The name of this is such and such,” have the superimposition of the object of negation, and the reasoning refuting it is also similar.

[Reasoning Presented In Asāṅga’s *Grounds Of Bodhisattvas* (325) (435)]
In Asāṅga’s *Grounds of Bodhisattvas* [the superimposition of other-powered natures being established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses apprehending them] is refuted thus:

If a name is later imputed to an object that existed earlier, “This is such and such,” then when it has not been so imputed, the entity of that object would be nonexistent. Also, if it is later imputed to an entity that exists even when it is not imputed, then at a time when the name has not been imputed, an awareness thinking, “This is form,” would [absurdly] be generated.

[Refuting Attempts By The Proponents Of External Objects To Dispel These Fallacies (325) (435)]
The Hearer schools [that is, the Great Exposition and Sūtra Schools] say [in reply]:

If the explicit object of the imputation of terminology [that is, a term-generality or meaning-generality] were established by way of its own character in the entity of that object, then there would be faults such

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* Ďzung-ka-ṣa briefly presents only the second and third of the three reasonings given in Asāṅga’s *Grounds of Bodhisattvas*.

* Jam-yang-shay-ba’s *Great Exposition of the Interpretative and the Definitive*, 206.1; and A-ku Lo-dro-gya-tso’s *Precious Lamp*, 258.2. Šer-shül (Note, 46a.6) refers only to a meaning-generality. Da-drin-rap-den (Annotations, 123.5) has “the likeness of form and so forth” (gzaṅs sogs kyi ’dra rnam).
as that without depending upon making the association of the terminology [with the object through being taught the name of the object], an awareness of the name would be generated, and so forth. However, such fallacies do not accrue to the establishment, by way of its own character, of form and so forth being the foundations of the imputation of terminology and the referents of conceptual consciousnesses.

Though they say this, it is similar.\textsuperscript{b}

[Ancillary Points]\textsuperscript{a} (326) {435}

Thus, form and so forth being the referents of conceptual consciousnesses\textsuperscript{c} is an imputational factor posited by name and terminology, but, since it is established by valid cognition, it cannot be refuted.\textsuperscript{d} However, that it is established by way of the thing’s own character is an imputational factor posited only nominally that does not occur among objects of knowledge [that is, does not exist]. Hence, among what are posited by names and terminology there are two [types], those established by valid cognition and those not established by valid cognition.\textsuperscript{e} Still, this system asserts that once something is only posited by names and terminology, cause and effect are not suitable to occur in it.\textsuperscript{f}

The two Proponents of [Truly Existent External] Objects [that is, the Great Exposition and the Sutra Schools]\textsuperscript{g} do not know how to posit forms and so forth as existing if their being established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses and as the foundations of imputing terminology is negated. This is not the own-character that is renowned to the Epistemologists.\textsuperscript{h}

\textsuperscript{a} See Absorption, \#126.
\textsuperscript{b} Jam-yang-shay-ba (Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive, 206.3) interpret this sentence as meaning:

The fallacies [that we adduced] cannot be dispelled through this because [your reply] remains with [that is, does not escape] just the fallacies set forth above.

\textsuperscript{c} See Absorption, \#78-82.
\textsuperscript{d} See ibid., \#108.
\textsuperscript{e} See ibid., \#88.
\textsuperscript{f} The Consequence School asserts the opposite—that cause and effect are possible and, in fact, only occur in what are merely posited by name and terminology. Thus, as A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso (Precious Lamp, 258.4) says, the implications of Dzong-ka-ba’s saying “this system” (\textquoteleft di pa, literally, “those of this system”) is that the Consequentialists, in opposition, assert that cause and effect are not suitable to occur in what are established from their own side and in what are not posited by name and terminology. See Absorption, \#74.
\textsuperscript{g} These are the two Proponents of Truly Existent External Objects; however, the assertion is perhaps more cogently limited to the Proponents of Sutra, as Sher-shul does (Notes, 46.1).
\textsuperscript{h} tshad ma pa, pramāṇika. According to A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso (Precious Lamp, 259.2), Dzong-ka-ba is making the point that this sort of own-character is not limited to those ob-
For example, although the absence of a pot is a non-affirming negative and it and a certain place come together as a common locus [that is, as something that both is a certain place and is without a pot], this does not prevent the fact that the two—a non-affirming negative and a [functioning] thing—are contradictory. Just so, it is also not contradictory that:

- a consciousness’s being a referent of conceptual consciousnesses is an imputational factor that is not ultimately established, but
- a consciousness is ultimately established.

[Answer To The Reason Cited In The Third Objection, Namely, The Claim That The Passage In The Transmigration Sūtra Is Established For Both The Proponents Of Sūtra And The Proponents Of Mind-Only] 100 (322) [436]

Therefore, [the passage from the Transmigration Sūtra] 101

Whosoever phenomena verbalized with whatsoever names
Do not exist in those [names through the force of their mode of subsistence as they are so imputed].
This [non-existence of phenomena by way of their own character as referents of names] 102
Is the real nature of phenomena.

and so forth are sūtra passages confirmed for the Hearer schools, but it is not that the explanations [of these passages] by these [schools] do not differ in subjects that perform functions (a category that excludes permanent phenomena) since—according to the Mind-Only School—in the Great Exposition School and the Sūtra School all phenomena, both the permanent (which are not able to produce effects) and the impermanent, come to be established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses and as the foundations of the imputation of terminology. Therefore, in this context “own-character” refers to establishment through the force of objects’ own status (rang gi gnas tshod kyi dbang gi grub pa) and not to the ability to perform the function of creating an effect, as it does in the system of the “Epistemologists,” which here connotes the Proponents of Sūtra, who assert that the definition of own-character is that which is ultimately able to perform a function (don dam par don byed nus pa). In other contexts, “Epistemologists” refers also to the Proponents of Mind-Only that follow Dignāga and Dharmaśīkā. See Absorption, #40, 121-124.

* med dag, prāṣādyaprāśisedha. Unlike an affirming negative, such as the fat Devadatta’s not eating during the day (which suggests that he eats at night), a non-affirming negative, such as the absence of a pot on a certain table, does not suggest anything in its place. For a discussion of the various types of negatives and their relationship to the thoroughly established nature, see Reflections on Reality, chaps. 14 and 15.

b “Contradictory” here obviously does not refer to a dichotomy; rather, the text is saying that these two are mutually exclusive or are contraries.

c Dzong-ka-ba cites only the first line of the above stanza; thus “and so forth” may refer merely to the rest of the stanza or to all three passages; for the other two passages, see p. 202, footnote a.
meaning [from those given by the Mind-Only School, for they do differ]. It is like, for example, this [Mind-Only School’s] explanation of the statement in a Majority School scripture of a “fundamental consciousness” as the basis-of-all [whereas the Majority School takes it as referring to the mental consciousness].

The aforementioned conception that factors imputed in the manner of entity and attribute exist by way of its own character or exist ultimately is the main obstruction to omniscience. Therefore, it is also correct for the non-existence of this as it is conceived by that [consciousness]—this being the meaning that is delineated [when settling the view of selflessness]—to be the object of observation for purifying the obstructions to omniscience.

[Entry Into Cognition-Only Through These Reasonings](326) [436]

[Answer To The Fourth Objection, Namely, That It Is Not Feasible To Explain That This Mode Of Emptiness Is The Object Of Observation That, When Meditated, Purifies The Obstructions To Omniscience Because It Does Not Involve The Meaning Of Cognition-Only That Is The Negation Of Apprehended-Object And Apprehending-Subject As Different Substantial Entities] (326) [436]

**Question:** How does one enter into cognition-only through these reasonings? [That is, in dependence upon this mode of proof that factors imputed in the manner of entity and attribute are empty of being established by way of their own character, how does one understand cognition-only, that is to say, truly established consciousness without external objects?]

**Answer:** When that phenomena ranging from forms through to exalted knowers of all aspects [that is, omniscient consciousnesses] are the foundations of the imputation of nominal conventions and the referents of conceptual consciousnesses is refuted as ultimately established, one enters into cognition-only which is the non-dualism of apprehended-object and apprehending-subject. In doing this, one thinks:

In dependence upon a verbalizing name [such as “pot.”], the verbal-

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*a* A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso (Precious Lamp, 259.5) says that the Proponents of Truly Existent External Objects treat the stanza in terms of the selflessness of persons, whereas the Proponents of Mind-Only take it as teaching the selflessness of phenomena as the object of observation purifying the obstructions to omniscience.

*b* *phal chen sde pa, mahāsāṃghika.*

*c* That is, understands.

*d* Da-drin-rap-den (127.6) uses “form” as an illustration of a name, and thus he uses “that which is suitable as form” as the verbalized meaning, the latter being the commonly accepted definition, or defining property, of form. Unfortunately, the definition of form is one of the least evocative in Buddhist scholarship, since it merely resorts to common acceptance of what form is, that is, that which is suitable to be called form. Almost any other object defined and
ized meaning [such as that which is bulbous, flat bottomed, and capable of holding fluid], and the relationship between the name and the meaning, [the phenomena ranging from forms through to omniscient consciousnesses] appear to a mental conceptual consciousness [to be established by way of their own subsistence] as the entities and the attributes of the objects verbalized. Objects conceived in accordance with such appearance [to be separate entities from their respective conceptual consciousnesses] do not exist, and hence unmistak [consciousnesses] apprehending such also do not exist.  

Asaṅga’s *Summary of the Great Vehicle* says:  

It is thus: such Bodhisattvas making effort at entering into cognition—only thoroughly understand—with respect to the mental verbalization [that is, conceptual consciousnesses] to which letters [that is, names] and the meanings [to which those names refer] appear—that those lettered names are exhausted as only [posited by] mental conceptuality [and are not established in accordance with how they appear to refer to the object verbalized. This is the examination of names.]

They also thoroughly understand that the meaning depending on letters is just exhausted as only a mental verbalization [that is, as only imputed by conceptuality and not established by way of its own character as the referent of the verbalizing name. This is the examination of meaning.]

Moreover, they thoroughly understand that those names are only exhausted as factors imputed in the manner of entities and in the manner of attributes. [That is, they understand that the two imputational natures in the manner of entities and attributes—which are factors imputed individually by the two types of names imputing entities and attributes—are only exhausted as imputed by conceptuality and are not established by way of their own character. These are the examinations of factors imputed in the manner of entity and in the manner of attribute.]

its definition would be preferable; for instance, pot is a defined object, and its definition, or defining property, is: that which is bulbous, flat bottomed, and capable of holding fluid. Therefore, I have used the latter for the sake of accessibility.

Asaṅga calls the defined object (that is, the definiendum) a “name” and the definition, the “meaning” or actual object, but this does mean that whatever is a defined object is necessarily a name, because a pot, though a defined object, is not just a name, not just a sound. However, it is clear by the fact that definienda are called names that emphasis is put on considering defined objects to be names in the context of considering definitions and defined objects.

* For samples of six centuries of Tibetan commentary on this topic, see *Reflections on Reality*, chaps. 18 and 19.
Therefore, when they apprehend these as just exhausted as only mental verbalization and when they do not apprehend meanings as well as names involving factors imputed in the manner of entities and attributes nor [anything] involving [factors imputed] in the manner of entity and attribute [as other than only being imputed by conceptuacity, that is to say, when they do not apprehend these] as having the factual character [of subsisting as external objects, they attain] the four thorough examinations [which are entities of the path of preparation] and the four thorough knowledges [which are entities of the path of seeing], just as they are in reality. Through these, they enter into cognition-only concerning those mental conceptual consciousnesses to which letters and meanings appear. [By way of establishing that:]

- although name, meaning, entity, and attribute seem to mental conceptuality to be different entities from the mind,
- the other-powered natures of forms and so forth are the same substantial entity as mind, and
- uncompounded phenomena are the same entity as mind,

they understand that name, meaning, entity, and attribute are of the essence of cognition.]

[Objection That The Above Passage Indicates Entry Into Cognition-Only In Terms Of Only Conceptual Consciousnesses And Not Non-Conceptual Sense Consciousnesses]

Objection: This refutes apprehended-object and apprehending-subject related with conceptual mental consciousnesses, but it does not refute—through reasoning—apprehended-object and apprehending-subject related with non-conceptual consciousnesses that arise from stable predispositions. Therefore, how could this be feasible for entering into cognition-only?

Answer: [This reasoning can establish that since a sense consciousness is mistaken with respect to its appearing object, apprehended-object and apprehending-subject are not other substantial entities. Hence] there is no fault, for when it is refuted through reasoning that blue’s being the referent of a conceptual consciousness—conceiving the apprehended-object as a factuality other

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Saying “stable predispositions” distinguishes between consciousnesses which are polluted by a superficial cause of error and those which are not. The predispositions which give rise to direct perceivers are stable in the sense that their continuum will continue as long as does cyclic existence; those that give rise to wrong consciousnesses such as a sense consciousness seeing blue snow mountains or a thought apprehending sound as permanent are unstable in that their continuum can be adventitiously cut off.
[than the consciousness apprehending it]—exists by way of its own character, it will be established that [a consciousness] apprehending blue to which blue’s being the referent of a conceptual consciousness appears is mistaken with respect to its appearing object. This is because, when it [that is, blue’s being the referent of a conceptual consciousness] appears, it appears as established by way of its own character. When it has been established [that a consciousness apprehending blue to which blue’s being the referent of a conceptual consciousness appears is mistaken with respect to its appearing object], it has been established that blue does not exist as another substantial entity from the consciousness perceiving it [but instead is established as cognition-only].

[Objection That A Self-Cognizing Consciousness Would Be Mistaken] (328) [437]

Objection: Then, when it is refuted with reasoning that a consciousness’s being a referent of a conceptual consciousness is ultimately established, it would be proven that the self-cognizing consciousness—perceiving [the consciousness]—is mistaken with respect to its appearing object because when [that consciousness] appears, [its being a referent of a conceptual consciousness] appears to be established by way of its own character. Since, when that has been proven, this consciousness would not exist as established by way of its own character as an experiencing entity, a tenet of the Yogic Practitioners would be discarded.

Answer: That fault does not exist because a consciousness’s being the referent of a conceptual consciousness does not appear to a self-cognizing consciousness, whereas blue’s being a referent of a conceptual consciousness for conception as an external object does appear to [a consciousness] apprehending blue. This is because there is no contradiction in the fact that being the referent [of a conceptual consciousness] is not suitable to appear to a self-cognizing consciousness and so forth,\(^a\) for which dualistic appearance has vanished, but appears to [a consciousness] apprehending blue that is endowed with dualistic appearance.

The reason why (328) [438], when the referent of a conceptual consciousness\(^b\) appears, it must have dualistic appearance is that when its generality appears to a conceptual consciousness, it definitely appears as having an aspect of dualistic appearance. [However] this [fact of necessarily appearing to a conceptual consciousness as having an aspect of dualistic appearance]\(^c\) is not the same for consciousness, because even when a generality [of how a self-cognizing consciousness knows a consciousness]\(^c\) appears to a conceptual consciousness, it

\(^a\) According to A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso (Precious Lamp, 266.3), “and so forth” includes uninterrupted paths directly cognizing emptiness, these being in a totally non-dualistic manner.

\(^b\) Da-drin-rap-den (Annotations, 133.4) takes this as “being the referent.”

\(^c\) Ser-shül’s Notes, 49b.2: shes pa rang rig gis myong thul gyi spyi. The Second Dalai
appears as having the aspect of just experience. You cannot say that it is the same [that is, that when a self-cognizing consciousness appears to a conceptual consciousness, it must appear as having an aspect of dualistic appearance, citing as your] reason [the well-founded fact] that a conceptual consciousness definitely has dualistic appearance, because the two—a conceptual consciousness’s having dualistic appearance* and an object’s appearing in the aspect of dualistic appearance**—are not equivalent. If that [these are not equivalent] were not the case, one would have to assert that a vanishing of dualistic appearance could not appear to conceptuality, but this also is not feasible, because a vanishing of dualistic appearance would not occur [that is, would not exist at all].

Lama’s Lamp Illuminating the Meaning (86.6) similarly takes Ḍzong-ka-ba’s reference to be to “how the mode of appearance of consciousness to a self-cognizing consciousness appears to a conceptual consciousness” (rnams shes rabs rig la snang thub rtag la snang thub). Jamyang-shay-ba’s Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive (235.6) treats it similarly (rangs rig la rnams shes kyi snang ba ji la rbar ‘char nyam du bsam pa na). However, Bel-jorhlum-drup’s Lamp for the Teaching (86.4) glosses the reference merely as “when a generality of consciousness appears to a conceptual consciousness” (shes pa’i spyi rtag pa la ‘char ba na).

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*a* rotg pa la gnyis snang yod pa: Text, p. 438.

*b* yul de gnyis snang gi rnam par ’char ba: Text, p. 438. Ḍzong-ka-ba says “in the aspect of dualistic appearance” (gnyis snang gi rnam par) whereas just above he says “as having the aspect of dualistic appearance (gnyis snang gi rnam pa can da). I do not take the difference to be significant; it is likely that he is seeking to indicate that these two have the same meaning.

*c* A-ku Lo-drö-gye-tso (Precious Lamp, 269.2) says that they are not equivalent, in that a conceptual consciousness’s having dualistic appearance refers to the fact that a meaning-generality appears in the face of its appearance factor (rtog pa la gnyis snang yod pa snang nga śo śen spyi snang ba), whereas appearance in an aspect of dualistic appearance refers to an appearance to the mode of apprehension (gnyis snang gi rnam par ’char ba ’dein stangs la ’char ba). Roughly speaking, the first refers to the fact that a conceptual consciousness gets at its object through the means of an intervening mental image, whereas the second refers to what the consciousness is understanding; thus, when a conceptual consciousness rightly understands what a self-cognizing consciousness is, it knows it just to be an entity of experience; it does not superimpose a sense of duality on self-consciousness itself even if self-consciousness appears to it through the route of a conceptual meaning-generality.

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*d* As Gung-ru Chö-jung (Garland of White Lotus, 112b.2) frames the point:

It [absurdly] follows that with respect to the subject, the vanishing of dualistic appearance, it would not occur among existents [literally, “among objects of knowledge”] because [according to you] the appearance of its aspect to a conceptual consciousness apprehending it does not occur.

The entailment being used is: if the appearance of something’s aspect to a conceptual consciousness apprehending it does not occur, then it would not exist. In other words, everything existent, at least in some vague way, can appear to conceptuality. It would be difficult to say that this refers even to the appearance of an image of a word for something to a conceptual consciousness, but it would also be hard to say that this refers to an inferential consciousness realizing an object such as an omniscient consciousness. It is said that the exis-
[Objection That Something Posited Through The Force Of Conceptuality Could Not Appear To A Non-Conceptual Consciousness]{329} (438)

Objection: Because blue's being the referent of a conceptual consciousness is just posited through the force of conceptuality, it does not appear to [an eye consciousness, for instance,] which is devoid of conceptuality.

Answer: Then, because a magician’s illusion is just posited by conceptuality, a magical illusion being a horse or elephant also would [absurdly] not appear to [the sense consciousnesses of an audience whose eyes have been affected by the force of the mantra repeated by the magician, those sense consciousnesses being] devoid of conceptuality.

Therefore, it is also not that a negation of an otherness of substantial entity between apprehended-object and apprehending-subject is absent in the statements in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought that the emptiness of imputational factors imputed in the manner of entities and attributes is the thoroughly established nature. [Not only that, but also,] in that sūtra on the occasion of discussing calm abiding [in the "Questions of Maitreya Chapter"], a refutation of external objects is clearly set forth.¹

[Eliminating Qualms About Other Imputational Natures]{329} (438)

Although among imputational factors in general there are many, such as all generally characterized phenomena and space, and so forth, the reason why these are not [explicitly] mentioned in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought is

tence of an omniscient consciousness can be realized prior to realizing an omniscient consciousness, based on realizing with inference the validity of the four noble truths or of emptiness and making the extension that, if someone can be correct about such profound topics, that person must be correct with respect to everything else, even if those other topics, such as the relationship between a particular effect and its particular karmic cause, are even more hidden than the four truths or emptiness, which are only slightly hidden.

Still, since the first four chapters on the ultimate—in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought—emphasize that the ultimate is beyond argumentation and the entire text presents no reasonings to prove that the ultimate is of one taste with phenomena but merely declares it to be so, this dictum that for something to exist it must appear, to some degree, to a conceptual consciousness suggests the influence of the later development of formal epistemology and logic in Indian Buddhist scholarship and its successors in Tibet.

¹ See Reflections on Reality, part 4; and Absorption, #52, 53.
² Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 631.6) raises the interesting point that, since space is included within "all generally characterized phenomena," it needs to be analyzed why Dzong-ka-ba mentions it separately. Indeed, why he does is difficult to determine.
³ Dzong-ka-ba says that space is "not mentioned in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought," but Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 620.6, 625.4-625.6) points out that space is indeed mentioned in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought (see Absorption, #139, for six occurrences in the sūtra) as an example for the thoroughly established nature. Thus he cogently interprets Dzong-ka-ba as meaning that the sūtra at the point of the extensive indication
that they are not relevant on the occasion of the imputational factor, the emptiness of which is posited as the thoroughly established nature.⁴ Although many of those are existents that cannot be posited by names and terminology, they are not established by way of their own character because of being only imputed by conceptuality.⁶

[Reasonings (Explicitly) Refuting External Objects]⁷ (330) {438}

The refutations of apprehended-object and apprehending-subject related with externality are:

1. In Asaṅga's *Summary of the Great Vehicle*, the reasonings of dreams, reflections, and so forth
2. In Vasubandhu's *The Twenty*, the reasoning refuting partless particles
3. By Dharmakirti [in his *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition"]*, the reasoning refuting that the character of an apprehending-subject is produced from the apprehended-object and is similar to the apprehended-object
4. By Dignāga [in his *Examination of Objects of Observation*],⁸⁸ the reasoning refuting that an aggregation of particles or an [individual] minute particle is the apprehended-object

[The Need To Know The Mode⁹⁹ Of Refuting Imputational Natures As Presented In The Sūtra Unraveling the Thought] (331) {438}

When one does not know—with respect to the statements in Asaṅga's *Summary of the Great Vehicle*⁴ that all declarations in the Mother Sūtras of identifying imputational natures does not explicitly say that space, and so forth, are imputational natures since, except for imputational natures in the manner of entity and attribute, space and so forth are not relevant on the occasion of identifying the thoroughly established nature.

⁴ See *Absorption*, #85, 89-92.
⁶ This seems to contradict an earlier statement that equates being posited by names and terminology with being only imputed by conceptuality (p. 86):

Here, the measure indicated with respect to existing or not existing by way of [an object's] own character is: not to be posited or to be posited in dependence upon names and terminology.

See *Reflections on Reality*, chap. 13; and *Absorption*, #105-109.
⁶ For discussion of these reasonings, see *Reflections on Reality*, chap. 22.
⁸ The May-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 666.6) identifies the passage as from chapter 2:

How is one to understand the imputational nature in the teaching of the Very Extensive Great Vehicle [Sūtras] taught by the Buddha? It is to be understood through the teachings in the framework (nam grang) of non-existence.

“does not exist” refute the imputational factor—this mode of refuting the imputation [that objects are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses and as the referents of terms] in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought, one [wrongly] explains [all the statements of “does not exist” in the Mother Sūtras] as only [refuting] the imputation of other substantial entities of apprehended-object and apprehending-subject. Thereby, many great unsuitabilities also have to be propounded with respect to the system of the Yogic Practitioners, and it moreover is very difficult for this system to explain the statements that there is no way to hold [objects] as anything—permanent, impermanent, and so forth. For that reason, one also has to propound that statements [in sūtras] about [phenomena as] being unapprehendable as anything are in consideration of the period of meditative equipoise and that statements of apprehendability in which there is a differentiation of “it is this, it is not that” are in consideration of the period subsequent to meditative equipoise, making such a division of time. This is due to being bereft of having anything to say.

The setting out of the four examinations and the four thorough knowledges in Asaṅga’s Grounds of Bodhisattvas, Summary of the Great Vehicle, Summary of Manifest Knowledge, and so forth are said to be the excellent door of entry to cognition-only—the means of settling the view of cognition—and also the antidote to the obstructions to omniscience [which consist of] the conceptuality that serves as the basis of even the afflictive emotions. To understand the meaning of these, it appears to be necessary to understand from the level of subtle detail the reasonings refuting the imputational factor and the superimposition that are objects of negation discussed in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought. In particular, it appears to be necessary to know how through those reasonings an otherness of substantial entity of apprehended-object and apprehending-subject is refuted, whereupon there is entry into cognition-only. Having seen that [many] nevertheless have not even involved themselves in analyzing these, [1] have indicated a mere door of analysis for the intelligent.

(II.26), and vol. 2, 120; and John P. Keenan, The Summary of the Great Vehicle by Bodhisattva Asaṅga: Translated from the Chinese of Paramārtha (Berkeley, Calif.: Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research, 1992), 51.

See Absorption, #107, 139, 140, and, esp., 145.

Here Dzong-ka-ṣa makes the significant point that this false conceptuality not only comprises the obstructions to omniscience but also serves as the basis underlying the afflictive emotions of desire, hatred, and so forth. This does not mean that consciousnesses conceiving subject and object to be different entities (or conceiving that objects are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses) are the afflictive obstructions preventing liberation from cyclic existence. Rather, such false conceptuality underlies the afflictive emotions that prevent liberation and itself also prevents the omniscience of Buddhahood.
11. Handling Objections

Dispelling Objections To The Refutation Of The Extreme Of Superimposition (333) [440]

[Dispelling The Objection That This Presentation Contradicts The Sūtra Unraveling the Thought\textsuperscript{a} (333) [440]

\textit{[Objection:]\textsuperscript{a} The Sūtra Unraveling the Thought\textsuperscript{a}} says that through manifestly conceiving the imputational nature in other-powered natures, [all]\textsuperscript{a} afflictive emotions are produced and, due to that, karmas are accumulated whereby one revolves in cyclic existence. Also, it says\textsuperscript{b} that if one sees other-

\textsuperscript{a} The reference is to chapter 7, where Buddha says:

Superimposing the imputational nature onto other-powered natures and thoroughly established natures, sentient beings designate the convention that other-powered natures and thoroughly established natures are of the character of the imputational nature. In just the way that they designate such conventions, [their] minds are thoroughly infused with such designations of conventions, and due to relation with the designation of conventions or due to the dormancies of designations, they manifestly conceive other-powered natures and thoroughly established natures to be of the character of the imputational nature. In just the way that they manifestly conceive this, in that same way—due to the causes and conditions of manifestly conceiving other-powered natures as being of the imputational nature—in the future other-powered natures are thoroughly generated.

On that basis, they become thoroughly afflicted by the afflictions that are the afflictive emotions. Also, they are thoroughly afflicted by the afflictions that are actions and the afflictions that are the production of a lifetime. For a long time, they transmigrate as hell-beings, animals, gods, demi-gods, or humans, and travel about within these transmigrations, not passing beyond cyclic existence.


\textsuperscript{b} The reference is to chapter 7, where Buddha says:

Because, hearing these doctrines, they do not conceive other-powered natures in the manner of the imputational character, they believe, thoroughly differentiate, and realize properly that [other-powered natures] are self-production non-natures, character non-natures, and ultimate non-natures...Moreover, on this basis, they thoroughly develop aversion toward all compositional phenomena, become completely free from desire, become completely released, and become thoroughly released from the afflictions that are the afflictive emotions, the afflictions that are actions, and the afflictions that are births.

powered natures as without the nature of the character of the imputational character, those are overcome in that order. It then says that the three—Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Bodhisattvas—through just this path and just this practice attain nirvana, due to which the paths of purification of those [three vehicles]⁶ and also their purification is⁷ are one, there being no second. Moreover, [on the level of what is explicitly indicated, the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought]⁸ does not speak of a mode of other-powered natures being empty of an imputational factor other than that [of the selflessness of phenomena]⁹ explained earlier.

Therefore, do you take the meaning of this sūtra to be that even Hearers and Solitary Realizers [must]⁹⁰ realize the selflessness of phenomena, or do you not? If you do, this contradicts the earlier explanations of this as uncommon [that is, as comprehended by Bodhisattvas and not by Hearers and Solitary Realizers]. If you do not [take it that Hearers and Solitary Realizers comprehend the selflessness of phenomena], then how do you explain the meaning of the sūtra [that the states of purification are one]?⁹¹

[Answer:]⁹² About this, (334) (440) Asanga’s Grounds of Bodhisattvas also says that:⁹³

Conceptualization [that factors imputed] in the manner of entity and attribute [are established by way of their own character] and conceptualization apprehending amorphous wholes⁴⁴ generate the

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a The reference is to chapter 7, where Buddha says:

Paramārthaśāmudgata, concerning that, even sentient beings having the lineage of those of the Hearer Vehicle attain a nirvana of unsurpassed achievement and bliss through just this path and just this achievement. Also, sentient beings having the lineage of those of the Solitary Realizer Vehicle and those having the lineage of Ones Gone Thus attain a nirvana of unsurpassed achievement and bliss through just this path and just this achievement. Therefore, this is the sole path of purification of Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Bodhisattvas, and the purification is also one. Thinking of this, I teach one vehicle, but it is not that there are not varieties of sentient beings—the naturally dull, middling, and sharp—among the types of sentient beings.

Lamotte, Samādhisamuccaya, 73 [14], and 198; Dön-drup-gyel-tsen’s Four Intertwined Commentaries, 13.2-13.5; and Powers, Wisdom of Buddha, 111-112.

b Da-drin-rap-dden (Annotations, 141.3) glosses “purification” as “the emptiness that is object observed by the path” (lam gyi dmig pa’i stong pa nyid); however, Dzhong-ka-ba below (p. 224) describes it as the state of release, that is, nirvana.

c See Absorption, #84, 86.

d According to Da-drin-rap-dden (142.5) this reads, with his interpretive material in brackets:

...the conceptualization that apprehends [a self of persons] as an amorphous whole [which arises from the former conception of a self of phenomena] generates....

Bel-jor-hlun-drup (Lamp for the Teaching, 96.6) gives a similar explanation. However, a
The essence of eloquence: translation

Consciousness conceiving a self of persons, "the view of the transitory," is mentioned just below as arising in dependence upon "conceptualization [that factors imputed] in the manner of entity and attribute [are established by way of their own character] and conceptualization apprehending amorphous wholes." Using just this reasoning, Ser-thuel cogently (Notes, 51b.4) concludes that "conceptualization apprehending amorphous wholes" is not a conception of a self of persons; rather, he takes it to be the conception that amorphous wholes—such as that a collection of many types of trees is a forest—are established by way of their own character.

The apprehension of amorphous wholes (ril por 'dzin pa, pindagrabā), found in a list of eight types of conceptualization in the Grounds of Bodhisattvas (Peking 5538, vol. 110, 145.4.5; Unrai Wogihara, Bodhisattvabhumi: A Statement of the Whole Course of the Bodhisattva (Being the Fifteenth Section of Yogācarabhumi), (Tokyo: Seigo Kenkyūkai, 1930-1936), 50.25; and Nalinaksha Dutt, Bodhisattvabhumi (Being the XVth Section of Asangapada's Yogācarabhumi), Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, 7 (Patna, India: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1966), 34.24), is described by Asanga as follows:

What is conceptuality apprehending amorphous wholes? That which, arisen from apprehending a conglomerate of many phenomena as an amorphous whole, acts on just those things imputed with the names of "form" and so forth with the nominal terminology of self, sentient being, living being, and creature and which acts on a home, an army, a forest, and so forth, as well as food, drink, conveyance, clothing, and so forth, with the nominal terminology for those is called "conceptuality apprehending amorphous wholes."

The Sanskrit (Wogihara, Bodhisattvabhumi, 52.4; and Dutt, Bodhisattvabhumi, 35.20) is:


The Tibetan (Peking 5538, vol. 110, 146.1.4) is:

ril por 'dzin pa'i nram par rtag pa g dang zhe nal gzaṅ la sogs pa ming btags pa'i dangs po de nyid la bdag dang sams can dangs srog dangs skyey ba po'i ming gi brda dang ldan pa' khyim dangs smag dangs nas la sogs pa dangs zas dangs skom [text reads: sgom] dangs zhes pa dangs sogs la sogs pa de dag la de dag gi ming gi brda dang ldan pa' cho mangs po bsdus pa dag la ril por 'dzin pa'i rgya las byung ba 'jug pa gang yin pa de ni ril por 'dzin pa'i nram par rtag pa zhes bya'ol/


A-khu Lo-drö-gya-tso (286.6) and Be-lor-hluṅ-drup (95.4) give only general commentaries, without identifying whether this is a conception of a self of persons or a conception of a self of phenomena. However, as mentioned above, it is much more likely that this section is describing aspects of the conception of a self of phenomena. In Ge-luk-ba exegesis of the Mind-Only system, the objects of a conception of a self of phenomena are not limited to phenomena other than persons but include persons as well, since the distinctive feature of a conception of a self of phenomena is to conceive of the object in question is established by way of its own character as the referent of a conceptual consciousness, and thus the conception of a self of phenomena can be done with respect to anything, whether a person or an-
foundations of [fictional] proliferations—the things that are the objects observed by conceptuality. In dependence upon that, the view of the transitory [as substantially established I and mine] is generated, and through this the other afflictive emotions are produced, whereby one travels in cyclic existence. However, if through the four examinations and the four thorough knowledges, one understands the objects apprehended by conceptuality as nonexistent, those [afflictive emotions and so forth] are overcome.

In that way, [Asaṅga] asserts that a consciousness conceiving a self of phenomena—which conceives that factors imputed in the manner of entities and attributes are established by way of their own character in phenomena—acts as the root of the view of the transitory [as substantially established I and mine].

That a consciousness conceiving a self of phenomena acts as the basis of a consciousness conceiving a self of persons is also asserted by those Proponents of the Middle [that is, Autonomous] who assert that Hearers and Solitary Realizers do not have realization of the selflessness of phenomena. Concerning that, when the conception of a self of phenomena is extinguished, the conception of a self of persons is overcome, but if the conception of a self of phenomena has not been extinguished, it is not that the conception of a self of persons has not been overcome. Hence, it is not contradictory for one to have been released from cyclic existence although the final basis of cyclic existence has not been overcome.

Therefore, even though the statement “just this path” [cited above from the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought] refers to the path of realizing other-powered natures as empty of the imputational character, it need not refer to the path of the selflessness of phenomena because Asaṅga’s Summary of Manifest Knowledge also speaks of other-powered natures’ emptiness of the imputational fact...

other phenomenon. The conception of a self of persons, according to most explanations, consists of the apprehension that persons are substantially existent in the sense of being self-sufficient. See Absorption, #83, 84, 86.

a Da-drin-rap-den (Annotations, 142.6) says that the three above-mentioned conceptions generate “improper mental application conceptualizing cleanliness, happiness, permanence, and self”; however, it is more likely that this phase of the process is limited to the conception of a self of phenomena since the view of the transitory is generated in dependence upon this sequence. In this way, Ser-shiül (Notes, 52a.1) speculates that the meaning is that the previous three conceptions generate a liking for such superimpositions and, thereby, a proliferation of conceptuality.

b *jīg bta, saktavyadṛśti.

c Yogic Autonomous assert that Solitary Realizers cognize what is for them merely the coarse selflessness of phenomena, this being the non-difference of entity between subject and object; the subtle selflessness is the emptiness of true existence of all phenomena.

d Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 675.3) cites a passage from Summary of Manifest Knowledge:
tor in terms of the selflessness of persons. Since there is no difference between the Great and Small Vehicles with respect to affictive emotions being purified through realizing the selflessness of persons and with respect to the release [that is, nirvana] that is a mere abandonment of affictive emotions, it is also said [in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought] that the paths of purification and the purification [that is, the state of having been purified] are the same. [Therefore, the above-mentioned contradictions are not incurred.]62

As the meaning of the Great Vehicle sūtras, the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought spells out:

• The positing of the aggregates and so forth as other-powered natures
• The positing of the self of phenomena superimposed on those as the imputational factor
• The positing of their emptiness of that [imputational nature] as the thoroughly established nature that is the selflessness of phenomena

Through the force of this exposition, one can understand that the meaning of the Low Vehicle sūtras is just the presentation of the three natures in which the emptiness of the imputational factor—a self of persons—in other-powered natures—the aggregates—is posited as the thoroughly established nature that is the selflessness of persons. Therefore, it is implicit to the exposition in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought that the trainees for whom the first wheel was spoken are suitable as vessels for realizing the character-non-nature in terms of the selflessness of persons and are not suitable as vessels for realizing the character-non-nature in terms of the selflessness of phenomena. This is the meaning of the statement that the wheel of doctrine of good differentiation is for the sake of those engaged in all vehicles.

What are the divisions of the character of reality? The selflessness and non-existence of a sentient being, living being, creature, sustainer, person, one born from Manu, and child of Manu in those aggregates, constituents, and sense spheres. Selflessness just exists.

Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso then refers to but does not cite the commentary of Jinaputra (rgyal sras ma) which states that the emptiness of a self of persons that is imputed to the other-powered natures of the aggregates and so forth is a thoroughly established nature. See Absorption, #153-157.

* This sentence strongly suggests that the selflessness of persons is a thoroughly established nature, but some hold that it means only that the selflessness of persons is a thoroughly established nature in terms of the selflessness of persons but is not an actual thoroughly established nature. See ibid., #153-157.

b See ibid., #95.

c About the third wheel of doctrine, Paramārthasamudgata, in relating back to Buddha the meaning of what he has said, says (p. 116):

Based on just the naturelessness of phenomena and based on just the absence of production, the absence of cessation, quiescence from the start, and naturally
[Dispelling The Challenge That This Presentation Contradicts The
Conquest Over Objections About The Three Mother Scriptures]¹
(335) [441]

passed beyond sorrow, the Supramundane Victor turned a third wheel of doctrine
for those engaged in all vehicles, possessed of good differentiation, fantastic and
marvelous. This wheel of doctrine turned by the Supramundane Victor is unsur-
passable, does not afford an occasion [for refutation], is of definitive meaning, and
does not serve as a basis for controversy.

According to Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 298.2):

1. Wonch’uk takes this as meaning that there are cases of all three types of trainees
   (Hearer, Solitary Realizer, and Bodhisattva) attaining the respective fruits of their paths
   in dependence upon the Sutra Unraveling the Thought
2. Jay-dzin Cho-gyi-grel-tsen similarly says that the Sutra Unraveling the Thought has
   trainees of both the Great and Lesser Vehicles
3. The Second Dalai Lama, Gung-ru Cho-jung, and Jam-yang-shay-ba as well as the fol-
   lowers of the latter two say that this refers to those (followers of the Great Vehicle)
   who are able to realize—independence upon the explanation of the thought of the first
   two vehicles by the third vehicle—that the thoughts behind the first two vehicles con-
   tain the two selflessnesses (that is, the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phe-
   nomena respectively)
4. The Illumination of the Difficult to Realize (rtogs dba’i snang ba) says that, although the
   intended trainees of the Sutra Unraveling the Thought are those who have the Great Ve-
   hicle lineage, those of duller faculties among them are fit to be led into another (that is,
   Lesser) vehicle.

Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso favors the third opinion, as do I.

¹ yum gsam gnid ’joms / ’phags pa shes rab kyi pha rol tu phin pa ’bum pa dang nyi khri
   lnga stong pa dang khri lgyud stong pa ’rgya cher bshad pa, ’aryalatasahrkāpahattatattasatā
   -harika-astadasaśahrkāpajñaptottamākṛtaḥ, Peking 5206, vol. 93. The commentary on the
   “Maitreya Chapter” is 334.2.1-339.3.6. The three mothers are the One Hundred Thou-
   sand Stanzas, Twenty-Five Thousand Stanzas, and Eighteen Thousand Stanzas Perfection of
   Wisdom Sūtras. Gyrme Dorje and Matthew Kapstein (The Nyingma School of Tibetan Bud-
   dhism: Its Fundamentals and History [Boston: Wisdom, 1991], vol. 2, 93, n. 1325) mistak-
   enly assert that Ge-luk scholars identify the Conquest Over Objections about the Three Mother
   Scriptures as a commentary solely on the One Hundred Thousand Stanzas Perfection of Wisdom
   Sūtra (Peking 5205). Lama Chimpa and Alaka Chattopadhyaya (Tāranātha’s History of Bud-
   dhism in India [Simla, India: 1970; reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1990], 417) list the
   latter commentary as by Damśrāsenā, and at the end of this section Đong-ka-ba identifies the
   Conquest Over Objections about the Three Mother Scriptures as by him.

The translation of this section, which goes to the end of the chapter, follows the exten-
sive and cogent explanation by Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s Port of Entry, 680.6-698.1; the
heading here is from 680.6. Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s interpretation, framed as an inter-
pretation by “others,” disagrees with that by Jam-yang-shay-ba; Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso
(690.3-693.5) lists and refutes Jam-yang-shay-ba’s many statements that indicate that for
him the Conquest Over Objections actually is similar in view to the Jo-nang-bas and to the
Śāṅkhya.
[Objection by followers of Dol-bo-ba Shay-rap-gyel-tsen. According to you, Dzong-ka-ba,] on all occasions of the emptiness of factors imputed in the manner of entity and attribute and factors imputed in the manner of other substantial entities of apprehended-object and apprehending-subject—(1) just other-powered natures must be taken as the bases of emptiness [that is, the things that are empty] and (2) their emptiness in terms of the two above-mentioned [imputational natures] must be taken as the thoroughly established nature. If so, how do you interpret the statement by Vasubandhu in his Conquest Over Objections about the Three Mother Scriptures in which he takes the thoroughly established nature as the basis of emptiness and speaks of its emptiness of the other two natures? That text [in a summary statement] says:

Concerning that [statement in Perfection of Wisdom Sutras, "The eye is empty of the eye,"]: "The eye is the eye of reality [that is, the reality of the eye]." Of the eye is of (1) the eye that is the imputational factor and (2) the eye that is the imputed. "Empty" means "devoid." Such is likewise to be applied to "The ear is empty of the ear," and so forth.

[Answer.] With respect to that, (337) (442) when the thoroughly established nature that is the selflessness of phenomena is delineated in either the Yogic Practice School or the Middle Way School, the bases of emptiness with respect to which [the thoroughly established nature] is delineated are relative to those bases with respect to which a self of phenomena is conceived by a consciousness conceiving a self of phenomena. It is like, for example, the fact that if you wish to remove the suffering of fright from someone upon that person's apprehending a rope as a snake, you must show—upon taking the rope as the dol po ba rje 'brang dag A-k'u Lo-drö-gya-tso's Precious Lamp, 287.5; the phrase might mean, "Dol-bo-ba and his followers." About Shay-rap-gyel-tsen's reliance on the Conquest Over Objections, Cyrus R. Stearns (The Buddha from Dol po and His Fourth Council of the Buddhist Doctrine [Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, 1996], 139) says:

Dol po pa emphasized that the Bhattacharjā was the work of Vasubandhu, and gave it a place of central importance in his interpretation of Prajñāpāramitā thought.


b Peking 5206, vol. 93, 230.4.4-230.4.6; chap. 2. Stearns (The Buddha from Dol po, 142) cites a similar passage just before this; see the next citation from the Conquest Over Objections.

c Ser-shül's Notes, 52a.5; for a typical passage from the Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra, see p. 349. Shay-rap-gyel-tsen (Ocean of Definitive Meaning, 196.4) cites a similar explanation in the One Hundred Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra.
basis of emptiness—that it is empty of a snake. However, it is not suitable to take the rope's emptiness of a snake as the basis of emptiness and say that it is empty [of being a rope and a snake] because of existing as factually other [than them].

Furthermore, (338) (442) with respect to the conception of a self of phenomena, such conceptions as that directionally partless minute particles exist and that objects of apprehension composed of them exist or that a moment of consciousness that has no earlier and later temporal parts exists or that a consciousness that is a continuum composed of those exists—these being imputed only by those whose awarenesses have been affected by [mistaken] tenets—occur only among those proponents of tenets and do not exist among other sentient beings. Therefore, though an emptiness that is no more than merely an absence of those [objects of negation] is taught, it does not at all harm the innate conception of self that has resided [in the mental continuum] beginninglessly. Therefore, it must be taught that those bases—that the innate conception of self conceives as self—are empty of self in the way that such is conceived. It must be understood that the refutation of imputational factors that are constructed by tenet systems is a branch [of the process] of refuting that [innate conception of self].

This being the case, since ordinary sentient beings conceive just these other-powered internal and external things—eyes, forms, and so forth which are objects seen, heard, and so forth—as self [that is, as objects and subjects that are different entities or as established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses and of words], emptiness must be delineated within taking just these as the bases of emptiness. The error does not come through holding that the other two natures [that is, other-powered natures and imputational natures] exist as other factualities in the thoroughly established nature. Therefore, how could selflessness be delineated within thinking [as the Jo-nang-bas do] that the thoroughly established nature is empty because of existing as factually other than the other two natures!

Furthermore, the conception that a self of phenomena exists is not a conception that some other thing exists, as in the conception that fire exists on a pass. Rather, one conceives that when there is an appearance—to one's own mind—as external object and internal subject in the manner of being separate, distant, and cut off, these are established in the way that they appear. Hence, as an antidote to this, it is taught that appearances as object and subject are [in fact] not established as other substantial entities of apprehended-object and apprehending-subject, but it is not taught that apprehended-object and apprehending-subject do not exist as other factualities with respect to that [thoroughly established nature]. Therefore, Shihramati's Explanation of (Vasubandhu's) Commentary on (Maitreya's) "Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes" also says that it is not like a temple's being empty of monastics and so
forth but like a rope's being empty of a snake. The other mode of emptiness of a self of phenomena [that is, objects' emptiness of establishment by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses] is also that way.

Therefore, without letting it become like the worldly [example] of putting a scapegoat effigy at the western door when a demon is bringing harm at the eastern door, one should meditate on an emptiness that is such that the emptiness of the imputational self as it is conceived in just those other-powered natures—these being the bases apprehended as self—is the thoroughly established nature. If this is done, it will serve as an antidote to the conception of self. If, on the other hand, one meditates on an emptiness the mode of which is other than this style, it will not harm the conception of self at all.

[Showing That The Conquest Over Objections Means Something Else And Establishing That It Is Not Contradictory] (337) (443)

[Though, from the literal run of the summary statement in the Conquest Over Objections quoted above (p. 226), it might seem that the thoroughly established nature's emptiness of imputational natures and other-powered natures is the final reality, this is not the meaning of that text because of what that text says in its extensive explanation.] Concerning the explanation in the Conquest Over Objections, it asserts that:

- Appearances to a conceptual consciousness of sound-generalities, which are the means of verbalization, and meaning-generalities, which are the objects of verbalization, are the imputational eye
- The appearance as an eye that has the essence of apprehending an object of apprehension, a sense-sphere of form, is the imputed eye
- The thoroughly established nature known by individual self-cognition in meditative equipoise (1) which is inexpressible due to being devoid of the means of verbalization and the objects of verbalization that are sound-generalities and meaning-generalities and (2) which is devoid of individual appearances as the object apprehended [by the eye] and the apprehending-subject which is the eye—is the eye of reality [that is, the reality of the eye]

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a In just this way, Shay-rap-gyal-tsen, in his The Fourth Council (Stearns, The Buddha from Dol po, 215), uses the similes of an empty village and an empty vase.

b "Self" here does not mean person but (1) the establishment of objects by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses and of words and (2) the establishment of subject and object as different entities.

c Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso cogently sees this section as Dzong-ka-ba's spelling out the meaning of the Conquest Over Objections such that it does not contradict Dzong-ka-ba's own assertions. A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso (Precious Lamp, 289.2), however, entitles it "stating the explanation in the Conquest Over Objections and indicating that it contradicts the Mother Sūtras."

d gezugs kyi skye mchod, r-byiṣyatanas.
Therefore, about the reality of the eye—which, in the perspective of a Superior’s meditative equipoise, is devoid of the dualistic appearances that are (1) the appearance as object of verbalization and means of verbalization and (2) the appearance as apprehended-object and apprehending-subject—[the Conquest Over Objections] says that the object of meditative equipoise is empty of the other two natures. This is because the former dualistic appearance [that is, the appearance as object of verbalization and means of verbalization] is the imputational factor\(^a\) and the latter [that is, the appearance as apprehended-object and apprehending-subject] is the imputed.\(^b\)

For, in this way, the Conquest Over Objections moreover says [in its extensive explanation].\(^c\)

Concerning that, the thing called “the eye” which is apprehended [or appears]\(^d\) in the aspect of object of verbalization [that is, meaning-generality]\(^e\) and verbalization [that is, term-generality]\(^f\) is the imputational eye [this being the first of the two types of dualistic appearance].\(^g\) Its\(^h\) individually appearing in the aspect of an eye abiding in the essence of apprehended-object and apprehending-subject is the imputed eye [which is the latter of the two types of dualistic appearance].\(^i\) The thoroughly established nature that is its voidness of the aspects of object verbalized and verbalization, that cannot be verbalized, that is devoid of having appearance [as apprehended-object and

\(^a\) kun brtags.
\(^b\) nam brtags.
\(^c\) Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s Port of Entry, 684.6.
\(^d\) Śer-thül (Notes, 53b.1) wonders whether de nyid in the second and third sentences, which I have translated as “its,” have the same sense as de la (“concerning that”) at the beginning of the citation, which there means “concerning the occasion of identifying the imputational eye” (kun brtags kyi mig ngos ’dzin skabs de la). I presume that he means that in this second sentence de nyid means “concerning the occasion of identifying the imputed eye” and that in the third sentence it means “concerning the occasion of identifying the eye of reality.” Śer-thül seems to be deliberately bending the grammar in order to make sense out of the two de nyid. Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 684.6), however, takes the first as referring to the imputational eye and the second as referring to the imputed, or other-powered, eye.

The Peking edition of the source text (5206, vol. 93, 230.4.3) does not have either de nyid, in which case these two sentences read more easily as:

The individual appearance in the aspect of an eye abiding in the essence of apprehended-object and apprehending-subject is the imputed eye. The thoroughly established nature that is its voidness of the aspects of object verbalized and verbalization, that cannot be verbalized, that is devoid of having appearance [as apprehended-object and apprehending-subject], and that is known by oneself individually is called “the eye of reality.”

This version strikes me as being the more likely reading.
apprehending-subject], and that is known by oneself individually is
called “the eye of reality.”

Also, [in its extensive explanation] the Conquest Over Objections speaks in the
context of the absence of dualistic appearance in the face of a Superior’s meditative
equipoise:^[27]

It is thus: since, when meditating within taking the ultimate to mind,
the things that have the signs of compositional phenomena do not ap-
pear, know that those do not ultimately exist but exist conventionally.^[28]

Therefore, (337) [444] that [mode of explanation aside from describing the
mode of appearance in meditative equipoise]^[29] is not how the thoroughly es-
established nature that is the selflessness of phenomena is delineated as a view of
the basal state.^[30]

The Conquest Over Objections (340) [444] explains [in the quotation just
above] that what merely exists in the perspective of a Superior’s meditative
equipoise ultimately exists [in the sense of being what exists in the perspective
of an ultimate consciousness]. However [this does not indicate that in the sys-
tem of the Conquest Over Objections an ultimate existent that is able to bear
analysis by reasoning analyzing the mode of being is asserted as it is by the Pro-
ponents of Mind-Only, since] all those [Proponents of Mind-Only and Pro-
ponents of Non-Nature] assert that [a consciousness of] meditative equipoise real-
izes suchness, and thus they only assert that the object [that is, suchness] exists

The view of the basal state (ghzhi’i la ba) is in contrast to the view in the face of knowl-
edge (rig ngo la ba)—the latter being the state of meditative equipoise directly realizing
emptiness. Bel-jor-hlun-drup (Lamp for the Teaching, 101.5) describes the latter as “the
mode of appearance to meditative equipoise, a path state” (lam mnyam bsgag la snang tshul)
and contrasts it with “delineating the selflessness of phenomena by hearing and thinking in
the basal state” (ghzhi chos kyi bdag med thos bjam gyi gnas la *behi pa). In sum, the meaning is
that although the Conquest Over Objections describes how emptiness appears to a conscious-
ness of direct realization, it does not present how to get at that state through reflecting on
phenomena and how they are empty of an imputational nature.
in the perspective of the respective subject. Hence how could this be the ultimate existence about which [the Middle Way School and the Mind-Only School] debate whether [an object] ultimately exists or does not ultimately exist? That [the Conquest Over Objections] utterly does not assert an ultimate existent that is able to bear analysis by reasoning analyzing the mode of being [this being the type of ultimate existence about which the Middle Way School and the Mind-Only School debate] is to be known through its expression—on the occasion of the emptiness of emptiness, the emptiness of the ultimate, and the emptiness of the uncompounded—of many refutations specifically aimed at such an assertion [that the ultimate ultimately exists in the sense of being able to bear analysis by reasoning]. Fearing it would take too many [words, I] will not write them down.

The Mother Sūtras themselves, having made a presentation of three [natures] each for each [phenomenon] ranging from forms through to exalted knowers of all aspects, explain [in agreement with the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought] that the emptiness of the imputational object of negation [that is, the imputational nature] in the imputed basis of emptiness [that is, an other-powered nature] is the thoroughly established nature, reality. Therefore, the imputed eye's emptiness of the imputational eye must be explained as reality. Consequently, the explanation [in the Conquest Over Objections] that the meaning of the sūtra [statement that "The eye is empty of the eye," is that] reality is the latter [nature's, that is, the thoroughly established nature's] emptiness of the two former [natures, that is, imputational natures and other-powered natures] in the face of meditative equipoise also does not appear to be good.

[Proof That Vasubandhu Did Not Author The Conquest Over Objections] (341) (445)

1. Reference is made in this [Conquest Over Objections] to the "Commentary" with regard to the eight conceptions of great beings who are Hearers, and

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*a* Da-drin-rap-den's Annotations, 152.6. Dzong-ka-ba's implicit point is that Shay-rap-gyel-tsen has mistaken the meaning of the Conquest Over Objections in that he has taken it as a source for his assertion that the ultimate is ultimately existent in the sense of its being established by way of its own character. Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 686.1-687.5) cites passages in the Conquest Over Objections to which Dzong-ka-ba is referring and draws the conclusion that the Conquest Over Objections itself specifically refutes other-emptiness.

*b* As Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 687.5) indicates, Dzong-ka-ba extensively speaks to this topic in his Golden Rosary of Eloquence at the point of discussing the collection of wisdom.

*c* That is, an other-powered nature.

*d* That is, the nonexistent imputational nature falsely imputed to the eye.

*e* *rnam 'grel*, identified two footnotes below.

*f* Ser-shül (Notes, 53b.2) lists the eight as: fewer desires, knowing satisfaction, initiating
such is exactly in the *Commentary on the "Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sûtra"* [by Vimuktasena].

2. [The *Conquest Over Objections*] refutes that both other-powered natures and thoroughly established natures are able to bear analysis by the reasoning analyzing the mode of being [and thus refutes that they are truly established].

3. The mode of explanation [in the *Conquest Over Objections*] discords very effort, solitariness, equipoise, establishment in mindfulness, meditative cultivation of wisdom, and liking the dislike of proliferation. He says that in the *Commentary on the "Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sûtra,"* they are mentioned at the point of the third of the twenty-two mind-generations. He explains that not liking proliferation (spros pa la mi dga' ba) is described as not liking the proliferations involved in commerce, farming, and so forth.

*a nity khrid nam 'grel / 'phags pa shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa stong phrag nity shu lnga pa'i man ngag gi bstan bcos mgon par rtogs pa'i rgyan gyi stshig le'i byas pa'i mnam par 'grel pa, aryan pa'sinvatvâtaharih kâraṇâpâramitopadesa śrîdharmaśayālaṃkâra kâarâkârtisakâta*; Peking 5186, vol. 88, 107.2.2; this is supposedly (see the next footnote) the commentary by Bhadanta Vimuktasena, who was the student of Vasubandhu's student. The same eight are also given in another commentary by the same title (Peking 5185, vol. 88, 12.2.7), supposedly by Aryavimuktasena; see Champa and Chattopadhyaya, *Târanâtha's History*, 210, n. 8.

*b According to Bel-jor-hlun-drup (*Lamp for the Teaching*, 102.3), this is Bhadanta Vimuktasena (*btsun pa grol id*). (In their translation of *Târanâtha's History* [210, n. 8], Champa and Chattopadhyaya cite the Sanskrit of *btsun pa as bhûjandaka*. In *Târanâtha's History* (210) he is said to be from Magadhā. Based on Dzong-ka-ba's *Golden Rosary of Eloquence*, Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (*Port of Entry*, 690.2) identifies him as a Kashmiri (*kha chê*) and reports, but with evident reservation, that in the text entitled *ye shes tog tog* he is said to be from "Singala." In any case, according to Bel-jor-hlun-drup and Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso, he is not to be confused with the earlier Aryavimuktasena who was Vasubandhu's disciple (see Champa and Chattopadhyaya, *Târanâtha's History*, 188-189, 210-212). According to Bel-jor-hlun-drup and Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso, Dzong-ka-ba's point is that Vasubandhu would not have cited a text that postdated him. I would add that even if the *Commentary on the "Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sûtra"* is the one by his contemporary Aryavimuktasena, Vasubandhu probably would not have cited it, since it was the custom not to cite works by one's own students.

In his *Golden Rosary* (see E. Obermiller, *Prajñâpâramitâ in Tibetan Buddhism* [Delhi: Classics India Publications, 1988], p. 4, n. 7), Dzong-ka-ba adds devastating evidence (cited also by Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso, *Port of Entry*, 689.6) for the conclusion that the *Conquest Over Objections* was not composed by Vasubandhu, this being that it also cites (Peking 5206, vol. 93, 300.4.3) "the thought of Shântîračêhita" with regard to how long the teaching will remain—making it a complete impossibility for the *Conquest Over Objections* to be by Vasubandhu if the reference is to the eighth-century Indian master by that name.

Stearns (*The Buddha from Dol po*, 140), after citing opinions of scholars from other orders of Tibetan Buddhism that Vasubandhu is indeed the author, says that it seems only Dzong-ka-ba and his followers hold that it is not by Vasubandhu (Stearns recognizes the strength of their evidence). For other opinions, including those found by Ruegg, see Stearns, *The Buddha from Dol po*, 140-141.
greatly with Vasubandhu’s exposition, in his *Principles of Explanation*, that
the meaning of the thought of the Mother Sūtras must be taken in accord-
dance with the explanation in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought.*

Therefore, Vasubandhu did not compose it. As renowned in earlier ancient
essays, it was composed by Damśṭāsena.\(^b\)

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\(^a\) See the next chapter, pp. 237 and 240.

\(^b\) *mche ba'i sde* (*Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s Port of Entry*, 690.3; and Chimpa and Chat-
topadhyaya, *Tārānātha’s History*, 268, n. 18). The same *History* (417) gives as alternate
names Damśṭāsena, Dīśasena, Damśṭāsena, Damśṭrāsena, Damśṭasyāna, and so forth. A-ku
Lo-drö-gya-tso (*Precious Lamp*, 290.1) cites the *phang thang gi dkar chag* as identifying
Damśṭāsena as the author. In his *La Théorie du Tathāgathagarbha et du Gota*, 61 and 325,
Ruegg identifies the author as Damśṭrāsena.

Bu-dön (E. Obermiller, *History of Buddhism [Chos-hbyung]* by Bu-ston [Heidelberg:
Heft, 1932; Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation, n.d.], 146) identifies the author as
Vasubandhu; Obermiller (*History of Buddhism*, 146, n. 1038) refers to Đzong-ka-ba’s and
Jam-yang-shay-ba’s refutation of this and their identification of the author as “the
Kashmirian Damśṭrāsena.” For an extensive and thorough-going discussion of the author-
ship, see *Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s Port of Entry*, 693.5-698.1.
12. Differentiating Scriptures

How, By Means Of This, [Buddha’s] Scriptures Are Differentiated Into The Interpretable And The Definitive (342) [446]

[The Differentiation Of The Three Wheels Of Doctrine As To Requiring Interpretation Or Being Definitive As Per The Sūtra Unraveling the Thought]Mitch (342) [446]

[Showing That The First Wheel Of Doctrine Requires Interpretation]Mitch (342) [446]

When the mode of commentary on the consciousness of things by the masters, the brothers [Asanga and Vasubandhu], is taken as given above, the description—in the first wheel—of the two apprehended-object and apprehending-subject, in terms of externality is elucidated as requiring interpretation. The [factual] basis [in Buddha’s] thought is [the appearance of the six types of objects—forms and so forth—to the six types of consciousness as if they were external objects, as is]Mitch stated in Vasubandhu’s The Twenty.a

The Subduer spoke about these—

The seeds from which cognitions respectively arise  
And the appearances [of forms]—

In a dualistic way as [internal and external] sense-spheresc of those  
[cognitions].

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a In the threefold format of basis in Buddha’s thought (dgyong; gzhi), purpose (dgos pa), and refutation of the explicit teaching (dgos la good byed), dgyong should not be translated as “intention,” since this would too easily be confused with dgos pa (“purpose” or “intention”). The triad is also used by Shi-yan-gyel-rten in his Ocean of Definitive Meaning, 337.3ff.

b Stanzas 9; for the Sanskrit, see p. 446, footnote b. Vasubandhu’s own commentary on this stanza is:

Regarding (1) the seeds—the respective seeds that have undergone a type of transformation [that is, have thoroughly ripened]—from which the cognitions that perceive forms arise and (2) those appearances, the Supramundane Victor respectively spoke of an eye-sense-sphere and a form-sense-sphere of that cognition.

The bracketed material is from Vinitadeva’s Explanation of (Vasubandhu’s) [Auto] Commentary on the "Twenty Stanza Treatise" (rab tu byed pa nyes shes pa'i 'gyel bshad, prakaramavimśatīkā), Peking 5566, vol. 113, 318.4.4; Vinitadeva glosses parināmavīśeṣapāpāṭād with what in the extant Tibetan is yongs su smin pa. See also Stefan Anacker, Seven Works of Vasubandhu (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984), 165; and Thomas A. Kochumuttom, A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1982), 265.

c skye mched, āyatanā.
Also, the purpose [of his teaching such] is as the same text says:

That form-sense-spheres and so forth exist [as external objects] was said through the force of a thought behind it
With regard to beings tamed by that,
Like [the teaching of] spontaneously arisen sentient beings [as substantially established or permanent].

When it is taught that a consciousness viewing forms and so forth arises from external and internal sense-spheres, it is for the sake of realizing that there is no viewer and so forth except for those. The damage to the literal reading is the reasonings refuting external objects.

Since an imputational factor imputed to phenomena in the manner of entity and attribute is a phenomenon-constituent and a phenomenon-sense-sphere, statements that those two [that is, phenomenon-constituent and phenomenon-sense-sphere] are established by way of their own character without differentiating [from among phenomena what does and does not exist by way of its own character] also require interpretation.

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Stanza 8; for the Sanskrit, see p. 446, footnote d. See also Anacker, Seven Works of Vasubandhu, 165; and Kochumuttom, Buddhist Doctrine of Experience, 264-265.

A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso (Precious Lamp, 291.4) explains that the purpose is to cause entry into realizing the selflessness of persons, just as, for example, Nihilists are taught about the existence of spontaneously arisen beings of the intermediate state so that they might understand that there is a basis for the connection of actions in one life and their effects in another life. However, Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 699.4) speculates that "spontaneously arisen sentient beings" refers merely to a self of persons—that is, the substantial existence of persons—and not to the category of beings by this name among the four types of birth—egg birth, womb birth, birth from heat and moisture, and spontaneous birth. Sher-thül (Notes, 54b.2) similarly interprets the example in the fourth line to mean that, for those who like the doctrine of self, Buddha taught a self of persons, having as the fact behind this the existence of beings of the intermediate state.

chos kyi khams, dharmanātha.
chos kyi skye mchod, dharmanātana.

Since these two, as categories, contain instances (such as uncompounded space) that are permanent, the categories themselves are considered to be permanent and hence not established by way of their own character. Đong-ka's more specific reference is to imputational natures that are factors imputed in the manner of entity and attribute, and when it is taught in the first wheel that all phenomena, without differentiation, are established by way of their own character, these imputational natures, being existent, also are included as being established by way of their own character. Since they exist but actually do not exist by way of their own character, such scriptures also (that is, in addition to those teaching external objects) require interpretation.

Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 699.6) says that, with respect to the teaching that all phenomena are established by way of their own character, the factual basis in Buddha's thought is that other-powered natures and thoroughly established natures are established by way of their own character; the purpose is to prevent the annihilationist view of
[Showing That The Middle Wheel Of Doctrine Requires Interpretation] (343) (447)

[With respect to the basis in Buddha’s thought behind the middle wheel], Asaṅga’s Summary of Manifest Knowledge* explains that the statements in the Very Extensive [Sūtras]b that all phenomena are natureless are in consideration of the three non-natures. Also, Asaṅga’s Summary of the Great Vehiclec says that in the Very Extensive [Sūtras]:

1. all statements of “does not exist” indicate [that] imputational factors [are not established by way of their own character]d
2. the demonstrations of examples of magical illusions and so forth indicate [the naturelessness of self-production in] other-powered natures
3. the four purificationsd indicate thoroughly established natures

holding that imputational natures do not exist at all; and the damage to the literal reading is the reasonings proving that imputational natures are not established by way of their own character.

About the following word “also,” see Absorption, §52, 53.

* Peking 5550, vol. 112, 266.1.3-266.1.6, near the end of the section entitled dharma-rūpa-bhrasastha (chos nyan par rgyas pa kun las btus pa); and Walpola Rahula, La compéndium de la super-doctrine (philosophie) (Abhidharma-samuccaya) d’Asaṅga (Paris: École Française d’Extrême-Orient, 1971), 142.

Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 700.3) calls attention to Dzong-ka-ba’s earlier reference to the Summary of Manifest Knowledge on the occasion of the way that Maitreya’s Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras abandons the two extremes; see p. 172.

b shin tu rgyas pa, sva-pa-i. Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 700.3) identifies this as the One Hundred Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra, but Dzong-ka-ba’s usage of the plural below indicates that he considers other Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras to be included.

c Earlier, when Dzong-ka-ba indicated that Dignāga’s Summary Meanings of the Eight Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra agrees with Asaṅga’s Summary of the Great Vehicle (p. 190), Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 537.3) cited the stanza from chapter 2 of the Summary:

Magical illusions and so forth are taught in relation to the dependent.
Non-existence is taught in relation to the imputational.
The four purifications are taught
In relation to the thoroughly established.


d A-kū Lo-dro-gya-tso (Precious Lamp, 231.5-232.2) and Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 536.6) list these as:

1. the natural purification—emptiness,
Since those [Very Extensive] Sūtras appear to be the Mother Sūtras [that is, the
Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras], Asaṅga asserts that the second wheel, which is
described as requiring interpretation, consists of just those [sūtras] as well as
those [that teach] in accordance with it.603

Furthermore, Vasubandhu’s Principles of Explanation refutes the assertion
that the explanations—in the Mother Sūtras—of naturelessness and so forth
are literal and says:603

It is set out in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought that all such state-
ments that “All phenomena are natureless,” and so forth are not of de-
finitive meaning.

Therefore, he asserts the Mother Sūtras as the second wheel.604

The way (344) (447) that the second wheel is explained to require inter-
pretation differs very greatly from the way that the statements in the first wheel
of apprehended-object and apprehending-subject come to require interpreta-
tion. For:

2. the stainless purification—true cessations,
3. the path purification—the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment,
4. the observational purification—the scriptural collections of the Great Vehicle.

Pan-chen Sö-nam-drak-ba’s Garland of Blue Lotus (gs.7-6b.3) offers two interpreta-
tions of this sentence. His concern is that it seems to suggest that the second wheel includes
not only the extensive, middling, and brief Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras but also those that
* teach in accordance with it. He feels that if it does, the meaning of “those that teach in ac-
cordance with it” must be restricted, since he does not accept that the King of Mediative
Stabilizations Sūtra is an actual second wheel sūtra even though it teaches in accordance with
the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras. Therefore, in his first interpretation, he accomplishes his
aim by severely restricting the meaning of “those that teach in accordance with it” to the
Condensed Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra and so forth. In his second interpretation, he takes the
sentence structure differently, such that it would read:

Since those [Very Extensive] Sūtras appear to be the Mother Sūtras [the Perfection
of Wisdom Sūtras], Asaṅga (1) asserts that the second wheel, which is described as
requiring interpretation, consists of just those [sūtras] and (2) asserts that those
[that teach] in accordance with it [can, from the fact that Asaṅga explains that the
statements in them on the literal level that other-powered natures and thoroughly
established natures are not truly established require interpretation, be understood
as also of interpretable meaning].

The second interpretation evinces considerable creative reformulation by an inventive com-
mentator.

Da-drin-rap-den’s Annotations (156.6) identifies Vasubandhu’s passage as the one that
Dzong-ka-ba cites below (p. 240) in the detailed explanation of how the middle wheel of
doctrine is proved to require interpretation (Peking 5562, vol. 113, 278.5.7-279.3.2); however,
it may also include everything up to 281.4.2, which Dzong-ka-ba now cites.

Some reverse the last two wheels; they identify the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras as the
definitive, third wheel of doctrine and the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought, and so forth, as the
second wheel. See p. 129, footnote c.
1. The [basis in Buddha’s] thought when he spoke of the eye sense-sphere and visible-form sense-sphere as existing is that he said this in consideration of (a) the respective seed called a “predisposition of fruition,” from the ripening of which an eye consciousness arises, and (b) the appearance [of form]; but the meaning of [his] thought is not suitable to be the meaning that is expressed by those Low Vehicle sūtras. However, the three modes of non-nature which are that in consideration of which he spoke of non-nature [in the middle wheel] are explained as being the meaning of the Mother Sūtras.

2. Also, the existence of sense-spheres that are external objects is explained as the meaning of Low Vehicle sūtras, but the assertion—without differentiating modes of non-nature—that [phenomena] do not ultimately have a nature at all is not explained to be the meaning of the Mother Sūtras.

Therefore, these [texts, such as Asaṅga’s Compendium of Ascertainments, Asaṅga’s Summary of the Great Vehicle, Vasubandhu’s Principles of Explanation, and so forth]⁴ are not making the commentary that:

- although the explanation that all phenomena, without distinction, are ultimately natureless⁵ is the meaning of the Mother Sūtras, it requires interpretation.

Rather, they are explaining that:

- [those sūtras] require interpretation from the viewpoint that—since such is not suitable to be taken literally—the meaning [that is expressed by those sūtras]⁶ is not definitive as just that [which is the literal reading,] and their meaning still needs to be explained.

The mode of explanation is to comment in this way:

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⁴ Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 700.6) cogently rephrases these points:

- In the first wheel the basis in Buddha’s thought (this being the seed from which a consciousness arises and the appearance of, for instance, form to an eye consciousness as if it is an external object) is necessarily not what is expressed (since what is expressed is the existence of external objects and the non-existence of external objects is not suitable to be taught to the intended trainees of the first wheel), but in the middle wheel the basis in Buddha’s thought (this being the three non-natures teamed with the three natures) necessarily is what is expressed, since the three non-natures, teamed with the three natures, is suitable to be taught to sharp Proponents of Mind-Only who are the intended trainees of the middle wheel.

- In the first wheel the literal reading (this being the existence of external objects) is necessarily what is expressed, but in the middle wheel the literal reading (this being that all phenomena are natureless) necessarily is not what is expressed (since what is expressed is the three non-natures, teamed with the three natures).

⁵ don dam par ngo bo nyid med pa.
Since imputational phenomena$^a$ are not established by way of their own character, they are non-natures ultimately$^b$ [that is, are without the nature of existing ultimately or by way of their own character]. Since other-powered phenomena are not established as the ultimate which is the object of purification, they are non-natures ultimately$^c$ [that is, are without the nature of being the ultimate]. Also, since thoroughly established phenomena are the ultimate [which is the object observed by a path of purification]$^d$ and also are the non-existence of phenomena as entities of self, they are non-natures ultimately$^e$ [that is, are without the nature of that ultimacy which is the self of phenomena].

Therefore, because they do not assert that those who hold [the Mother Sūtras]$^f$ to be of literal meaning are the [intended]$^g$ trainees for whom the Mother Sūtras were spoken,$^h$ they assert that the intended trainees of those [Mother Sūtras] realize the meaning of those sūtras as it is commented on by the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought [but without relying on the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought].$^i$ Hence, the thought of the latter two wheels is one and the same.

[Showing That The Final Wheel Of Doctrine Is Definitive]$^j$ (345) (448)

The Sūtra Unraveling the Thought refutes those [Consequentialists and so forth]$^k$ who, though they are devoted$^l$ to the Very Extensive Sūtras, hold them

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$^a$ See Absorption, #85.
$^b$ don dam par ngo bo nyid med pa.
$^c$ don dam par ngo bo nyid med pa.
$^d$ don dam par ngo bo nyid med pa. Da-drin-rap-den (158.5) cogently takes “ultimate” here as referring to the object of negation. His point is well taken because one should not confuse “non-natures ultimately” (don dam par ngo bo nyid med pa) with “ultimate-naturelessness” (don dam pa ngo bo nyid med pa), in which “ultimate” don dam pa refers to the ultimate, or thoroughly established nature, itself. The latter is the ultimate-non-nature that is the third of the three non-natures constituting Buddha’s thought behind the teaching in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras that phenomena are natureless. Here Dzong-ka-ba is using the terminology of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras, that is, “ultimately natureless” or “non-natures ultimately” (don dam par ngo bo nyid med pa), with respect to each of the three natures with individual meanings; see individual identifications of these in brackets in the translation.
$^e$ Those who hold the Mother Sūtras to be of literal meaning are the Proponents of Non-Nature, and, according to the Mind-Only School, they are not the intended trainees of the middle wheel of doctrine; the intended trainees of the middle wheel are sharp Proponents of Mind-Only themselves; see Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso's Port of Entry, 702.5. The Proponents of Non-Nature, however, are the intended trainees of the literal reading of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras.
$^f$ mos.
to be literal and thereupon propound that the meaning of those sūtras is the literal meaning. It then clearly explains that there is a meaning of those sūtras that is not the literal meaning. Therefore, that [Sūtra Unraveling the Thought] is said to be of definitive meaning, and since the Mother Sūtras do not clearly differentiate this meaning and are unsuitable to be held as literal, they require interpretation.

[Detailed Explanation Of How The Middle Wheel Of Doctrine Is Proved To Require Interpretation] (345) {448}

The damage to the literal reading [of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras] is just the former statements that if taken to be literal, they would involve deprecation, such that all three characters would be concealed as not established by way of their own character. Furthermore, Vasubandhu's Principles of Explanation says:

The Perfection of Wisdom [Sūtras] indicate many times, for instance, that all phenomena are natureless and so forth. However, they say that those who wish to enter into the flawlessness of Bodhisattvas [should train in the Perfection of Wisdom] and...they also teach the individual disclosure of all ill deeds, and so forth.

Having explained that, Vasubandhu shows that if naturelessness and so forth were literal, there would be internal contradictions.

If the words of naturelessness and so forth [in the Mother Sūtras] were of only literal meaning, they would contradict all of these. As there would be nothing to be adopted [in practice], it would not be suitable to adopt [a practice] within thinking, "From this cause such and such will arise." Or, one would wonder what thing to be adopted exists to be adopted. Therefore, those words [speaking of naturelessness] definitely should not be taken as of literal meaning. Then, as what? As having another thought [behind them].

With respect to the mode of contradiction, if [phenomena] were natureless, one would be propounding that objects of adoption [in practice] and the wish to attain [levels of the path,] as in, "Because of wishing to attain such and such, one should train in the Mother [that is, the perfection of wisdom]," would not be suitable, and one would be propounding that the causes and effects involved in great resources [resulting] from giving and so forth would not be feasible.

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*a* There is no fault in considering imputational natures not to be established by way of their own character, but it is wrong to hold that all three natures are not established by way of their own character.

*b* dga'ngs pa’i can.
[The mode of contradiction] is mainly held to be the unfeasibility of other-powered natures.

Even those [that is, the Proponents of Non-Nature] who assert the Mother Sūtras as of definitive meaning make an assertion in accordance with the statements again and again [in the literal reading of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras]—about adoption of [virtues] and discarding [of non-virtues] as well as cause and effect and so forth—in the following way: “Furthermore, these are in worldly conventions but not ultimately.” They do not assert that in general entities of these [phenomena] utterly do not exist or do not exist conventionally.

The meaning is that [the Proponents of Non-Nature] assert that, although [“ultimately”] is not affixed to each [negation] in the sūtra, since it is already affixed in general, the absence of ultimate existence is literal, and [Vasubandhu adduces] the fault that [ultimately] if the absence of ultimate existence is literal, cause and effect and so forth would not be feasible. For, Asanga’s *Grounds of Bodhisattvas* and *Compendium of Ascertainties* also explain that [the position] that everything is not ultimately established is a depreciation and refute such.

*Advice to Tibetans who claim to be Proponents of Non-Nature.* (346) (449)

In the Mind-Only School], the differentiation between interpretable and definitive scriptures that are set forth stemming from the ultimate derives from whether there is or is not damage by reasoning to the literal reading. Concerning the damage indicated here [to the literality of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras], if you [Tibetans as Proponents of Non-Nature] know well how to refute the ultimate existence [of phenomena] and know well how to posit cause and effect as well as bondage and release, and so forth, as validly established within the context of these being phenomena with respect to which such ultimate existence has been negated, then your answer hits the mark [in the sense that], in accordance with a proper interpretation of the Consequence School, it can refute Vasubandhu’s challenge of internal contradiction. Otherwise, propounding that “If the production of a sprout is established by valid cognition, it becomes ultimate production; hence a sprout is produced in the perspective of a mistaken consciousness fancying production, and thereby all those are feasible conventionally,” cannot dispel the damage [by reasoning put forward in Vasubandhu’s objections]. Therefore, it would be splendid if you relied on this mode of commentary by the Yogic Practitioners [rather than attempting such a misguided version of the doctrine of the Naturelessness School, thereby making many deprecations].

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1. Dzong-ka-ba describes these misguided persons as those who hold that phenomena are not established by valid cognition, and thus his reference cannot be to Autonomists but must be to those who claim to be Proponents of Non-Nature but cannot figure out how an elimination of inherent existence is compatible with the valid certification of phenomena. A-ku Lo-drö-ya-tso (*Precious Lamp, 293.3*) identifies these as earlier Tibetans and other quarters (*bod rgya ma dang gchen phyogs*). For Dzong-ka-ba’s extensive presentation on overidentifi-
Although [in the Mind-Only School] there are many approaches with respect to commenting [on a scripture] as requiring interpretation [such as the four intentions and the four thoughts], those with intelligence should know that the Yogic Practitioners’ way of commenting on the second wheel as requiring interpretation is just in accordance [with what was explained above, that is, their not being literally acceptable].

[Identifying The Three Wheels Of Doctrine According To The Sūtra Unraveling the Thought] (347) (450)

The three stages of wheels of doctrine mentioned in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought are posited, not by way of the assemblies of [Buddha’s] circle or by way of periods in the Teacher’s life and so forth but by way of topics of expression. Furthermore, those in terms of delineating the meaning of selflessness:

- Initially, at Varanāsī, he spoke of the selflessness of persons; [thus] there is one cycle [of teaching], in which the true establishment of the phenomena of the aggregates and so forth, except for a few, is not refuted and true existence is mentioned frequently.


a A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso’s Precious Lamp, 293.5. Jam-ṭhang-shay-ba (Great Exposition of Teng, nga, 9b.7) lists the four:

Four Thoughts (dgongs pa bzhī, catvāro bhīprāya)
Thinking of sameness (mnyam pa nyid la dgongs pa, samatābhīprāya)
Thinking of another meaning (don gshan la dgongs pa, arthāntarābhīprāya)
Thinking of another time (dui gshan la dgongs pa, kālantarābhīprāya)
Thinking of a person’s attitude (gang zag gi bjam pa la dgongs pa, pūdgalantarābhīprāya)

Four Intentions (ldem dgongs bzhī, catvāro bhīsamādhyā)
Intending entry (gzhug pa la ldem por dgongs pa, avataṣṭābhīsamādhi)
Intending the characters (mnychan nyid la ldem por dgongs pa, lakṣaṇābhīsamādhi)
Intending an antidote (gnyen po la ldem por dgongs pa, pratipakṣābhīsamādhi)
Intending translation (iḥyor ba la ldem por dgongs pa, bhavajñābhīsamādhi).

For discussion of these, see Absorption in No External World, chap. 19.

Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 705.4), however, takes Dzong-ka-ba’s reference not as different modes within the Mind-Only School but the contrasting way in which the Middle Way School determines what requires interpretation and what is definitive, and thus he glosses this as “such as whether the passage is literal or not, whether the ultimate truth is taken as the main topic taught or not, and so forth.”

b Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 705.5) identifies the Jo-nang-bas as the proponents of this notion.

c Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (ibid., 705.6) identifies Chim, the Translator Tro, and the Translator Chak (mchims khang chag) as the proponents of this notion.

d According to Jam-ṭhang-shay-ba (Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive,
• Then, there is one cycle in which, without [clearly]\(^{716}\) making distinctions, true establishment is refuted [on the literal level]\(^{717}\) with respect to all of the phenomena of the aggregates and so forth\(^{*}\)

• Then, there arose one cycle in which, with respect to those, he individually differentiated the mode of the first nature [that is, the imputational nature] as not established by way of its own character and the other two [that is, other-powered natures and thoroughly established natures] as established by way of their own character

Therefore, [the wheels of doctrine that are the bases for differentiation—in the "Questions of Paramārthasamudgata Chapter" of the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought and in the texts commenting on its thought—of what requires interpretation and what is definitive]\(^{718}\) are taken in terms of these [modes of teaching subject matter].\(^{719}\) Other sūtras that teach in a way other than these modes of teaching are not in any sensible way bases of this analysis of the interpretable and the definitive.

[Presenting Ratnākarashānti's Mistaken Mode Of Differentiating The Interpretable And The Definitive]\(^{720}\) (347) {450}

Ratnākarashānti's Quintessential Instructions on the Perfection of Wisdom says:\(^{721}\)

The meaning of whatsoever sūtra that is literal is just of definitive meaning. That meaning does not have a second meaning. Since it is said, “The meaning of this is just ascertained,” it is a definitive meaning. Through what is the meaning ascertained? Through (1) just that sūtra, (2) a sūtra other than it, and (3) both.

He asserts the first [that is, those whose meaning is ascertained through themselves]\(^{722}\) to be the Descent into Laṅkā, the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought, and so forth; he does this thinking that these clearly differentiate the existence and non-existence of nature [that is to say, establishment or non-establishment by way of its own character with respect to the three natures].\(^{723}\) He asserts the second [that is, those whose meaning is ascertained through another sūtra]\(^{724}\) to be the Eight Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra, and so forth, thinking that these do not possess differentiation of the existence and non-existence of nature as such is done in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought. He asserts the third

27.3), the last sentence should be rendered as:

Initially, at Varanāsī, he spoke of the selflessness of persons; [thus] there is one cycle [of teaching], in which the true establishment of the phenomena of the aggregates and so forth—[these being] no more than a few [of the one hundred and eight phenomena]—is not refuted and true existence is mentioned frequently.

See Absorption, #21, 32, 36.

* See ibid., #37 and 38.
[that is, those whose meaning is ascertained through themselves and through another sūtra] as being the Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra, and so forth, thinking (1) that the “Questions of Maitreya Chapter” [in those sūtras] has an explanation [that those very sūtras] require interpretation, thereby abandoning the error of adhering [to such teachings] as of literal meaning, and (2) that the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought also comments that [these sūtras] require interpretation. This is due to the fact that the middling length [Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra, that is, the Eight Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra] does not have a “Questions of Maitreya Chapter.” According to him, the three characters posited by the “Questions of Maitreya Chapter” [in the Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra and so forth] and the explanation [of the three characters] by the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought are asserted as having the same meaning.

[Refuting Ratnakarashánti’s Mode Of Differentiating The Interpretable And The Definitive] (348) {451}

If those two [that is, the “Questions of Maitreya Chapter” in the Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra and the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought] had the same meaning, such would be correct, but [they do not, for]:

- Vasubandhu establishes that the naturelessness and so forth mentioned in the Mother Sūtras [which include the Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra] require interpretation in accordance with [how] other sūtras such as the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought and so forth [say that such teachings require interpretation]
- He indicates that, in a literal reading, the Mother Sūtras themselves have contradictions between what is said in them earlier and later [and thereby establishes that they require interpretation]; he does not establish this

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a A-lu Lo-drö-gya-tso (Precious Lamp, 296.5) identifies “and so forth” as “the Hundred Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra, and so forth.” However, Cyrus R. Stearns (The Buddha from Dol po and His Fourth Council of the Buddhist Doctrine [Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, 1996], 137-138) refers to the 72rd chapter of the Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra and the 83rd chapter of Eighteen Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra and states that a “Questions of Maitreya Chapter” is not found in other versions of the Prajñāpāramitā. For a typical passage, see p. 348.

b Through criticizing and correcting Ratnakarashánti on the issue of what is definitive and what requires interpretation, Drong-ka-ba indirectly seeks to undermine Shay-rap-gyet-sen’s synthesis of the second- and third-wheel teachings; see the Synopsis, p. 348ff. The “Questions of Maitreya Chapter” of the 18,000- and 25,000-“stanza” Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras are counted as one in the list of five sūtras of definitive meaning that Shay-rap-gyet-sen studied under Gyi-don Jam-phyang-drak-ba-gyet-sen at Sa-gya (see Stearns, The Buddha from Dol po, 19, n. 17).
through the “Questions of Maitreya Chapter” [of the Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra and so forth]

Therefore, this [explanation by Ratnākarashānti]³⁹ is not the thought of the brothers [Asaṅga and Vasubandhu].

Since [the presentations of the three natures by]³⁹ these two [sūtras, (1) the “Questions of Maitreya Chapter” in the Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra and (2) the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought]³⁹ are quite similar, it is difficult to differentiate them. However, if those two had the same meaning, it would not be suitable [for even the Middle Way School]³⁹ to explain that the meaning of the thought of the Mother Sūtras is that all phenomena are natureless ultimately but exist conventionally [since the “Questions of Maitreya Chapter” of the Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra would be saying that such teaching is not definitive. The Middle Way School absurdly] would have to accord with the Cognition School [on the topic of the three natures]. As a point to be analyzed this is very important; it will be explained on the occasion of the Middle Way School.⁴

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³⁹ Bel-jor-hлин-drup’s Lamp for the Teaching, 112.6. The reference could be just to “the brother,” that is, Vasubandhu, but it is more likely to both, although Dzong-ka-ба here has not made an explicit case for Asaṅga.

⁴ Dzong-ka-ба analyzes this issue in detail in the section on the Consequence School, in a subsection entitled “Showing that the two, the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought and the ‘Questions of Maitreya Chapter’ are not similar”; two-thirds of that explanation is translated and discussed in Shōtarō Iida, Reason and Emptiness (Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, 1980), 262-269. For a condensation of its meaning drawn from the works of Jam-yang-shay-ба, see p. 348ff. The reason why it is “very important” is that it is crucial to his delineation of the difference between the Mind-Only and Middle Way Schools and thus the impossibility of an amalgamation of the thought of the classical so-called Mind-Only and Middle Way Indian scholars, as is done by Shay-rap-gyel-tsen.
PART THREE: 
SYNOPSIS
Remarks

In his *Treatise Differentiating Interpretable and Definitive Meanings: The Essence of Eloquence* Đöng-ka-ba, after a prologue, presents an analysis of scriptural interpretation from the viewpoint of the Mind-Only School. He focuses on the Mind-Only School’s explication of Buddha’s own statements about interpretation in the seventh chapter of the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*, called the “Questions of the Bodhisattva Paramārthaśamudgata,” giving a lengthy treatment of passages in this chapter of the sūtra, during which he presents opinions sometimes following and sometimes refining the Korean scholar Wonch’uk but solely criticizing renditions of doctrine by the Tibetan scholar Shay-rap-gyeltse of the Jo-nang-ba School.

Then Đöng-ka-ba discusses major Indian commentarial literature on differentiating scriptures in the Mind-Only School—first detailing the importance of the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* for Asaṅga’s Mind-Only system and then explicating significant portions—that deal with emptiness, the differentiation of what requires interpretation and what is definitive, and related topics—in Asaṅga’s *Grounds of Bodhisattvas and Compendium of Ascertainments*; Maitreyä’s *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras* and *Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes* as well as briefly mentioning twelve other Indian treatises. He openly refutes only one Indian scholar, the eleventh-century Ratnākarashānti.

An annotated translation of the prologue and the section on the Mind-Only School is given in part 2, but the text is often so brief and the shifts of topic so abrupt that detailed synopses of these chapters in a more free-flowing style may be helpful. Given the six centuries of scholarship, almost every point has spawned discussion; many of these are addressed in footnotes in the Translation, found in part 2, while other issues are considered in my *Reflections on Reality and Absorption in No External World*, as indicated by footnotes to the Translation. (The page numbers in square brackets after the headings refer to the corresponding part of the Translation, and the page numbers in curly brackets refer to the Tibetan text.)

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a Whether Śākyamuni Buddha actually spoke this sūtra or not, the tradition being examined takes the former to be the case; thus, as a literary device, I shall use the assumption of the tradition since the authorship of the text is not the issue here.
b *gan la dbab pa idu ba, vinicayasaṃgrahani*; Peking 5539, vol. 110-111.
c *theg pa chen po’s mdo sde rgyan, mahāyānaśūtrakārama*; Peking 5521, vol. 108.
d *dhus mtha’ rnam ’byed, madhyāntavibhaṅga*; Peking 5522, vol. 108.
e For a list of these, see p. 285.
Prologue

Overview. Dzong-ka-ba begins *The Essence of Eloquence* [65] (363) with a brief obeisance in Sanskrit to Mañjughoṣa, or Mañjusri. The prologue that follows the obeisance and precedes the section on the Mind-Only School is in four basic movements—the first three being standard precursors to the actual subject matter of a text:

- Expression of worship
- Promise of composition
- Exhortation to listen
- Call for reasoned analysis in order to determine the reality of phenomena in the midst of divergent scriptures

Expression Of Worship [65] (363)

The first expression of worship is to Shākyamuni Buddha from the viewpoint of his overwhelming—through his teaching of dependent-arising—worldly deities such as Maheshvara, Īndra, Brahmā, the demonic Lord of Love, and Viṣṇu. Dzong-ka-ba then makes worship to the upholders of the teaching, these being Mañjughoṣa and Maitreya who are the divine sustainers of Shākyamuni Buddha’s teaching and who passed it respectively through Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga. Also included are other great masters of the Middle Way School—Āryadeva, Shūra, Buddhāpālita, Bhāvaviveka, and Chandrakīrti—and of the Mind-Only School—Vasubandhu, Sthiramati, Dignāga, and Dharmakīrti.

Promise Of Composition [68] (364)

In his promise to compose the text, Dzong-ka-ba stakes the claim that he has realized a profound topic that others in Tibet failed to penetrate—the meaning of suchness, emptiness. This leads to a call to his listeners (and readers) to pay close attention.

The Necessity For Reasoned Analysis [68] (365)

Dzong-ka-ba cites a passage from the *Superior Sūtra of the Questions of Rāṣṭrapāla* that speaks of the multiplicity of Buddha’s doctrines that arise from his skill in means. This provides the context for a multistaged argument that it is necessary, given the seeming contradictions in Buddha’s manifold teachings on reality, to rely on reasoning to determine the final mode of being of phenomena.
1. In order to be released from cyclic existence it is necessary to realize suchness—emptiness, the thoroughly established nature

2. To realize suchness, it is not sufficient to train only in scriptures that require interpretation; rather, one must engage properly in hearing and thinking on definitive scriptures

3. The determination that a sūtra is definitive cannot be made by the mere fact that there is a scripture saying that it is definitive. For, just as in general it is not necessarily suitable to assert what is indicated on the literal level of a sūtra since Buddha spoke variously in accordance with the needs of trainees—for instance, sometimes he said that there are no external objects and sometimes he said that there are—so, more specifically, it is not suitable to accept a scriptural statement that a certain sūtra is definitive and that another requires interpretation. For instance, Buddha said in the Teachings of Akṣhobyaśīhā Sūtra that the type of teachings classified as the middle wheel of his doctrine is definitive but in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought said that such requires interpretation. Therefore, through scriptural citation alone, one cannot differentiate which sūtras require interpretation and which are definitive

4. Also, persons such as us cannot make the differentiation through our own powers of mind, nor can we make it following just any of the many schools and great adepts. Hence, the differentiation must be made following either Nāgārjuna or Asaṅga, the two great "chariots" (that is, great leaders) prophesied by the Conqueror Buddha himself as differentiating the interpretable and the definitive

5. To follow Nāgārjuna or Asaṅga does not mean just to read texts written by them; rather, it means analytically to delineate what is definitive and what requires interpretation within Buddha’s scriptures in dependence upon the stainless reasonings through which Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga opened up their respective traditions—the Middle Way School and Mind-Only School. These are reasonings through the power of the fact (and not through citation of scripture) that refute all ambiguities that might allow interpreting the Conqueror’s thought otherwise and that establish just what his thought is

6. Thus, the process meets back just to pure analysis (a) of emptiness—the mode of subsistence of phenomena that is the uttermost meaning to be delineated—and (b) of the paths of reasonings—the uttermost means of delineation—set forth by the two great chariots, Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga

Dzong-ka-ba concludes with the famous scriptural quote that Buddha’s doctrines are to be examined the way a goldsmith analyzes gold before purchasing it—by scorching it, cutting it, and rubbing it with a special cloth.

He immediately indicates that his exposition of how to differentiate what requires interpretation and what is definitive is in two parts—the presentations
in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought and in Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra, corresponding to the presentations in the Mind-Only School and the Middle Way School. (Within the Middle Way School, the Autonomy School also makes extensive use of the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought; hence Pan-chen Šö-nam-drak-ňa79 structures his textbook such that the presentation in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought itself has two parts—the Mind-Only School and the Middle Way School. Under the latter category, he treats how the two divisions of the Middle Way School—the Autonomy School76 and the Consequence School77 treat the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought. After those,78 he considers how the Autonomy School79 and the Consequence School80 present the interpretable and the definitive according to the Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra.8 The Autonomy School takes the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought literally but with a reading different from the Mind-Only School, whereas the Consequence School holds that although the thought of the sūtra is as the Proponents of Mind-Only say it is, Buddha’s own thought is different, and thus the sūtra is not to be taken literally.)
MIND-ONLY SCHOOL:
THE SŪTRA UNRAVELING THE THOUGHT
ON DIFFERENTIATING
THE INTERPRETABLE AND THE DEFINITIVE
Overview of Chapters 1 Through 4

Dzong-ka-ba’s exposition of how the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought presents the differentiation of what requires interpretation and what is definitive begins in chapter 1 with the sūtra’s depiction of a question put to Shākyamuni Buddha by the Bodhisattva Paramārthaśamudgata about apparent contradictions in his teachings in the first two wheels of doctrine. Chapter 2 centers around Buddha’s short and long answers to Paramārthaśamudgata’s question—explaining what was behind his teaching in the middle wheel of doctrine, in which he said that all phenomena are natureless and are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow. The principal format is Buddha’s exposition that all phenomena are not natureless, and so forth, in the same way, and that it should be understood that all phenomena can be divided into the three categories called the three natures, each of which has its own type of non-nature; thus there are three natures and three non-natures.

Chapter 3 discusses the three natures through considering Paramārthaśamudgata’s rerendering of Buddha’s teaching. Chapter 4 presents the overall meaning established by the above movements in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought through giving the sūtra’s presentation of the three wheels of doctrine, again as per Paramārthaśamudgata’s rerendering of Buddha’s teaching.

Throughout these four chapters, Dzong-ka-ba, while relying on Won-ch’uk’s presentation, seeks to correct many points; also in chapter 1 he excoriates Shay-rap-gyal-tsen for completely missing what for him is a crucial point and again in chapter 4 criticizes opinions of both Shay-rap-gyal-tsen (1292-1361) and Bu-don Rin-chen-drup (1290-1364). Let us turn to these chapters in more detail.
1. Questioning Apparent Contradiction

**Overview.** This chapter [75] {368} has three basic movements:

1. Explaining Paramārthaśamudgata’s question about apparent contradictions in Buddha’s teachings
2. Criticizing Wench’uk’s rendering of two points
3. Glossing the meaning of a word in the sūtra

Paramārthaśamudgata’s Question [75] {368}

Ḍzong-ka-ba immediately cites the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* without even mentioning who is speaking, this being the Bodhisattva Paramārthaśamudgata. In this citation, Paramārthaśamudgata contrasts the teachings of the first two wheels of doctrine. In the first wheel of doctrine Buddha spoke of a multiplicity of phenomena which are arranged in seven groups—the five mental and physical aggregates, the twelve sense-spheres, the twelve links of dependent-arising, the four foods, the four noble truths, the eighteen and six constituents, and the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment. About the first wheel, Paramārthaśamudgata describes the teachings on the aggregates, sense-spheres, dependent-arising, and foods as having five features:

1. own-character
2. production
3. disintegration
4. abandonment
5. thorough knowledge

The teachings on the four truths are described as having two features:

1. own-character
2. thorough knowledge (of true sufferings), abandonment (of true sources of suffering), actualization (of true cessations), and meditation (cultivating true paths)

The teachings on the constituents are described as having three features:

1. own-character
2. abandonment
3. thorough knowledge

The teachings of the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are described as having eight features:

1. own-character
2. discordances

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Paramārthasamudgata contrasts this first-wheel teaching with the second wheel, when Buddha said in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras, “All phenomena are natureless; all phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow.” He concludes by asking Buddha what he meant by the second-wheel teaching.

Dzong-ka-ba summarizes the question as being that the teaching in the middle wheel that all phenomena are natureless, and so forth, and the teaching in the first wheel that the aggregates, and so forth, have an “own-character” would be contradictory if they were left as they are on the surface. Since Buddha’s teachings must be non-contradictory, Paramārthasamudgata asks of what Buddha was thinking when he taught the middle wheel of doctrine. Dzong-ka-ba adds that the explicit question about the middle wheel contains an implicit question about what Buddha was thinking when he taught the first wheel of doctrine.

Criticizing Wonch’uk [78] [370]

The Korean scholar Wonch’uk, in his Great Commentary on the “Sūtra Unraveling the Thought,” takes the term “own-character” in Paramārthasamudgata’s description of Buddha’s teaching in the first wheel of doctrine as referring to the unique character or definition of a phenomenon as when Buddha speaks of a phenomenon and then of its unique character that distinguishes it from other phenomena. In the case of form, for instance, this is obstructiveness. Dzong-ka-ba, however, holds that “own-character” refers not to the entity—the distinguishing nature—of form but to form’s being established by way of its own character. He points out that the sūtra itself, in the course of Buddha’s answer to Paramārthasamudgata’s question, says not that imputational natures do not have their own unique character but that they do not subsist by way of their own character. He draws the absurd conclusion that if “own-character,” as Wonch’uk says, meant an object’s unique character, then it could not be held, as the sūtra says, that imputational natures are character-non-natures. Dzong-ka-ba gives no further explanation, but the commentators agree that he is referring to the fact that imputational nature (as a category) does indeed have a unique characterization—namely, that which is imputed by conceptuality and is not established by way of its own character.

Dzong-ka-ba next criticizes unidentified “commentaries” for mistaking the meaning of “the various and manifold constituents” mentioned in Paramārtha-
samudgata’s question. He says that these should be taken as referring to the eighteen constituents and the six constituents based on another occurrence of these terms in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought, at which point they are identified as the eighteen constituents and the six constituents. (See the footnotes in the Translation for the connection to Wonch’uk.)

Glossing The Meaning Of A Word [81] [370]

He finishes discussion of the question by glossing an obscure term, this being the sixth feature of the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment. He glosses "non-loss" with "non-forgetfulness."b

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a mi bskyed pa, asampramosā (Étienne Lamotte, Samdhinirmocana-śri: L’Explication des mystères [Louvain: Université de Louvain, 1935], 67 [1], n. 26).

b mi brjed pa.
2. Buddha’s Answer

*Overview.* This long chapter [82] [371] has eight basic movements:

1. Citing Buddha’s brief indication of his thought behind the teaching in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras that all phenomena are natureless and also citing Asaṅga and Vasubandhu on the same issue
2. Based on these, denouncing the Jo-nang-bas for holding that the ultimate truly exists
3. Presenting Buddha’s extensive explanation of his thought behind the teaching in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras that all phenomena are natureless, this being that there are three types of phenomena and three types of non-nature. In this and the above two subsections he makes distinctions between the Mind-Only School and the Middle Way School
4. Through focusing on the description of the ultimate in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* as a mere negation, assailng the Jo-nang-bas for holding, on the one hand, that the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* is definitive and, on the other hand, that the ultimate is a positive entity
5. Citing the examples used in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* to highlight the three non-natures, or three natures
6. Showing how, from the perspective of the Mind-Only School, when the Consequence School takes the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras literally, they come to depreciate all three natures
7. Citing Buddha’s explanation of the thought behind his teaching in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras that all phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow—this being from two perspectives, imputational natures and thoroughly established natures
8. Based on Wonch’uk’s explanation, showing how the just mentioned description of the teaching—that phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow—is from the perspective of two of the three natures does not conflict, in essence, with the statement in Asaṅga’s *Summary of Manifest Knowledge* that this teaching is from the perspective of all three natures

Let us turn to these in more detail.

*Brief Indication Of The Thought Behind Buddha’s Teaching In The Perfection Of Wisdom Sūtras That All Phenomena Are Natureless [82] [371]*

Buddha explains that when, in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras, he said that all phenomena are natureless, he was not making a blanket statement with respect to all phenomena but was referring to three types of non-nature:
- A character-non-nature
- A production-non-nature
- Two types of ultimate-non-nature

Dzong-ka-ba quotes Asanga’s *Compendium of Ascertainments* and Vasubandhu’s *The Thirty*, the latter indicating that the three non-natures are posited with respect to the three natures. Thus, to repeat the charts given in the introduction:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Three Natures</th>
<th>Three Non-Natures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imputational natures</td>
<td>Character-non-natures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other-powered natures</td>
<td>1) Production-non-natures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2) Ultimate-non-natures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thoroughly established</td>
<td>Ultimate-non-natures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>natures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To understand Dzong-ka-ba’s immediate criticism of the Jo-nang-bas, it is necessary to flesh out the meaning of these correspondences by drawing from the subsequent extensive explanation. Using that, it is seen that:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Three Natures</th>
<th>Three Non-Natures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imputational natures</td>
<td>Character-non-natures, in the sense that they are posited by names and terminology and do not exist by way of their own character</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other-powered natures</td>
<td>1) Production-non-natures, in the sense that they arise through the force of other conditions and are not self-produced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2) Ultimate-non-natures, in the sense that they are not objects of observation of paths of purification, that is, are not objects of the ultimate, purifying consciousness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thoroughly established</td>
<td>Ultimate-non-natures, in the sense that they are the ultimate and the very absence of a difference of entity of subject and object and the very absence of establishment by way of a phenomenon’s own character as the referent of terms and conceptual consciousness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This is how the three natures are paired with the three non-natures (the last of the three non-natures having two types).

Denouncing The Jo-nang-bas For Holding That The Ultimate Truly Exists [83] [372]

Dzong-ka-ba accuses the Jo-nang-bas of self-contradiction since:

- they must admit that the *Sutra Unraveling the Thought* reports that in the middle wheel of doctrine Buddha taught that all phenomena are natureless, and
- they must admit that the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras themselves individually mention that the 108 classes of phenomena—which include the 18 emptinesses—are natureless, and in particular that all synonyms of the ultimate, such as emptiness, the element of a (Superior’s) qualities, thusness, and so forth are natureless;
• however, they hold that the ultimate is not among the phenomena that the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras say are natureless.

Also, the Sutra Unraveling the Thought, as well as Asanga and Vasubandhu, say that all three non-natures, including ultimate-non-natures, are behind Buddha’s statements in the middle wheel that all phenomena are natureless. Thus Dzong-ka-ba shows amazement that the Jo-nang-bas could hold that statements in the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras that all phenomena are natureless are in consideration only of conventional phenomena and not the ultimate. He concludes that the Jo-nang-bas are outside of Asanga’s and Vasubandhu’s Mind-Only system and that they also are outside Nagarjuna’s Middle Way system (since they hold that the ultimate is truly established). This means that they are outside of any Great Vehicle system.

Extensive Explanation Of The Thought Behind Buddha’s Teaching In The Perfection Of Wisdom Sutras That All Phenomena Are Natureless [85] [373]

Character-Non-Nature [85] [373]

Apparently following Wonch’uk’s,” structuring of Buddha’s description of the character-non-nature in the Sutra Unraveling the Thought, Dzong-ka-ba divides it into a (rhetorical) question, an answer, a (rhetorical) questioning of the reason, and an answer to that question. He then advises that this format should be used also with respect to the other two non-natures.

In short, Buddha identifies that it is imputational natures that are character-non-natures because, from the negative side, they are not posited by way of their own character and, from the positive side, are posited by names and terminology.

Dzong-ka-ba stresses that, therefore, the character that imputational natures do not have is establishment by way of their own character and that whether something is or is not established by way of its own character turns on whether it is not or is posited in dependence upon names and terminology (“terminology” here being taken—in order to avoid redundancy with “names”—to mean a conceptual consciousness). He makes the distinction that whatever is posited by names and terminology does not necessarily exist but, typical to his brevity, does not spell out the point—this being that phenomena, such as uncompounded space and an object’s being the referent of a term or conceptual consciousness, which are posited in dependence upon names and terminology, do indeed exist but that the horns of a rabbit or an object’s being established by way of its own character as the referent of a term or conceptual consciousness, which are also posited in dependence upon names and terminology, do not exist.

He cryptically adds that:
• the Mind-Only School and the Consequence School do not agree with respect to the meaning of being posited in dependence upon names and terminology, and hence
• do not agree with respect to what it means to exist by way of its own character, but
• if a person has the conception of an object as being established by way of its own character according to how this is described in the Mind-Only system, that person also has the conception of its being established by way of its own character according to how this is described in the Consequence School, and yet
• even though Proponents of Mind-Only did not conceive imputational natures in accordance with their own description of what it means to be established by way of their own character, they conceive imputational natures to be established by way of their own character in accordance with the description by the Consequence School.

He gives no further explanation, expecting the reader to know the dictum that the Mind-Only School holds that any existent, including existent imputational natures, is findable when the object imputed is sought and that this is the meaning of "establishment of an object by way of its own character" for the Consequence School.

Production-Non-Nature [87] [374]

In short, Buddha identifies that it is other-powered natures that are production-non-natures because, from the negative side, they are not produced by themselves and, from the positive side, they arise through the force of other conditions. Đzong-ka-ba stresses that, therefore, the nature in terms of production that other-powered natures do not have is production by themselves, that is to say, production under their own power. He buttresses this point with a citation from Asanga's Compendium of Ascertainments and thereby implicitly emphasizes the consonance between the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought and Asanga's text.

Contrasting the Mind-Only School with the Consequence School, he reiterates that in the Mind-Only School other-powered natures are natureless due to being without the nature of self-powered production, unlike the Consequence School, which holds that other-powered natures are natureless due to not being established by way of their own character. He seeks to underline that in the Mind-Only School other-powered natures are established by way of their own character.

Ultimate-Non-Nature [88] [375]

In short, Buddha identifies that, from between the two types of ultimate-non-
nature, other-powered natures are ultimate-non-natures because the ultimate is what is observed and meditated upon in order to purify obstructions, whereas other-powered natures are not objects of such a process of purification.

Dzong-ka-ba raises the hypothetical question that if something were posited as an ultimate-non-nature merely because of not being an object of observation of purification, imputational natures also would have to be posited as ultimate-non-natures. However, he answers that Buddha at this point in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought is responding to a qualm that stems from the fact that the sūtra itself explains that one is to meditate on other-powered natures' emptiness of being established by way of their own character as the referents of words and of conceptual consciousnesses, and thus other-powered natures are the substrata and the imputational nature is what is refuted with respect to them. Specifically, there arises the qualm that since, in that case, a wisdom consciousness must also observe the other-powered natures that are the substrata of the quality of emptiness, those other-powered natures also would be objects of observation of purification, due to which they would be ultimates. This is why such a qualm needs to be alleviated with respect to other-powered natures; however, since the sūtra speaks of the imputational nature as what is refuted, such a qualm does not occur with respect to the imputational nature.

The qualm is that the substratum, since it is observed in the sense of being the basis of the quality of emptiness, would also be an object of observation by a path of purification and hence an ultimate. Dzong-ka-ba declares that this is not the case and draws a parallel to the fact that although the conception that sound is permanent is overcome by ascertaining sound as impermanent, the conception of permanence is not overcome through merely observing sound.

As a final point, he cryptically says that although other-powered natures are not established as ultimates in the sense of being objects which, when observed and meditated upon, bring about purification, they are another type of ultimate. He does not explain the point here, but later it is clear that other-powered natures are ultimates in the sense of being ultimately established, that is to say, established by way of their own character.

Actual Ultimate-Non-Nature [90] [376]

Then, with respect to the second (and main) ultimate-non-nature, Buddha identifies that it is thoroughly established natures that are the ultimate-non-nature because in phenomena just the selflessness of phenomena

- is their naturelessness, and
- is the ultimate.

Drawing from the previous description of other-powered natures as not the

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¹ *don dam pa ngyo bo nyid med pa nyid, paramārthaṃ bhāvāvastā* (Lamotte, *Samdhinirmochana*, 67[3], n. 5). For discussion of the two meanings of this term see p. 35, footnote c.
ultimate because they are not objects of observation of purification. Dzong-ka-ba emphasizes here that the thoroughly established nature is the object of observation of purification.

The Ultimate As A Mere Negation: Assailing The Jo-nang-bas For Holding The Opposite [91] [376]

In order to counter the Jo-nang-ba notion of a positive ultimate, Dzong-ka-ba cites a passage from the third chapter of the Sutra Unraveling the Thought called the "Questions of the Bodhisattva Suvishuddhamati." It offers more evidence that a thoroughly established nature is a "mere selflessness" and a "mere naturelessness"; that is to say, only an elimination of an object of negation and not something positive, as the Jo-nang-bas claim. He also cites the fact that the Sutra Unraveling the Thought (94) gives space—which is a mere absence of obstructive contact—as an analog to the thoroughly established nature. Thus, for Dzong-ka-ba it is clear that, according to the Sutra Unraveling the Thought, the thoroughly established nature is a non-affirming negative, a mere absence of the self of phenomena—a mere lack of objects' establishment by way of their own character as the referents of their respective conceptual consciousnesses and as the objects expressed by terms. Based on this, it is self-contradictory for the Jo-nang-bas to hold that the Sutra Unraveling the Thought is definitive in its teachings about the ultimate and yet to hold that the ultimate is a positive, self-powered uncontaminated wisdom and that its appearance to the mind does not depend on the elimination of an object of negation.

Dzong-ka-ba finishes the discussion by making the distinction that in the Mind-Only School it is not said that the thoroughly established nature is natureless due to the negation itself not being established by way of its own character. He says no more, but the point is that in the Mind-Only School the thoroughly established nature is established by way of its own character whereas in the Consequence School it is not. Also, in the Autonomy School it, like all phenomena, is ultimately not established by way of its own character although it is conventionally established by way of its own character.

Examples For The Three Non-Natures [93] [377]

Buddha compares character-non-natures, that is, imputational natures, to a flower in the sky. Due to an eye disease, the figure of a flower appears in the sky, but in fact there is no flower in the sky; just so, imputational natures are merely imputed by conceptuality. Dzong-ka-ba points out that, nevertheless, this does not mean that all imputational natures do not exist, but he does not give any further explanation. His point is that uncompounded space, for instance, is an existent imputational nature, as is an object's being the referent of

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*rab ri.`
a term and of a conceptual consciousness—with the qualification that they are not established by way of their own character.

Buddha compares production-non-natures, these being other-powered natures which are without self-production, to magical creations. Dzong-ka-ba refers the reader to a later explanation but does not identify it. It is found in chapter 8, on Maitreya's Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras. The example is of a magician who takes pebbles or sticks, for instance, puts a salve on them, and recites a mantra, whereupon they appear to the entire audience as well as to the magician to be horses, elephants, and so forth. Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso, a late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century scholar from northeastern Tibet, aligns the relevant factors of the example and of the exemplified this way:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The pebbles and sticks that are the bases of illusion</th>
<th>Unreal ideation⁴ (that is, other-powered natures)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The pebbles and sticks being affected by the mantra and substance, that is, salve, that the magician uses</td>
<td>Unreal ideation (other-powered natures) being affected by predispositions for mistaken dualistic appearance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The appearance—to the audience—of the sticks and pebbles as horses, elephants, and so forth due to being affected by the magician's mantra and salve</td>
<td>The appearance of unreal ideation (other-powered natures) as distant and cut off due to being affected by predispositions for mistaken dualistic appearance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Buddha says that from between the two ultimate-non-natures, other-powered natures—which are posited as ultimate-non-natures since they are not the ultimate—are again to be viewed as like a magician's illusions. Then addressing the (actual) ultimate-non-nature, he says that the thoroughly established nature, which is both the ultimate and the absence of the nature of the self of phenomena, is like space. Dzong-ka-ba merely says that the example is clear. As Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso⁵⁴ puts it, just as space is distinguished, or posited, by way of a mere negation of obstructive contact and pervades all physical phenomena in the sense of existing with them, so the thoroughly established nature is distinguished by way of a mere elimination of a self of phenomena and pervades all phenomena as their mode of subsistence.

When The Consequence School Takes The Perfection Of Wisdom Sūtras Literally, It Comes To Deprecate All Three Natures [95] [378]

According to the Mind-Only School, when the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras state that all phenomena are natureless, it must be understood that these statements are in consideration of the three non-natures. Otherwise, one would absurdly have to explain, in accordance with the Consequence School, that all three natures are not established by way of their own character, and this would be unsuitable because one would be adhering literally to the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras' statements of naturelessness, in which case one would incur a view

⁴ For a discussion of this term, see p. 307ff.
of nihilism. Thereby one would come to have the view that character, that is, establishment by way of its own character, does not exist, because one would be deprecating all three natures:

- Other-powered natures would be deprecated due to the fact that the Mind-Only School, following clear statements in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*, holds that if other-powered natures are not established by way of their own character, production and cessation are not feasible
- Thoroughly established natures would be deprecated due to the fact that the Mind-Only School holds that if the thoroughly established nature does not exist by way of its own character, it could not be the basic disposition of phenomena
- Imputational natures would be deprecated due to viewing that the other two natures are not established by way of their own character, because when those two do not exist by way of their own character, they must be nonexistent, in which case the bases of imputing imputational natures, as well as the terms and conceptual consciousnesses that impute them would not exist

Ḍzong-ka-ba cites a passage in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* which says that (indented material throughout the synopses is paraphrase except where quotation marks appear):

> There are trainees who, even though they have interest in the profound thoroughly established nature, do not understand, just as it is, the profound reality that Buddha set forth in a non-literal manner. These trainees adhere to the terms as only literal: "All these phenomena are only natureless. All these phenomena are only unproduced, only unceasing, only quiescent from the start, only naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow." Due to that, they acquire the view that all phenomena do not exist and the view that establishment of objects by way of their own character does not exist. Doing so, they deprecate all three natures. For, if other-powered natures and the thoroughly established character are established by way of their own character, the imputational character is possible, whereas those who perceive other-powered natures and thoroughly established natures as not being established by way of their own character also deprecate the imputational nature. Thereby, those persons deprecate even all three natures.

Ḍzong-ka-ba concludes by pointing out that even if one holds that production and cessation do not exist by way of their own character, one deprecates other-powered natures, whereby one also comes to deprecate the imputational and thoroughly established natures. For the Mind-Only School holds that if production and cessation are not established by way of their own character, they would be nonexistent. He says no more, but his point must be that, in that
case, the bases of imputation of imputational factors and the substrata of the thoroughly established nature would not exist, and thus all three natures would be deprecated.

The Thought Behind Buddha’s Teaching In The Perfection Of Wisdom Sūtras That All Phenomena Are Unproduced, Unceasing, Quiescent From The Start, And Naturally Thoroughly Passed Beyond Sorrow [97] [380]

In the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras, Buddha taught that all phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow. He did this from two viewpoints—character-non-natures and ultimate-non-natures, these being imputational natures and thoroughly established natures, respectively. Thinking of character-non-natures, that is, imputational natures, he said that all phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow because imputational natures do not exist by way of their own character and hence are not produced, due to which they do not cease, due to which they are from the start quiescent, due to which they are naturally—without depending on an antidote—devoid of the afflictive emotions, due to which they do not have the least thing to pass beyond sorrow.

Dzong-ka-ba stresses that the reason why imputational natures are not produced and do not cease is that they are not established by way of their own character. He does this to highlight the difference between the Mind-Only School and Chandrakīrti’s Consequence School, in which no phenomenon is established by way of its own character.

Thinking of the ultimate-non-nature [98] [381], that is, thoroughly established natures, Buddha taught that all phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow because the ultimate-non-nature is distinguished by the selflessness of phenomena and only subsists in permanent, permanent time and everlasting, everlasting time (these being identified by Wonch’uk as former and later time), and thus the ultimate-non-nature is the uncompounded final reality of phenomena, devoid of all afflictive emotions. Due to being uncompounded, it is unproduced and unceasing, and due to being devoid of all afflictive emotions, it is quiescent from the start and naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow.

Non-Contradiction Of This Presentation With That In Asaṅga’s Summary of Manifest Knowledge [100] [381]

In identifying what was behind Buddha’s teaching in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras that all phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow, the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought at this point identifies only character-non-natures and the ultimate-non-nature, that is, imputational natures and the thoroughly established nature.
However, Asaṅga, in his *Summary of Manifest Knowledge*, says that Buddha taught such in consideration of *all three* natures. Đzong-ka-ba first cites Wönch'ūk's description and then refines it, explaining that:

- the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* is indicating that, since other-powered natures have production and cessation that exist by way of their own character, the statements in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* concerning no production and no cessation are not in consideration of other-powered natures. Also, since most other-powered natures are included within the class of thoroughly afflicted phenomena, they are not treated as what was behind Buddha’s teaching that phenomena are quiescent from the start and naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow;

- Asaṅga, on the other hand, sought to demonstrate a correspondence between how each of the three natures is natureless and how they also are unproduced, unceasing, and so forth.

Đzong-ka-ba’s followers’* flesh out Asaṅga’s presentation:

- Imputational natures are said to be “unproduced” because they are not produced by way of their own character. They are said to be “unceased” because they do not cease by way of their own character. They are said to be quiescent from the start and naturally passed beyond sorrow because they are not afflicted phenomena, since they are uncompounded.

- Other-powered natures are said to be “unproduced, unceasing” because they are not produced by their own power without depending on conditions and do not cease by their own power. They are said to be “quiescent from the start and naturally passed beyond sorrow” because without depending on conditions they do not exist as thoroughly afflicted phenomena.

- Thoroughly established natures are said to be “unproduced, unceasing” because they are not produced and do not cease as the nature that is a self of phenomena or because they are the suchness that is not produced and does not cease as either a self of persons or a self of phenomena. They are said to be “quiescent from the start” and “naturally passed beyond sorrow” because they are without afflictions that are the nature of a self of phenomena, that is, without afflictions that are established by way of their own character as referents of conceptual consciousnesses. On this occasion, “sorrow” consists of the affective emotions. Or, in another way, thoroughly established natures are said to be “quiescent from the start” and “naturally passed beyond sorrow” because of being naturally passed beyond the afflictions, in the sense of not being either established as a substantially existent person or established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses and words.

Đzong-ka-ba’s implication is that since the sūtra and Asaṅga had different purposes in mind, they are not contradictory in essence.
3. The Three Natures

The previous chapter was concerned with the three non-natures that are teamed with the three natures; Dzong-ka-ba now turns his focus on the three natures themselves through identifying each briefly.

**Overview.** This chapter [104] {383} has five basic movements:

1. Based on Paramārthaśamudgata’s description in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*, identifying the imputational nature of a form
2. Identifying the other-powered nature of a form
3. Identifying the thoroughly established nature of a form
4. Based on the sūtra’s exposition of the thoroughly established nature as a mere elimination of the imputational nature in an other-powered nature, criticizing the Jo-nang-bas for holding that the thoroughly established nature is the absence of the other two natures
5. Explaining Paramārthaśamudgata’s extension of the three natures to other phenomena

The Imputational Nature Of A Form [104] {383}

Using the example of a form, Paramārthaśamudgata renders what he understands Buddha to have said about the three natures. First, he indicates that the imputational nature being discussed here is of two types—imputation of an entity, as in “This is a form,” and imputation of an attribute, as in “This is the production of form.” Dzong-ka-ba refers to his own later discussion of this topic, where he says that, since forms and so forth are indeed entities of such imputation, it is not that the mere conception that forms and so forth are entities of imputation as entity and attribute is refuted; rather, the superimposition being refuted is that forms and so forth are established as entities of imputation as entity and attribute by way of their own character. (This is an important point since it allows language to refer to objects without making referentiality an integral nature of objects.)

The Other-Powered Nature Of A Form [106] {383}

As Paramārthaśamudgata says, the bases of imputation of the imputational nature are other-powered natures that have three qualities. Other-powered natures are:

- the objects of activity of conceptuality,
- the foundations of imputational characters, and
- those which have the signs of compositional phenomena.

The first means that other-powered natures are objects of observation of con-
ceptual consciousnesses—both main minds and mental factors. The second means that other-powered natures are bases of imputation of the imputational factor. Dzong-ka-ba says merely that the third indicates the entities themselves of other-powered natures; other-powered natures themselves are compositional phenomena. (In a sense, therefore, the passage indicates the substrata—compositional phenomena—and two qualities.)

The Thoroughly Established Nature Of A Form [107] [383]

Paramārthasamudgate indicates that an other-powered nature’s non-establishment as the imputational nature is the thoroughly established nature. He calls this the absence of self in phenomena and calls it thusness, as well as the object of observation of purification. Dzong-ka-ba stresses that the sūtra says that the thoroughly established nature is just the naturelessness of only that imputational nature; he does this so that he can contrast this with the Jo-nang-ba assertion that the thoroughly established nature is other-empty, in the sense of being empty of other-powered natures and imputational natures. For Dzong-ka-ba, the bases of emptiness are not the thoroughly established nature itself but other-powered natures. He stresses that the sūtra very clearly indicates that the emptiness of the imputational nature in those other-powered natures is the thoroughly established nature.

Criticizing The Jo-nang-ba’s Presentation Of The Thoroughly Established Nature [109] [384]

Based on this very clear delineation in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought, Dzong-ka-ba accuses the Jo-nang-ba of self-contradiction in that:

- they hold that the presentation of the mode of emptiness in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought is to be taken literally, and yet
- they assert that the mode of emptiness is that the thoroughly established nature is empty of the imputational and other-powered natures.

He adds that emptiness is not the negation of something that exists elsewhere (as would be the case if emptiness here meant the absence of other-powered natures and existent imputational natures) but is the absence of something that never existed, as in the case of the common Buddhist notion of a person’s absence of substantial existence, which a person never had but is imagined to have. This is why the sūtra speaks of emptiness—the thoroughly established nature—as the mere non-establishment of other-powered natures as the imputational nature.

Dzong-ka-ba mentions that, with respect to the imputational nature, the sūtra speaks only of factors imputed in the manner of entities and attributes. As he says later, there are other imputational natures, such as uncompounded
space, but they are not relevant to the discussion of the imputational nature the emptiness of which is the thoroughly established nature.

Extension Of The Three Natures To Phenomena Other Than Forms [111] [384]

Having used forms, the first of the five aggregates, as a paradigm for laying out the three natures, Paramārthasamudgata extends this threefold formulation to all other categories of phenomena in the seven groups:

The remainder of the five mental and physical aggregates
The twelve sense-spheres
The twelve links of dependent-arising
The four foods
The four noble truths
The eighteen and six constituents
The thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment

(Đzong-ka-ba does not address the issue that, since permanent phenomena are included among the twelve sense-spheres and the eighteen constituents, an other-powered nature must be posited with respect to them; this conundrum is left for his followers to unravel.)
4. The Overall Meaning

*Overview.* This summary chapter [114] {386} has four basic movements:

1. Describing the three wheels of doctrine in terms of whether they require interpretation or are definitive and then citing the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* on this topic
2. Through drawing on and refining Wonch’uk’s commentary, explaining terminology in the sūtra
3. Identifying just what scriptures the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* is calling interpretable and definitive and why Buddha made this division
4. Based on these distinctions, indicating briefly that the descriptions of the three wheels of doctrine by the Jo-nang-bas, Bu-dön, and others are wrong

*Three Wheels Of Doctrine And Whether They Require Interpretation Or Are Definitive [114] {386}*

Ḍöng-ka-ba explains that, according to the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*, there are three sets of sūtras:

- a first wheel, which teaches that all phenomena exist by way of their own character
- a middle wheel, which teaches that all phenomena do not exist by way of their own character
- a final wheel, which differentiates well whether phenomena do or do not exist by way of their own character.

These three are put into two classes:

- The first two sets of sūtras do not differentiate well whether the three natures exist by way of their own character and thus require interpretation
- The final set of sūtras differentiates well that other-powered natures and thoroughly established natures exist by way of their own character and that imputational natures do not exist by way of their own character, and thus it is definitive

He then quotes from the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* Paramārthaśamudgata’s rendering of the meaning that implicitly rests in the question and answer, as well as in the presentation of the three natures.

*Explaining Terminology In The Sūtra [118] {387}*

*The First Wheel Of Doctrine [118] {387}*

Paramārthaśamudgata describes the first wheel of doctrine from nine viewpoints.\(^{245}\)
The turner of the wheel is the Supramundane Victor
The time is the first period (which, according to the late-seventeenth- and early-eighteenth-century Tibetan scholar Jam-ŷang-shay-Щa, begins with Buddha’s enlightenment and extends up to his death)\textsuperscript{460}
The place is the Deer Park called “Sage’s Propounding,” in the area of Va-\text{ran\~a}śi
The intended trainees are those of low lineage mainly engaged in the Hearers’ scriptural collections through hearing, thinking, and meditating
The topics are the aspects of the four noble truths
The mode of teaching is to declare that all phenomena without differentiation are equally established by way of their own character
The entity is that it is a wheel of doctrine
The praise is to call it fantastic and marvelous, which none—god or human—had previously turned in a similar fashion in the world
The differentiation as to whether it requires interpretation or is definitive is to describe the first wheel of doctrine as surpassable, affording an occasion, requiring interpretation, and serving as a basis for controversy

Refining Wonch’uk’s presentation of the last set of qualities in both word and meaning, Đzong-ka-Щa explains that:

Surpassable means that there are other teachings of definitive meaning higher than this
Affording an occasion means that it affords an occasion for the assessment of fault by other disputants (Đzong-ka-Щa praises Paramārtha’s translation of this as “susceptible to dispute.”)
Requiring interpretation means that its meaning must be interpreted otherwise
Serving as a basis for controversy means that, since Buddha did not clearly differentiate the status of what from among the three natures exists by way of its own character and what does not, there is controversy about the meaning

The Second Wheel Of Doctrine [123] [388]

Paramārtha’samudgata’s description of the second wheel of doctrine can be structured by way of the same nine viewpoints:\textsuperscript{467}

The turner of the wheel is the Supramundane Victor
The time is the second period (which, according to Jam-ŷang-shay-Щa, begins with the first pronouncement of the middle-wheel sutras and extends up to Buddha’s death)\textsuperscript{468}
The places are not mentioned in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought because they are manifold—it was set forth in sixteen assemblies at four places, such as Vulture Peak
The intended trainees are those of the Great Vehicle lineage mainly engaged in the scriptural collections of the Great Vehicle through hearing, thinking, and meditating.

The topics are the naturelessness of all phenomena, their absence of production, absence of cessation, quiescence from the start, and being naturally passed beyond sorrow.

The mode of teaching is to declare that all phenomena without differentiation are equally not established by way of their own character (or not established from their own side).

The entity is that it is the second wheel of doctrine relative to the first.

The praise is to call it very fantastic and marvelous since, by way of its extensive teaching of emptiness, it is the principal of all sūtras (even in the Mind-Only School).

The differentiation as to whether it requires interpretation or is definitive is to describe the second wheel of doctrine as surpassable, affording an occasion, requiring interpretation, and serving as a basis for controversy.

Đōng-kā-ba criticizes Wonch'uk for merely saying the final set of four qualities are so “in relation to the third wheel.” He also passes off Paramārtha’s explanation, cited by Wonch’uk, as not good and thus does not even cite it or explain his disdain. He says the four should be interpreted as above for the first wheel:

- Surpassable means that there are other teachings of definitive meaning higher than this.
- Affording an occasion means that it affords an occasion for the assessment of fault by other disputants.
- Requiring interpretation means that its meaning must be interpreted otherwise.
- Serving as a basis for controversy means that, since Buddha did not clearly differentiate the status of what from among the three natures exists by way of its own character and what does not, there is controversy about the meaning.

_The Third Wheel Of Doctrine_ [124] [388]

As before, Paramārthasamudgata’s description of the third wheel of doctrine can be structured by way of the same nine viewpoints:

- The turner of the wheel is the Supramundane Victor.
- The time is the third period (which, according to Jam-γyang-shay-ḥa, begins with the first pronouncement of the third-wheel sūtras and extends through Buddha’s death).
- The places are not mentioned in the _Sūtra Unraveling the Thought_, but it was spoken to eight assemblies in seven places, the principal of which is
Vaishali, since that is where the *Sutra Unraveling the Thought* was spoken

- The intended trainees are those of the Great Vehicle lineage mainly engaged in the scriptural collections of both the Lesser Vehicle and the Great Vehicle through hearing, thinking, and meditating
- The topics are—as with the middle wheel—the naturelessness of all phenomena, their absence of production, absence of cessation, quiescence from the start, and naturally being passed beyond sorrow
- The mode of teaching is to differentiate a presentation of three natures and three non-natures with respect to each phenomenon
- The entity is that it is the third wheel of doctrine relative to the first two wheels of doctrine
- The praise is to call it fantastic and marvelous
- The differentiation as to whether it requires interpretation or is definitively RangeIntDiffSynChapFour is to describe *this Sutra Unraveling the Thought* that makes such differentiation—and not other sutras that do not—as unsurpassable, not affording an occasion for refutation, being definitive, and not serving as a basis for controversy

Dzong-ka-ba points out that the set of four qualities of the third wheel mean the opposite of his earlier explanation with respect to the first wheel. Thus, if we reverse the earlier descriptions and add his further comments:

- Unsurpassable means that there are not other teachings of definitive meaning higher than this
- Not affording an occasion means that it does not afford an occasion for the assessment of fault by other disputants since its literal meaning, unlike the previous two wheels, does not need to be interpreted otherwise
- Being definitive means that its meaning need not be interpreted otherwise
- Not serving as a basis for controversy means that since Buddha clearly differentiated the status of what from among the three natures exists by way of its own character and what does not, there is no controversy about the meaning, for there is no room for controversy when scholars analyze whether the meaning of the sutra is or is not to be delineated that way, even though there can be other controversies (such as objections by the Proponents of Non-Nature)

Dzong-ka-ba quotes Wonch‘uk on these four and laconically faults the first part of his twofold interpretation of the second quality—“Because it does not afford an occasion for something more superior later and does not afford an occasion for later destruction, it does not afford an occasion.” Jik-may-dam-chö-gyatso explains the unsuitability of Wonch‘uk’s explanation as being that if it means that the third wheel does not allow for there being something superior to it, then (1) it is redundant with the earlier mention that “there is no other exceeding it” and (2) the second wheel would also “not afford an occasion.” Jik-
may-dam-chö-gya-tso's latter point is that sharp Bodhisattvas can, without further explanation, understand the second wheel as teaching the three natures and three non-natures, and thus the second wheel teaches the three natures and three non-natures even if not on the literal level, and hence the second wheel also does not afford an occasion for there being something superior to it, in this sense.

Dzong-ka-ba [126] 389 agrees with Wonch’uk that the first wheel is to be called the wheel of doctrine of the four truths and that the second is to be called the wheel of doctrine of no character, but he does not agree that the third is to be called the wheel of the ultimate, the definitive. Rather, he prefers “the wheel of good differentiation,” based on the sūtra’s description:

The Supramundane Victor turned a third wheel of doctrine for those engaged in all vehicles, possessed of good differentiation, fantastic and marvelous.

(Perhaps Dzong-ka-ba seeks to preserve the point that the middle wheel teaches the ultimate, even if not on the literal level.)

Identifying Just What Scriptures The Sūtra Unraveling the Thought Is Calling Interpretable And Definitive And Why Buddha Made This Division [128] 390

Dzong-ka-ba emphatically makes the point that the scriptures that the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought says require interpretation or are definitive are not all teachings during certain periods. What the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought says require interpretation in the first period are the teachings that all phenomena are established by way of their own character (or established by way of their own character as the referents of their respective conceptual consciousnesses), and not other teachings, such as when Buddha told the five ascetics, “The lower robe should be worn in a circular fashion,” meaning not to let it sag here and there. Similarly, what require interpretation in the second period are the teachings that all phenomena are not established by way of their own character (or are not established from their own side), and others that do not teach such naturelessness are not the concern. The teachings that the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought says are definitive in the third period are those that differentiate clearly between what from among the three natures are established by way of their own character and what are not—that give a clear presentation of the three natures and three non-natures—and not all teachings during the third period, as when, for instance, about to pass away, Buddha told his disciples that it would be suitable to use his earlier declarations concerning similar ethical situations as a basis for deciding new issues that he had not addressed; this type of teaching is not of concern to the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought in its declaration that certain third-wheel teachings are definitive.
The purpose [129] [390] behind Buddha's differentiation between what require interpretation and what are definitive is that he is intent that trainees of the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought overcome taking literally the teachings that phenomena, without differentiation, either are or are not established by way of their own character. He wanted to teach them that:

- imputational natures are not established by way of their own character,
- other-powered natures and thoroughly established natures are established by way of their own character, and
- other-powered natures' emptiness of the imputational factor is the final ultimate that is the object of observation of the path.

Criticizing The Descriptions Of The Three Wheels Of Doctrine By The Jo-nang-bas, Bu-dön, And Others [129] [390]

Đōng-ka-ba ends the section on what the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought itself says about differentiating the interpretable and the definitive with a very brief refutation of the Jo-nang-bas, Bu-dön, and others without mentioning any of them by name. He accuses them of not having analyzed well Paramārthaśamudgata's question, Buddha's answer, or how sūtras are posited as requiring interpretation or being definitive. As Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso

explains, these scholars hold the mistaken notion that the division of sūtras as to whether they require interpretation or are definitive is made only by way of periods in Buddha's teaching rather than by way of whether teachings do or do not differentiate which from among the three natures is established by way of its own character. Thus, the Jo-nang-bas take literally all scriptures of the third period, including a certain type of teaching on the matrix of One Gone Thus (Buddha nature) that says that a fully developed Buddha is already present in sentient beings' continuums and that actually was given for the sake of non-Buddhists addicted to the conception of self. Bu-dön Rin-chen-drup and so forth, on the other hand, seeing the fallacy of taking such teachings literally, hold that the differentiation of what requires interpretation and what is definitive, as found in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought, is itself not to be taken literally (supposedly even in the Mind-Only system).

In addition, rather than holding that, according to the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought, other-powered natures and thoroughly established natures exist by way of their own character and that imputational natures do not exist by way of their own character, the Jo-nang-bas hold that only the thoroughly established nature exists by way of its own character, whereas the other two natures are only fancied by a mistaken awareness to exist at all. This is what they hold to be the meaning of the good differentiation by the third wheel of doctrine.
MIND-ONLY SCHOOL:
EXPLICATIONS OF THE SŪTRA UNRAVELING
THE THOUGHT ON DIFFERENTIATING
THE INTERPRETABLE AND THE DEFINITIVE
Overview of Chapters 5 Through 12

In the second section of his exposition of the Mind-Only School [135] [392], Đzong-ka-ba turns to great Indian Mind-Only treatises for their exegesis of the topic of the interpretable and the definitive in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*. Initially, he shows how Asaṅga, who came to be renowned as the founder of the Mind-Only School, relied on the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*. Then, in chapters 6 through 12, he discusses central Mind-Only treatises by Asaṅga and Maitreya and briefly treats others. From among the four contexts mentioned above as operative in the first section,

- Presenting Indian Mind-Only scholarship, so that the architecture of the system can be engaged
- Distinguishing the Mind-Only School from the Consequence School
- Refining the Korean scholar Wonch’uk’s seventh-century presentation
- Criticizing the eclectic syncretism of his close thirteenth and fourteenth Tibetan predecessor Jo-nang-ba Shay-rap-gyet-sen,

Đzong-ka-ba no longer addresses Wonch’uk’s interpretations, probably because, from his viewpoint, the refinements he has made are sufficient, but not because Indian exegesis of the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* is now his focus, since Wonch’uk, as is obvious from even a quick reading of his commentary, was well versed in Indian treatises, which he very frequently cites.
5. The Importance of the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought

As commanding evidence [135] [392] that the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought is vital to Asaṅga's system, Đzong-ka-ba points out that, except for its introductory chapter, Asaṅga cites the sūtra almost in its entirety, chapter by chapter, in his Compendium of Ascertainments. Also, he stresses that Asaṅga's three works on the view—the “Chapter on Suchness” in the Grounds of Bodhisattvas, the Compendium of Ascertainments, and the Summary of the Great Vehicle—derive their central theme from the statement in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought that other-powered natures' emptiness of factors imputed in the manner of entities and attributes is the thoroughly established nature. Finally, he indicates that the teachings on emptiness in Maitreya's Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras, Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes, and so forth, as well as their commentaries, accord with the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought.

These points not only show the connection of these treatises with the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought but also account for Đzong-ka-ba's own exclusive concentration on this sūtra in the previous section. In addition, the importance of this sūtra to Asaṅga and Maitreya justifies his citing its very clear statements about the thoroughly established nature as a mere absence in order to refute the Jo-nang-ba presentation of a positive ultimate. (Indeed, the sūtra's statements to this effect are even clearer than are those in Asaṅga's and Maitreya's treatises.)
Overview of Chapters 6 Through 9

Dézong-ka-ba's exposition of major Indian Mind-Only treatises in terms of their exegesis of the sūtra's discussion about the interpretable and the definitive begins with how these treatises refute the two extremes of superimposition and nihilism in general. These comprise chapters 6 through 9; he gives a more specific refutation of the extreme of superimposition in chapters 10 and 11; and finally in chapter 12 he considers how, in dependence on the determination of the middle free from the extremes, scriptures are differentiated into those that require interpretation and those that are definitive.

In chapters 6 through 9 Dézong-ka-ba focuses on four texts:

- Asaṅga's
  * *Grounds of Bodhisattvas*
  * *Compendium of Ascertainments*

- Maitreya's
  * *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras*
  * *Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes*

He secondarily touches on nine texts by four authors:

- Vasubandhu's
  * *The Thirty*
  * *Principles of Explanation*
  * *Commentary on (Maitreya's) "Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes"*
  * *Explanation of (Maitreya's) "Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras"*
  * *The Twenty*

- Sthiramati's
  * *Explanation of (Vasubandhu's) Commentary on (Maitreya's) "Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes"*
  * *Commentary on (Vasubandhu's) "The Thirty"*

- Dignāga's
  * *Summary Meanings of the Eight Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra*
  * *Examination of Objects of Observation*

- Dharmakīrti's
  * *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition. "*

Along the way, he occasionally refers to:

* Dharmakīrti's Ascertainment of Prime Cognition (tsad ma rnam par nges pa, pramāṇavi-ni-caya; Peking 5710, vol. 130) is mentioned in passing.
• Asaṅga’s
  Summary of Manifest Knowledge
  Summary of the Great Vehicle

Dzong-ka-ba frames these four chapters around how these texts avoid the extremes of superimposition (or reification) and deprecation, but the emphases within each chapter differ.

• Chapter 6, on Asaṅga’s Grounds of Bodhisattvas, introduces the issue of the two extremes of reification and deprecation but focuses on the extreme of deprecation—describing the pitfalls of holding that other-powered natures are not ultimately established and not established by way of their own character, as is asserted by the Proponents of Non-Nature.

• Chapter 7, on Asaṅga’s Compendium of Ascertainments, continues describing how the extreme of deprecation is avoided; it depicts a debate by Proponents of Mind-Only against the assertion by Proponents of Non-Nature that all phenomena just conventionally exist and do not ultimately exist. In order to dispel confusion between the Mind-Only School and the Naturelessness School, it then explores the complex usage of the vocabulary of (1) the two truths, (2) existing ultimately and existing conventionally, and (3) existing substantially and existing imputedly.

• Chapter 8, on Maitreya’s Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras, lays out the thought behind the six teachings in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras that phenomena are natureless, without production, without cessation, quiescent from the start, and naturally passed beyond sorrow, as well as that practitioners should attain forbearance with respect to the doctrine of non-production. It also explores how an object can be untrue like an illusion and yet truly exist.

• Chapter 9, on Maitreya’s Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes, focuses on the Mind-Only doctrine that other-powered natures and emptiness truly exist but duality does not exist, thereby delineating emptiness and the middle path free from the two extremes. As an appendage, brief mention is made of Dignāga’s Summary Meanings of the Eight Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra and Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Prime Cognition”; in the latter Dzong-ka-ba focuses on how Dharmakīrti posits the thought behind the literal reading of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras.

Let us consider these four chapters in detail.
6. Asaṅga’s *Grounds of Bodhisattvas*

**Overview.** This chapter [140] [393] has three basic movements:

1. Within drawing out the implications of the vocabulary of the *Grounds of Bodhisattvas*, describing the final nature of phenomena through the route of identifying the extremes of superimposition and deprecation.

2. After putting off discussion of the extreme of superimposition until chapter 10, showing how the *Grounds of Bodhisattvas* refutes the extreme of deprecation by depicting a controversy on the final nature of phenomena between the Proponents of Mind-Only and unnamed opponents—who by context are understood to be the Proponents of Non-Nature (the dispute centers on whether other-powered natures are established by way of their own character).

3. Ending with a depiction of the suchness of phenomena that avoids the extremes of superimposition and of deprecation according to the Mind-Only system.

Final Nature Of Phenomena [140] [393]

To expose how this system differs from that of the Proponents of Non-Nature, Đōong-ka-ba cites Asaṅga’s description of the final nature of phenomena:

> The middle—the final nature of phenomena—avoids the extremes of superimposition and deprecation. The extreme of superimposition is to misapprehend imputational natures as established by way of their own character, and the extreme of deprecation is to misapprehend other-powered natures that are “real things ultimately existing with an inexpressible essence” as not ultimately established by way of their own character.

Those who commit the latter fallacy have fallen away from the doctrine of the Great Vehicle through such deprecatory nihilism; they are the Proponents of Non-Nature.

Đōong-ka-ba makes the distinctions that:

- When Asaṅga speaks of the “nature of imputational words” he is referring not to the words that impute a false nature (words themselves being other-powered natures) but to the false nature that is imputed by words. It is not words that are being refuted but a misconceived nature of things imputed by verbalization and conceptual consciousnesses—the establishment of objects by way of their own character as the referents of their respective terms and conceptual consciousnesses.

- When Asaṅga speaks of superimposition, he uses the vocabulary of “own-
character," and when he speaks of deprecation he uses the vocabulary of "not existing ultimately," and thus it can be seen that existing by way of its own character and existing ultimately are equivalent. Hence, conceiving imputational natures to exist ultimately or to be established by way of their own character is a superimposition, and conceiving other-powered natures not to be established by way of their own character or not to exist ultimately is a deprecation.

- When Asaṅga speaks of deprecation, he casts the topic only in reference to holding that other-powered natures do not ultimately exist and does not mention thoroughly established natures. However, Óṣong-ka-ba extends the explanation of deprecation to include thoroughly established natures since if other-powered natures did not ultimately exist, their final nature—that is, their thoroughly established nature—also would not ultimately exist.

- The deprecation of other-powered natures that Proponents of Non-Nature commit is not that they claim that other-powered natures do not exist at all but that they claim that these do not ultimately exist, or do not exist by way of their own character. This is a deprecation since, according to the Mind-Only School, other-powered natures do indeed ultimately exist. (Still, for the Mind-Only School, the claim that other-powered natures do not ultimately exist amounts to holding that they do not exist at all even if the Proponents of Non-Nature do not say this, as is seen in the next section.)

Having made these distinctions, he proceeds to show how Asaṅga refutes the extreme of deprecation that is asserted by the Proponents of Non-Nature.

Refuting The Extreme Of Deprecation [143] [396]

To the Proponents of Non-Nature who hold that all phenomena—the five aggregates and so forth—exist conventionally and do not exist ultimately, the Proponents of Mind-Only make the objection:

When the other-powered natures that are the bases of designation of the imputational nature are established by way of their own character, then imputational natures can be imputed, but if they are not established by way of their own character, imputational natures cannot be imputed. This is like the fact that, for example, when the mental and physical aggregates are established by way of their own character, a person is suitable to be imputed in dependence upon them, whereas if they are not established by way of their own character, then, since the bases of imputation do not exist, a person is not suitable to be imputed in dependence upon them.

Óṣong-ka-ba makes the side-point that, nevertheless, the principle that the ba-
sis of imputation must be established by way of its own character does not apply to all phenomena, since it is not to be extended to existent imputational natures such as uncompounded space. For it is a cardinal rule, expounded in the Sutra Unraveling the Thought itself, that imputational natures “do not subsist by way of their own character,” and thus uncompounded space—which is not an other-powered nature (because it is not produced by causes and conditions) and which is not a thoroughly established nature (because it is not the final reality of phenomena) and thus must be an (existent) imputational nature—must not exist by way of its own character.

The Proponents of Non-Nature cannot respond to the above-stated challenge by saying:

Other-powered natures are causes and effects for a mistaken consciousness that conceives causes and effects to be truly established, but other-powered natures themselves actually are not established as causes and effects.

For then they would have no way to posit actual cause and effect, and the doctrine of karma would be lost. For example, a rope is a snake for a consciousness misconceiving it to be a snake, but it simply is not a snake.

In the Mind-Only School, production that is not established by way of its own character or is not ultimately existent is as good as nonexistent, a mere figment of the imagination. When the Proponents of Non-Nature claim that no phenomenon ultimately exists and that the absence of ultimate existence is the very meaning of suchness, they have fallen into the chief of annihilatory views. Asanga cites a sutra passage saying that those who misapprehend emptiness and thereby deprecate all phenomena neglect proper training and ruin others, as a consequence of which they will be reborn in a hell. (This theme resurfaces in the next chapter, when Özong-ka-ba criticizes certain Tibetan scholars for holding that, according to the Mind-Only School, all phenomena only conventionally exist; he says that they mistakenly attribute to the Proponents of Mind-Only the very view that, as shown here, this school considers the pit of nihilism.)

Delineation Of The Middle Position [147] [400]

The chapter concludes with a brief recapitulation of what the actual suchness of phenomena is in the Mind-Only School, based on a pithy statement in the Grounds of Bodhisattvas that Özong-ka-ba cites in similar form in chapter 9 on Maitreya’s Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes from Vasubandhu’s commentary. In short, the meaning is that:

- The absence of the ultimate existence of the imputational nature in other-powered natures is the thoroughly established nature
- The remainder—identified as other-powered natures or as both other-
powered natures and thoroughly established natures—ultimately exists
- One who perceives this is non-erroneously oriented to emptiness

In this way, both the extreme of superimposition and the extreme of depreca-
tion are avoided, whereby the true middle is delineated.

Through these points, Dzong-ka-ba emphasizes the differentiation of the
tenets of the Mind-Only School from those of the Naturelessness School—this
theme continuing in the next three chapters. By showing how these systems
differ from each other, he perforce demonstrates that the Jo-nang-ba eclecticism
is uninformed and unfounded.
7. Asaṅga’s *Compendium of Ascertainments*

**Overview.** This chapter [149] {402} has four basic movements:

1. Showing how the extreme of deprecation is avoided in Asaṅga’s *Compendium of Ascertainments* by citing another debate that Asaṅga carries on with the Proponents of Non-Nature, who accept the literal reading of the statement in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras that everything exists conventionally, nothing exists ultimately (Thus the chapter begins with again distinguishing the Mind-Only School from the Naturelessness School.)

2. On the basis of this debate, criticizing those Tibetans who hold that, according to the Mind-Only School, other-powered natures exist only conventionally and do not exist ultimately.

3. Handling seemingly divergent usages—in the Mind-Only system itself—of the vocabulary of existing conventionally and existing ultimately, in order to dispel possible criticisms of his interpretation of the Mind-Only system (He shows how statements in Mind-Only texts that seem to suggest that other-powered natures do not ultimately exist do not actually mean this—thereby undercutting the possibility that Proponents of Mind-Only could agree with Proponents of Non-Nature that other-powered natures exist only conventionally.)

4. Ending with a reminder that, through understanding the many meanings of vocabulary for levels of existence in Indian treatises, one can appreciate the need on the part of the Proponents of Non-Nature to refute other schools’ assertions, even if their respective positions have superficial similarities.

The concern throughout the chapter is with establishing differences between the Mind-Only School and the Naturelessness School.

The Debate [149] {402}

To expose inconsistencies in the position of the Proponents of Non-Nature, Asaṅga asks them:

What is the ultimate (*don dam, paramārtha*)? What is the concealer (*kun rdzob, samyæz?)?

Đzong-ka-ba cogently takes the first part of the question as asking what the ultimate truth (*don dam bden pa, paramārthasatya*) is, but he does not take the second part as asking what conventional truths (*kun rdzob bden pa, samyæzatya*) are. Indeed, the run of the debate bears out his reading that the second part concerns the ignorance, or concealing consciousness, in the face of which
phenomena other than emptiness are wrongly considered to be truths, that is to say, to exist the way they appear.¹

The Proponents of Non-Nature answer:

The naturelessness, or absence of ultimate existence, of all phenomena is the ultimate. That which conceives those phenomena—which are without ultimate existence—to have ultimate existence is the concealer of the true nature of phenomena.

Asaṅga [151] [404] now grills the Proponents of Non-Nature about the status of the concealing ignorant consciousness itself:

Does the concealing consciousness arise from causes which are of its own similar type, or is it mere verbalization and convention, that is, imputedly existent? If it arises from causes that are of its own similar type, then since it arises from causes, it is not suitable to say that it does not (ultimately) exist.

Ḍzong-ka-ba takes "exist" to mean not mere existence but ultimate existence, since the Proponents of Non-Nature do assert that phenomena conventionally exist. Thus, the debate is about whether an ignorant consciousness misconceiving phenomena to ultimately exist itself ultimately exists; by extension, it also is about whether other-powered natures ultimately exist. (Indeed, although neither Asaṅga nor Ḍzong-ka-ba cites it at this point, the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought itself says, "That which does not exist by way of its own character is not produced," and hence in the Mind-Only system whatever is produced must be established by way of its own character.)

Asaṅga continues:

If an ignorant, concealing consciousness misconceiving ultimate existence is merely verbal and conventional, then all other-powered natures likewise would be only imputed by conceptuality. In that case, they would be nonexistent, and thus it is not suitable to assert that a consciousness conceiving ultimate existence is imputedly existent.

Next Asaṅga [152] [405] grills the Proponents of Non-Nature about the ultimate:

Given that other-powered natures are observed to be ultimately existent, how can you claim that their absence of ultimate existence is the ultimate? Why do you claim that things are not existent, that is, are not ultimately existent or are not established by way of their own character?

¹ At first blush, his reading seems to be a suspicious maneuver to maintain a facet of his own interpretation of the Mind-Only School; however, further analysis does not support that suspicion.
The Proponents of Non-Nature answer:

That there is a consciousness that observes, or conceives, phenomena to ultimately exist does not damage our assertion that objects are not ultimately existent, because such a consciousness is erroneous.

Asaṅga responds:

Do you assert that this erroneous consciousness exists (ultimately) or that it does not exist (ultimately)? If it does, then it is not suitable for you to say that the naturelessness, that is, the absence of ultimate existence, of all phenomena, is the ultimate since this erroneous consciousness would exist ultimately. If it does not exist (ultimately), then since it would not exist at all, it is not suitable to say that because this consciousness erroneously conceives ultimate existence, what is observed by it is actually natureless, that is, without ultimate existence.

Having described the conflict between the Proponents of Mind-Only and Proponents of Non-Nature on the mode of being of phenomena, Dzong-ka-با [154] [405] cites Asaṅga’s *Compendium of Ascertainties* to show that:

- it describes the two extremes in a way similar to that in the same author’s *Grounds of Bodhisattvas*, especially on the issue of what constitutes depreciation—this being to hold that other-powered natures and thoroughly established natures are not established by way of their own character; and
- it indicates that among imputational natures some exist and some do not and that existent imputational natures are imputedly existent and conventionally existent.

On the basis of the latter point, Dzong-ka-با [156] [406] criticizes a commentary (not the one by Wonch’uk) on the Sūtra *Unraveling the Thought* that holds that imputational natures (and thus all imputational natures including existent ones) are not included anywhere in the two truths. That commentary also mistakenly says that subject and object as different entities are other-powered natures and dependent-arisings, whereas in fact subject and object as different entities do not exist at all, as is indicated in Asaṅga’s *Summary of the Great Vehicle*, *Grounds of Bodhisattvas*, and *Compendium of Ascertainties*. These facts make it impossible that Asaṅga, as one scholar claims, wrote the above-mentioned commentary on the Sūtra *Unraveling the Thought*, as does the fact that the commentary cites Dharmakīrti’s *Ascertainment of Prime Cognition*, which postdates Asaṅga. Dzong-ka-با adds that Asaṅga had no need to write a separate commentary on the Sūtra *Unraveling the Thought*, since in the *Compendium of Ascertainties* he cites almost all of the sūtra and delineates the difficult points. (I take the “difficult points” to refer, for instance, to the arguments that are presented in this chapter.)
Criticizing A Recent Interpretation [157] {406}

Having established that in Asaṅga's system other-powered natures ultimately exist, Dzong-ka-ba criticizes a scholar who claims that Asaṅga holds that other-powered natures do not ultimately exist and only conventionally exist. The criticism is that this scholar thereby attributes to Asaṅga just the position that Asaṅga himself considers the very pit of deprecation. That scholar is variously identified by later exegetes as either of Dzong-ka-ba's immediate predecessors in the fourteenth century, Bu-don Rin-chen-drup or Jo-nang-ba Shay-rap-gyet-sen. Relative to Dzong-ka-ba's more indirect rebuttals, this strong refutation stands as a theme-repeating crescendo. Still, their opinion is based on statements in Indian Mind-Only texts that other-powered natures exist conventionally, and thus Dzong-ka-ba begins a detailed analysis of terminology in order to reveal the different contexts in which it is said in some places that other-powered natures conventionally exist and in others that other-powered natures ultimately exist. Shay-rap-gyet-sen, for instance, would stress the former, interpreting conventional existence to mean that other-powered natures exist only for ignorance, whereas Dzong-ka-ba stresses the latter, interpreting the ultimate existence of other-powered natures as not implying that they are ultimate truths. Since the same Indian texts do say both, Dzong-ka-ba must show how these two attributions are not contradictory. Thereby any assumed harmony between statements in the Mind-Only School and in the Middle Way School that phenomena only conventionally exist will be undermined.

Handling Complex Vocabulary In The Mind-Only System [158] {407}

He devotes the rest of the chapter to Mind-Only authors' complicated usage of the vocabulary of (1) the two truths, (2) existing ultimately and existing conventionally (including existing as an ultimate and existing as a conventionality), and (3) existing substantially and existing imputedly. The section is framed around a hypothetical objection to his delineation that in the Mind-Only School other-powered natures ultimately exist but are not ultimates.

The objection is that other-powered natures could not ultimately exist if they are not ultimates, that is, ultimate truths. The objector points to the undisputed facts that:

- the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought says that whatever is a compounded phenomenon is not ultimate,
- Maitreya's Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes says that the ultimate truth is just the thoroughly established nature,
- Maitreya's Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras says (and Vasubandhu's commentary affirms) that other-powered natures are not ultimates, and
- Asaṅga's Compendium of Ascertainments says that other-powered natures exist conventionally.
The objector cites the first three on the assumption that whatever is not an ultimate could not possibly ultimately exist, and thus Drong-ka-ba answers by distinguishing between ultimate truth and existing ultimately. He points out that other-powered natures can ultimately exist without being ultimate truths. The objector cites the last passage on the assumption that if other-powered natures exist conventionally, they could not also exist ultimately. Thus, Drong-ka-ba answers this part by explicating two meanings of “ultimately existing” and “conventionally existing”: in the first version other-powered natures ultimately exist and do not conventionally exist, but in the second version the opposite is the case. Let us consider these points.

**The First Mode Of Positing Existing Conventionally And Existing Ultimately**

[160] [409]

In the first way, an existent that is posited through the force of conventions is said to exist conventionally, and an existent that is not posited through the force of conventions but exists by way of its own character is said to exist ultimately. Hence existent imputational natures such as uncompounded space exist conventionally and do not exist ultimately, but other-powered natures and thoroughly established natures exist ultimately and do not exist conventionally.

In an important aside, Drong-ka-ba explains the difference between imputed existence and substantial existence. Imputed existence means that the object (such as a person) is not apprehensible without relying on apprehension of other phenomena (such as the mental and physical aggregates) and thus the object must be apprehended in reliance upon apprehending other phenomena. Therefore, it is not contradictory that a phenomenon such as a person (1) ultimately exists—in the sense explained above of not being posited through the force of conventions but existing by way of its own character—and yet (2) imputedly exists.

**The Second Mode Of Positing Existing Conventionally And Existing Ultimately**

[162] [410]

The second mode of existing conventionally and existing ultimately means to exist as a conventionality and to exist as an ultimate, that is to say, to exist as a conventional truth and to exist as an ultimate truth. Based on Maitreya’s *Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes* and Vasubandhu’s commentary, Drong-ka-ba analyzes the term for ultimate, paramārtha, which is translated into English literally as “highest-object.” “Highest” (dam pa, parama) is taken as the exalted wisdom of uncontaminated meditative equipoise, and “object” (don, artha) is taken as the thusness, or emptiness, that is the object of that exalted wisdom, whereby thusness is called the truth that is the object of the

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*don dam.*
highest (wisdom) \( (\text{dam pa'i don, paramasya artha-satya}) \). In another interpretation, that wisdom itself is called the highest object \( (\text{don dam pa, parama-artha}) \), since it is both highest and object; emptiness is called the truth of the highest object \( (\text{don dam pa'i bden pa, parama-arthasya satya}) \). Given these interpretations of the ultimate, only thoroughly established natures and not other-powered natures are ultimates.

Therefore, according to this second interpretation of "ultimately exist" (that is, exist as an ultimate truth), other-powered natures are not ultimates, but according to the first interpretation of "ultimately exist" (that is, exist by way of their own character), they ultimately exist. Thus, other-powered natures are conventional truths and ultimately exist, whereas existent imputational natures such as uncompounded space are conventional truths but do not ultimately exist—they conventionally exist.

Could A Wisdom Consciousness Be An Ultimate? [163] [411]

Dzong-ka-ba briefly addresses the qualm that, since ultimate truths are objects of the highest wisdom and since the Mind-Only School asserts self-consciousness, the exalted wisdom would be aware of itself, and thus it itself would be its own object, whereby it would be an ultimate truth. (If a wisdom consciousness were the ultimate, this would challenge the point he made with great emphasis in chapter 1 against the Jo-nang-bas that, according to the system of the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought, the thoroughly established nature is a mere elimination, a simple negative, in which case it could not be a consciousness.) His response is that Maitreya’s explanation that the final object observed by the purifying wisdom is the ultimate is in consideration of that object in relation to which suchness is realized; and therefore, the fault that the wisdom consciousness itself would be an ultimate is not incurred. The answer means that even though, roughly speaking, an exalted wisdom is an object of itself, only that object in relation to which a consciousness is said to be an exalted wisdom realizing emptiness is a thoroughly established nature. Thus, since an object is not posited as a thoroughly established nature merely because of being an object of an exalted wisdom, there is no fault that the exalted wisdom itself would be an ultimate truth even though, roughly speaking, it knows itself. (This debate establishes the theme of separating wisdom and emptiness even if, in direct realization of emptiness, wisdom does not distinguish itself from emptiness.) He concludes from this that the ultimate has to be uncompounded and could not be a wisdom consciousness itself but adds that other-powered natures, although not ultimate in the sense of being ultimate truths, are ultimately established in the sense of subsisting by way of their own character without being posited through the force of conventions.
Explaining Away Seeming Contradiction With Āryadeva's Statement [164] [411]

In another brief aside, Dzong-ka-ba handles evidence by an authoritative Indian master that seems to declare to the contrary that in the Mind-Only School the exalted wisdom itself is an ultimate. Āryadeva's *Compilation of the Essence of Wisdom* seems to say:

That a consciousness which is released
From apprehended-object and apprehending-subject exists as the ultimate* [that is, as the ultimate truth]
Is renowned in the texts of the Yogic Practitioners
Who have passed to the other shore of the ocean of awareness.

However, Dzong-ka-ba holds that the passage actually means:

That a consciousness which is released
From apprehended-object and apprehending-subject exists ultimately
 [that is, exists by way of its own character]
Is renowned in the texts of the Yogic Practitioners
Who have passed to the other shore of the ocean of awareness.

(Perhaps he must claim that Āryadeva means this in order to forge consistency between his own interpretation of the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* on this issue and the highly respected Āryadeva's opinion; the only other, but unacceptable, option would be to hold that he is correcting an errant opinion by Āryadeva.)

Why Does Asaṅga Say That Other-Powered Natures Exist Conventionally? [165] [412]

The remaining question is: Since other-powered natures ultimately exist in the sense that they are established by way of their own character, in what sense does Asaṅga's *Compendium of Ascertainties* say that other-powered natures conventionally exist? Dzong-ka-ba's answer is that one must understand the two ways in which that text itself speaks of other-powered natures as conventionally existing, that is to say, as existing as conventionalities. The first way that other-powered natures conventionally exist is relative to the statement in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* that ultimates are objects of observation of paths of purification; opposite to this, most other-powered natures give rise to afflicting emotions when they are observed, and thus they are said to exist conventionally, or in an obscuring manner.

The second sense in which Asaṅga's *Compendium of Ascertainties* says that other-powered natures exist conventionally, or as conventionalities, is that they are entities imputed through the conventions of names and terminology and are bases of imputing designations. Dzong-ka-ba points to Vasubandhu's *Principles of Explanation*, which says that truths, that is, existents, that are ob-

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* dam pa'i don du.
jects understood by means of conventions are convention-truths—the objects to which verbalizations refer.

Through these distinctions, Dzong-ka-ba establishes that, when Asanga, in his Compendium of Ascertainties, says that other-powered natures exist conventionally, this means that they exist as conventionalities in either or both of these two ways—they give rise to afflicting emotions, or they exist as bases of imputing designations. It is thereby confirmed that statements that other-powered natures conventionally exist do not contradict that other-powered natures exist ultimately, in the sense of existing by way of their own character.

Then, in two asides [166] [413], Dzong-ka-ba explains away divergent usages of these terms in Asanga’s Compendium of Ascertainties that might challenge his interpretation:

- Asanga speaks of a Superior’s exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise directly realizing emptiness as existing ultimately, that is, as an ultimate, contrary to the above explanation that other-powered natures are conventional truths and only emptiness is ultimate truth. Dzong-ka-ba explains merely that this is in consideration that such a wisdom consciousness does not have the latter two grounds for being posited as existing conventionally, that is, as a conventionality—namely, it does not give rise to afflicting emotions and is not posited by conventions. His nineteenth-century follower, A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso, explains further that a Superior’s exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise is called an ultimate because the ultimate truth exists as its object of comprehension; in other words, since the ultimate is its object, the wisdom consciousness gets the name of its object but it itself is not an actual ultimate. (These explanations repeat the theme of separating wisdom and emptiness.)

- Asanga’s Compendium of Ascertainties speaks of a Superior’s exalted wisdom subsequent to meditative equipoise as existing both conventionally and ultimately, that is, as a conventionality and as an ultimate, but in Dzong-ka-ba’s system the two truths are mutually exclusive—nothing could be both. A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso explains away Asanga’s statement by asserting that it is another case of naming the subject from the viewpoint of the object; he indicates that from the viewpoint of its observing conventional phenomena, a Superior’s exalted wisdom subsequent to meditative equipoise is said to exist conventionally, that is, as a conventionality, and from the viewpoint of its understanding emptiness, it is said to exist ultimately, that is, as an ultimate, even though it is not an actual ultimate. (Again, wisdom and emptiness are separated through explaining away a statement that seems to suggest the opposite.)

Since Dzong-ka-ba’s presentation requires many distinctions and thus may look like his own creation, he caps his case by citing a passage from Vasubandhu’s
Principles of Explanation [168] [413]. This Indian text provides supporting evidence for the non-contradiction of other-powered natures’ existing conventionally, that is, as conventionalities, and yet existing ultimately, in the sense of being established by way of their own character. Vasubandhu explains that:

- actions and fruitions both exist ultimately, in the sense of existing by way of their own character, and exist conventionally in the sense of existing as bases of the imputation of conventions, that is to say, as conventionalities, and
- persons also exist in these two ways, but, unlike actions and fruitions, they do not substantially exist; they imputedly exist.

In a final step [170] [414], Dzong-ka-ba handles another seemingly divergent usage of these terms. He explains a passage in Maitreya’s Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes saying that thoroughly established natures are verbal conventionalities, whereas in his own interpretation thoroughly established natures are only ultimates. His rationalization is that Maitreya is indicating that verbalizations are conventionalities and that even thoroughly established natures are referents of verbalizations—the import being that Maitreya is not indicating that thoroughly established natures are actual conventionalities.

Conventional and Ultimate Existence

**EXISTING CONVENTIONALLY:** kun rdzob tu yod pa, samyvti(tas)-sat

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meaning</th>
<th>What from Three Natures</th>
<th>Illustrations</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Existing within being posited through the force of conventions (usually translated here as “existing conventionally”)</td>
<td>Existents imputations</td>
<td>Uncompounded space, being the referent of terms and conceptual consciousnesses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Giving rise to afflictive emotions when they are observed (usually translated here as “existing as a conventionality” or “existing as a conventional truth”)</td>
<td>Most other-powered natures (but not a superior’s exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise and not a superior’s exalted wisdom subsequent to meditative equipoise, for instance)</td>
<td>A beautiful body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Existing as entities imputed through the conventions of names and terminology and as bases of imputing designations</td>
<td>Existents imputational natures, most other-powered natures (but not a superior’s exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise, for instance, and not a superior’s exalted wisdom subsequent to meditative equipoise [?])</td>
<td>Uncompounded space, house</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exceptional usage: referent of a verbalization</td>
<td>Thoroughly established natures</td>
<td>An emptiness (even though it is not an actual conventionality)</td>
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EXISTING ULTIMATELY: *don dam par yod pa, paramārtha(tas)-sat*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meaning</th>
<th>What from Three Natures</th>
<th>Illustrations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Existing within not being posited through the force of conventions but by way of its own character (usually translated here as &quot;existing ultimately&quot;)</td>
<td>Other-powered natures and thoroughly established natures</td>
<td>A conceptual consciousness, a chair, a term, a person, a superior’s exalted wisdom subsequent to meditative equipoise, an emptiness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Existing as a final object of observation by a path of purification (usually translated here as “existing as an ultimate” or “existing as an ultimate truth”)</td>
<td>Thoroughly established natures</td>
<td>An emptiness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exceptional usage: not giving rise to afflicting emotions and not posited by conventions</td>
<td>Pure other-powered natures (?)</td>
<td>A Superior’s exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise, for instance.*</td>
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* Since the ultimate is its object, the wisdom consciousness gets the name of its object, but it itself is not an actual ultimate.

Hence, if exceptional usages are not considered,

- **all other-powered natures** exist ultimately in only the first sense of existing ultimately,

- **most other-powered natures** exist conventionally in the second and third senses of existing conventionally,

- **all existent imputational natures** exist conventionally in the first and third senses of existing conventionally, and none exist ultimately in any of the senses of existing ultimately, and

- **all thoroughly established natures** exist ultimately in both the first and second senses of existing ultimately, but none exist conventionally in any of the senses of existing conventionally.

Also, since imputed existence (*btags yod, prajñāpti-sat*) means that the object (such as a person) is not apprehensible without relying on apprehension of other phenomena (such as the mental and physical aggregates) and thus the object must be apprehended in reliance upon apprehending other phenomena, it is not contradictory that a phenomenon such as a person:

- ultimately exists in the first sense of existing ultimately—that is, not being posited through the force of conventions but existing by way of its own character—and yet
- imputedly exists.

Importance Of Understanding This Vocabulary [171] [415]

Đzong-ka-ba has subjected the multivalent usage of terminology in India, esthetically delightful in its juxtapositions of unlikely combinations of terms, to a
rigorous, philosophical analysis in order to expose an internally consistent system. (Of course, whether that consistency is endemic to the Indian text or is superimposed needs to be examined; in any case, it is clear that literary multivalency in India gives way to philosophical rigor in Dzong-ka-ba's system.) In this light, he concludes the chapter on Asaṅga's *Compendium of Ascertainties* by stressing the importance of delineating the actual import of terminology on the status of objects:

- the different meanings of substantial existence and imputed existence, and
- the meanings of existing conventionally and existing ultimately, as well as existing as a conventionality and existing as an ultimate.

He states that, by knowing how these terms are used in different systems, as well as the multiple meanings they have within a single system, one can understand why the Proponents of Non-Nature have to prove to the other Buddhist schools that many phenomena, such as persons, do not exist ultimately even though those phenomena are asserted by those very schools to be imputedly existent and to exist conventionally. He thereby justifies their refutations of other Buddhist systems despite those schools' sometimes using vocabulary superficially similar to that used in the Naturelessness School. Dzong-ka-ba reinvoles an overall purpose for his *The Essence of Eloquence*—delineating the context of the view of emptiness in the Naturelessness School. As was mentioned earlier (p. 12), he wrote this text after beginning a commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle*; it may be that he felt that to continue that commentary, he needed to set the historical philosophical context of the critiques of the Mind-Only School, and so forth, by Proponents of Non-Nature.

In sum, the chapter begins with distinguishing the Proponents of Mind-Only from the Proponents of Non-Nature and ends with a reference to understanding criticisms of other systems by Proponents of Non-Nature. The theme of distinction of systems is stressed both to undermine the syncretic doctrine of the Jo-nang-bas and to appreciate the subtleties of the criticisms by the Proponents of Non-Nature.
8. Maitreya’s *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras*

*Overview.* This chapter [172] {416} has two basic movements:

1. Considering explanations—in Maitreya’s *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras*—of the thoughts behind three groups of teachings in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras, whereby it is shown that in this text Maitreya, unlike the Proponents of Non-Nature, does not take the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras literally.

2. Considering an objection that the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* and Maitreya’s *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras* use the example of a magician’s illusion for other-powered natures and thus would seem to hold the position of the Proponents of Non-Nature—that all phenomena lack true existence—and responding that the Mind-Only School can use this and other examples of illusion without holding that all phenomena lack true existence.

Thoughts Behind Teachings In The Perfection Of Wisdom Sūtras [172] {416}

Exploring the esthetic delight that Indian scholars take in creatively positing what is behind certain teachings in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras, and so forth, Dzong-ka-ba finds in Maitreya’s text a plethora of types of naturelessness, non-production, and so forth. Indians’ creative positing of a multiplicity of specific negations that Buddha had in mind when his words seemed only to be setting forth a general negative teaching draws from a wide variety of Buddhist perspectives on phenomena. As in Indian and Tibetan art, multiplicity—and not simplicity—is what is predominantly considered elegant.

1. That phenomena are natureless was taught in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras and so forth in consideration of five facts in two groups:  

   **Compounded phenomena of the three times are natureless, in the sense that:**
   
   1. a future compounded phenomenon is not produced through its own power,
   2. a past compounded phenomenon is not produced again as itself,
   3. a present compounded phenomenon does not abide for a second moment after its own time.

   **Compounded phenomena are natureless, in the sense that five natures of phenomena as conceived by childish beings do not exist:**
   
   4. what is conceived to be clean is actually unclean; what is conceived to be happiness is actually suffering; what is conceived to be
permanent is actually impermanent; what is conceived to be self is actually not self; and
5. whereas object and subject are not different substantial entities, they are conceived to be.

2. That phenomena have no production, no cessation, are quiescent from the start, and are naturally passed beyond sorrow was taught in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras and so forth [173] [417] in consideration of the facts that:
   • in just the many ways that phenomena are natureless, so they are not produced;
   • in just the ways that they are not produced, so they do not cease;
   • in just the ways that they are not produced and do not cease, so they are quiescent from the start; and
   • and in those same ways they are naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow.

3. In the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras and so forth [173] [418], Buddha speaks of attaining forbearance, that is, facility and non-fear, with respect to the doctrine of non-production in consideration that there are eight types of non-production:
   1. No production of a beginning to cyclic existence
   2. No production again of a compounded phenomenon that was produced before
   3. No new production of sentient beings who did not earlier exist in cyclic existence and no production of phenomena that did not exist earlier since something of similar type to what ceased earlier is produced
   4. No production of imputational natures by way of their own character
   5. No production of other-powered natures under their own power without relying on their respective conditions
   6. No production and no change in thoroughly established natures
   7. No production of afflictive emotions in Foe Destroyers
   8. No production of enhancements in a Buddha’s Truth Body

The positing of thoughts behind Buddha’s teaching—that all phenomena are natureless, have no production, have no cessation, are quiescent from the start, and are naturally passed beyond sorrow, as well as that one is to attain forbearance with respect to the doctrine of non-production—means that these seemingly blanket, negative declarations with respect to all phenomena are not to be taken literally, as the Proponents of Non-Nature do. Rather, there were specific types of naturelessness and non-productions that Buddha had in mind.

(Since there appears to be no evidence internal to the Perfection of Wis-
dom Sutras that Buddha had all these limited negations in mind when he made such blanket statements, we can see the strong intention on the part of these commentators to counteract a perceived, excessive sense of negativity found in interpretations by the Proponents of Non-Nature. A tendency toward less negative and more positive interpretations can be seen in many Great Vehicle systems from India to Japan.)

How The Example Of A Magician’s Illusion Is Used [176] {419}

Having established that for Maitreya’s Ornaments for the Great Vehicle Sutras the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras are not to be taken in accordance with its verbal rendering, Dzong-ka-ba addresses the qualm that it is contradictory for the Mind-Only School to assert that other-powered natures truly exist and yet for both the Sutra Unraveling the Thought and Maitreya’s Ornaments (XI.30) to compare other-powered natures with magician’s illusions. This is because comparison with magical illusions is commonly accepted as showing that phenomena are not true.

Dzong-ka-ba implicitly accepts that the example does indicate a lack of trueness, in the sense of showing that phenomena do not exist in accordance with how they appear, but he responds that, nevertheless, comparison with a magician’s illusions is not always used to communicate that phenomena do not truly exist, that is to say, do not exist by way of their own character. For the example is also used in the Mind-Only School to indicate the non-duality of subject and object, the selflessness of persons, and how, if there are no external objects, a consciousness could observe an object. Specifically:

- Maitreya’s Ornaments (XI.15-16) itself explains that the example of a magician’s illusion is used to demonstrate the false appearance of subject and object in a dualistic mode, and Vasubandhu’s commentary substantiates this
- In what may be Dzong-ka-ba’s unique interpretation of Ornaments stanza XI.30, he explains that the example of a magician’s illusion is also used in the context of the selflessness of persons
- He caps the argument that comparison with illusions does not always mean that phenomena are not truly existent by referring to the explanation—in Asanga’s Summary of the Great Vehicle—of the import of eight types of illusions, none of which is to show that objects are not truly existent or established by way of their own character

(Implicitly, Dzong-ka-ba thereby shows that the teaching in the Sutra Unraveling the Thought that other-powered natures are established by way of their own character is not contradicted by Maitreya’s Ornaments, even though an explicit statement in the Ornaments that other-powered natures are established by way of their own character is not forthcoming.)
9. Maitreya’s *Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes* and Other Scholars

**Overview.** This chapter [182] (422) has four basic movements:

1. Explaining the first two stanzas in Maitreya’s *Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes* that delineate emptiness and the middle path free from the two extremes
2. Refuting, through these distinctions, two Jo-nang-itably positions
3. Contrasting how the Proponents of Mind-Only and the Proponents of Non-Nature take a statement in the *Kāśyapa Chapter Sūtra* about the middle path
4. Mentioning Vasubandhu, Sthiramati, and Dignāga and explaining briefly five stanzas from Dharmakirti

Two Stanzas [182] (422)

Ḍong-ka-po uses the commentaries by Vasubandhu and Sthiramati to unravel Maitreya’s elegantly abstruse stanzas, which I will cite here first in their bare form in order to convey a sense of the esthetic enterprise required to penetrate the meaning:[a]

Unreal ideation exists.  
Duality does not exist there.  
Emptiness exists here.  
Also that exists in that.

Not empty and not non-empty,  
Thereby all is explained.  
Due to existence and due to non-existence, existence.  
Therefore that is the middle path.

The unraveling of the three demonstrative pronouns (“that”) is done through coordinating their gender with the gender of the nouns in the stanzas, something that cannot be conveyed in a bare English translation without using “he”

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*abhūta-parikalpa 'iti duṣyata sātra na vidyate/
śūnyatā vidyate tu atra tasyām api sa vidyate/
na śūnyam nāpi cātūṣṇyaṃ tasmāt sarvam [Pandeya: sarvam] vidhyate/
satvād asatvāt satvā [Pandeya: sattvādu asatvāt sattvāt] ca madhyamām pratiṣṭha ca u/*

and "she." Let us give the gender identifications in note form: m = male; f = female; n = neuter:

Unreal ideation exists.
Duality does not exist there.
Emptiness exists here.
Also that exists in that.

Not empty and not non-empty.
Thereby all is explained.
Due to existence and due to non-existence, existence.
Therefore that is the middle path.

Identifying the antecedents of the demonstrative pronouns and identifying the two adverbs ("there" and "here"), the stanzas read:

Unreal ideation exists.
Duality does not exist there [in that conceptuality].
Emptiness exists here [in this conceptuality]
Also that [conceptuality] exists in that [emptiness].

Not empty and not non-empty.
Thereby all is explained.
Due to existence and due to non-existence, existence.
Therefore that is the middle path.

In the first stanza, the identifications provide minimal clarification, but both stanzas remain cryptic, waiting for exposition.

Utilizing Vasubandhu’s commentary and Sthiramati’s expansive explana-

Among those who use this convention are:
• Stefan Anacker, Seven Works of Vasubandhu (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984), 211.

Among those who do not use this convention are:
• David Lasar Friedmann, Sthiramati, Madhyāntavibhāgāṭikā: Analysis of the Middle Path and the Extremes (Utrecht, Netherlands: Rijksuniversiteit te Leiden, 1937), 10
• Thomas A. Kochumuttom, A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1982), 29
• Thomas E. Wood, Mind-Only: A Philosophical and Doctrinal Analysis of the Viññānāsādha, Monographs of the Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy, 9 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991), 10
tion of his teacher Vasubandhu's commentary, Đzong-ka-ba interprets the stanzas as meaning:

Unreal ideation[—ideation being the main other-powered nature—] exists [by way of its own character in that it is produced from causes and conditions].

Duality [of subject and object in accordance with their appearance as if distant and cut off] does not exist in that [ideation].

[The thoroughly established nature which is the] emptiness [of being distant and cut off] exists [by way of its own character as the mode of subsistence] in this [ideation].

Also that [ideation] exists [as an obstructor] to [realization of] that [emptiness].

[Thus, other-powered natures and thoroughly established natures] are not empty [of establishment by way of the object's own character] and are not non-empty [of subject and object being distant and cut off].

Thereby all [of the mode of thought in the teachings in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras, and so forth, of not being empty and of not being non-empty] is explained [thoroughly].

Due to the existence [of the other-powered nature that is the erroneous ideation apprehending object and subject as distant and cut off, the extreme of non-existence is avoided] and due to the non-existence [of distant and cut off object and subject—in accordance with how they are apprehended by that ideation—as their mode of subsistence, the extreme of existence is avoided, and ideation and emptiness] exist.

Therefore that [thoroughly established nature which is the emptiness of distant and cut off object and subject and which is the voidness of the two extremes in other-powered natures] is the middle path [that is to say, is established as the meaning of the middle].

Since the passage indicates what exists and what does not exist, it indicates the middle between the two extremes of reified existence and utter non-existence.

The first line of the first stanza. [183] (422) Đzong-ka-ba cites Sthiramati, who holds that the identification of what exists is in response to those who hold the deprecatory position that all phenomena lack inherent existence. Thereby he again stresses the controversy between the Proponents of Mind-Only and the Proponents of Non-Nature.

Maitreya says that what exists is "unreal ideation."* Đzong-ka-ba does not

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* yang dag pa ma yin pa'i kun tu rog pa / yang dag ma min kun rog, abhūtāparikalpa.
explain this term, but Maitreya's *Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes* itself says:

Unreal ideation is the minds
And mental factors of the three realms.

Based on this, the early-twentieth-century commentator Šer-šül Lo-sang-pün-tsoṅ\(^{2}\) identifies unreal ideation as all consciousnesses of the Desire, Form, and Formless Realms that have dualistic appearance of apprehended-object and apprehending-subject. Thus the term is not limited to conceptual consciousnesses in the division of consciousness into the conceptual and the non-conceptual but includes non-conceptual consciousnesses, such as sense consciousnesses, that have the dualistic appearance of subject and object as different entities. He explains that such ideation is called unreal\(^{b}\) because:

- apprehended-object and apprehending-subject do not exist in accordance with their dualistic appearance, and
- forms and so forth do not exist in accordance with their appearance as being established by way of their own character as the referents of their respective conceptual consciousnesses.

Thus the mode of appearance to these consciousnesses is unreal. Also, because these consciousnesses observe objects that are merely imputed by conceptuality as referents of terms and conceptual consciousnesses, they are called "ideation," or "conceptuality." For these latter points, Šer-šül Lo-sang-pün-tsoṅ cites Maitreya's *Differentiation of Phenomena and the Final Nature*:\(^{c}\)

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\(^{a}\) I.8. The Tibetan, Peking 5522, vol. 108, 19.5.1:

yang dag ma yin kun rtog nīl/
sems dang sems byang khams gsum pa'll/
The Sanskrit from Nagao (Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya, 20) is:

abhūtaparikalpaḥ ca [Pandeya: parikalpaḥ] citta-caittā tridhātukāḥ/

See also Pandeya, Madhyānta-vibhāga, 24.

\(^{b}\) yang dag ma yin, abhūta.

\(^{c}\) choṅ dang choṅ nyid rnam 'byed, dharmadharmaṇavibhāṅga: Peking 5524, vol. 108, 23.1.2:

snang ba yang dag ma yin pa'll/
dei na yang dag ma yin pa'o'll/
de yang thams cad don med cing/
rtog tsam yin pa kun rtog pa'o'll/

Other possible translation equivalents for kun rtog are "comprehensive imagination" or "comprehensive construction." For an excellent article on this topic, see Hugh B. Urban and Paul J. Griffiths, "What Else Remains In Śūnyatā?: An Investigation of Terms for Mental Imagery in the Madhyāntavibhāga-Compos," *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies*, 17, no. 1 (1994) 1-25; they favor "unreal comprehensive construction."
The appearance is unreal.
Therefore it is unreal.
Also all are nonexistent as [external] objects and are
Mere conceptualizations; hence ideation.

Based on such explanations, Ge-luk-ba scholars take “unreal ideation” as a
code-word for other-powered natures since, as the late Da-drin-rap-den says,¹ they are imbued with the mess of ideation. Other-powered natures are, for
common beings, inevitably involved with the pollution of false appearance and
misconception of them as different entities in terms of subject and object and as
being established by way of their own character as the referents of their respective
conceptual consciousnesses and terms. (Still, there are pure other-powered
natures, such as a wisdom of meditative equipoise directly realizing emptiness.)

The second line of the first stanza. Maitreya says that what does not exist
is duality—the appearance of subject and object as distant and cut off—and
that what remain are unreal ideation and emptiness, also called other-powered
natures and thoroughly established natures, respectively. The reason why un-
tutored beings do not realize the emptiness of duality is that they have a mis-
taken conception of duality that serves to obstruct such realization.

The specification of emptiness as the absence of such duality explains the
thought behind the statements in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras, and so
forth, that all phenomena are empty. Therefore, even though it might seem
contradictory for the Mind-Only system to hold that other-powered natures
exist inherently when some of their own sources, the Perfection of Wisdom
Sūtras, say that phenomena are empty of inherent existence, it is not con-tradictory. For, this system holds that what Buddha had in mind when he said on
the literal level that all phenomena are empty is that the duality of subject and
object as different entities does not exist—he was not denying their inherent
existence. From this point of view, Dzong-ka-ba, without mentioning the Jo-
ning-bas by name, criticizes them for holding that Maitreya puts forth the sys-
tem of the Great Middle Way in which it is held that other-powered natures are
empty of themselves.

The third line of the first stanza. Shiramati contextualizes the next line,
and Dzong-ka-ba and his followers¹⁰ elaborate on the background:

Since Maitreya says in the first line that ideation, that is, other-
powered natures, exist and then says in the second line that duality,
that is, the imputational nature that is the object of negation, does not
exist, it might seem that emptiness might not truly exist. For, if em-
ptiness does truly exist, it should have been mentioned before the sec-
ond line, along with or after other-powered natures. Also, imputa-
tional factors, which do not truly exist, and the thoroughly established
nature are similarly uncompounded phenomena, and thus it might

¹ Annotations, 99.6: gešen dbang la kun rgya gi byed pa de yod pas na.
seem that, since imputational natures do not truly exist, thoroughly established natures also do not truly exist.

This is the qualm cleared away by the third line, which says that “The thoroughly established nature which is the emptiness of being distant and cut off exists in this ideation.”

Furthermore, Ðzong-ka-ða points out that:

• when Shhiramati frames the hypothetical challenge, the objector describes the position of the Proponents of Mind-Only as being that “unreal ideation ultimately exists inherently”; and
• since such is not challenged in Shhiramati’s answer, the description accurately depicts the stance of the Mind-Only School.

Ðzong-ka-ða also cites a similar statement in Shhiramati’s Commentary on (Vasubandhu’s) “The Thirty” and reminds his readers that earlier he provided a similar statement in Asanga’s Grounds of Bodhisattvas.

We can see that he is intent on providing whatever evidence he can from the texts of the Proponents of Mind-Only themselves that they assert that other-powered natures ultimately exist and that existence by way of its own character and ultimate existence are equivalent. His triple purpose is to show that:

• It is not just Chandrakirti’s creation in his critique of the Mind-Only School that the latter assert that other-powered natures ultimately exist and are established by way of their own character
• The Proponents of Mind-Only recognize that the Proponents of Non-Nature assert that phenomena exist, albeit conventionally, and thus that they do not assert that phenomena do not exist at all. (Still, the Mind-Only School assesses their assertion that other-powered natures do not truly exist as ending up in asserting that they do not exist.)
• Because of the great variance between the two schools on these crucial issues, the Jo-nang-ða synthesis of the Mind-Only School and Naturelessness School in a Great Middle Way School is impossible

The second stanza. [188] [426] From the above points, it is clear that in the Mind-Only system:

• unreal ideation—other-powered natures—are not empty of themselves, in the sense of being empty of establishment by way of their own character;
• emptiness—the thoroughly established nature—also is not empty of itself, in the sense of being empty of establishment by way of its own character; still
• everything is empty of a difference of entity between subject and object.

Consequently, it is said that phenomena are neither uniformly empty nor
uniformly non-empty. Also, since other-powered natures and thoroughly established natures ultimately exist and imputational natures do not ultimately exist, phenomena also neither uniformly ultimately exist nor uniformly do not ultimately exist.

Refuting The Jo-nang-bas [188] {426}

Since the above is described as the meaning of statements in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras, Dzong-ka-ba criticizes the Jo-nang-bas for holding that the thoroughly established nature is non-empty, that is, is truly established, and that other-powered natures and imputational natures are empty of true establishment. For he has shown that in the Mind-Only School both thoroughly established natures and other-powered natures are truly established and imputational natures are not. Also, since emptiness here is the absence of a difference of entity between subject and object, he criticizes the Jo-nang-bas for holding that the point here is to distinguish that the thoroughly established nature is empty of the other two natures, which, in turn, are empty of the thoroughly established nature.

Contrasting The Mind-Only School And The Naturelessness School [189] {426}

Dzong-ka-ba refers to Sthiramati’s association of this description of the middle with that found in the Kāśyapa Chapter Sūtra: 78

Existence is one extreme; non-existence is the second extreme. That which is the center between these two is unanalyzable [because it cannot be analyzed just as it is by thinking about it], is undemonstrable [because it cannot be explained to another just as it is], is not a support [because it is not an object of the senses], is unperceivable [because from the viewpoint of the mind directly realizing it duality has disappeared], is unknowable [because it cannot be ascertained just as it is by a dualistic mind], and is placeless [because it is a place or source of the affective emotions]. Kāśyapa, this is called the middle path, individual analysis of phenomena.

He points out that from Sthiramati’s citation it can be seen that he (and by extension the Mind-Only School) holds that there is harmony between Maitreya’s description in these stanzas and the Kāśyapa Chapter Sūtra. Dzong-ka-ba makes the distinction that the Proponents of Non-Nature take the middle path as explained in the Kāśyapa Chapter Sūtra to accord with their own description of the middle and thus they consider it to be superior to that described in Maitreya’s Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes. Again, he is stressing that
the Naturelessness School and the Mind-Only School must be distinguished, and hence the Jo-nang-ba synthesis is unfounded.

Indeed, Šhay-rap-gyel-ten⁷⁹⁹ cites this passage as an instance of one that teaches the Great Middle Way, that is to say, that there is a profound meaning of the middle devoid of the extremes between existence and non-existence that "is not just an elimination, a non-affirming negative that is merely devoid of the extremes, but is established as an inclusionary center or middle that has abandoned the two extremes and is a third category." In his cryptic and implicit rebuttal, Đzong-ka-ba refers to separate interpretations of the passage by separate schools rather than an over-arching meaning beyond the Mind-Only and the Middle Way Schools.

He has reached the end of his exposition on how, in a general way, the two extremes are avoided in Asaṅga’s Grounds of Bodhisattvas and Compendium of Ascertainments and in Maitreya’s Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras and Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes. The emphasis has been on the extreme of depreciation, since a detailed exposition of the extreme of superimposition is yet to come in chapters 10 and 11.

Other Indian Scholars [190] [426]

Vasubandhu, Sthiramati, And Dignāga [190] [426]

Đzong-ka-ba crisply mentions that he has made occasional citations of Vasubandhu’s and Sthiramati’s exegesis on these points, the implication being that he has shown their concordance with Asaṅga and Maitreya and that thus these scholars do not require separate treatment. Then, about Dignāga’s condensation of the meanings of the Eight Thousand Stanzas Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra into thirty-two topics, he merely states that Dignāga’s exposition agrees with that of Asaṅga’s Summary of the Great Vehicle.

Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso cites the lines of Dignāga’s text:⁸

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⁷ Port of Entry, 536.4; stanzas 27-29ab; Golden Reprint, vol. 103, 824.6:

shes rab pa rol phyin par ni/  
bsin pa gsum la yang dag bren/  
byags pa dang ni gzhed dang //  
yongs su grub pa kha na’ol/  
med ces bya la sogs tshig gi/  
byags pa thams cad ’gog pa ste/  
sgyu ma la sogs dpe rnam bris//  
gzhed gi dbang ni yang dag bsun//  
rnam par byang ba bzhis yi ni//  
yongs su grub pa rab tu bsgagra//


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The teaching in the Perfection of Wisdom
Thoroughly relies on the three—
Just the imputational, the other-powered,
And the thoroughly established.

Expressions of non-existence and so forth
Refute all imputations.
Examples of magical illusions and so forth
Thoroughly teach the other-powered.

The four purifications
Proclaim the thoroughly established.

According to A-ku Lö-drö-gya-tso, Dignāga holds that in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras:

- the statements that phenomena are natureless, unproduced, and so forth are in consideration that imputational natures are natureless in terms of character, that is to say, are not established by way of their own character;
- the teachings by way of the examples of illusions and so forth are in consideration that other-powered natures are natureless in terms of production, that is to say, are without self-powered production; and
- the teachings based on the four purifications—the natural purification which is emptiness, the stainless purification which is true cessations, the path purification which is true paths, and the observational purification which is the Great Vehicle scriptural collections—are in consideration of the thoroughly established nature, that is to say, that thoroughly established natures are the ultimate-non-nature.

Ödzong-ka-ša declares that this exposition accords with Asaṅga’s Summary of the Great Vehicle, and Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso identifies the stanza as being from chapter 2.

praṇāparāsitāṃ hi trīṇi sāmaṇṭiya delanā
delitāṃ paraśtantraṃ ca parinispānam eva ca/ /
nāśityāpadaiḥ sarvam kalpitam vinivṛyate/
māyaopamadīṛṣṭaṁ paraśtantraṁ delanā//
caturdhaiḥ svaśuddhena parinispamakṛttanam//


a Šhay-rap-gyel-tsen (Ocean of Definitive Meaning, 207.5) cites the same stanzas from Dignāga’s commentary as a presentation of the three natures from the viewpoint of the Great Middle Way.
b Port of Entry, 537.3:
Magical illusions and so forth are taught in relation to the dependent. Non-existence is taught in relation to the imputational. The four purifications are taught in relation to the thoroughly established.

The similarity between this and Dignāga’s text is obvious.

Dharmakīrti [190] [426]

About Dharmakīrti’s *Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Prime Cognition”* Dzong-ka-ba makes three basic points:

1. He establishes that Dharmakīrti asserts a non-difference of entity between subject and object
2. He describes three ways that Dharmakīrti posits the thought behind the literal reading of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras
3. In closing, he briefly refers to a controversy between Dharmakīrti and Proponents of Non-Nature

Dharmakīrti’s *Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Prime Cognition”* is not a commentary per se on Dignāga’s text but an independent text related to that of his predecessor. The seventh-century Dharmakīrti was a student of Iśvaraśāna, who himself was a direct student of Dignāga. In Tibet, Dharmakīrti’s work is said to contain a hundred texts, in the sense that it is open to many interpretations. According to Bu-dön’s *History*, Dharmakīrti himself asked his student Devendrabuddhi to write a commentary, which, when presented, he found so dissatisfying that he threw it in the river, and then, when presented with the second try, burned it in fire; the third go-around was somewhat successful, so he let it be. As will be exemplified in the last section below (p. 316), Indian and Tibetan scholars have indeed taken Dharmakīrti’s work in startlingly different ways.


māyādideśanāḥ bhūte kalpiṇān nāstideśanāḥ

caturvīdha-vibuddhes tu parinispattadideśanāḥ/*

gezhung brgya ldan.

lha dbang blo.
Non-Difference Of Entity Between Subject And Object [190] [426]

First Đzong-ka-ba cites four contiguous stanzas from chapter 3, primarily to make the case that Dharmakīrti also does not take the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras literally and thus is to be distinguished from Proponents of Non-Nature. An implicit message is that an amalgamation of Great Vehicle masters' works (or parts of those) into a single, unified doctrine is groundless.

Citing chapter 3, stanza 213, of the Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition," Đzong-ka-ba shows that for Dharmakīrti, the final nature of other-powered natures is an emptiness of apprehended-object and apprehending-subject as other substantial entities. Dharmakīrti says:

Concerning subject and object, due to the absence of a difference of substantial entity of one of them, the other also lacks a difference of substantial entity, and thus the emptiness of duality of one of them is also the suchness of the other one.

Two Ways To Posit The Thought Behind The Perfection Of Wisdom Sūtras [190] [427]

Citing the next two stanzas (III.214-215), he shows how, from this perspective, Dharmakīrti posits in two ways the thought behind the literal reading of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras that phenomena are devoid of inherent existence. In the first, Dharmakīrti indicates that the production, abiding, and disintegration—which characterize things—appear to a mistaken mind infected with the appearance of subject and object as if they were different entities, and thus this factor of difference is false, in that it appears to truly exist but does not. Consequently, when in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras Buddha says that all phenomena lack inherent existence, what he has in mind is the absence of a truly established factor of difference between these characteristics of things.

In the next stanza Dharmakīrti indicates that when a defining character (or definition) appears to a conceptual mental consciousness, it appears as if cut off on the side of the subject, and its definiendum appears to be cut off on the side of the object. In this way, a definition appears to define, or characterize, something over there, and thus this mode of definition, aside from just being a factor appearing to a conceptual consciousness, does not exist as it appears, since the defining character of an object is the same entity as the object itself. Hence, when in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras Buddha says that all phenomena lack inherent existence, what he has in mind is such a lack of difference of entity between definition and definiendum.

A Third Way To Posit The Thought Behind The Perfection Of Wisdom Sūtras [191] [428]

Although, as A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso says, the above explanation of the non-difference of entity between definition and definiendum is that found in the Mind-Only system, Dharmakīrti in the next stanza (III.216) indicates another
rendition that is in common with the Hearer schools. Not using the vocabulary of apprehended-object and apprehending-subject, Dharmakīrti speaks of the
definition as the agent of the activity of characterization (or that which causes
understanding) and the definiendum as the object of the activity. The defining
counterpart of fire, for instance, is that which is hot and burning, but it is not an
entity other than fire itself, since fire is that which is hot and burning, and that
which is hot and burning is fire. A conceptual consciousness, however, sees the
two—the definition and the defined—as different entities. Thus when, in the
Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras, Buddha says that all phenomena lack inherent
existence, what he has in mind is such a lack of difference of entity between
definition and definiendum.

Controversy With Proponents Of Non-Nature [192] [428]

In these ways, Dzong-ka-ba shows that Dharmakīrti does not take the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras literally but posits other meanings as to what Buddha
has in mind. To make it even clearer that Dharmakīrti is at odds with the Proponents of Non-Nature, Dzong-ka-ba cites a stanza (III.4) in which Proponents of Non-Nature challenge Dharmakīrti and he answers. As was mentioned
above, Dharmakīrti’s text is open to many interpretations; thus, let us start with
the bare stanza:

If all are without capacity,
The capacity of sprouts and so forth is seen in seeds and so forth.
That is asserted conventionally.
How? Let it be so!

Dzong-ka-ba mentions only that the stanza makes the same point as what was
said earlier in Asanga’s Compendium of Ascertainments—he does not give any
commentary.

An interesting exegesis of the stanza is given by the early-nineteenth-
century Kalkha Mongolian scholar Nga-wang-bel-den, who treats it in accordance with two different interpretations found in India. The first supports
Dzong-ka-ba’s point; the second does not. He identifies the first explanation as
that of the seventh-century Indian scholar Devendrabuddhi and unnamed others,
who interpret the system of Dharmakīrti’s text as Mind-Only. In para-
phrase:

Dharmakīrti’s position on the two truths is illustrated when he says
(III.3):

That which has the capacity ultimately to perform a function
Here ultimately exists.
Others exist conventionally.

* The fourth line of the stanza (“These describe the specifically and generally character-
ized,”) is not germane to our discussion.
Thus in this interpretation, the first line of III.4 ("If all are without capacity") is a challenge by a Proponent of Non-Nature to that position:

It follows that the explanation, “That which has the capacity to perform a function ultimately, here ultimately exists,” is incorrect, because there is nothing that is ultimately capable of performing a function.

The second line (“The capacity of sprouts and so forth is seen in seeds and so forth,”) is a response by a Proponent of Truly Existing Things, including Dharmakirti himself:

It is not the case that there is nothing that has the capacity to perform a function ultimately, because the capacity of a cause, such as a seed, to assist in producing an effect, such as a sprout is seen with direct perception.

The third line (“That is asserted conventionally”) is a rejoinder by the Proponent of Non-Nature:

Since the capacity of a cause to assist in producing effects is asserted by us to be so conventionally, there is no fallacy.

The last line (“How? Let it be so!”) is a concluding retort by Dharmakirti, a Proponent of Truly Existing Things:

Since conventionalities are superimposed factors, how could they be appearing objects of non-mistaken direct perception? Though you Proponents of Non-Nature use the name “conventionality,” you have come to assert ultimate establishment.

Thus the stanza according to the first interpretation is:

[A Proponent of Non-Nature] says: All are [ultimately] without the capacity [to perform functions].
[Answer by a Proponent of True Existence:] The capacity [to produce] sprouts and so forth is seen in seeds and so forth.
[The Proponent of Non-Nature responds:] That is asserted conventionally.
[Answer by the Proponent of True Existence:] How? Let it be so!

In the second interpretation, Dharmakirti is taken to be not a Proponent of Mind-Only but a Proponent of Non-Nature. An impressive lineup of Indian scholars—the eighth-century Rājugupta, the eighth-century Shāntarakṣita and his spiritual son Kamalashila, the ninth or tenth-century Prajñākaragupta, as

\[^{a}\text{nyi ma ibas pa.}\]
\[^{b}\text{Referred to as “the author of the Ornaments” (rgyan mkhan po); the text is}\]
well as Jetārī and so forth—identify Dharmakīrti’s stanza in this fashion. They attribute the first line to Dharmakīrti himself as a Proponent of Non-Nature; the second line to the opponent; the third line to Dharmakīrti; and the final to the opponent.

According to the second interpretation, the stanza is:

\[ \text{[A Proponent of Non-Nature such as Dharmakīrti] says: All are [ultimately] without the capacity [to perform functions].} \]
\[ \text{[Response by a Proponent of True Existence:] The capacity [to produce] sprouts and so forth is seen in seeds and so forth.} \]
\[ \text{[The Proponent of Non-Nature, for example, Dharmakīrti, responds:] This is asserted conventionally.} \]
\[ \text{[Response by a Proponent of True Existence:] How? Let it be so!} \]

The last line is explained as meaning:

Since conventionalities are superimpositions, how could they be appearing objects of direct perception! Thus although you Proponents of Non-Nature use the name “conventionality,” you have come to accept the meaning of ultimate existence.

It is clear that the second interpretation is not Dzong-ka-βa’s intent. Rather, he seeks to end the brief excursus into Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Prime Cognition” as well as discussion of the other texts covered in chapters 5 through 9—that focus on the extreme of deprecation—with another reminder of the conflict between the Proponents of Mind-Only and the Proponents of Non-Nature, with Dharmakīrti on the side of the Proponents of Mind-Only.

\textit{pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra} (nidāna ma rnam ’grei kyi rgyan; Peking 5719, vol. 132, entire volume). Gnoî (The \textit{Pramāṇavārttikā} of Dharmakīrti, xxiv) places him in the ninth or tenth century.
10. Superimposition

Dzong-ka-ba now turns to a detailed exposition of the extreme of superimposition—the exaggeration that constitutes the conception of a self of phenomena. The negation of this superimposed status is emptiness—the thoroughly established nature—and thus the superimposed status itself is what is to be negated.

Overview. This long chapter [194] {430} has seven basic movements:

1. Identifying the superimposition in its artificial (or acquired) and innate forms
2. Raising four hypothetical objections by others to this identification
3. Answering the four objections in an intentionally convoluted way, so that many points can be presented—some detailed and others briefly
4. Laying out the reasonings establishing the selflessness of phenomena that is other-powered natures’ emptiness of being established in accordance with the superimposed status of being established by way of their own character as the referents of their respective conceptual consciousnesses
5. In response to a challenge that the two types of selflessness—the emptiness of factors imputed in the manner of entity and attribute and the emptiness of subject and object as different entities—are not related, showing how the reasonings proving that objects are not established by way of their own character as the objects verbalized by their respective terms and as the referents of their respective conceptual consciousnesses bring about entry into cognition-only; that is to say, realization of an absence of external objects
6. Briefly mentioning the reasonings explicitly refuting external objects
7. Emphasizing the importance of understanding the two types of selflessness of phenomena in the Mind-Only School and the reasonings used to establish them

Identifying The Superimposition [194] {430}

Dzong-ka-ba briefly mentions that in the Mind-Only School two types of positions are refuted by reasoning: deprecation and superimposition. After describing the deprecatonal as only acquired (and thus not innate) and identifying it as the position of the Proponents of Non-Nature depicted in earlier chapters, he quickly passes on to the superimpositional, of which there are a conception of a self of persons and a conception of a self of phenomena. He postpones discussion of the self of persons to the section on the Consequence School and concentrates on the innate superimposition of a self of phenomena, as identified in the Mind-Only School. This is because the artificial version of conceiving a self of phenomena is for the sake of underpinning the innate version and because reasoning is mainly used to counteract belief in the innately
conceived self of phenomena. The latter point appears frequently in his works, since he seeks to counter the notion that reasoning is used only to refute philosophical opinions, which are thus artificially acquired conceptions dependent on scripture or reasoning.

With respect to the superimposition of a self of phenomena, Đzong-ka-ḥa is sensitive to the fact that although many texts of the Mind-Only School speak only of misapprehending subject and object as different substantial entities, the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought itself speaks in a different manner when it repeatedly announces that other-powered natures are not established in accordance with the imputational nature, whereby implicitly it communicates the notion that a consciousness conceiving the opposite of this—that other-powered natures are established in accordance with the imputational nature—is a superimpositional consciousness conceiving a self of phenomena.

Moreover, Asaṅga's Grounds of Bodhisattvas, Compendium of Ascertainment, and Summary of the Great Vehicle present the middle as the emptiness of such a status and as the thoroughly established nature. Thus Đzong-ka-ḥa warns that if one does not know this type of superimposed factor, one will not decisively understand what, in the Mind-Only School, it means to conceive a self of phenomena and hence what the selflessness of phenomena is.

The topic is intriguing since the two types of emptiness are so intimately related that some Ge-luk-ḥa scholars say that through explicitly realizing one of them a practitioner implicitly realizes the other. Does Đzong-ka-ḥa mean merely that in these texts Asaṅga is explaining another but equivalent emptiness? Or does he mean that the two types of emptiness are realized serially and are not equivalent? We will return to this subject at the end of the synopsis of this chapter, when he hints at what he means.*

First, he succinctly explains that the superimposed factor is the establishment of the aggregates and so forth by way of their own character:

- as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses thinking about entities and as the referents of terms verbalizing entities, such as "This is a form," and so forth, and
- as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses thinking about attributes and as the referents of terms verbalizing attributes, such as "This is the production of form."

He emphasizes that since forms and so forth indeed are the referents of thoughts and indeed are objects verbalized by terms, to conceive merely that phenomena are referents of thoughts and objects verbalized by terms is not a superimposition. Rather, the superimposition is to conceive that forms and so forth are established by way of their own character as the referents of thoughts and the objects verbalized by terms.

* For a detailed discussion of this topic, see Reflections on Reality, chaps. 18-20.
Four Objections To This Identification [196] [431]

According to Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s cogent exposition, Dzong-ka-ba considers objections to his presentation that:

- the establishment of forms and so forth by way of their own character as the foundations of name and conception is the self (that is, the exaggerated status) of phenomena that is being negated, and
- the negative of this is the subtle selflessness of phenomena

due to the fact that many Tibetan scholars of his time were uncomfortable with any mode of emptiness in the Mind-Only School except for the emptiness of object and subject as different entities.

The first three of the four objections revolve around the seeming unsuitability that, if the self of phenomena is identified this way, a Lesser Vehicle school could realize the selflessness of phenomena. This is unsuitable because the four schools of Buddhist tenets—Great Exposition, Sutra, Mind-Only, and Naturelessness Schools—are posited by way of their view of selflessness. The view of selflessness in a higher school must be both different and more subtle.

I would add that since the Sutra Unraveling the Thought itself explicitly presents an ultimate that is beyond the ken of Lesser Vehicle practitioners, the concern with showing how the view that it presents exceeds that of the Lesser Vehicle schools is not brought to the sūtra by Tibetan scholars but is already there. The factor that is not in the sūtra and that makes this endeavor so intriguing is that Dzong-ka-ba recognizes a Lesser Vehicle school following Dharmakirti—a school that did not pick up on Dharmakirti’s exposition of the subtle selflessness of phenomena of the Mind-Only School but affirmed the existence of external objects. In Ge-luk-ba scholarship, Dharmakirti’s Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Prime Cognition” is seen as having three layers—one unique to the Mind-Only School, in which the position of no external objects is presented, one unique to the Sūtra School, in which external objects are presented, and one shared with those two schools, which does not address this issue—and thus various commentators picked up on different strands. Here the result is that Ge-luk-ba scholars must show that Lesser Vehicle followers of Dharmakirti could not realize the emptiness that is specific to the Mind-Only School.

The First Three Objections [196] [431]

The Proponents of Sutra following Dharmakirti realize that objects such as forms—since they have their own unique characteristics that serve as appearing objects of direct perception—cannot be actual objects verbalized by terms; this is because terms cannot evoke an experience of them as they are known in direct perception. The explicit object verbalized by a term is, roughly speaking, a mental image, technically a meaning-generality. Since (oddly enough) internal
images such as meaning-generalities are considered to be non-functioning phenomena, they cannot be established by way of their own character, and thus Proponents of Sūtra understand that the explicit objects of terms are not established by way of their own character. Consequently, if understanding such constituted realization of the thoroughly established nature in the Mind-Only School, that school would not delineate an emptiness any more profound than a tenet found in the Sūtra School.

The objector imagines that Dzong-ka-ba has delineated emptiness, the thoroughly established nature, in the Mind-Only School in just this way and thus draws the absurd consequences that a selflessness of phenomena would not be put forth and that meditation on it would not remove the obstructions to omniscience. These supposed positions, in turn, would contradict both the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought and Asaṅga's Grounds of Bodhisattvas, since the former clearly says that imputational factors' emptiness of establishment by way of their own character is the thoroughly established nature that is the selflessness of phenomena and the latter says that such an emptiness is the object to be meditated upon for purifying the obstructions to omniscience.

In the objector's mind, the only other possibility is that Dzong-ka-ba is saying that in the Mind-Only School other-powered natures themselves are refuted as established by way of their own character. However, this is impossible since the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought clearly indicates that other-powered natures are indeed established by way of their own character.

In addition to these points, since Asaṅga in his Grounds of Bodhisattvas cites—as a scriptural proof for his delineation of the selflessness of phenomena—passages from Lesser Vehicle sūtras, it absurdly seems that Proponents of Sūtra would indeed realize the selflessness of phenomena as presented in the Mind-Only School. Thus the objector draws the conclusion that Dzong-ka-ba's presentation of the thoroughly established nature in the Mind-Only School is unfounded.

Dzong-ka-ba answers these objections first through an appeal to authority. He declares that the emptiness described in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought could not be realized by proponents of Lesser Vehicle schools because Asaṅga, in his Grounds of Bodhisattvas, describes it as what is realized by the wisdom purifying the obstructions to omniscience and, in his Summary of the Great Vehicle, says that realization of this type of emptiness brings about entry into cognition-only. Since it is axiomatic that Lesser Vehicle schools do not present a path for overcoming obstructions to omniscience—such that all objects of knowledge are realized directly and simultaneously—and since Lesser Vehicle schools, being proponents of external objects, do not propound a path for realizing cognition-only, it is clear that Asaṅga does not hold that proponents of Lesser Vehicle schools could realize this type of emptiness.

Conversely, that Asaṅga [201] holds that the Lesser Vehicle schools assert such a self of phenomena is clear from the very way he cites their scrip-
tured to buttress his presentation of emptiness. Since he cites Buddhist scriptures, it is clear that he is not refuting non-Buddhists, and since it is obvious that he is refuting neither Proponents of Non-Nature, whose problem is with the extreme of deprecation, nor another type of Proponent of Mind-Only, he must be refuting proponents of Lesser Vehicle tenets. This is why, to present this form of emptiness, he cites three passages from Lesser Vehicle Buddhist scriptures—the Transmigration Sūtra, the Collection of Meanings Sūtra, and the Story of Samthakayāyana. Though the passages are known to proponents of Lesser Vehicle tenets, they are not fully understood by them. Later, he cites the analogy that a Lesser Vehicle school called the Majority School identifies the mention of a “fundamental consciousness” in a Lesser Vehicle scripture as the mental consciousness, whereas Asaṅga takes it to be the mind-basis-of-all.

Dzong-ka-ba next [203] [432] presents the heart of his response by identifying in more detail the innate superimposition of a self of phenomena. Based on Asaṅga’s Compendium of Ascertainments, he points out that when we are asked what the meaning of the verbalization “house” is, we say, “That over there is a house,” and do not say, “That which is merely nominally imputed with the name ‘house’ is the meaning of the verbalization ‘house.’” From this, it can be concluded that when a house’s being a basis of imputation of the convention “house” appears, it does not appear to us to be posited as such by names and conceptual consciousnesses, but its being a foundation of name and thought appears as if established through the force of the house’s own mode of subsistence. A consciousness ascribing to this appearance is an innate superimpositional consciousness conceiving that a house is established by way of its own character as the object verbalized by the term “house” and as the referent of the thought “house.”

This is a conception that imputation in the manner of an entity is established by way of its own character. A similar asser to the house’s appearing to be established by way of its own character as the referent of the term “beautiful” and of the thought “beautiful” is a conception that imputation in the manner of an attribute is established by way of its own character.

Dzong-ka-ba declares that even though the Lesser Vehicle schools and the Mind-Only School agree that the meaning-generalities that are the explicit objects verbalized by terms are not established by way of their own character, the Lesser Vehicle schools propound tenets supporting that objects themselves are established by way of their own character as the referents of their respective terms and conceptual consciousnesses. (It is noteworthy that, aside from the previously cited appeals to the authority of scripture—the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought—and of a special commentator—Asaṅga—no other evidence that Proponents of Sūtra hold this position is cited.)

He uses “form” as the example; “house” is my adaptation.
Reasonings Establishing The Selflessness Of Phenomena [206] [434]

Ḍrong-ka-ba turns to the reasonings refuting such a superimposed status in order both to gain a better sense of this false notion and to prepare the way for a discussion of how the reasonings provide a door of entry to cognition-only. He points out that the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought itself does not offer reasonings (it gives only pronouncements on the nature of reality), and thus he relies on Asaṅga’s presentation of reasonings in his Grounds of Bodhisattvas, Compendium of Ascertainments, and Summary of the Great Vehicle. These three texts give a similar threefold reasoning built around the relationship between an object and its names.

It may be that Ḍrong-ka-ba primarily uses the presentation in Asaṅga’s Summary of the Great Vehicle because it includes a concise, if initially abstruse, verse form. Let us first cite Asaṅga’s text without bracketed commentary:

What makes it evident that other-powered entities which appear to be imputational natures are not of such a nature?…

Because awareness does not exist prior to name,
Because many, and because not restricted,
There are the contradictions of its essence, many entities,
And mixture of entities. Therefore, it is proven.

With commentary, the stanza is understood to mean:

There are the contradictions that if a bulbous flat bottomed thing able to hold fluid, for instance, were established through the force of its own mode of subsistence as the referent of the verbal convention “pot”:

1. the imputational nature would exist in the essence of that bulbous thing because an awareness of the name of an object would have to exist prior to learning its name;
2. one object that has many names would have to be many entities because many names are used for one object; and
3. the entities of many objects that have the same name would be mixed because a name is not restricted to one object.

Therefore, it is proven (that objects are not established by way of their own character as the referents of terms and conceptual consciousnesses).

The first reasoning. The most common example in philosophical treatises is a pot—which is defined as that which has a bulbous belly, a flat bottom, and is capable of holding fluid. If this bulbous thing’s being a foundation of a term such as “pot” were established by way of the bulbous thing’s own mode of subsistence, its being such a foundation would not depend upon language, and
thus an awareness thinking "pot" with respect to it absurdly would be generated just through seeing it, prior to learning its name.

**The second reasoning.** If a person's being the referent of names is established right in the mode of being of the person, the usage of many names—such as Shakra, Indra, Grāmāghātaka, and so forth—for one god, the Lord of the Heaven of the Thirty-Three, must be by way of the force of the god himself since this god is established by way of his own character as the referent of those names. In that case, the one god absurdly would be several gods.

**The third reasoning.** If a person's being the referent of names is established right in the mode of being of the person, the usage of one name for two persons—two different people called Upagupta, for instance—would mean that the two persons absurdly would be just one person.

The conclusion drawn from these three fallacies is that objects are not established by way of their own character as the objects verbalized by their respective terms and as the referents of their respective conceptual consciousnesses.

Even babies, animals, and so forth—who do not know language and thus do not know specific terms for articles such as pots—nevertheless have awarenesses conceiving that pots and so forth are established by way of their own character as foundations of thoughts about them, and thus the same reasoning is applicable.

Dzong-ka-ba [209] [435] makes only passing reference to Asaṅga's *Grounds of Bodhisattvas* and does not cite the *Compendium of Ascertainties* at all with regard to the reasonings because, as Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso says:309

- The first reasoning in the *Summary of the Great Vehicle* and in the *Compendium of Ascertainties* is similar to the third reasoning in the *Grounds of Bodhisattvas*
- The second reasoning in the *Summary of the Great Vehicle* and in the *Compendium of Ascertainties* is similar to the first reasoning in the *Grounds of Bodhisattvas*
- The third reasoning in the *Summary of the Great Vehicle* and the third reasoning in the *Compendium of Ascertainties* are similar. (It is difficult to claim that these two are similar to the second reasoning in the *Grounds of Bodhisattvas*.)

The Lesser Vehicle schools [209] [435] use the same reasoning to prove that the meaning-generalities that are the explicit objects of verbalization by words are not established by way of their own character, in that if objects were so established, an awareness thinking "pot" would absurdly be generated without making the linguistic connection, and so forth. However, the Lesser Vehicle schools mistakenly feel that the reasonings do not apply to a phenomenon's
existing by way of its own character as an object verbalized by a term and as a referent of a conceptual consciousness.

From this discussion of the superimposed status, it is concluded [210] (435) that imputational factors posited by name and terminology are of two types:

- Those that exist and cannot be refuted by reasoning, such as being an object verbalized by a term or being a referent of a conceptual consciousness
- Those that do not exist and are susceptible to refutation by reasoning, such as an object's being established by way of its own character as the object verbalized by a term and as the referent of a conceptual consciousness.

Dzong-ka-ba points out that there is nothing odd about the fact that although a form or a consciousness, for instance, is ultimately established, a form's or a consciousness's being an object verbalized by a term or a referent of conceptual consciousness is an existent imputational factor that is not ultimately established. He cites the example that a place without a pot is a common locus of a place and an absence of a pot, the first being a functioning thing and the second being a non-affirming negative that is necessarily not a functioning thing.

As is his frequent refrain, he adds a remark that distinguishes the Mind-Only system from the Proponents of Non-Nature and especially the Consequentialists: Even though the Proponents of Mind-Only can posit something as existing despite its only being posited by name and terminology, they cannot posit cause and effect within such a context, whereas the Consequentialists can.

In a similar way, the Great Exposition and Sūtra Schools cannot posit forms and so forth without their being established by way of their own character as objects verbalized by terms and as referents of conceptual consciousnesses. This sort of "own-character" is not limited to those objects that perform functions (a category that excludes permanent phenomena) since—according to the Mind-Only School—in the Great Exposition School and the Sūtra School all phenomena, both permanent and impermanent, come to be established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses and as the foundations of the imputation of terminology.

In these ways the challenges that a lower school could realize the emptiness of such a superimposed status are countered, and the hierarchy of tenet systems is preserved.

Showing How The Two Selflessnesses Are Related [212] (436)

The Fourth Objection [212] (436)

The last objection in this series is that this description of emptiness does not involve the meaning of cognition-only and thus could not be the object of observation that, when meditated upon, purifies the obstructions to omniscience. Since Dzong-ka-ba's cryptic answer is discussed at length in Reflections on Real-
ity, part 4, I will give here my condensed rendition of the argument as formulated by my student Ke-drup:

1. Forms and so forth appear to conceptual consciousnesses to be established by way of their own character as the referents of the conventions of entity and attribute.

2. A conceptual consciousness adheres to this mistaken appearance as being correct.

3. Reasoning refutes the correctness of this appearance and thus also the correctness of the conceptual consciousness's asserting to this appearance.

4. Objects also appear to sense consciousnesses to be established by way of their own character as the referents of the conventions of entity and attribute, and thus the correctness of this appearance to non-conceptual consciousnesses, such as sense consciousnesses, is also refuted.

5. Thereby, sense consciousnesses are shown to be mistaken with respect to their appearing objects, in that their objects seem to be established by way of their own character as the referents of the conventions of entity and attribute, whereas they are not.

6. Thereby, it is refuted that the apprehended-object is produced through the power of an external object. (That is to say, it is refuted that the images of objects apprehended in sense perception are produced through external objects impinging on consciousness; rather, they are produced through the activation of seeds of perception contained within the mind-basis-of-all.)

7. Thereby, it is also refuted that a sense object, such as a patch of blue, exists as an entity other than, or outside of, the sense consciousness that perceives it. (The one seed of perception contained within the mind-basis-of-all produces both the apprehended-object and the consciousness apprehending it, which, although they appear to be separate entities, are not.)

After the third point, Dzong-ka-ba cites Asaṅga's *Summary of the Great Vehicle* which details the four examinations and the four thorough knowledges:

1. Examination into whether names are merely adventitious, mere imputation, or whether they are designated through the force of the object's own mode of being.

2. Examination into whether objects by way of their character or adventitiously exist as referents of names.

3. Examination into whether in the designation of entities the relationship between the word and the object exists substantially.

4. Examination into whether objects are established by way of their own character as the referents of the designation of attributes, such as their production, destruction, color, impermanence, and use.

1. Knowledge that names do not exist by way of their own character in the objects they denote.
2. Knowledge that objects do not exist by way of their own character as the referents of the designation of names
3. Knowledge that the designation of entities based on the relationship of names and objects does not exist by way of its own character
4. Knowledge that the designation of attributes does not exist by way of its own character

Asaiga concludes by saying, "Through these, practitioners enter into cognition-only concerning those mental conceptual consciousnesses to which letters and meanings appear." This leaves Dzong-ka-ba [214] [437] to counter the qualm that the refutation applies only to conceptual consciousnesses and not to sense consciousnesses. This is accomplished by points four through seven (see p. 327).

That non-conceptual sense consciousnesses are mistaken leads to a further qualm [215] [437]:

A self-cognizing consciousness apprehending a sense consciousness would also be mistaken in that the sense consciousness’s being a referent of a conceptual consciousness would appear to it as being established by way of its own character. This is like the undisputed fact that when a patch of blue, for instance, appears to a sense consciousness, its being a referent of a conceptual consciousness appears to that sense consciousness as being established by way of its own character and thus the sense consciousness is mistaken.

The problem is that self-cognizing consciousnesses are supposed to be only non-mistaken.

Dzong-ka-ba's response is that, since a self-cognizing consciousness is devoid of dualistic appearance, being a referent of a conceptual consciousness does not even appear to it. The reason why being a referent of a conceptual consciousness does not appear to it is that when being the referent of a conceptual consciousness appears, it definitely appears as having dualistic appearance, but a self-cognizing consciousness is necessarily devoid of dualistic appearance.

This line of argument leads to another qualm [215] [438] that, although peripherally related to the issue, must be addressed. Specifically, one might be led to think that whatever appears to a conceptual consciousness necessarily appears to have dualistic appearance. Dzong-ka-ba immediately counters this misimpression by pointing out that when consciousness (or, as some take his meaning, self-cognizing consciousness) appears to a conceptual consciousness (such as when thinking about what consciousness is or what self-cognizing consciousness is), that consciousness itself does not appear to have dualistic appearance; rather, it appears to be just an entity of cognitive experience; this is so even though all conceptual consciousnesses themselves are dualistic. His point is that the object on which a dualistic consciousness focuses does not have to be
dualistic, as when one conceptually considers a vanishing of dualistic appearance in the state of meditative equipoise that realizes emptiness totally non-dualistically. He makes a distinction between a conceptual consciousness’s having dualistic appearance and an object’s appearing to it as having the aspect of dualistic appearance. He goes on to say that if a vanishing of dualistic appearance could not appear to a conceptual consciousness, it would not exist—the axiom being that whatever exists can appear (however vaguely) to a conceptual consciousness apprehending it.

Dzong-ka-ba [217] [438] quickly switches back to an extension of the basic question, this being whether being the referent of a conceptual consciousness—which is something that is only posited through the force of conceptuality—could appear to a non-conceptual consciousness such as an eye consciousness. This question stems from a fundamental tenet in the Mind-Only system that the false sense of objects’ being established by way of their own character as objects verbalized by terms and as referents of conceptual consciousnesses appears even to non-conceptual consciousnesses such as an eye consciousness. The basic position is that the infection is so deep that raw sensation is polluted with an erroneous sense of the status of the object. Dzong-ka-ba counters the seemingly fatal flaw—that something posited through the force of conceptuality could appear to a non-conceptual consciousness—by declaring that, in a magical illusion, pebbles and sticks are used as the bases of emanation of magical display of horses and elephants, that is to say, as the things that will appear to be horses and elephants, and their being horses and elephants—despite the fact that it is merely imputed by conceptuality—appears to a visual sense consciousness devoid of conceptuality. (We learn from this that being posited by conceptuality or imputed by terms and conceptual consciousnesses does not necessarily mean that conceptuality is presently operating on the object—an important point laying the groundwork for the stance by the Consequentialists that all phenomena are only imputed by conceptuality even if conceptuality is not presently acting on the object.)

He has shown the connection between (1) realizing that objects are not established by way of their own character as the objects verbalized by terms and as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses and (2) realizing that objects and subjects are not different entities. Thus he summarizes this section on the entry into cognition-only by pointing out that a negation of subject and object as different entities is not absent in the statements in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought that the emptiness of imputational factors imputed in the manner of entities and attributes is the thoroughly established nature. He immediately adds, somewhat cryptically until his references are identified, that in the “Questions of Maitreya Chapter” of the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought there is a clear refutation of external objects. (For extensive discussion of these issues see Reflections on Reality, part 4.)

Before listing explicit refutations of external objects found in Mind-Only
treatises, Đzong-ka-ba [217] {438}, typical to his style of making refinements that do not fit into the superficial flow of the text but reflect a mind seeking even to take care of peripheral issues, points out that the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought does not mention other existent imputational natures, such as uncompounded space and so forth. He says the reason for this is that the sūtra is concerned with identifying the imputational factor the emptiness of which is the thoroughly established nature—the object negated in the view of selflessness of phenomena. He cryptically adds, in seeming contradiction with an earlier statement† that equates being posited by names and terminology with being only imputed by conceptuality, that many of those existent imputational natures are not posited by names and terminology but are only imputed by conceptuality. His followers are left with trying to adjust these two positions so that they fit together coherently.‡

Reasonings Explicitly Refuting External Objects [218] {438}

He now lists how external objects are refuted in Mind-Only treatises. Though he restricts the discussion to a mere naming of four types of reasoning without any exposition, let us identify the four briefly:

1. Asaṅga, in his Summary of the Great Vehicle, draws parallels between the lack of external objects and yet generation of consciousness in illusory states, such as dreams, and the lack of external objects in other types of consciousness

2. Vasubandhu, in his The Twenty, attacks the possible building blocks of external objects—partless particles—by considering that they are surrounded by other particles and thus have sides, and hence parts, facing those other particles*

3. Dharmakīrti, in his Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition," refutes external objects by way of demonstrating that an apprehended-object does not produce an apprehending-subject similar to it; he denies that an external object impinges on a consciousness, making it similar to the object

4. Dignāga, in his Examination of Objects of Observation, employs a reasoning analyzing what kind of object could possibly impinge upon a conscious-

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† The statement (p. 86) is:
Here, the measure indicated with respect to existing or not existing by way of [an object's] own character is: not to be posited or to be posited in dependence upon names and terminology.

‡ See Reflections on Reality, chap. 13; and Absorption, #105-109.

* A reasoning refuting partless particles is also found in the third chapter of Dharmakīrti's Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition."
ness, generating it into its likeness. In technical vocabulary this is called an observed-object-condition, because it is the object observed that serves as a condition, or secondary cause, generating the consciousness. Dignāga refutes that an aggregation of particles or an individual minute particle could be an observed-object-condition.

Re-Emphasizing The Importance Of Understanding The Two Types Of Selflessness Of Phenomena [218] [438]

Having mentioned these other reasonings that refute externality, Dzong-ka-ba concludes the chapter by returning to his point that understanding the thoroughly established nature as set out in the “Questions of Paramārthasamudgata Chapter” of the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought—this being the non-establishment of objects by way of their own character as the objects verbalized by terms and as the referents of their respective conceptual consciousnesses—is crucial to understanding the texts of this system. Otherwise, attempts to delineate the meaning of many types of statements will involve great absurdities, since these will all have to be explained as refuting an otherness of substantial entity of subject and object. Also, it would be difficult to explain the teaching that objects should not be held to be anything—permanent, impermanent, and so forth—for these statements would have to be taken as referring to states of meditative equipoise (whereas the meaning is that one should not hold objects as being established by way of their own character as the foundations of imputations as entity and attribute); also, other passages that do make differentiation of “it is this, it is not that” will have to be explained as referring to states subsequent to meditative equipoise.

He harkens back to the statements in Asaṅga’s Grounds of Bodhisattvas, Summary of the Great Vehicle, and Summary of Manifest Knowledge that the four examinations and the four thorough knowledges are the door of entry to cognition-only and the antidotes to the obstructions to omniscience—those obstructions being the foundations of the afflicting emotions that comprise the defilements preventing release from cyclic existence. He recommends that to understand the four examinations and four thorough knowledges, it is necessary to understand from a subtle level:

- The reasonings refuting the falsely superimposed status of things’ establishment by way of their own character as the objects verbalized by terms and as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses
- The types of consciousness that make these false superimpositions
- How these reasonings promote realization of the absence of a difference of entity between subject and object
Concluding, he humbly says that, having seen that few have involved themselves in analyzing these issues, he has written the start of such analyses for the intelligent, and indeed the six centuries of analysis of his insights have yielded a stream of reflection and discussion as well as a wealth of written commentary.
11. Handling Objections

Given that in the previous section Đzong-ka-βa presented the superimposed status in the format of objections and answers, it may seem anticlimactic that he follows with a separate section dispelling more objections. However, here he counts two new challenges.

Overview. This chapter [220] [440] has four basic movements:

1. A challenge that Đzong-ka-βa's presentation that Bodhisattvas realize the selflessness of phenomena, whereas Hearers and Solitary Realizers do not, contradicts the statement in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought that the path and the practice of the three vehicles is one and that the state of release is one
2. Response that the meaning of the sūtra is that practitioners of all three vehicles attain conquest over the afflictive emotions through the same path and practice
3. A challenge that taking other-powered natures as the bases of emptiness contradicts a text attributed to Vasubandhu in which the thoroughly established nature is taken as the basis of emptiness
4. Response that Damshtasena, not Vasubandhu, composed this text, which itself does not accord with either the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought or presentations in texts known to be by Vasubandhu

First Challenge: What Does The Sūtra Unraveling the Thought Mean When It Says That The Path And The Practice Of The Three Vehicles Are One? [220] [440]

The Sūtra Unraveling the Thought describes the process of cyclic existence as follows:

- From conceiving the imputational nature in other-powered natures, the afflictive emotions are produced
- This leads to accumulation of karmas
- These, in turn, result in revolving among the levels of cyclic existence

The sūtra describes release from this invidious process as being through perceiving other-powered natures as without the imputational nature, and it declares that Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Bodhisattvas through just this path and just this practice attain nirvana, due to which their paths of purification of their vehicles and also the states of purification are one.

Since in this context the sūtra speaks only of a selflessness of phenomena and does not speak of a selflessness of persons, it would seem that when it says that Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Bodhisattvas attain their release through
perceiving other-powered natures as without the imputational nature, it implies that Hearers and Solitary Realizers, and not just Bodhisattvas, realize the selflessness of phenomena. However, this would contradict the explanation that it is only Bodhisattvas who realize the thoroughly established nature that is the selflessness of phenomena. On the other hand, if Hearers and Solitary Realizers do not realize the selflessness of phenomena, what is the meaning of the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought when it says that the paths of practice of the three vehicles are one and the states of release of the three vehicles are one?

Response: The Meaning Of The Sūtra Is That Practitioners Of All Three Vehicles Attain Nirvana Through The Same Path And Practice [221] [440]

Ḍzong-ka-ba first cites a passage from Asaṅga’s Grounds of Bodhisattvas that affirms that the conception of a self of persons does indeed have as its root the conception of a self of phenomena. It says that:

The three:

- the conception that factors imputed in the manner of entity are established by way of their own character,
- the conception that factors imputed in the manner of attributes are established by way of their own character, and
- the conception that amorphous wholes are established by way of their own character, as in viewing that a collection of many types of trees is a forest

generate a liking for such superimpositions and thereby a proliferation of conceptuality. Based on this, the conception of a self of persons—called the view of the transitory as substantially established I and mine—is generated, whereby other afflicutive emotions are produced and beings travel in cyclic existence. The entire process is overcome through the four examinations and the four thorough knowledges.

By citing this passage that clearly places the conception of a self of phenomena prior to the conception of a self of persons, Ḍzong-ka-ba highlights the challenger’s question about how Hearers and Solitary Realizers could achieve liberation from cyclic existence without extricating its root—the conception of a self of phenomena.

His answer is that the final root of cyclic existence need not be overcome in order to overcome cyclic existence. Hearers and Solitary Realizers overcome the conception of a self of persons that is the root of cyclic existence, but they do not overcome the conception of a self of phenomena that is the final root of cyclic existence. He calls attention to a parallel assertion by the Middle Way Autonomists, the followers of Bhāvaviveka, who make a similar difference between the root and the final root of cyclic existence, holding that Hearers and
Solitary Realizers overcome cyclic existence without overcoming its final root.

Still, the Sutra Unraveling the Thought, despite mentioning the selflessness of persons four times, never explicitly says that Hearers and Solitary Realizers meditate on it rather than on the selflessness of phenomena, and thus it might seem that the sûtra refers only to the realization of the selflessness of phenomena when it speaks of "just this path" and "just this practice." To avoid this, Dzong-ka-ba refers to but does not cite a passage in Asanga’s Summary of Manifest Knowledge that speaks of other-powered natures’ emptiness of the imputational factor in terms of the selflessness of persons, and, seemingly based on this, he draws the conclusion that, when the Sutra Unraveling the Thought says that the paths of purification and the state of purification are the same for all three types of practitioners, it means (1) that the afflicting emotions are purified through realizing the selflessness of persons and (2) that the release—the nirvana—that is a mere abandonment of afflicting emotions attained through this path is the same. In this way, he can hold that this statement in the Sutra Unraveling the Thought does not contradict that only Bodhisattvas realize the selflessness of phenomena, gradually overcome the obstructions to omniscience, and attain the supreme liberation of Buddhahood.

To bolster this point, Dzong-ka-ba cites the fact that the sûtra says that the wheel of doctrine of good differentiation, which is mainly the passages under consideration in the Sutra Unraveling the Thought itself, is for the sake of those engaged in all vehicles. Thus, when it explicitly lays out the three natures in terms of the selflessness of phenomena, it implicitly indicates that the emptiness of the imputational factor of a self of persons in other-powered natures—the mental and physical aggregates—is posited as the thoroughly established nature that is the selflessness of persons.

Therefore, it is implicit to the exposition in the Sutra Unraveling the Thought that Hearers and Solitary Realizers, for whom the first wheel was taught, are suitable as vessels for realizing the thoroughly established nature in terms of the selflessness of persons but not suitable as vessels for realizing the thoroughly established nature in terms of the selflessness of phenomena. In this sense the Sutra Unraveling the Thought is for the sake of those engaged in all vehicles.

Second Challenge: Only Taking Other-Powered Natures As The Bases Of Emptiness Contradicts Vasubandhu [225] [441]

The next challenge is put forward by followers of Dol-bo Shay-rap-gyel-tsen; Dzong-ka-ba pays it particular attention. According to his own interpretation, in the Mind-Only School the thoroughly established nature that is the selflessness of phenomena is:

* other-powered natures’ non-establishment by way of their own character as

* It is mentioned once in chapter 3 and three times in chapter 8.
imputational natures imputed in the manner of entity and attribute, and
• other-powered natures’ non-establishment as other substantial entities of
  apprehended-object and apprehending-subject.

Hence:
• other-powered natures are taken as the bases of emptiness,
• imputational natures are that of which other-powered natures are empty,
  and
• other-powered natures’ emptiness of the imputational nature is the thor-
  oughly established nature.

The challenger, however, says that Vasubandhu himself, in his *Commentary on
the One Hundred Thousand, Twenty-Five Thousand, and Eighteen Thousand
Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras* called *Conquest Over Objections about the Three
Mother Scriptures*, takes as the basis of emptiness not other-powered natures,
but the thoroughly established nature and explains that the thoroughly estab-
lished nature is empty of the other two natures—other-powered natures and
imputational natures. In commentary on a passage in the Perfection of Wisdom
Sūtras that says, “The eye is empty of the eye,” the *Conquest Over Objections*
says in a summary that:

“The eye” = the eye of reality, which means the reality of the eye.

“Of the eye” = of (1) the eye that is the imputational factor and (2) the
eye that is the imputed (the eye itself).

“Empty” = “devoid.”

Hence, “The eye is empty of the eye,” = “The reality of the eye is
empty of the imputational factor of the eye and empty of the im-
puted,”—the word “imputed” here meaning “the eye itself.”

The Jo-nang-ḥas, based on this summary statement in the *Conquest Over Ob-
jections*, understandably take the passage to mean:

The reality, or thoroughly established nature, of the eye is empty of
the imputational nature of the eye and is empty of the other-powered
nature of the eye.

Taken this way, the passage indicates that the thoroughly established nature is
the basis of emptiness in that it is empty of the other two natures; this is the
position of “other-emptiness.”

This exposition conflicts with Ḍzong-ka-ḥa’s limiting the selflessness of
phenomena to other-powered natures’ emptiness of the imputational nature.
Hence, he is challenged to explain away this disparity with the word of
Vasubandhu.
Response: Realization Of Emptiness As Explained In The Conquest Over Objections Is Not Sufficient, And Vasubandhu Did Not Write The Conquest Over Objections [226] [442]

Dzong-ka-◊a’s often cryptic response basically communicates three points:

1. The challenger’s interpretation of the Conquest Over Objections is mistaken
2. The explanation of the thoroughly established nature in the Conquest Over Objections is not how it is delineated in the context of a view for practice in the basal, or ordinary, state and thus does not offer a practice that would harm the innate conception of a self of phenomena
3. Vasubandhu did not write the Conquest Over Objections; Dharmśtasena did

The Challenger’s Interpretation Of The Conquest Over Objections Is Mistaken [228] [443]

Dzong-ka-◊a faults the Jo-nang-◊as for their interpretation of the exposition in the Conquest Over Objections. He does this from the viewpoint that the Conquest Over Objections itself, since in a longer exposition immediately preceding the above summary statement, it gives a different explanation, which puts the exposition in the context of meditative equipoise realizing emptiness. It also says that:

- The imputational eye = appearances to a conceptual consciousness of means of verbalization and objects of verbalization
- The imputed eye = the appearance as an eye that apprehends color and/or shape
- The eye of reality, that is to say, the reality of the eye = the thoroughly established nature known by individual self-cognition in meditative equipoise
- “The eye is empty of the eye” = the reality of the eye is (1) inexpressible due to being devoid of the means of verbalization and the objects of verbalization and (2) devoid of individual appearances as object apprehended by the eye and the eye as an apprehending-subject

Thus Dzong-ka-◊a’s implicit point is that the Conquest Over Objections here (and elsewhere) does not offer support for the Jo-nang-◊a view of other-emptiness.

The Explanation Of The Thoroughly Established Nature In The Conquest Over Objections Is Not How It Is Delineated In The Context Of A View For Practice In The Basal, Or Ordinary, State And Thus Does Not Offer A Practice That Would Harm The Innate Conception Of A Self Of Phenomena [230] [444]

Dzong-ka-◊a also criticizes the Conquest Over Objections for its exposition of
this passage from Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras. For he makes the point that
this type of teaching is not sufficient for opposing the ingrained tendency to
view objects wrongly, and thus those objects, that is, other-powered natures,
have to be taken as the bases of the emptiness of the imputational nature. He
mentions that the presentation of the thoroughly established nature in the Con-
quest Over Objections is not how the selflessness of phenomena is delineated as a
view of the basal state. He says no more than this, but his fifteenth-century
commentator Bêl-jor-hlûn-drup⁷⁷ adds:

This type of teaching is not in terms of delineating the selflessness of
phenomena by hearing and thinking in the basal state; rather, it
teaches the mode of appearance to meditative equipoise, a path state.

The point is that the Conquest Over Objections indicates how emptiness is ex-
perienced in meditative equipoise directly realizing the ultimate. It may be that,
since it is merely indicating that in meditative equipoise no conventional phe-
nomena appear, Dzong-ka-ba does not quarrel with the accuracy of such a pres-
entation from the viewpoint of such a path state. However, he insists that, in
the basal—or ordinary—state, beings need a presentation related to the phe-
nomena that are misconceived to exist with a false status. The presentation in
the Conquest Over Objections is from the viewpoint of how the thoroughly es-
tablished nature appears in meditative equipoise, a path state.

Realization Of Such A Thoroughly Established Nature Would Not Harm The
Innate Conception Of A Self Of Phenomena [226] [442]

In order to indicate the inadequacy of the explanation in the Conquest Over
Objections, Dzong-ka-ba explains the process of entrapment in suffering and its
converse, how to undo that process. Beings are trapped into a delusory state,
not by misapprehending the thoroughly established nature but by misappre-
hending other-powered natures, such as bodies and houses, to be established in
accordance with the imputational nature. Thus, both the Yogic Practice School
(that is, Mind-Only School) and the Naturelessness School take other-powered
natures as the bases of emptiness and delineate a thoroughly established nature
that is other-powered natures’ emptiness of the imputational nature. He com-
pares this to how a person’s fright, arisen upon misapprehending a rope to be a
snake, is removed. It is done by being shown that the rope is empty of a
snake—that it is not a snake. It is not done by being shown that the emptiness
of a snake is devoid of being a rope and devoid of being a snake due to being
factually other than those two.

Dzong-ka-ba’s concern is that realization of the thoroughly established
nature must counter the innate misconception of the status of objects that has
resided in the mental continuum from beginningless time. Thus the conception
of a self of phenomena cannot be like non-innate misconceptions that:
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- directionally partless minute particles exist,
- objects of apprehension composed of directionally partless minute particles exist,
- partless moments of consciousness exist, and
- a consciousness that is a continuum composed of partless moments exists.

For these are imagined only by those whose minds have been affected by mistaken systems of tenets and do not occur innately among sentient beings. He sees the refutation of such tenets, which is indeed present in Buddhist texts, as a subsidiary branch of the more important project of refuting that the bases—the phenomena that are innately misconceived to exist in accordance with a self of phenomena—exist this way.

Just these things—that ordinary beings misconceive to be objects and subjects that are different entities or to be established by way of their own character as the referents of words and conceptual consciousnesses—must be the bases of delineating emptiness, the thoroughly established nature. They appear in a false way, and this appearance is assented to; such assent is the innate conception that objects exist the way they appear. The antidote is to realize that appearances in fact are not established as other substantial entities and are not established by way of their own character as the referents of their respective conceptual consciousnesses or objects verbalized by words. This is the delineation of the selflessness of phenomena. Selflessness, therefore, is not like a temple’s being empty of monastics (who exist somewhere else) but like a rope’s emptiness of a snake—the rope never was a snake.

Since the root error does not come from misconceiving that other-powered natures and imputational natures exist in the thoroughly established nature, delineation of selflessness is not constituted by realizing that the thoroughly established nature is empty of the other two natures. Đzong-ka-ba uses the worldly example of attempting to ward off a spirit. The proper way is to make an effigy of the person and place it in the direction from which the spirit comes to the house. The spirit is fooled into thinking that the effigy (crafted to look like the person) is the actual person and makes trouble for it, whereby the person is relieved. However, if the effigy is put in the wrong direction, the ritual cannot have any effect. The point is that this mistaken assertion attempts to overcome the conception of a self of phenomena without taking into account the actual process of the misconception.

From this perspective, Đzong-ka-ba says that the explanation in the Conquest Over Objections of the statement in Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras that “The eye is empty of the eye,” means that the thoroughly established nature is empty of imputational natures and other-powered natures in the face of meditative equipoise is not good. Rather, the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras themselves present three natures each for every phenomenon and explain that the emptiness of the imputational nature in an other-powered nature is the thor-
oughly established nature, reality. Therefore, the reality of the eye is the imputed eye’s emptiness of the imputational eye.

_The Conquest Over Objections Does Not Offer Support For The Jo-nang-ba Notion That The Thoroughly Established Nature Ultimately Exists_ [230] [444]

Without saying why he is bringing up the matter, Düng-ka-śa adds that:

- the _Conquest Over Objections_ does indeed explain that what exists in the face of a Superior’s meditative equipoise ultimately exists, and thus the thoroughly established nature ultimately exists in the sense of existing in the perspective of an ultimate consciousness;
- however, this does not establish that in the system of the _Conquest Over Objections_ the thoroughly established nature has the status of ultimate existence as that term is understood in the debate between the Middle Way School and the Mind-Only School on whether an object ultimately exists or not, that is to say, is established by way of its own character or not; and
- in fact, the _Conquest Over Objections_ utterly does not accept that there are any ultimate existents in this latter sense, and this can be seen through its specific refutations that the ultimate ultimately exists by way of its own character. (These refutations occur in its discussion of the emptiness of emptiness, the emptiness of the ultimate, and the emptiness of the uncompounded.)*

Düng-ka-śa’s implicit point is that such a presentation does not fit Vasubandhu’s system or that of authoritative Mind-Only scholars; nor does it accord with the Jo-nang-ba position that the thoroughly established nature ultimately exists in the sense of being established by way of its own character. He thereby undercuts one of Shay-rap-gyel-ten’s important sources for the ultimate existence of the thoroughly established nature.

Encapsulating points made earlier, Düng-ka-śa says that, since the Mother Sūtras—the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras—describe the thoroughly established nature as other-powered natures’ emptiness of the imputational nature, it must be said that the imputed eye’s emptiness of the imputational eye is reality, the thoroughly established nature. Hence, the _Conquest Over Objections_ does not give an explanation relevant to the ordinary state when it posits that the meaning of the sūtra statement that “The eye is empty of the eye” is that the thoroughly established nature of the eye is empty of other-powered natures and of imputational natures in the face of a Superior’s meditative equi-

* From the fact that the _Conquest Over Objections_ speaks of even the ultimate truth of being empty of ultimate existence (this being the Middle Way School’s presentation of emptiness acceptable to Düng-ka-śa), Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 691.4-693.2) draws the conclusion that Düng-ka-śa, although criticizing the _Conquest Over Objections_ for its treatment of the above sūtra passage, does not see that text as presenting other-emptiness and thus does not refute its mode of emptiness.
poise. Given what has gone before, it may be that Đzong-ka-ba allows that the Conquest Over Objections does indeed give a suitable description of a path state of meditative equipoise but does not do so for the crucial basal state, when the pernicious misconception of the status of phenomena has to be opposed. Đzong-ka-ba’s brevity leaves the point in a pregnant hiatus.

Đamshtasena, Not Vasubandhu, Wrote The Conquest Over Objections [231]

Đzong-ka-ba offers two proofs that Vasubandhu did not author the Conquest Over Objections:

1. The Conquest Over Objections cites a text written after Vasubandhu—a Commentary on the “Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra” by Bhadanta Vimuktasena (not to be confused with Vasubandhu’s student Aryavimuktasena)

2. The Conquest Over Objections refutes that both other-powered natures and thoroughly established natures are established by way of their own character or are truly established. However, this explanation is at great variance with Vasubandhu’s Principles of Explanation, where he says that the thought of the Mother Sūtras must be taken in accordance with the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought. The sūtra clearly says that other-powered natures are established by way of their own character and takes other-powered natures, not the thoroughly established nature, as the bases of emptiness.

Đzong-ka-ba concludes that for these reasons Vasubandhu did not compose the Conquest Over Objections. Rather, it was written by Đamśhtasena, as is attested in early catalogues.
12. Differentiating Scriptures

In chapters 6 through 11, Đzong-ka-ba presented how authoritative authors of treatises on Mind-Only delineate the middle through avoiding the two extremes:

- the extreme of reification, in which even imputational natures are established by way of their own character
- the extreme of deprecation, in which all three natures are not established by way of their own character.

Based on those expositions, he now presents how scriptures are differentiated into those that require interpretation and those that are definitive.

Overview. This chapter [234] [446] has seven basic movements:

1. Through citing Vasubandhu, showing how the first wheel of doctrine requires interpretation
2. Through citing Asaṅga, showing how the middle wheel of doctrine requires interpretation
3. Explaining that the types of interpretation required for the first two wheels of doctrine are markedly different
4. After briefly indicating that the final wheel of doctrine is definitive, referring to Vasubandhu's opinion that the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras, if taken literally, are self-contradictory
5. Chiding Tibetans who claim to be Proponents of Non-Nature but who do not give sufficient status to conventional phenomena and urging them to learn how to uphold the valid status of conventional phenomena, since otherwise they will be subject to Vasubandhu's criticisms that the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras, if taken literally, are self-contradictory
6. Briefly identifying the three wheels of doctrine.
7. Finishing the section on the Mind-Only School with a refutation of the way the eleventh-century Indian scholar Ratnākarashānti differentiates what requires interpretation and what is definitive.

Showing How The First Wheel Of Doctrine Requires Interpretation [234] [446]

Once it is an extreme of reification for phenomena to be established by way of their own character as the referents of their respective conceptual consciousnesses or for apprehended-object and apprehending-subject to be separate entities from each other, the first wheel of doctrine that teaches just such an extreme requires interpretation. Vasubandhu's The Twenty is cited to show that interpretation is required from three viewpoints:
• **The basis in Buddha's thought:** This refers to the actuality that Buddha had in mind when teaching something that in fact does not exist. Thus, for the first-wheel teaching of a difference of entity between subject and object, the basis in Buddha's thought is said to be (1) the seeds from which consciousnesses arise and (2) the appearance of forms, sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible objects as if they were external objects.

• **The purpose for the teaching:** This refers to the liberative purpose for Buddha's teaching something that is non-factual. In the case of the first wheel, it is said that when he taught that subject and object are different entities, he wanted his listeners to realize that, aside from consciousness, there is no permanent self or substantially existent self that perceives objects. As an example, Vasubandhu cites Buddha's teaching of spontaneously arisen sentient beings, that is to say, his teaching that there are sentient beings that just spontaneously exist and thus are permanent and substantially exist; this teaching has—as its basis in Buddha's thought—the intermediate state between lives, and it is given for Nihilists and so forth so that they might understand that there is a basis for the connection of actions in one life to their effects in another life.

• **The damage to the literal reading:** These are the scriptures and the reasonings refuting external objects that were given earlier.

The discussion thus far has been about the teaching of external objects; hence Dzong-ka-ba adds that:

• when it is taught in the first wheel that all phenomena, without differentiation, are established by way of their own character, the imputational nature—a phenomenon's being a referent of a conceptual consciousness and of words—is included as being taught that it is established by way of its own character;

• however, since it exists but actually does not exist by way of its own character, such scriptures also require interpretation.

Showing How The Middle Wheel Requires Interpretation [236] (447)

The extreme of depreciation is that all three natures are not established by way of their own character (or not established from their own side), and thus the second wheel of doctrine, since it teaches this, requires interpretation. Dzong-ka-ba refers to the statement in Asaṅga's *Summary of Manifest Knowledge* that the declarations in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras that all phenomena are natureless are in consideration of the three non-natures and thus require interpretation. He also refers to but does not cite Asaṅga's *Summary of the Great Vehicle*, which says:

> Magical illusions and so forth are taught in relation to the dependent. Non-existence is taught in relation to the imputational.
The four purifications are taught
In relation to the thoroughly established.

He finishes describing the second wheel of doctrine by citing a similar statement in Vasubandhu’s Principles of Explanation refuting the literality of the explanations in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras that all phenomena are natureless.

The Types Of Interpretation That The First Two Wheels Of Doctrine Require Are Markedly Different [237] [447]

In the first wheel of doctrine, the basis in Buddha’s thought—also called the thought of the speaker—is that there are seeds in the mind-basis-of-all, from the ripening of which the various consciousnesses arise, and that there are appearances of their respective objects as if they are external objects. However, the thought of the first-wheel scriptures, or the meaning that is expressed by those sūtras, is different from the thought of the speaker—namely, that object and subject are different entities, a notion that is contradicted by Buddha’s own thought.

With respect to the middle wheel of doctrine, on the other hand, the thought of the speaker and the thought of the scriptures are the same, in that both are the three modes of naturelessness—imputational natures are character-natures, other-powered natures are [self-]production-natures, and thoroughly established natures are ultimate-natures. Thus the literal reading of the middle wheel—that all phenomena are natureless—is neither the thought of the middle-wheel scriptures nor the thought of their speaker, whereas the literal reading of the first wheel—the existence of external objects and the establishment of all phenomena by way of their own character as the referents of their respective conceptual consciousnesses—is the thought of the first-wheel scriptures, but not the thought of the speaker.

These distinctions make the important point that the Mind-Only School does not hold that the meaning of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras is that all phenomena are natureless; rather, this is just the literal reading of those sūtras. Thus the Proponents of Non-Nature, who erroneously take the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras to be literal, are not the intended trainees for whom those sūtras were spoken; rather, the intended trainees are sharp Proponents of Mind-Only who understand the meaning of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras in accordance with the doctrine of the three non-natures as presented in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought but without needing to rely on an explanation of the three non-natures as in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought. (From this viewpoint, Ge-luk-ba scholars say that, even according to the Mind-Only School, the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras are the supreme of all sūtras).b

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a  gzung ba po'i dgongs pa.
b  mdo sde kun gyi mchog.
The mode of commentary on the literal reading of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras is that:

- imputational natures are non-natures, in the sense that they lack establishment by way of their own character;
- other-powered natures are non-natures, in the sense that they lack self-production and also in the sense that they lack being the ultimate that is the object meditated to bring about purification; and
- thoroughly established natures are non-natures, in that they are the very lack of a self of phenomena that exists with each phenomenon. (They are also the ultimate that is the object meditated in order to bring about purification.)

In this way, the thought of the middle and final wheels of doctrine are the same, and those who hold the middle-wheel sūtras to be literal are to be refuted. Hence, the perspective from which the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought says that the sūtras of the final wheel of doctrine are definitive is that they are literal. It is not that their thought differs from the middle wheel.

Self-Contradictions In The Literal Reading Of The Perfection Of Wisdom Sūtras [239] [448]

After concluding that the final wheel of doctrine is literal and thus definitive, Dzong-ka-ba skips over the expected topic of the purpose behind the teaching of the literal reading of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras and proceeds to lay out the damage to their literal reading. Nevertheless, his followers have speculated on the purpose for the literal reading of the second wheel. Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso,¹ for instance, holds that (the literal reading of) the second wheel is for the sake of leading CONSEQUENTIALISTS to the view of the Mind-Only School; he bases this on Dzong-ka-ba's earlier citation from Asaṅga's Compendium of Ascertainments (p. 83):

¹ Port of Entry, 702.4. He (Port of Entry, 706.2) also lists other scholars' interpretations of the purpose of the middle wheel of doctrine:

- Both Pañ-chen Šö-nam-drak-ba and Jay-ādun Chö-kyi-gyel-tsen explain that the middle wheel is for the sake of taking care of Proponents of Mind-Only who have sharp faculties. (This speaks to the purpose of the explicit teaching of the middle wheel, not to the purpose of its literal reading.)
- Jam-yang-shay-ba explains that it is for the sake of leading CONSEQUENTIALISTS and so forth
- Jang-ṣaṅ-gya explains that it is for the sake of stopping the ten types of distracted conceptuality
- "Others" explain that it is for the sake of stopping the view of reification in which the first wheel of doctrine is held to be literal
Question: Thinking of what did the Supramundane Victor say [in the middle wheel] that all phenomena are natureless?

Answer: Here and there he said such through the force of taming [trainees], thinking of three types of non-nature.

Still, he does not explain the crucial point of how the teaching of what the Mind-Only School calls a deprecation of all phenomena could be of service to Consequentialists. However, it can be surmised that Consequentialists are able to posit the cause and effect of actions and the practice of virtue only in the context of the utter absence of inherent existence in all phenomena, and thus, in relation to their mind-set, Buddha communicates to them that all phenomena are natureless.

With respect to the damage to the literal reading of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras, Đzong-ka-ba refers to the earlier pronouncements in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought that if they were taken to be literal, this would involve the deprecation that all three natures would not be established by way of their own character—the problem being that other-powered natures and thoroughly established natures are indeed established by way of their own character. He cites Vasubandhu’s analysis—in his Principles of Explanation—of internal contradictions in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras:

On the one hand, the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras call for the adoption of practices for the sake of certain effects and call for training in the perfection of wisdom in order to attain levels of the path. On the other hand, those same sūtras propound the naturelessness of all phenomena. Therefore, the latter cannot be taken literally but as having another thought behind it.

Đzong-ka-ba points out that even the Proponents of Non-Nature do not assert that the entities of phenomena utterly do not exist or do not exist conventionally. Vasubandhu’s criticism is that if such a denial of ultimate existence in other-powered natures were literal, cause and effect would not be feasible.

Advice To Tibetan Proponents Of Non-Nature [241] [449]

Having explained how Vasubandhu interprets the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras such that they become free of self-contradiction, Đzong-ka-ba turns to indicating how Proponents of Non-Nature should take the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras so that they are not subject to Vasubandhu’s criticisms. He upbraids those

- who claim to be Proponents of Non-Nature but think that cause and effect cannot be established by valid cognition since, according to their wrong notions, valid certification would make cause and effect inherently existent; and
who therefore hold that cause and effect exist only in the perspective of a mistaken consciousness that fancies production to exist.

He chides these pretenders who cannot uphold the valid status of conventional phenomena by saying that it would be splendid if they followed the interpretation by the Proponents of Mind-Only, for otherwise they are subject to the fault of nihilism. Ðzong-ka-ba, being a Consequentialist himself, is warning that denial of the valid establishment of objects is an extreme of nihilism, according to his exposition of the Consequence School; here he is speaking in his own voice, not from the perspective of the Mind-Only School.

Identifying The Three Wheels Of Doctrine [242] [450]

Ðzong-ka-ba draws the conclusion that the three wheels of doctrine are posited not by way of the assemblies of Buddha’s students or by way of periods in the Buddha’s life, and so forth, but by way of the topics expressed.

1. Initially, at Varanāśi within teaching the selflessness of persons, Buddha taught that all phenomena, ranging from the five aggregates through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment, are established by way of their own character as referents of their respective conceptual consciousnesses and as objects expressed by words

2. Then, he taught that all phenomena, ranging from forms through omniscient consciousnesses, are not established from their own side

3. Finally, he made the distinction that other-powered natures and thoroughly established natures are established by way of their own character but that imputational natures are not established by way of their own character

Thus the three wheels of doctrine that the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought elucidates as requiring interpretation or being definitive are very specific teachings, and other sūtras that do not teach these topics are not in any way what Buddha, in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought, is dividing into what require interpretation and what are definitive.

Refuting The Way That Ratnākarashānti Differentiates The Interpretable And The Definitive [243] [450]

To complete his exposition of how the Mind-Only School differentiates the interpretable and the definitive, Ðzong-ka-ba refutes the presentation of this topic by the eleventh-century Indian scholar Ratnākarashānti, who speaks of a threefold division of sūtras:

• Those whose meaning is ascertained through themselves—such as the Descent into Laiṅkā, the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought, and so forth. These themselves clearly teach that imputational natures are not established by
way of their own character and that other-powered natures and thoroughly established natures are established by way of their own character

- Those whose meaning is ascertained through another sūtra—such as the Eight Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra, and so forth. On the literal level, these do not differentiate from among the three natures that other-powered natures and thoroughly established natures are established by way of their own character and that imputational natures are not established by way of their own character; rather, they require elucidation with regard to these facts by other sūtras, such as the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought

- Those whose meaning is ascertained through themselves and whose meaning is ascertained through another sūtra—such as the Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra, and so forth. The meaning of earlier chapters in the Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom is ascertained through the “Questions of Maitreya Chapter” in that sūtra itself and through the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought

With respect to the latter, Ratnākarashānti’s point is that the “Questions of Maitreya Chapter” in the Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra has an explanation that earlier passages in that sūtra require interpretation regarding their blanket presentation of all phenomena as natureless. He holds that this chapter presents the three natures in the same way as the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought does.

Dzong-ka-ba [244] [451] disagrees and, in so doing, indirectly undermines Shay-rap-gyel-tsen’s amalgamation of the final thought of the middle and final wheels of doctrine into a Great Middle Way through the “Questions of Maitreya Chapter.” Dzong-ka-ba holds that on the surface the presentation of the three natures in the “Questions of Maitreya Chapter” in the Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra might seem to be like that in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought, but it is not. However, he defers explanation of this point until late in the section on the Consequence School. Because of its importance in understanding his criticisms of Shay-rap-gyel-tsen’s system, let us pursue it briefly here.

The passage from the Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra, for instance, at the least seems to give a presentation of the three natures that accords with that in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought, in that it declares that imputational forms and so forth do not substantially exist but that forms themselves do substantially exist, this being similar to the statement in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought that imputational natures do not subsist by way of their own character but that other-powered natures do. It is cited at length in Jam-yang-shay-ba’s Great Exposition of Tenets (the bracketed additions in the last paragraph below represent Dzong-ka-ba’s way of explaining away the
seeming similarity with the exposition of the three natures in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought."

"In dependence on the name, discrimination, and convention of the term 'form' to these and those things which have the character of compositional phenomena, a nature of forms is imagined. These are imputational forms.

"Maitreya, in dependence on the name, discrimination, designation, and convention of the terms 'feelings,' 'discriminations,' 'compositional factors,' 'consciousnesses'—through to—'qualities of a Buddha' to these and those things which have the character of compositional phenomena, there is imputed a nature of feelings, discriminations, compositional factors, consciousnesses—through to—a nature of the qualities of a Buddha. These are imputational feelings, discriminations, compositional factors, consciousnesses—through to—imputational qualities of a Buddha.

"[Then with respect to other-powered natures] there are the nominal, discriminated, imputed, and conventional 'forms,' 'feelings,' 'discriminations,' 'compositional factors,' 'consciousnesses'—through to—'qualities of a Buddha' that are designated to these and those things which have the character of compositional phenomena, in dependence on conceptuality abiding in just the nature of conceptuality. These are imputed forms, imputed feelings, imputed discriminations, imputed compositional factors, imputed consciousnesses—through to—imputed qualities of a Buddha.

"Whether the Ones Gone Thus appear or not, reality and the sphere of the actual status of phenomena just abide. Reality's forms are imputed forms' permanent, permanent, stable, absence of nature and absence of a self of phenomena as imputational forms—suchness, final reality. These are reality's feelings, discriminations, consciousnesses—through to—reality's qualities of a Buddha." Thus Buddha said.

The Bodhisattva Maitreya asked, "From among these three types of forms [imputational forms, imputed forms, and reality's forms], which forms are to be viewed as not substantially existing? Which as substantially existing? Which as neither not substantially existing nor substantially existing but distinguished by being ultimate objects? From among the three types of feelings, the three types of compositional factors, the three types of consciousnesses—through to—the three types of qualities of a Buddha, which are to be viewed as not substantially existing? Which as substantially existing? Which as neither not substantially existing nor substantially existing but distinguished by being ultimate objects?" Thus [Maitreya] asked.

The Supramundane Victor said to the Bodhisattva Maitreya, "O
Maitreya, these imputational forms [that is to say, the ultimate existence imagined in forms] should be viewed as not substantially existing [because of not existing at all]. These imputed forms [that is, forms themselves] should be viewed as substantially existing [that is, conventionally existing] because conceptuality substantially exists and not because forms exist under their own power. Reality’s forms [that is, emptinesses] should be viewed as neither not substantially existing [because of existing as the nature of phenomena] nor as substantially existing [because of not existing by way of their own character] but as distinguished by being ultimate objects."

Despite the seeming similarities (if we disregard the interpolations in the last paragraph) with how the Sutra Unraveling the Thought treats the status of the three natures, Dzong-ka-ba explains that this chapter presents the three natures in a different way from the Sutra Unraveling the Thought and that Ratnakarashānti is not to be followed with regard to this topic. This is because the Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra itself elsewhere speaks of all phenomena as not existing ultimately and only existing conventionally whereas the Sutra Unraveling the Thought indicates that other-powered natures (and, by extension, thoroughly established natures) are established by way of their own character and imputational natures are not. Thus, though it might seem that the “Questions of Maitreya Chapter” of the Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra makes a differentiation of status here among the three natures like that of the Sutra Unraveling the Thought when it says that imputational forms (the imputational nature imputed to forms) do not substantially exist whereas imputed forms (other-powered natures) substantially exist, Dzong-ka-ba holds that “imputational forms” here refers to the ultimate existence imagined of forms which does not exist at all and “imputed forms” refers to forms themselves which exist conventionally; he asserts that it can be understood that “substantial existence” here means not ultimate existence but just existence, that is, conventional existence. Ratnakarashānti is faulted for not having taken the context of the sutra into proper account. (Dzong-ka-ba uses the rest of the Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra to explain the “Questions of Maitreya Chapter,” whereas Ratnakarashānti uses this chapter to explain the rest of the sūtra.)

The point is that since here “substantial existence” is equivalent to “existence,” which is equivalent to conventional existence, even this passage, which seems to accord with the Sutra Unraveling the Thought, is not—for the Mind-Only School—definitive and requires interpretation. Dzong-ka-ba’s explanation of the three-natures section of the “Questions of Maitreya Chapter” thereby maintains his position that, for the Mind-Only School, the literal reading of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras requires interpretation and does
not—on the literal level—present a doctrine of the three natures similar to that in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought:*

Shay-rap-gyel-ten, on the other hand, holds that this presentation in the Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra is just the same as that given by Maitreya at the beginning of his Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes, and so forth (see p. 182ff.). Thus Dzong-ka-ba’s refutation of Ratanākarashānti’s similar notion also is aimed implicitly at Shay-rap-gyel-ten.

Here in the Mind-Only section, Dzong-ka-ba points out that Vasubandhu establishes that the statements in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras that all phenomena are natureless require interpretation as per the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought and that Vasubandhu indicates contradictions in the literal reading of those sūtras. Indeed, Vasubandhu does not establish this through citing the “Questions of Maitreya Chapter” in the Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra. We can see that this is a reason for Dzong-ka-ba’s earlier quotation of Vasubandhu’s explicit citation of the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought (p. 237):

Vasubandhu’s Principles of Explanation refutes the assertion that the explanations in the Mother Sūtras of naturelessness and so forth are literal and says:

It is set out in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought that all such statements that “All phenomena are natureless,” and so forth are not of definitive meaning.

* For treatments of these issues see Edward Conze and Shōtarō Iida, “‘Maitreya’s Questions’ in the Prajñāpāramitā,” Mêlanges d’indianisme a la mémoire de Louis Renu, 229-242 (Paris: Éditions E. de Boccard, 1968); Noriaki Hakamaya, “A Consideration on the Byams Shus kyi Le’u,” Indobukkyōgaku Kenkyu 14, no. 1 (1975): 499-489; Shōtarō Iida, Reason and Empinity (Tokyo: Hokuseido, 1980), 259-269; Ian Charles Harris, The Continuity of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra in Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 1991), 102-131; and Cyrus R. Stearns, The Buddha from Döl po and His Fourth Council of the Buddhist Doctrine (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, 1996), 136-143. The complexities of Dzong-ka-ba’s presentation are perhaps what have led Harris (Continuity of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra, 110) mistakenly to surmise that Dzong-ka-ba would be put in the uncomfortable position of having to accept that the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought is not a basic scripture for the Yogic Practice School ("His position seems to entail a denial of the fact that the Sanđhinirmocanāsūtra is āgama for the Yogācāra...") and (Continuity of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra, 120) that Dzong-ka-ba himself "was a Svātantrika-Madhyamika!"

The scholars mentioned in the above paragraph do not consider the “Questions of Maitreya Chapter” to be an integral part of that sūtra but take it to be a later insertion into the text, by reason of the fact that it contains this explanation of the three natures so opposed to the run of the rest of the sūtra. Indeed, this is a way to avoid having to make the forced complexities of interpretation that Dzong-ka-ba employs in order to create a unified whole.

b Shay-rap-gyel-ten (Ocean of Definitive Meaning, 205.4-207.6) cites and explains the passage from the Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra given above.
It also can be seen that he is buttressing this argument when, earlier on the occasion of presenting the damage to the literal reading of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras, he cites Vasubandhu’s presentation of the internal contradictions of those sūtras. The point, by extension, is that Vasubandhu did not take literally the exposition of the three natures in the “Maitreya Chapter” of the Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra, and thus Ratnākaraśānti is wrong to hold that this chapter presents the three natures in the same way as the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought.

Đzong-ka-ba adds that if the presentation of the three natures in the “Maitreya Chapter” and in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought were equivalent, then it could not be said, as the Proponents of Non-Nature rightly do, that the meaning of the thought of the Mother Sūtras is that all phenomena are natureless ultimately but exist conventionally. This is because, according to Ratnākaraśānti’s wrong view, the “Questions of Maitreya Chapter” of the Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra would be saying (even on the literal level) that such teaching is not definitive and that other-powered natures are established by way of their own character. The Middle Way School absurdly would have to accord with the Cognition School, that is to say, the Mind-Only School, on the topic of the three natures, whereas it is obvious that these scholars differed on this issue.

Đzong-ka-ba’s refutation of Ratnākaraśānti’s opinion in terms of its implications for the Naturelessness School serves as a transition to the following sections on the Naturelessness School. It also calls his readers to apply the principles—that he has seen in basic Indian Mind-Only treatises—in critically examining any and all presentations of the Mind-Only School, whether these be Indian or Tibetan. The suggestion that critical analysis is paramount resonates with the statement in his prologue that the differentiation of what requires interpretation and what is definitive derives from reasoning.
PART FOUR: 
CRITICAL EDITION IN TIBETAN SCRIPT 

Ḍjong-ka-ba Lo-sang-drak-ba’s 

Treatise Differentiating 
Interpretable and Definitive 
Meanings: 
The Essence of Eloquence 

Prologue and Section on the 
Mind-Only School
Preface to Critical Edition

Editions Consulted

Ten editions were used; five were checked exhaustively:

1. “Delhi NG dkra shis lhun po”: from the Collected Works of Rje Tsoṅ-kha-pa Blo-bzain-grags-pa, vol. 21 pha, 478-714 (Delhi: Ngawang Gelek, 1975); photographic reprint, of the old dkra shis lhun po edition. At the end, after an identification of the scribe, bsod nams blo gros, it finishes with “mangalam”

2. “Se rva zhol”: 1988 printing at se rva Monastic University of the zhol blocks (for identification of the blocks, see number 6) from volume pha of the Collected Works; 114 folios. It is the same as number 6 except that the latter includes both corrections and flawed attempts at correction. At the end, after an identification of the scribe, bsod nams blo gros, it finishes with a prayer that begins with “svasti” and ends with “mangalam”; it frequently employs contractions, such as guung so for guung spu

3. “Zi ling sku ’bum”: from rje tsong kha pa chen po’i guung ’bum, pha, 337-526 (Zi ling: mtsho sgon mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1987); codex fixed-type rendering of the “sku ’bum byams pa gling” edition, 337-526. At the end, after an identification of the scribe, bsod nams blo gros, and finishing with “mangalam,” there is an additional colophon that begins with “svasti” and identifies the place of publication. It has more shad than other editions and creatively uses shad to alert the reader to meaning breaks. It is likely that most of its many variations are due to the editors of this edition

4. “Sarnath gsang”: on the cover in roman letters is Dan-ne-leg-shed nying-po (Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1973); codex fixed-type flawed rendering of a “gsang” edition with corrections, 251 pages. At the end, after an identification of the scribe, bsod nams blo gros, and “mangalam,” there are an additional prayer by H.H. the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, which is different from that in number 9, and a further identification of sponsors of the publication

5. “Grags pa & nams rgyal”: on the title page is drang nges legs bshad snying po: The Essence of Eloquent Speech on the Definitive and Interpretable (Mundgod, India: SOKU, 1991); codex fixed-type critical edition by Geshe Palten Drakpa and Damdul Namgyal, 231 pp. The editors compared four editions—using as the basis the zi ling mtsho sgon mi rigs dpe skrun khang edition (1987) which is number 3 above, compared with the Peking edition (number 7 below); the gsang dkra shis lhun po edition (perhaps number 1 above or an earlier version); and the lha sa rite zhol edition (number 2 above but perhaps not printed at se rva). At the end, after an
identification of the scribe, \textit{bdod nam} \textit{blo} \textit{gro}s, it finishes with a prayer that begins with "\textit{svasti}" and ends with "\textit{mangalam}," followed by an additional prayer by H.H. the Fourteenth Dalai Lama and an additional colophon. Since it is based on the Zi ling sku 'bum edition, only instances where it differs from it will be cited.

Two closely related editions were consulted:

6. "Delhi GD zhol": from The Collected Works (\textit{gsun 'bum}) of the Incomparable Lord Tson-kha-pa Blo-bzang-grags-pa, vol. 14 \textit{pha}, 443-669 (New Delhi: Guru Deva, 1979); photographic reprint, of the "1897 old zhol\textit{} (\textit{dga'-ldan-phun-tshogs-glii}) blocks." This is the same as number 2 above, except that this edition includes flawed attempts at correction. At the end, after an identification of the scribe, \textit{bdod nam} \textit{blo} \textit{gro}s, and giving the word "\textit{mangalam}," the word "\textit{svasti}" follows; there is a further stanza.

7. "sku 'bum 1988": (Ch'ing-hai: sku 'bum Monastic University, 1988); printed from \textit{sku 'bum} blocks of the beginning of the nineteenth century; it is the basis of number 3 above; 124 folios. At the end, after an identification of the scribe, \textit{bdod nam} \textit{blo} \textit{gro}s, and finishing with "\textit{mangalam}" there is an additional colophon that begins with "\textit{svasti}" and identifies the place of publication.

\textsuperscript{a} E. Gene Smith (personal correspondence) identifies the "old zhol":

The old Zhol Par-khang has the formal name Shar Dga'-'ldan-phun-tshogs-gling. This was founded by the 5th Dalai Lama and was the chief printing house of Lhasa until the establishment of the new Zhol Par-khang printery, the Bka'-gyur Par-khang, styled the Gangs-can-phan-bde'i-grer-medod-gling. This was founded during the reign of the 13th Dalai Lama for housing the blocks of the Lha-sa edition of the Bka'-gyur. After the completion of this project, the Lhasa government initiated the carving of the printing blocks for a number of other important gsung 'bum including Bu-ston, A-khu-ching, Thu'u-bkwan, Gung-thang. The blocks from the Old Zhol printery were under the custody of the Potala authorities. Most seem to have been discarded and are being sold around the Bar-khor as curios. The New Zhol blocks are under the custody of the TAR Archives and are well kept, for the most part. Regarding the name Shar Dga'-'ldan-phun-tshogs-gling for the old Zhol printery, I think this is called Shar in contrast to the Nub Dga'-'ldan-phun-tshogs-gling or the old Rtag-brtan-phun-tshogs-gling, the seat of Jo-nang Rje-brou Taranâtha. This monastery boasted a great printing house with a number of works by the 5th Dalai Lama. Ngawang Gelek Demo published a 1957 survey of the printing houses of Central Tibet in his Three Catalogues. For the history of the Dga'-'ldan-phun-tshogs-gling of the west (formerly Rtag-brtan-phun-tshogs-gling), see Champa Thupten Zongtse, \textit{History of the Monastic University Dga'-'ldan-phun-tshogs-glii = Geschichte der Kloster-Universität dGa'-ldan-phun-tshogs-glii = Dga'-'ldan phun tshogs glii gi thog mtha' bar gum gi byung ba yid la dran byed kun khjub snyan pa'i rnga sgra} (Göttingen: Im Selbstverlag des Verfassers, 1977).

\textsuperscript{b} Many thanks to Leonard van der Kuijp for identifying the date of the carving.
Three other editions were consulted:

8. "Peking": Peking 6142, vol. 153, 168.5.8-209.3.4; volume nga of the Collected Works. At the end, after an identification of the scribe, bsdod nams blo gros, there is a long additional colophon on the occasion of this new edition that identifies it as built on the dga' ldan phun tshogs gling edition; it ends with "sarsamangalam" and identifies the place of publication.

9. "Kalimpong": (Kalimpong, India: Kalsum Laksey, 1968); fixed-type small Tibetan-style book; 142 folios, on green paper. At the end, after an identification of the scribe, bsdod nams blo gros, there is an additional prayer by H.H. the Fourteenth Dalai Lama that is different from that in 9 and begins with "om svasti" and ends with "mangalam."

10. "rje'i gsung lta ba'i skor": from rje tsong kha pa'i gsung dbu ma'i lta ba'i skor (Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1975); codex fixed type edition, 262-458. It ends like number 3 above.

I also compared portions of the text with citations in the following works, which are fully cited in the bibliography:

Bel-don-drak-ba's gzhi gsum gyi dus tshig la dbyod pa'i legs biad lu'i rigs dga' tshal
Bel-jor-hlin-drup's Lamp for the Teaching
Da-drin-rap-den's Annotations
Dön-drup-gyel-tsen's Four Intertwined Commentaries
Gung-ru Chö-jung's Garland of White Lotuses
Gung-tang Gön-chok-den-bay-dron-may's Annotations and Difficult Points
Jam-yang-shay-ba Nga-wang-dzön-dru's Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive
Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso's Port of Entry
Ser-shuil Lo-sang-pun-tsok's Notes
Wonch'uk's Commentary on the "Sutra Unraveling the Thought"

For citations from the Sutra Unraveling the Thought I consulted Étienne Lamotte's critical edition and the stog Palace edition, which are also fully cited in the bibliography. For Dzong-ka-ba's citations of Indian texts, comparisons were made with editions of the Sanskrit, as cited in the footnotes.

Page numbers of two major editions and one minor edition have been inserted into the text in small type as follows:

[2] = Delhi NG dkra shis lhun po
(2a) = Se rva zhol
[2] = Sarnath gtsang (included even though seriously flawed because of the availability of the edition among refugee scholars in India).

Process Of Editing

The editing of Dzong-ka-ba's text involved the work of four graduate students.
in the University of Virginia Tibetan program:

1. In the summer of 1988, Steven Weinberger typed the entire Tibetan text of the Sarnath gsang edition into my computer in Wylie transcription, using Microsoft Word. I converted it to Tibetan script via the program by Chet Wood.

2. John C. Powers compared both the Wylie transcription and the Tibetan script of the prologue, the Mind-Only section, and the Autonomy section to the Delhi NG dkra shis lhun po edition, since I had determined that this edition should be the basis because the Sarnath gsang is an error-laden edition. My editorial decisions on these sections were entered by Nathanial Garson.


4. I did a computer spell-check on the Wylie transcription and then made editorial decisions by incorporating changes and making footnotes, based on the work done to date, also checking Dzong-ka-ba's quotations against the Peking and sometimes the sde dge.

5. Nathanial Garson checked the text of the prologue and the Mind-Only section against the Zi ling sku 'bum edition, after which I made editorial decisions.

6. Mark Seibold checked the text of the prologue and the Mind-Only section in hard copy against the Grags pa & rnam rgyal edition, after which I made editorial decisions.

This new critical edition incorporates several features:

- All quotations are indented for easy identification.
- The Sanskrit of quotations is provided, often comparing multiple editions.
- All unspecified references to headings of sections are identified and given in brackets.
- Corresponding page numbers of three editions are given, as indicated above.
- Titles of texts are marked by a broken underline.
- A separate table of contents is provided.
- Marginal line numbers are provided.
- Speculations on possible reasons for variations are given in hopes of provoking discussion.

Many thanks to Steven Weinberger, John C. Powers, Nathanial Garson, and Mark Seibold for their essential assistance in this project.
Table of Contents for Critical Edition: Tibetan Style

There are two tables of contents for the Tibetan text, one here and one at the end of the book. The detailed contents at the end of the book give all subsections in the order in which they appear, whereas the table here gives all subsections together with the larger section to which they belong. This one partially mimics the way a traditional Tibetan table of contents reads.

Using this type of table, a student would memorize and recite all of the sections in large type (except for the first two entries, which have been added for convenience). The entries in small type have no subsections and, as mentioned above, are all included in a larger section. The small-type entries would not be given in a strict traditional format but are added here for convenience in locating the page numbers of these subsections.
ཐུས་པར་དབང་པོའི་བོད་དཔྱོན་པ་དགེ་བོ་
སེམས་དཔའི་བོད་དཔྱོན་པ་དགེ་བོ།

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The Tibetan Text
མོང་རབ་ཐེག་པ་སེམས་དཔོན་པོ་

མི་དེ་རེ་ཞིག་བཏང་བས་དེ་རེ་གནས་པར་བཏང་བ།

སྡེ་བ་མ་གིང་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་ཐོབ་མ་ཁྱབ་མེད།

སེམས་པར་ཐེག་ཆེན་ཐོབ་མི་འབྲིས་པ་མཁན།

བརྒྱུན་མཐའ་དེ་རོ་བོ་དྲུང་བྲེལ་བ།

6

ཡུལ་ཡུལ་བཤད་ཟད་ལ་ཕན་གཏོང་བེན་དུ་མིང་བ།

སེམས་པར་ཐེག་ཆེན་ཐོབ་མི་འབྲིས་པ་མཁན།

ཐོག་མཐོང་མཐེ་དྭན་པོ་ཐུབ་མཐའ་པོ་[480]

སྟོིང་པོ་ཞིབ་ཐོབ་མེད་པར་ཐུབ་མཐའ་པོ་[68] (251)

8

ཕྱི་ནི་ཐོན་མོ་དེ་སུ་འཇིག་ཐོབ་དེ་སུ་འིན་ཐོབ་དེ་སུ་འདི་ཐོབ་

སེམས་པར་ཐེག་ཆེན་ཐོབ་མི་འབྲིས་པ་མཁན།

དྲིག་རྫོང་ཆེན་པོ་དྲོད་པོ་ནི་བོན་པོ་[68] (251)

10

སེམས་པར་ཐེག་ཆེན་ཐོབ་མི་འབྲིས་པ་མཁན།

ཕྱི་མོ་ཐོན་མོ་དེ་སུ་འཇིག་ཐོབ་དེ་སུ་འིན་ཐོབ་

སེམས་པར་ཐེག་ཆེན་ཐོབ་མི་འབྲིས་པ་མཁན།

དྲིག་རྫོང་ཆེན་པོ་དྲོད་པོ་ནི་བོན་པོ་[68] (251)

15

སེམས་པར་ཐེག་ཆེན་ཐོབ་མི་འབྲིས་པ་མཁན།

ཕྱི་མོ་ཐོན་མོ་དེ་སུ་འཇིག་ཐོབ་དེ་སུ་འིན་ཐོབ་

སེམས་པར་ཐེག་ཆེན་ཐོབ་མི་འབྲིས་པ་མཁན།

དྲིག་རྫོང་ཆེན་པོ་དྲོད་པོ་ནི་བོན་པོ་[68] (251)

19

སེམས་པར་ཐེག་ཆེན་ཐོབ་མི་འབྲིས་པ་མཁན།

དྲིག་རྫོང་ཆེན་པོ་དྲོད་པོ་ནི་བོན་པོ་[68] (251)

[3]  དེ་ཐོན་མོ་དེ་སུ་འཇིག་ཐོབ་དེ་སུ་འིན་ཐོབ་

a  Zhi ling sku 'bum (339.15): du yang.

b  Delhi NG dkar shis lhan po (480.3) and Peking (168.5.6): ngal ba med; Se eva zhol (2a1), Zhi ling sku 'bum (339.15), Sarnath gisang (1.20), and Kalimpong (3.6): ngal ba mang. Gung-tang's Difficult Points (18.9) reports that "another" edition reads "without weariness" (ngal ba med) rather than "with much weariness" (ngal ba mang) but that the meaning is similar. His point must be that both indicate that these scholars worked very hard at the task. Indeed, both readings are feasible. I have chosen the one more frequently cited in the commentaries.
Gung-tang (Difficult Points, 28.14) reports that this citation is not found in a small sutra by the same name (Peking 833, vol. 33) but is found in the eighteenth chapter of the Pile of Jewels Sutra (phags pa yul 'khor skyon gis zhus pa zhes bya ba theg pa chen po'i mdo, āryaśrīraparipṛcchānāmamahāyānaśūtra; Peking 760, vol. 23, chap. 17). Gung-tang (28.15) also cites a different edition of the sutra, which varies slightly due to a difference in translation:

ston pa zhi ba skye ba med pa'i tshul/
mi shes pa ni 'gro ba 'khyams gyur tsel/
thugs rje'i thabs tshul rigs pa brgya dag gis/
de dag rnam s gi 'dus par mdzad pa lag/

(In the last line of the Sarnath Guru Deva edition of Gung-tang’s text, 28.18, read mdsaṅg for dsaṅg in accordance with the Hla-tha Go-mang edition, 13a.4.)

The Sanskrit is found in P. L. Vaidya, Mahāyānaśīlaśāstra, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, 17 (Dharbangha, India: Mithila Institute, 1961), vol. 1, 154 (II. 310):

śūnyāśca lānta anupādānaya avijñānādeva jñāgadubhramati/
tetāmupāyayuktairatāraudaravayayayapi kṛpālutsayā/

This version accords with that cited by Đong-ka-ba, which has the instrumental thugs rje mnga' bas for kṛpālutsayā.


Gung-tang's Difficult Points (29.1/13a.5) identifies this version of the stanza as being like that found in the translation of Kalki Pundarika's (rigs ldan pad ma dkar po) Great Commentary on the "Kalachakra Tantra," the Stainless Light (bshad pa'i rgyad kyi rgyal po dus kyi 'khor lo'i grel bshad rtsa ba'i rgyad kyi rjes su 'jug pa stong phrag bsu guysis pa dri ma med pa'i 'od ces bya ba, visamalaprabhānamamātimātantrānuśārinaśūnyasthānāhāraśūnyakālacakrasrānta-tantrāsātā) by the Translator of Ra, Dor-jay-drak-ka (rua lo tsi ba rdo rje grags pa). He also gives the version of the same text by the Translator of Dro, Shāy-rap-drak (bro lo tsi ba shes rab grags):

bregs bcad brdar bu'i gser bzhin durl
mkhas pa rnams kyi yongs btags nas//
bdag gung blang bya dge slong dag//
gus pa'i phyir ni ma min nor//
Like gold that is [acquired] upon being scorched, cut, and rubbed,
My speech is to be adopted by scholars
Upon analyzing it thoroughly,
Not. O monastics, out of respect [for me].

Gung-tang also gives another, unidentified version:

bsreg bcad brdar ba'i gser bzhin du//
legs par brtags la ngs yi bka'n//
mkhas pa dag gis blang bya yil//
dge slong dag gis gus phyir min//
Like gold that is [acquired upon being] scorched, cut, and rubbed,
My word is to be adopted by scholars
Upon analyzing it well,
Not by monastics out of respect [for me].

The stanza is cited in Shāntarakṣita’s *Compendium of Principles* (de kho na nyid bdu ba'i thig le'ur byas pa, tattwasamgrahahakārikā), XXVI.3343 and 3587. The Sanskrit is found in Dwarikadas Shastri, *Tattwasamgraha of Acarya Shantarakṣita, with the Commentary “Pañjikā” of Shri Kamalāśīla* (Varanasi, India: Baudha Bharati, 1968), vol. 2, 1115:
tāpāchedacca nikaśati suvarṇam iva pañḍitaśi/
parikṣyā bhikṣavo grahyām mad vaco na tu gauravāt://

This version accords with that by the Translator of Dro, Śay-ṣrap-drak, which has *dge slong dag* (bhikṣavo) in the vocative. For a translation into English, see G. Jha, *The Tattwasamgraha of Śāntarakṣita, with the Commentary of Kamalāśīla*. Gaekwad’s Oriental Series. 80 and 83 (Baroda, India: Oriental Institute, 1937-1039), XXVI.3344 (p. 1485) and XXVI.3588 (p. 1558). The first citation occurs at the point of discussing the word of Buddha and how it is not annulled by direct perception, inference, and scriptural inference; the second citation occurs at the point of discussing identifying Buddha’s “lion’s roar” that brings about “the lowering of the arrogance of the maddened elephants in the shape of the False Philosophers” (Jha, *Tattwasamgraha*, 1558).


5

[བདེ་དགེ་གྲོང་བའི་དྲུག་པ་] [73] (255)

[བདེ་དགེ་གྲོང་བའི་དྲུག་པ་] [75] (257)

[བདེ་དགེ་གྲོང་བའི་དྲུག་པ་] [73] (255)

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[བདེ་དགེ་གྲོང་བའི་དྲུག་པ་] [73] (255)
of the other bka' stsal in the same section takes the instrumental), and (3) grammatically impossible (since the instrumental is not used for objects of verbs). Delhi NG dkra shis lhun po 482.6 and Sarnath gsang 4.10 correctly read zas rnam kyi bar yang; the Karmapa sde dge edition of the sūtra (mdo sde, ca. 31.4) reads zas rnam kyi yang; and the stōg Palace edition (mdo sde, na, 45.2), which represents a different translation, reads zas rnam dang.a

a In Lamotte (Samdhinirmochana, 66 [1, lines 17 and 26]), the stōg Palace (45.5 and 46.1), and the Karmapa sde dge (31.6 and 32.1) of the sūtra, “meditation” (bgom pa dang) is included in the list of attributes of the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment between “antidotes” and “production of that which has not been produced,” whereas Dzong-ka-ba’s text (for example, Delhi NG dkra shis lhun po, 483.1) and Dön-drup-gyel-tsen’s text (5.1) omit this.

b Lamotte (Samdhinirmochana, 66 [1, line 32]) reads ji lea dgyags nas, whereas the Karmapa sde dge (32.4) edition of the sūtra, the Delhi NG dkra shis lhun po (483.3), and Sarnath gsang (5.1) more properly read ci la dgyags nas; the stōg Palace sūtra gives a common variant of the latter, ci las dgyags nas.

c Lamotte (Samdhinirmochana, 193 [3], n. 2) gives the Sanskrit:
nīhuṣabhāvaḥ sarvadharmanā anvapannah sarvadharmanā anvṛtadhā adīśāntaḥ prakṛtis-parinirvāṇaḥ.
ཚོས་གསུམ་ཟེ། གསུམ་ཉིད་མེད་ཀྱི་དུས་མི་བཞི་ཕན་དཔོན་དུ་ཤིང་སི་བཞི་ཕན་གྱུར་བའི་ཨུ་བཞི་མི་ཤིང་སི་བཞི་ཕན་གྱུར་བུ་བུ་གམ་ནས་ཕྱི་པོ་བུ་བུ་གམ་ནས་ཕྱི་པོ་བུ་བུ་གམ་ནས་ཕྱི་པོ་

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མཚན་ཤིང་བུ་མོ་སེང་གོ་དུས་མི་བཞི་དྲུག་པའི་ཨུ་བཞི་ཕན་གྱུར་བུ་བུ་གམ་ནས་ཕྱི་པོ་[847] (259) དེར་བཞི་མཚན་ཤིང་བུ་ཐོས་ནད་ཤིང་གུ་ཤིང་གུ་ཤིང་གུ་ཤིང་གུ་ཤིང་

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ཐོ་ཕྱི་ཕྱི་འིར་ཕྱི་ཕྱི་འིར་ཕྱི་ཕྱི་འིར་ཕྱི་ཕྱི་འིར་ཕྱི་ཕྱི་འིར་ཕྱི་ཕྱི་འིར་ཕྱི་ཕྱི་འིར། [81] (260)

* Zi ling sku 'bum (342.13) have the common variant brags, here and throughout the text.
བོད་ཡིག [བོད་དེ་མཐོང་དེ་བཞི་]དཔེ་ཐོག སོགས་པོ་ཐུབ་ཙམ་པདྨ་དེར་ [བོད་པའི་ཐུབ་ཙམ་པདྨ་]དཔེ་ཐོག ཚོ་སྤྱོད་ཤེས་བོ་སྣང་གི་[82] (261)

དཔེ་ཐོག [བོད་དེ་མཐོང་དེ་བཞི་]དཔེ་ཐོག ཚོ་སྤྱོད་བོ་སྣང་གི་[82] (261)

དཔེ་ཐོག [བོད་དེ་མཐོང་དེ་བཞི་]དཔེ་ཐོག [82] (261)

དཔེ་ཐོག [བོད་དེ་མཐོང་དེ་བཞི་]དཔེ་ཐོག [82] (261)

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དཔེ་ཐོག [བོད་དེ་མཐོང་དེ་བཞི་]དཔེ་ཐོག [82] (261)

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བོད་དེ་མཐོང་དེ་བཞི་[བོད་དེ་མཐོང་དེ་བཞི་]དཔེ་ཐོག [82] (261)

\[\text{\textsuperscript{a}} \text{ rnam par gsal la dbab pa bdu ba, vinicitayamgrahati; Peking 5539, vol. 111, 71.2.8;}\]
\[\text{Tokyo ide dge, sems tshan, vol. 9 (sz), 8.4.5. In a typical variant reading, both of these editions read ci las dgon for ci la dgon. Lamotte similarly uses both readings: for instance, la dgon (Samdhinirmocana, 66 [1, four lines from the end of the section]) but las dgon (Samdhinirmocana 67 [3, line 4]).} \]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{b} sum cu pa'i thig le ur byas pa, trimukkacakikâ; Peking 5556, vol. 113, 233.3.3; stanza 23.} \]
\[\text{Wonch'uk cites the same passage (Extensive Commentary, Peking 5517, vol. 116, 130.4.8).} \]
\[\text{The Sanskrit from Sylvain Lévi, Vijñaptimārtātādādi / Deux traités de Vasubandhu:} \]
\[\text{Vimśatikā (La Vingtaine) et Trimūkā (La Trentaine), Bibliothèque de l'École des Hautes Études, 245 (Paris: Librairie Ancienne Honoré Champion, 1925), 14, is:} \]


 * Delhi NG dkra shis lhun po (485.5), Se rva zhol (4б.2), Peking (169.5.2), Sarnath gtsang (7.15), and Kalimpong (10.5): *ngo bo med pa*. Zi ling sku ’bum (344.1) and sku ’bum 1988 more cogently read: *ngo bo ngyid med pa.*
གུས་ཀླིང་གི་དོན་དོན

a Zi ling sku 'bum (344.13): kyi; the usage of gyi perhaps reflects an editor's not heeding the presence of a non-manifest extra suffix da at the end of the previous syllable, which calls for kyi.

b Zi ling sku 'bum (345.2): pa; the variation perhaps reflects an editor's seeking to hold to the rule that only pa is used for a possessor (bdag sgra) although later instances of editing pa to ba either throw such a suspicion into question or suggest two uncoordinated editors. Indeed, Si-du Chö-kyi-jung-hay (s'i tu chos kyi 'byung gnas, 1700-1774) holds that only pa should be used to indicate a possessor and says that possessor words using ba "are only the vulgar language of villagers" (grong pa'i skad phai pa tsam); see Explanation of (Tön-mi Sambhata's) "The Thirty" and "Usage of Gender," a Treatise on the Thorough Application of the Language of the Snowy Country: Beautiful Pearl Necklace of the Wise (yul gang) can pa'i brda yang
 ينب�་བོད་ལྡན་པ།
ཐུ་བྱེད་རྨ་མ་ི་་བཟོ་ཨི་་འབྲེལ་པ་རབ་ཡིན་པ་ཇི་ཕྱིར་ཨྲེལ་གྱི་ཟོབས
ཀྱིས་ཨི་བ་ནི་ཨི་ཨི་བ་ཉོ་བོ་ཉིད་མེད་པ་ཉིད་ཅེས་བློ་ལེ་

In English, literally:

That because compounded phenomena are dependent-arisings, they are produced through the power of conditions and are not self-produced is called “production-non-nature.”

In the second reading the nominative is confined to the last clause:

'du byed rnam ni rten ching 'brel par 'byung ba yin pa'i phyir rkyen gyi stobs kyis skye ba yin gyi rang gi skye ba ni skye ba ngo bo nyid med pa nyid ces bya'ol

In English, literally:

Because compounded phenomena are dependent-arisings, they are produced through the power of conditions, and self-production is said to be a “production-non-nature.”

The first reading strikes me as more readable and requires less strain. Also, the second (rang gi) would read better as rang gi, thereby paralleling the bdag nyid kyis of the sutra.

In Dzong-ka-ba’s treatment of Maitreya’s Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sutras (see p. 419, footnote b), the very same phrase (rang mi skye ba, rang gi skye ba) occurs, with the same variant readings in the various editions. In that context, rang mi skye ba is clearly preferable, as explained in that footnote.

1 Delhi NG dka' shis lhun po (488.1), Se rva zhol (5a.6), Peking (170.2.2), Sarnath gtsang (10.5), and Kalimpong (13.4): par; Zi ling sku ’bum (345.19): bar; see p. 368, footnote b.


*Zi ling sku 'bum (346.10); don dam pa; Delhi NG dkra shis lhun po (488.5), Samnath gtsang (10.19), Kalimpong (14.3), Se rva zhol (6a.1), and Peking (170.2.7) lack pa.*
བོད་ཡིག [དེ་རིང་པོ་ཆེན་པོ་] [82] (266)

[13] རྗེ་ནི་ཐིག་བཤད་པ་དེ་འོ་བོད་རྫས་ཐིག་

[14] སྦྱི་དེ་རིང་པོ་ཆེན་པོ་ [266]

20 དེ་འོ་བོད་དེ་འོ་བོད་དེ་འོ་བོད་དེ་འོ་བོད་དེ་འོ་བོད་

Zi ling sku 'bum (347.14): 'dis.


The *stog* Palace edition (49.1) offers a different reading:

> nam mkha’ gzugs kyi ngo bo nyid med pa tsum gyis rab tu phye zhing kun tu ’gro ba de bzhin du de dag las geig don dam pa ngo bo nyid med par bla ba ni gang chos la bdag med pas rab tu phye ba kun tu ’gro ba’o

Since *de dag* is dual or plural, I take it as referring to the other two natures; hence, in translation the *stog* Palace version would read:

Paramārthasamudgata, it is thus: just as, for example, space is distinguished by the mere naturelessness of form and pervades everywhere, so the ultimate naturelessness is to be viewed—as other than those—as distinguished by the selflessness of phenomena and as pervading everything.

Zi ling sku ’bum (348.15): *skur ba* here and throughout, again fulfill the rule that *ba* follows nga, ’a, ra, la; however, since *skur* is considered to have a non-manifest extra suffix *da, pa* is also correct. Other instances will not be cited.
བཐོད་བོད་བོད་བོད་བོད་བོད་བོད་བོད་བོད་བོད་བོད་བོད་བོད་བོད

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* Se rva zhol (7b.5): skur ba, though the same word earlier in the line is skur pa.
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\[16\] Zi ling sku 'bum (350.10) misreads \textit{sungs}.
\[17\] Zi ling sku 'bum (351.1): \textit{bstan} to here. The same is the case for Grags pa & gnam gyäg, 17.9, and so forth. The editors of the Zi ling sku 'bum were seeking to take account of the non-manifest extra suffix \textit{da} in the past form of the verb, which thus calls for \textit{to} as a terminator. It seems that they were intent on correction—ignoring non-manifest extra suffixes as in \textit{skur pa} (perhaps from the sometimes-cited rule that if the addition of the syllable creates an even number of syllables, it should be \textit{pa} and if its addition creates an odd number of syllables, it should be \textit{ba} or perhaps from the commonly accepted notion that there is no certainty, presumably because usage in the locality determines what is done) and paying attention to them in \textit{bstan to}. The other editions seem to have done the reverse.


\[ \text{Delhi GD zhol (8b.6) omits this syllable, which is written beneath the line in Se rva zhol.} \]
\[ \text{Se rva zhol (8b.6), presumably taking account of a non-manifest extra suffix} \ da \text{at the end of the previous syllable, reads} \ pa. \]
ིན་བདོན་ཐོབ

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a The Peking edition of Asaṅga's Summary of Manifest Knowledge (5550, vol. 112, 266.1.5) reads gi laa rang bzhin gyis yongs su mya ngan las 'das so. Wonnch'uk (Peking 5517, vol. 106, chap. 5, 134.2.2) cogently reads goad ma nas zhi ba gi laa ba de bzhin tu rang bzhin gyis yongs su mya ngan las 'das so.

b Delhi NG dkra shis lhan po (495.5), Zi ling sku 'bum (352.3), Sarnath gsang (18.10), and Kalimpong (22.6): ga'i; Se rva zhol (9a.5) and Peking (171.3.6): ka'i.

c Delhi NG dkra shis lhan po (495.6), Sarnath gsang (18.14), and Kalimpong (23.1): par; Se rva zhol (9a.6), Zi ling sku 'bum (352.5), and Peking (171.3.7): bar. Delhi GD zhol shows evidence of being emended to par.
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༽[ཧེ་ཧེ་ཤེ་ཧེ་ཤེ་ཧེ་ཤེ་ཧེ་ཤེ་ཧེ་ཤེ་ཧེ་ཤེ་ཧེ་ཤེ་ཧེ་ཤེ་ཧེ་ཤེ་ཧེ་ཤེ་ཧེ་ཤེ་ཧེ་ཤེ་ཧེ་ཤེ་ཧེ་ཤེ་ཧེ་ཤེ་ཧེ་ཤེ་ཧེ་ཤེ་ཧེ་ཤེ་ཧེ་ཤེ་ཧེ་ཤེ་ཧེ་ཤེ་ཧེ་ཤེ་ཧེ་ཤེ་ཧེ་ཤེ་ཧེ་ཤེ་ཧེ་ཤེ་ཧེ་ཤེ་ཧེ་ཤེ་ཧེ་ཤེ་ཧེ་ཤེ་ཧེ་ཤེ་ཧེ་ཤེ་ཧེ་ཤེ་ཧེ་ཤེ་ཧེ་ཤེ་ཧེ་ཤེ་ཧེ་ཤེ་ཧེ་ཤེ་ཧེ་ཤེ་ཧེ་ཤེ་ཧེའུ་


d[Booth Lamotte (Sandhinirmocana, 81 [25, line 9]) and Dönp-drup-gyel-tsen's Four Intertwined Commentaries (21.4) read ngo bo nyid kyi mtsahan nyid dam bye brag gi mtsahan nyid.


d[Booth Lamotte (Sandhinirmocana, 81 [25, line 9]) and Dönp-drup-gyel-tsen's Four Intertwined Commentaries (21.4) read ngo bo nyid kyi mtsahan nyid dam bye brag gi mtsahan nyid.
ེད་ཐོས་མཁས་པར་བོད་ཀྱིས་གཞིཏུ་བཞིན་ཐོབ་པ་དེ་ཤེས་སོང་བ་དེ་
མཚོན་ཐེག་བཅོམ་།

5 སྨེ་ཐོས་མཁས་པར་བོད་ཀྱིས་གཞིཏུ་བཞིན་ཐོབ་པ་དེ་ཤེས་སོང་བ་དེ་
མཚོན་ཐེག་བཅོམ་། དེ་ཞེས་ཐོབ་པ་དེ་ཤེས་སོང་བ་དེ་མཚོན་ཐེག་
བཅོམ་། དེ་ཞེས་ཐོབ་པ་དེ་ཤེས་སོང་བ་དེ་མཚོན་ཐེག་བཅོམ་། དེ་ཞེས་
ཐོབ་པ་དེ་ཤེས་སོང་བ་དེ་

10 གང་ཐོས་མཁས་པར་བོད་ཀྱིས་གཞིཏུ་བཞིན་ཐོབ་པ་དེ་ཤེས་སོང་བ་དེ་
མཚོན་ཐེག་བཅོམ་། དེ་ཞེས་ཐོབ་པ་དེ་ཤེས་སོང་བ་དེ་མཚོན་ཐེག་
བཅོམ་། དེ་ཞེས་ཐོབ་པ་དེ་ཤེས་སོང་བ་དེ་མཚོན་ཐེག་བཅོམ་། དེ་ཞེས་
ཐོབ་པ་དེ་ཤེས་སོང་བ་དེ་

15 གང་ཐོས་མཁས་པར་བོད་ཀྱིས་གཞིཏུ་བཞིན་ཐོབ་པ་དེ་ཤེས་སོང་བ་དེ་
མཚོན་ཐེག་བཅོམ་། དེ་ཞེས་ཐོབ་པ་དེ་ཤེས་སོང་བ་དེ་
མཚོན་ཐེག་བཅོམ་། དེ་ཞེས་ཐོབ་པ་དེ་ཤེས་སོང་བ་དེ་

20 གང་ཐོས་མཁས་པར་བོད་ཀྱིས་གཞིཏུ་བཞིན་ཐོབ་པ་དེ་ཤེས་སོང་བ་
དེ་མཚོན་ཐེག་བཅོམ་། དེ་ཞེས་ཐོབ་པ་དེ་ཤེས་སོང་བ་

a Delhi NG drak shis lhun po (498.3) and Sarnath gsang (21.5): ba; Se rva zhol (10b.1),
Zi ling sku 'bum (354.5), Peking (171.5.7), and Kalimpong (25.6): pa. The former probably
is a correction in order to follow either the rule that ba comes after nga or the sometimes-
evoked rule that after adding the syllable, it creates an even number of syllables. Another
possibility is that stong used to be spelled stongo, thereby accounting for pa. Other instances of
this will not be noted separately.

b Peking (171.5.8) mistreads min.
བོད་བོད་དེ་དུ་བོད་བོད་ཀྱི། [499] དེ་བོད་བོད་དུ་བོད་བོད་ཀྱི། [499]

5 དེ་བོད་བོད་དུ་བོད་བོད་ཀྱི། [499] དེ་བོད་བོད་དུ་བོད་བོད་ཀྱི། [499]

10 དེ་བོད་བོད་དུ་བོད་བོད་ཀྱི། [499] དེ་བོད་བོད་དུ་བོད་བོད་ཀྱི། [499]
The name is spelled many different ways, this spelling indicating that the location is at the junction of the Varana and As is Rivers. Sarnath gtsang (23-5) reads "va ra na si", given the consistency of the other editions, this probably represents a misguided "correction" by the Sarnath editors. A-ku Lo-drö-gya-ogs (Precious Lamp, 141.3) lists three etymologies, of which the two-river version is the third.

b Zhi ling sku 'bum (355.19) lacks de.
དཔག ཐོན་པར་ིན་བཞིན་པ་དུ་བཞིན་པ་བདེ་ལེགས་པ་ེད་བཞིན་པའི་ཆོས་དོན་ལ་མཚན་ད་པའི་ཆོས་དོན་ལ་མཚན་ད་པའི་ཆོས་དོན་ལ་མཚན་ད་པའི་ཆོས་དོན་ལ་མཚན་ད་པའི་ཆོས་དོན་ལ་མཚན་ད་པའི་ཆོས་དོན་ལ་མཚན་ད་པའི་ཆོས་དོན་ལ་མཚན་

5 བོད་བཅོས་[བོད་བཅོས་བོད་བཅོས་]དེ་ཚིགས་འབད་ཅན་དེ་ཚིགས་འབད་ཅན་

10 བོད་བཅོས་[བོད་བཅོས་བོད་བཅོས་]དེ་ཚིགས་འབད་ཅན་དེ་ཚིགས་འབད་ཅན་

ཇི་གཉིས་ཞིང་།

གཉིས་[གཉིས་༤༣]དེ་ཚིགས་འབད་ཅན་དེ་ཚིགས་འབད་ཅན་

15 བོད་[བོད་བཅོས་བོད་བཅོས་]དེ་[༢༧]དེ་ཚིགས་འབད་ཅན་དེ་ཚིགས་འབད་ཅན་

20 བོད་[བོད་བཅོས་བོད་བཅོས་]དེ་[༢༣]དེ་ཚིགས་འབད་ཅན་དེ་ཚིགས་འབད་ཅན་

25 བོད་[བོད་བཅོས་བོད་བཅོས་]དེ་[༢༦]དེ་ཚིགས་འབད་ཅན་དེ་ཚིགས་འབད་
ජེ་ཐོབ་བདེན་པོ་ཡུལ་ཐོབ་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཀྱིས་ཐོབ་པོ་ཡུལ་བོད་པ་[123] (275) སྐྱེས་འགྱུར་གཅིག་གིས་སྤྱི་མཆོད་པ།

10 ཞེས་པའི་བོད་ཐོབ་པོ་ཡུལ་ཐོབ་ཀྱིས་ཐོབ་པོ་ཡུལ་བོད་པ་[124] (276) རྩེ་བོར་བོད་པ་

20 ཡི་ངག་འབད་ཐོབ་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་ཀྱིས་ཐོབ་པོ་ཡུལ་བོད་པ་[125] (277) སྐྱེས་འགྱུར་གཅིག་གིས་སྤྱི་མཆོད་པ།

<sup>a</sup> Zi ling sku 'bum (357.7): gsal bod; this again is an application of the rule calling for ba after the suffix la, within not taking into account the fact that gsal has a non-manifest extra suffix da.

<sup>b</sup> Se rva zhol (12b.2) misreads les.

<sup>c</sup> Zi ling sku 'bum (357.20): gnyis ka'i.


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\[ Zi ling sku 'bum (358.15 and throughout): bya yi; other occurrences will not be cited. This seems to be an unnecessary emendation, since the two have the same meaning and since the disyllabic form is, by rule, limited to poetry. The Zi ling sku 'bum editors, or their predecessors, appear to have been intent on leaving their mark on the text; I doubt that many of this edition's variations stem from an older version. \]

\[ Zi ling sku 'bum (358.17) mistakenly omits la. \]

\[ Se sva zhul (13a.6) misreads pa. \]


a  Sarnath tsang (23.5) wā rā na ir; given the consistency of the other editions, it is likely that this unusual spelling represents a “correction” by the Sarnath editors.

b  Se rva zhol (13b.3) misreads good, corrected in the Delhi GD zhol to good. All other editions: good—Delhi NG dkra shis lhuṅ po (505.1), Zi ling sku 'bum (359.11), Peking (175.1.5), Sarnath gtsang (28.7), and Kalimpong (33.6).

c  Zi ling sku 'bum (359.20) uses the past form: bsdegs.
ཅེས་མཐོན་ཅན་མཐོན་མཐོང་ཤིང་མཐོན་སེམས་པ་མཐོན་བཅོས་པ་མཐོན་ཅེས་མཐོན་མཐོང་ཤིང་མཐོན་
མཐོན་པར་ཤིང་པ་ཕན་ལ་མཐོན་ཁང་ཤིང་མཐོན་པར་མཐོན་
སེམས་པ་མཐོན་བཅོས་པ་མཐོན་ཅེས་མཐོན་མཐོང་ཤིང་
མཐོན་པར་ཤིང་པ་ཕན་ལ་མཐོན་ཁང་ཤིང་མཐོན་
5   ཅེས་མཐོན་ཅན་མཐོན་མཐོང་ཤིང་མཐོན་སེམས་པ་མཐོན་བཅོས་པ་མཐོན་ཅེས་མཐོན་མཐོང་ཤིང་
མཐོན་པར་ཤིང་པ་ཕན་ལ་མཐོན་ཁང་ཤིང་མཐོན་
སེམས་པ་མཐོན་བཅོས་པ་མཐོན་ཅེས་མཐོན་མཐོང་ཤིང་
མཐོན་པར་ཤིང་པ་ཕན་ལ་མཐོན་ཁང་ཤིང་མཐོན་

* Da-drin-rap-den’s Annotations (48.4) misreads rang gi ngo bos grub pa.
བཐོས་པ་[ཉི་ནི་ཉི་ཉི་ཉི་ཉི་ཉི་ཉི་]བཐོས་པ་ བོད་ཀྱིས་ིར་ཆེན་གིས་
ཞུ་ཐོ་གི་དོན་དོན་དོན་དོན་དོན་དོན་དོན་དོན་
རིགས་པའི་ོབ་[135] (284) [30]

དཔོན་[སྲུང་དབང་ཆེས་ཆེས་གཞན་དོན་དོན་དོན་]ི་[135]

5 (284)

ལྡན་པར་

དོན་དམ་མཛད་ཤིག་རྗེས་བུ་ལུང་བུ་བོད་པའི་གིང་

[148]

ིས་པར་

10 བོད་ཀྱིས་མཛད་ཤིག་རྗེས་བུ་ལུང་བུ་བོད་པའི་

[149]

ིས་པར་

15 བོད་ཀྱིས་མཛད་ཤིག་རྗེས་བུ་ལུང་བུ་བོད་པའི་

[150]

ིས་པར་

20 བོད་ཀྱིས་མཛད་ཤིག་རྗེས་བུ་ལུང་བུ་བོད་པའི་

[151]

a Se rva zhol (14b.4) misreads rnam.
b Grags pa & rnam rgyal (30.3) misreads de dag ge.
དུས་ཐོན་དབང་པོ་ཤེས་པའི་ཆུ་སྨོང་[དུས་ཐོན་དབང་པོ་]དུས་ཐོན་གྱི་དབང་པོ་ག་པར་ཞིག་ལ།[138] (287)

དཔལ་[བོད་ཤེས་ཐོན་དབང་པོ་]དུས་ཐོན་གྱི་དབང་པོ་ག་པར་ཞིག་ལ།[140] (287)

དཔལ་[བོད་ཤེས་ཐོན་དབང་པོ་]དུས་ཐོན་[15a] (287)

དཔལ་[བོད་ཤེས་ཐོན་དབང་པོ་]སཤི་[140] (287)

10

བོད་ཤེས་པའི་ཆུ་སྨོང་[དུས་ཐོན་དབང་པོ་]སཤི་[15a] (287)

15

[508]

**a** དུས་ཐོན་དབང་པོ་(507.4) རིས་ལོག ཉོན་པ་ལ་; དུས་ཐོན་དབང་པོ་(14b.5), རི་ཞིང་སྲུ་ཀུན་(361.12), བོད་ཤེས་པའི ཁུ་བོད་(173.3.6), རྡོ་རྗེས་གཙང་པོ་(31.1), ིང་ལེགས་པོ་(36.6); ཉོན་པ་ལ་।

**b** ལ་ གསར་, ཚེ འཕགས་པ་(144.3.3-144.1.4). དུས་ཐོན་དབང་པོའི་ཆུ་སྨོང་(110), ལི་ལེགས་པོ་(361.12), སྲོས་ཀྱིས་བོད་ཤེས་པའི ཁུ་བོད་(173.3.6), རྡོ་རྗེས་གཙང་པོ་(31.1), ིང་ལེགས་པོ་(36.6); ཉོན་པ་ལ་।

See also Nalinaksha Dutt, *Bodhiattavabhumi (Being the XVth Section of Asangapada's Yogacarabhumi)*, Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, 7 (Patna, India: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1966), 30.6.

**c** དུས་ཐོན་དབང་པོ་(507.4), བོད་ཤེས་པའི ཁུ་བོད་(173.3.8), རྡོ་རྗེས་གཙང་པོ་(31.8); ཉོན་པ་ལ་; དུས་ཐོན་དབང་པོ་(14a.1), རི་ལེགས་པོ་(361.12), ིང་ལེགས་པོ་(36.1.18), ིང་ལེགས་པོ་(36.18), ིང་ལེགས་པོ་(36.18), ིང་ལེགས་པོ་(36.13), ིང་ལེགས་པོ་(36.13), ིང་ལེགས་པོ་(36.13), ིང་ལེགས་པོ་(36.13); ཉོན་པ་ལ་।

**d** The Sanskrit in Wogihara (*Bodhiattavabhumi, 45.14*) is:
ཡིན་པའི་ཤིས་ཀྱི་སྤྲིོལ་ནད་ཀྱི་དངོས་པོ་དང་པོ་དངོས་པོ་བཟོད་པ་བཟོད་པའི་དངོས་པོ་ འབྲེལ་ཞིག མཐོང་དབྱིངས་་བཟོད་པའི་དངོས་པོ་བཟོད་པ་བཟོད་པའི་དངོས་པོ་
དབྱིངས་མངའ་ཐོབ་པའི་དངོས་པོ་བཟོད་པ་བཟོད་པའི་

gsungs rgya mtshan
gsungs rgya mtshan
gsungs rgya mtshan
gsungs rgya mtshan
gsungs rgya mtshan
gsungs rgya mtshan

In Dutt, Bodhissattavabhumi, see 30.26. The Tibetan, in both Đöng-ka-ba's citation and the Peking, abbreviates the end.

a. The conjunction dang is absent in the Peking edition, as is its equivalent in the Sanskrit; see the previous footnote for the references.

b. The Peking (5538, vol. 110, 144.3.1) reads 'dogs pa'i thig, the Sanskrit is praśnātpiva da.

c. Ibid.

d. thams cad kyi thams cad du, sarvena sarvam. Gung-tho Chö-jung's Garland of White Lotus (65b.6) takes this phrase to be thams cad kyi's thams cad du (which mirrors the Sanskrit) and glosses it as "by all Proponents of Non-Nature in all places, times, and tenets" (ngo bo nyal med par smra ba thams cad kyi yul du grub pa'i mtha' thams cad du); A-ku Lo-drö-gyatso (Precious Lamp, 181.2) has the same reading but interprets it as "all phenomena not existing in all places, times, and tenets" (chos thams cad yul du grub mtha' thams cad du med pa).

e. Peking reads la, but las accords more with the Sanskrit ablative dharmavivekād.
དོན་གཟེངས་ཀྱི་སྣོ་ཟོན་མཛད་པའི་དོན་ནས

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6

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15

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* Sarnath gsang (32.8) misreads gi.
* Se rva zhol (15b.2) misreads gi: the other editions: gi—Delhi NG dkra shis lhun po (509.1), Zi ling sku 'bum (362.16), Peking (173.4.7), Sarnath gsang (32.12), and Kalimpong (38.4).
* Zi ling sku 'bum (363.2): kyi. It is likely that the change was made to accord with the dictum that the five instrumental endings are not to be used for conjunction-disjunction, whereas the five genitive endings are. However, this rule is contravened repeatedly in Tibetan literature.
* Peking 5538, vol. 110, 144.3.5-144.3.6. The Sanskrit in Wogihara (Bodhisattvabhūmi, 45.25) and Dutt (Bodhisattvabhūmi, 31.0) is:
  rūpādīnāṁ dharmaṁ vāstu-mātrāṁ apavādāmānāya [Dutt: apavādai] naiva
ཐོབ་བུག་རྩོམ་ཁྱེད།

[10]

ཅིག་བུག་རྩོམ་ཁྱེད།

[143] (288)

[34]

[160] (848)

[510]

[16b.1] misreads sde; in the Delhi GD zhul, this has been corrected to inga, as is the reading in the other editions—Delhi NG dkra shis lhun po (510.6), Zi ling sku.

tattvam nāpi prajñaptsit tad-ubhayam etan na yuyjate.

This reading of de kho na yang med la 'dogs pa yang med de de is preferable to the Peking de kho na yang med pa la 'dogs pa yang/ de since the former accords more with the Sanskrit (see the previous footnote).

Peking 5538, vol. 110, 144.3.6-144.5.1. The Sanskrit in Wogihara (Bodhisattvabhūmi, 46.1) and Dutt (Bodhisattvabhūmi, 31.7) is:


Se rva zhul (16b.1) misreads sde; in the Delhi GD zhul, this has been corrected to inga, as is the reading in the other editions—Delhi NG dkra shis lhun po (510.6), Zi ling sku.
བོད་ཀླུང་བཞི་བོད་ཀླུང་བཞི་བོད་ཀླུང་བཞི་བོད་ཀླུང་བཞི་བོད་ཀླུང་བཞི་བོད་ཀླུང་བཞི་བོད་ཀླུང་བཞི་

bum (364.5), Peking (174.1.3), Sarnath gsang (34.12), and Kalimpong (40.5).

a  Se rva zhol (16b.5) misreads par; in the Delhi GD zhol, this has been emended to bar.

b  Zi ling sku 'bum (364.17): rnam.

c  Se rva zhol (16b.6) lacks ro, which has been added in Delhi GD zhol and appears in the other editions—Delhi NG dkra shis lhun po (511.5), Zi ling sku 'bum (364.18), Peking (174.2.1), Sarnath gsang (35.10), and Kalimpong (41.5).

d  Delhi NG dkra shis lhun po (511.5), Delhi GD zhol (16b.6), Sarnath gsang (35.11), and Kalimpong (41.6): pas; Se rva zhol (16b.6), Zi ling sku 'bum (364.19), and Peking (174.2.1): bas. The variations reflect whether the presence of the non-manifest extra suffix da at the end of the previous syllable is taken into account.

e  Delhi NG dkra shis lhun po (511.6), Zi ling sku 'bum (364.19), Delhi GD zhol (16b.6), Sarnath gsang (35.12), and Kalimpong (41.6): ngor; Se rva zhol (16b.6) and Peking (174.2.1) misread dor.

f  Se rva zhol (16b.5) and Delhi NG dkra shis lhun po (511.6) misread sprul du; the other editions: sprul du—Zi ling sku 'bum (365.1), Sarnath gsang (35.13), Kalimpong (42.1), and Peking (174.2.2). Delhi GD zhol (17a.1) has been wrongly emended to sbrul bu.
གོང་རྒྱུ་ི་སྐྱེན་པ།

[12] ང་བོ་བཞིན་པར་བོད་ལྗོངས་སྐབས་བཤད་ནས་བར་བོད་པར་བཤད་པར་བཤད་པར་བཤད་པར་བཤད་པར་
བཤད་པར་བཤད་པར་བཤད་པར་བཤད་པར་བཤད་པར་བཤད་པར་བཤད་པར་བཤད་པར་བཤད་པར་བཤད་པར་

5 དཔེ་དེ་གཉིས་པ་གཙོ་བོས་སྐྱེས་ཚིག་བཞིན་ལ་ཀུན་དངུལ་བཤད་པར་ཐེག་པའི་དོན་བོད་པར་

[36] ཁུ་ལུང་བོད་ལྗོངས་སྐབས་དངོས་པོ་གཉིས་ཐིང་སོ་བོད་པར་བཤད་པར་བཤད་པར་བཤད་པར་

10 དཔེ་དེ་གཉིས་པ་གཙོ་བོས་སྐྱེས་ཚིག་བཞིན་ལ་ཀུན་དངུལ་བཤད་པར་ཐེག་པའི་དོན་བོད་པར་

[18] དཔེ་དེ་གཉིས་པ་གཙོ་བོས་སྐྱེས་ཚིག་བཞིན་ལ་ཀུན་དངུལ་བཤད་པར་ཐེག་པའི་

15 དཔེ་དེ་གཉིས་པ་གཙོ་བོས་སྐྱེས་ཚིག་བཞིན་ལ་ཀུན་དངུལ་བཤད་པར་ཐེག་པའི་

[17] དཔེ་དེ་གཉིས་པ་གཙོ་བོས་སྐྱེས་ཚིག་བཞིན་ལ་ཀུན་དངུལ་བཤད་པར་ཐེག་པའི་

* Peking 5538, vol. 110, 144.4.1-144.5.5. The passage immediately follows the previous citation; the Sanskrit in Waghora (Bodhiisattvabhumi, 46.7) and Dutt (Bodhiisattvabhumi, 31.10) is:

dhāno nāṣṭiko veditavyah."
༄༅། །སྣང་བའི་དཀྲིལ་འཕྲིན་ལུགས་ཟུན་པོ་རྒྱལ་དབྱིས་བོད་ཐོབ་པར་བྲག་པ་དེ་ཡིན།

རླིང་བོ་ཐུབ

དོན་དྲིག་པ་གསུང་ཐེན་པོ་སྤྱི་ཚོགས་དེའི་མི་ཐད་མ་ཐོབ་བྱེད་དུ་ཟོན་ཁྲིམས་བྱེད་དུ་ག་

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* Peking 5538, vol. 110, 144.4.7-144.5.3; Dzong-ka-ba’s paraphrase is considerable but fair. The Peking reads (with parts missing in the paraphrase in bold print):

_beom ldan 'das khyi' de la d邦gön nain 'di na la la gang zag tu lsa ba ni bla'i la la stong pa nyid la leg par zin pa ni de lsa ma yin no zhes lha' stsal te/ de ci' phyir zhe na/ gang zag du lsa ba can gyi skye ba po ni shes bya la rjongs pa 'ba' chig tu zad dol/ shes bya thams cad la skur pa mi 'debs pa ma yin tel/ ghii des sems can dmyal ba rnam su skye bar mi 'gyur lai/ gezan chos 'dod pa dang sdug bngal las rnam par thar par 'dod pa dag kyang phung bar mi byed cing slu bar ni byed la/ chos dang bden pa la yang 'god par byed dol/ blolab pa/i ghii dag la yang g.yel bar mi 'gyur rol/ stong pa nyid la leg par zin pa ni shes bya'i drong po la yang rjongs la/ shes bya thams cad la yang skur pa 'debs tel/ ghii des sems can dmyal ba rnam su yang 'gyur lai/ gezan chos 'dod pa dang/ sdug bngal las rnam par thar par 'dod pa rnam kyang phung bar byed dol/ blolab pa/i ghii dag la yang g.yel bar 'gyur tel/

His abbreviations suggest that he was trying to make the passage easier to read (or for the scribe to write down) by avoiding repetitions.

The Sanskrit in Wogihara (Bodhisattvabhumi, 46.21) and Dutt (Bodhisattvabhumi, 31.20) is:

_idam [Dutt: idam] ca samadhāyoktam bhagavatā. param ihaikatyaya pugdala-dṛṣṭir na tv evaikatyaya dur-gṛhitā śāntayate. tat kasya bhavah. pugdala-dṛṣṭikā jāntur jñeyā kevalam muhyān [Dutt: muhyen] na tu sarvam jñeyam abhāvata. na tato nidānāṃ apāyānāpadyate. nāpi dharmārthikām dukkha-vimokṣārthikām [Dutt: vi-

mokṣārthikānā] param viśvādāya na viprādāmbhāyet. dharine satye ca pratiśṭhāpayet. na ca ātihilika bhavač ca chikā-padeu. dur-gṛhitāya punah śāntayātī jñeyā vartāni mukhāy. api abhāvata jñeyam sarvam [Dutt: sarvam], tato nidānāṃ ca chikā-padeu. dharinakām ca dukkha-vimokṣārthikām param viśvādāya. ātihilikā ca sāt chikā-padeu.

b Zi ling sku 'bum (365.20) misread sla yi; as given in the previous footnote, the Peking reads bla'i, and the Sanskrit is saram. A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso’s Precious Lamp (187.6) glosses bla as “suitable or superior” (rung 'am mehog); in this context where two wrong views are compared, it has a connotation of “better” and thus, more loosely, “not so bad.”

c Zi ling sku 'bum (366.2) misread des; as given two notes above, the Peking reads des and the Sanskrit is tato nidānāṃ.
This is a paraphrase; Peking 5538, vol. 110, 144.5.6-144.5.8, reads:

ji tar na stong pa nyid la legs par zin pa yin zhe na zhe ng gi [text misreads gi] phyir gang la gang med pa de ni des stong par yang dag par mthong la/ ‘di la thag ma gang yin pa de ni’ /di na yang dag par yod do zhes yang dag pa ji lla ba bzhin du rab tu zhes pa de ni stong pa nyid la yang dag pa ji lla ba bzhin du phyin ci ma log par zhugs pa zhes bya stel

The Sanskrit in Wogihara (Bodhisattvabhūmi, 47.16; see also Dutt, Bodhisattvabhūmi, 32.11) is:

katham ca panah su-gehitā śānyātā bhavati, yataś ca yaśada na bhavati. tat tera śānyām iti samanupāyati. yat punara tāravāśātm bhavati. tat tad ihaśri ti yathābhū- 
tam prajñāni. iyam ucyate śānyātā vākāntri yathā-bhūtabhāvaparīt.

In translation:

How is emptiness apprehended well? One thoroughly sees that, because such and such does not exist in something, that thing is empty of it and thoroughly knows just as it is that what remains here exists here. This is called non-erroneous orientation to emptiness just as it is.

b Peking 5538, vol. 110, 142.5.1-142.5.3. The Sanskrit in Wogihara (Bodhisattvabhūmi, 39.23) and Dutt (Bodhisattvabhūmi, 27.5):

yat punah pūrvakena ca bhāvenāncena ca-bhāvena tad-ubhābhāyat [Dutt: cābhāvena ubhābhāyat] bhāvā-ubhābhāyāṃ vinirmuktam dharma-lakṣāna-samghehitam vastu, 
tad a-dvayam. yad a-dvayam iva [Dutt: tat] madhyamā pratipad aṃstādvyā-vivarjiti- 
tam [Dutt: vivarjitaṃ] nir-uttarāryucate.
ནི་ཐོན་འབུལ་ཐུབ

ཁོ་ཁྱུག་གི་ཨིང་། རྩོང་མོ་སྐྱེས་གསུམ་རྒྱུ་དུས་བོད

སློབ་དཔོན་གྲྭས་བྱུགས་དུས་ཐོས།
དོན་[ཐོགས་སྤྱོད་ཅེ་བོད་ལེགས་བསྒྲི་མོའི་དོན་]་(291) [149]

5 དོན་[ཐོགས་སྤྱོད་ཅེ་བོད་ལེགས་བསྒྲི་མོ]་(291) [149]

10 6 ལོག་པའི་ཐོགས་དཔོན་བཤེས་སྤྱོད་ེན་བསྒྲུབ་ཐོགས་ཐེག་

15 7 ལོག་པའི་ཐོགས་དཔོན་བཤེས་སྤྱོད་ེན་བསྒྲུབ་ཐོགས་ཐེག་

* The Peking of Asaṅga's text (5539, vol. 111, 82.4.7) reads rang gi nyes pa bzung nas; the Tokyo sde dge (sems tshan, vol. 9 [zi], 42b.5) reads rang gi nye bar bzung nas. In the latter gi nye bar is clearly mistaken.

b Sarnath gsung (39.9) misreads zhes; the other texts: zhes pa—Delhi NG dkra shis lhun
5 གཞིག་[གཙོ་བོ་གླིང་་སྦྱོར་རྒྱུས་]བཀོག་ནི་གཙོ་བོ་གླིང་་སྦྱོར་རྒྱུས་
གཞོན་དར་། བྲིས་སྦྱོར་གཞིག་གི་དབང་ཕྱི་[151] (292)

10 གཞིག་[གཙོ་བོ་གླིང་་སྦྱོར་རྒྱུས་]ཆུ། [151] (292)
སྐྱིད་སྐྱིད་ཤེས་ཀྱི་ཤེས་པོ་ལྷ་ནག་[151] (292)

15 གཞིག་གཞིག་གཞིག་[གཙོ་བོ་གླིང་་སྦྱོར་རྒྱུས་]ཟློག་ཟློག་[40] (190)

po (515.3), Se rva zhol (18b.2), Zi ling sku 'bum (367.15), Grags pa & rnam rgyal (37.19),
Peking (174.4.8), and Kalimpong (45.6).

* Se rva zhol (18b.3) and Peking (174.4.8) misread yong; the other editions: yod—Delhi
NG dkra shis lhun po (515.13), Zi ling sku 'bum (367.16), Sarnath gtsang (39.6), and
Kalimpong (46.1).

b According to Gung-tang (Annotations, khu 89.5) and A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso (Precious
Lamp, 192.6), this should read mgon par brjod pa, without the genitive ending; they take it
to be nominative because, just below, Dzong-ka-ba says mgon par brjod pa rong pas btags pa
tsam yin na. However, Ser-shül (Notes, 28b.1) cogently questions the emendation.
[Footnotes]

a Zi ling sku 'bum (368.14): bos, again correcting for following the suffix la, but rol has a non-manifest extra suffix da.

b Zi ling sku 'bum (368.9): ba'i, correcting from not taking account of the non-manifest extra suffix da at the end of the previous syllable.

c Zi ling sku 'bum (368.13): ba'i. See previous footnote.
བདུན་ཅན་བདེ་བ་མི་ལོག་

dam-thar-mi'i sde dge rnam bzhedubs khunsel phyag chos
nyi ma pho'ogs pa'i nga bo nyid

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bstan-byam-bcos-las ngags-rje

=Ling 5

bsten-byam-bcos-las ngags-rje

=Ling 10

=Ling 15

=Ling 20

* Tokyo sde dge, sems tsam, vol. 8 (zhi): yongs su grub pa'i nga bo nyid.

b Reading mgon par rtogs pa following Tokyo sde dge, sems tsam, vol. 8 (zhi) 279b.1, as well as Ser-thul's Notes, 410.3, and Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso's Port of Entry, 410.3 and 421.2. Gung-tang's Annotations (91.6), A-khu Lo-drö-gya-tso's Precious Lamp (194.3), Da-drin-rab-den's Annotations (71.3): mgon par rtogs pa.
ཉིད་མེད་པར་བཅུ་ཐོས་བཅུ་ཐོས་པར་ཞེས་བྱུང་བར་ཞི་བཟང་པོའི་ཞིང་དགོས་ལ་ཞེས་པའི་རི་སྤྲོད་པོའི་ཐོན་དང་།

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ཉིད་མེད་པར་བཅུ་ཐོས་བཅུ་ཐོས་པར་ཞེས་བྱུང་བར་ཞི་བཟང་པོའི་ཞིང་དགོས་ལ་ཞེས་པའི་རི་སྤྲོད་པོའི་ཐོན་

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ཉིད་མེད་པར་བཅུ་ཐོས་བཅུ་ཐོས་པར་ཞེས་བྱུང་བར་ཞི་བཟང་པོའི་ཞིང་དགོས་ལ་ཞེས་པའི་རི་སྤྲོད་པོའི་ཐོན་

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ཉིད་མེད་པར་བཅུ་ཐོས་བཅུ་ཐོས་པར་ཞེས་བྱུང་བར་ཞི་བཟང་པོའི་ཞིང་དགོས་ལ་ཞེས་པའི་རི་སྤྲོད་པོའི་ཐོན་

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* Zi ling sku 'bum (370.16): bar. See p. 368, footnote b.
* Zi ling sku 'bum (371.4): pa, correcting from not taking account of the non-manifest extra suffix du at the end of the previous syllable.
* Se rva zhol (20b.4) and Kalimpong (51.2) misread ba; the other editions: pa—Delhi NG dkra shis lhun po (519.5), Zi ling sku 'bum (371.6), Sarnath gtsang (43.16), and Peking (175.3.5)—the last also misreading par pa for bar pa.
ནང་དགོས་པ་ཤེས་སྲིད་ཀྱི་ཐུབ་ཕྲུག་བསྡུས་དྲུག་དགེ་དཔལ་ལྡན་གྱི་ཡོན་ཏན་གྱི་ཁྲིམས་ཡིག་

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*Peking 5528, vol. 108, 126.2.2. The Sanskrit in Nagao (Madhyantasivipaka, 41) is:

...paramārtha-satyaṃ/
ekastā pariṇāpamadya eva svabhāvād veditaṃ [Pandey: veditaṃ]/

See also Pandey, Madhyantas-vibhāga, 95.

b

theg pa chen po'i mdo 'de rgyan, mahāyānasūtrālaṁkāra; VI.1; Peking 5521, vol. 108, 5.1.1. The Sanskrit in S. Bagchi Mahāyāna-Sūtrālaṁkāra of Asaṅga [with Vasubandhu’s commentary], Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, 13 (Darbhanga, India: Mishila Institute, 1970), 24, is:

na sannya cāsanna tathā na cāyathā na jāyate vṛtya na ca[śā]na]vahityate/
na vartdha nāpi visthīyate pariṇāpamadya tati paramārthaśaṃpātiṃ/

*Added by Bagchi. For the Sanskrit text on which Bagchi’s edition was based see Sylvain Lévi, Mahāyāna-sūtrālāṅkāra, exposé de la doctrine du grand véhicule selon le système Yogacāra (Paris: Bibliothèque de l’École des Hautes Études, 1907), vol. 1, 22.

c

The Peking of Maitreya’s text (5521, vol. 108, 5.1.2) reads skyes; however, the Peking of Vasubandhu’s commentary (5527, vol. 108, 63.5.4) reads tshes.

d

Zi ling sku ’bum (372.5): bri.

e

Paraphrasing Vasubandhu’s Explanation of (Maitreya’s) “Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras” (mdo sde’i rgyan gi bshad pa, sūtrālāṁkārabhāṣya; Peking 5527, vol. 108, 63.5.5). The Sanskrit in Bagchi (Mahāyāna-Sūtrālāṁkāra, 24) is:

nasatparikalpitaparatranalakaṇābhāṣyam, na cāsapatparinipannalakaṇṇena/
བོད་ཀྱིས་ ཤེས་རབ་ཤེས་དང་པོ་བོད་པར་བཞི་དང་།

5 གཟིགས་བུམ་བོས་པ་དང་མི་འགོད་ཤེས་དེ་དུ་ཞི་བཞི་བོད་པར་བཞི་
དོན་དབང་བུམ་བོ་ཅིག་པའི་ཡིག་གི་ལོ་སྟེ། [160]
(295) རྒྱུབ་པའི་ཐུབ་གྲོས་དཔལ་དཔལ་ཤེས་པའི་ལེན་པ་ནད་དབང་མཛད་
དོན་དབང་བུམ་བོ་ཅིག་པའི་ཡིག་གི་ལོ་སྟེ། [468]

10 རྒྱུབ་པའི་ཐུབ་གྲོས་དཔལ་དཔལ་ཤེས་པའི་ལེན་པ་ནད་
དབང་བུམ་བོ་ཅིག་པའི་ཡིག་གི་ལོ་སྟེ། [522]

15 ལོ་འབུམ་ ལོ་འབུམ་ ལོ་འབུམ་ ལོ་འབུམ་ ལོ་འབུམ་ ལོ་འབུམ་ ལོ་འབུམ་

20 ལོ་འབུམ་ ལོ་འབུམ་ ལོ་འབུམ་ ལོ་འབུམ་ ལོ་འབུམ་ ལོ་འབུམ་ ལོ་འབུམ་

* The Peking (78.1.7) and the Tokyo ide dge (sems tsham, vol. 9 [zi]), 32a.4) of Asaṅga similarly read rnam par bual ba; Dönn-drup-gyet-sen's Four Intertwined Commentaries (136.50) and Ser-shül's Notes (32a.5) mistakenly read rnam par gsal ba.

b Zi lings kṣu 'bum (373.10): gnyis kar.
རྣམ་རིག་པར་བཏིས་

རློང་ན་བཞི་ཕྱི་

དོན་དུས་མཚན་དུས་མཚན་བྱིན་པ་[47]

དོན་དུས་མཚན་དུས་མཚན་བྱིན་པ་[523]

ེས་པར་དོན་དུས་མཚན་པ་

དོན་དུས་མཚན་པ་[162] (295) ཟོན་དུས་མཚན་པ་

་བཞི་ཕྱི་

དོན་དུས་མཚན་པ་

དོན་དུས་མཚན་པ་[280]

ེས་པར་དོན་དུས་མཚན་པ་

a  Se rva zhol (20b.4), Delhi NG dkar shis lhun po (522.5), Peking (176.1.2), and Kalimpong (54.5) misread rten; Tokyo sde dge (semu sam, vol. 8 [shi], 199a.7), Zi ling sku 'bum (373.13), and Samnath gtsang (47.1) read brten—as do all six editions for the same but positive construction in the next sentence, that is, gshan pa dag la brten nas.

b  III.11ab; Peking 5522, vol. 108, 203.6. The Sanskrit in Nagao (Madhyāntavibhāga, 41), is:

artha-praṣṭi-prapatṭyā hi paramārthas tridhā maśāh/

See also Pandeya, Madhyānta-vibhāga, 95.

c  Peking 5528, vol. 108, 126.2.3. The Sanskrit in Nagao (Madhyāntavibhāga, 41) is:

artha-paramārthas tathātā paramatayā jñānayārtha iṣi kṛtvā/

See also Pandeya Madhyānta-vibhāga, 95.
Delhi NG dkra shis lhun po (525.2), Se rva zhol (23a.5), Peking (176.3.4), Sarnath gtsang (49.14), and Kalimpong (57.5) as well as Bel-jor-hlin-drup’s Lamp for the Teaching (49.7) and Da-drin-rap-den’s Annotations (86.2): shes pa ’khrul pa’i yul. However, Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 474.3) and the Peking of Vasubandhu’s text (5562, vol. 113, 276.2.5): shes pa ma ’khrul pa’i yul. Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 478.6) points out that some editions of Dzong-ka-ba’s text, as well as (Gunamati’s) commentary on Vasubandhu’s Principles of Explanation, read ma ’khrul.

Delhi NG dkra shis lhun po appears to have been altered (see the ‘a prefix of ’khrul pa’i”), but this may have no bearing on a possible absent ma. Zi ling sku’ bum (375.13): shes pa la ’khrul ba’i yul; the nonsensical la appears to be a replacement for ma, which is confirmed by the Peking of Vasubandhu’s text. Both readings, with and without the negative, are possible.


*a* Zi ling sku 'bum (375.17, 375.18): *bgral*; this reading is based on the fact that *bgral bar bya ba* is a nominalized future passive participle, which calls for the future passive form of the verb; however, I have remained with the form used in the other editions.

*b* Delhi NG dkra shis lhun po (525.6) misreads *yed*; this appears to be a deliberate change made before photo-offsetting.

*c* This is a paraphrase; according to the Peking edition of Vasubandhu’s text (5562, vol. 113, 283.2.7-283.3.3), the passage reads (with material that Dzong-ka-ba condensed in bold):

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don dam pa stong pa nyid las kyang yod nram par smin pa yang yod la byed pa po ni mi dmigs so shes gungs pa gang yin pa de ci don dam pa nyid du'am [text misreads: lam] 'on te kun rdzob nyid yin zhe nal/ de las cir 'gyuri gal te don dam pa nyid du yin nal/ji ltar chos thami cads nge po nyid medi pa yin/ gal te kun rdzob tu yin na byed pa po yang kun rdzob tu yod pas byed pa po ni mi dmigs so shes brjod par mi bya'o zhe nal/re zhiug kun rdzob ces bya ba 'di ci yin/ don dam ni [text: na] gang zhiug yin/ de las ci kun rdzob tu yod dam/ ci don dam par yod par shes par bya'ol ming dang brjod pa dang gtags pa dang tha snyad ni kun rdzob yin la/ choz nrams kyi rang gi mtshan nyid ni don dam pa [text misreads: na] yin na zhe nal/ 'o na de sia na las dang nram par smin pa guyis ming du yang yod/ rang gi mtshan nyid du yang yod pas de guyis ji ltar 'dod par yod du riog la rag go /
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\[\text{(Translation)}\]

\[\text{Notes:}\]

\[\text{a} \quad \text{Se rva zhol (23b.4) and Kalimpong (58.6): bṛtrod; Delhi NG dkra shis lhun po (526.2), Zi ling sku 'bum (376.9), Peking (176.4.3), and Sarnath gsang (50.16): bṛtrod.}\]

\[\text{b} \quad \text{Zi ling sku 'bum (376.17): ba, again correcting in order to maintain the rule that ba follows nga, a, ra, la, and suffixless syllables. However, di pa is also correct (or the only correct choice, according to Si-du), since the situation calls for a syllable indicating possession (bdag gyra).}\]

\[\text{c} \quad \text{III.10bc: Peking 5522, vol. 108, 20.3.5. The Sanskrit in Nagao (Madhyāntavibhāga, 41); and Pandeya (Madhyāntavibhāga, 94) is:}\]

ཁུག་བཞག་པར་ཞིི་ཐོས་ཞིི་བཞིན་པ་བཞིན་པར་ཞིི་ཐོས་ཞིི་བཞིན་པ་ཞིི་ཐོས་ཞིི་བཞིན་པར་ཞིི་ཐོས་ཞིི་བཞིན་པ་ཞིི་ཐོས་ཞིི་བཞིན་པར་ཞིི་ཐོས་ཞིི་བཞིན་པ་ཞིི་ཐོས་ཞིི་བཞིན་པར་ཞིི་ཐོས་ཞིི་བཞིན་པ་ཞིི་ཐོས་ཞིི་བཞིན་པར་ཞིི་ཐོས་ཞིི་བཞིན་པ་ཞིི་ཐོས་ཞིི

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[52]

[171]  རོ་རུ་བཞིན་པ་ཚོར་བཞིན་པ་ཞིི་ཐོས་ཞིི་བཞིན་པ་ཞིི་ཐོས་ཞིི་བཞིན་པ་ཞིི་ཐོས་ཞིི་བཞིན་པར་ཞིི་ཐོས་ཞིི་བཞིན

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a  Se rva zhol (24a.6) and Peking (176.5.4) misread 'gal; the other editions: gal—Delhi NG dkra shis lhun po (527.4), Zi ling sku 'bum (377.10), Sarnath gtsang (52.4), and Kalimpong (60.3). The Delhi GD zhol has been corrected to gal.

b  Se rva zhol (24b.1) misreads par. Delhi NG dkra shis lhun po (527.4), Zi ling sku 'bum (377.12), Peking (176.5.5), Sarnath gtsang (52.6), and Kalimpong (60.4): par.
དར་དང་ [མཁོ་ནི་ཐོབ་བར་པ་པོ་] [172] (302)

5 རང་དང་ རང་དང་ རང་དང་

6 རང་དང་ རང་དང་ རང་དང་

10 རང་དང་ རང་དང་ རང་དང་}

\[\text{XI.50; Peking 5521, vol. 108, 9.1.3. The Sanskrit in Bagchi (Māhāyāna-Sūtraśāntaka, vol. 1, 67.16; French trans., vol. 2, 121.}}\]

\[\text{The Tibetan (dang 'dzin bsizin drel med phyir) accords more with Bagchi's grāhavatadābhāvāvaca. For the Sanskrit text on which Bagchi's edition was based, see Lévi, Mahāyānasūtraśāntaka, vol. 1, 67.16; French trans., vol. 2, 121.}}\]

\[\text{For mthun nyid du, the Peking of Maitreya's text (5521, vol. 108, 9.1.3) and of Vasubandhu's commentary (5527, vol. 108, 77.2.1) read bdag nyid du, which accords slightly more with the Sanskrit atmanā.}}\]

\[\text{For mdo ide's rgyan gyi bshad pa, sūtrālakārabhaṅga, Peking 5527, vol. 108, 77.2.1-77.2.5.}}\]

\[\text{Except as noted in the Translation, Dzong-ka-ba is paraphrasing Vasubandhu's commentary.}}\]

\[\text{For the Sanskrit, see Bagchi, Mahāyāna-Sūtraśāntaka, 67.20-67.25; and Lévi, Mahāyāna-sūtrālakāra, vol. 1, 67, 18-67.23.}}\]

\[\text{Peking 5550, vol. 112, 266.1.2-266.1.4:}}\]

\[\text{shin tu rgyas pa las chos thams cad ngo bo nyid med do zhes gang gsung pa de la dzogpa pa gang sin zhe na/ bdag nyid kyi s mi byung ba dang/ rang gi [text reads: gi] bdag nyid du med pa dang/ rang gi ngo bo la mi gnas pa dang/ byis pa bzang ba bzhi ba mthun nyid med pa'i phyir rol/ yang kun du brtugs pa'i nga bo nyid la mthun nyid kyi ngo bo nyid med pa dang/ gzhan gyi dbang la skye ba ngo bo nyid med pa dang/ yongs su grub pa la don dam pa nga bo nyid med pa'i phyir rol/}}\]

\[\text{Delhi NG dkar shis lhun po (528.2), Peking (177.1.1), and Sarnath gtsang (52.18):}}\]
rang; Se rva zhol (24b.3), Zi ling sku ’bum (378.1), Grags pa & rnam rgyal (51.11), and Kalimpong (61.2): rang dbang. This sentence is Dzong-ka-ba’s rerendering of Vasubandhu’s commentary:

That [phenomena] are natureless due to being without ownness is due to the fact that phenomena depend upon conditions (rang med pa’i phyir nge bo nyid med pa ni chos rnam rgyen la rag las pa’i phyir ro, sva’gyaabs bhaavansvabhavatvam dhar-ma-nam prátyaśādhi-nantaśūsā).

Thus, the rang reading would represent a straight reporting of Maitreya’s and Vasubandhu’s text (sva’gya) with rearranged syntax, whereas rang dbang would represent Dzong-ka-ba’s further interpretation of the meaning of rang. Both are plausible.

a Delhi GD zhol (24b.5) has been mistakenly emended to de ltar ba; all other editions: da ltar ba.

b Dzong-ka-ba continues his paraphrase of Vasubandhu’s Explanation of (Maitreya’s) “Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras” (Peking 5527, vol. 108, 77.2.4). For the Sanskrit, see Bagchi, Mahāyāna-Sūtrālaṃkāra, 67.23; Lévi, Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, vol. 1, 67.21.

c XI.51; Peking 5521, vol. 108, 9.1.3. The Sanskrit, as restored by Bagchi (Mahāyāna-Sūtrālaṃkāra, 67), is:

    nityavabhāvatāyā siddhā uttarottaraniśrāyāt/
    anusāsannā niruddhādi-lānta-prakṛti-nirūṣrāh/

Lévi’s restoration (Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, 67, n. 3) is:

    nityavabhāvatāyā siddhā uttarottaraniśrāyāh/
    anusāś’tād irodhatāddiāntithi pratinirṇīyāh/

In his translation Lévi revised this to read:

    nityavabhāvatāyā siddhā uttarottaraniśrāyāt/
Delhi NG dkra shis lhun po (528.6), Se rva zhol (24b.2), Zi ling sku 'bum (378.13), Peking (177.1.6), Sarnath gsang (53.14), and Kalimpong (62.2) read phyi ma, as does the Peking of Vasubandhu’s commentary (5527, vol. 108, 77.2.5), but the Peking of Maitreya’s text (5521, vol. 108, 9.1.4) reads snga ma. This seems to represent merely a difference in translation.

As Ser-shul (Notes, 38b.1) says:

The text of the original as well as Asaṅga’s Summary of the Great Vehicle, and many commentaries read ngo bo nyid ni med pa yis; I do not know whether this represents a difference in translation or a corrupt text, but if it is taken as yis, it facilitates commentary.

For similar reasons, the text has been emended to yis.

XL.52; Peking 5521, vol. 108, 9.1.4. The Sanskrit in Bagchi (Mahāyāna-Sūtrālāṃkāra, 68) is:

\[\text{ādau tattve 'nyatve svalaśāne svaayamathānathāḥāḥ śāvē}\]
\[\text{saṃkleśe 'tha viśeśa kiśāntirasūptisārāṃśūkān}\]

See also Lévi, Mahāyāna-sūtrālāṃkāra, vol. 1, 68.5.

All of the editions used read ‘gyur, as does the Peking of Vasubandhu’s commentary (5527, vol. 108, 77.2.5), but the Peking of Maitreya’s text (5521, vol. 108, 9.1.4) reads ‘gyur.
སློབ་མོ་རྡུ་མི་སད་ཀྱི་ཐབས

5.......

10...

15...

a  Peking 5527, vol. 108, 77.3.2-77.3.5. For the Sanskrit, see Bagchi, Mahāyāna-Sūtrālaṃkāra, 68.8-68.14; Lévi, Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, vol. 1, 68.7-68.14.

b  Delhi NG dkra shis lhun po (529.3), Zi ling sku ’bum (379.3), Peking (177.2.3), and Sarnath gsang (54.7): rang mi skye ba; Se rva zhol (25a.5) and Kalimpong (62.6): rang gi skye ba. With the latter reading, the line would be translated as: “Self-production” is in reference to other-powered natures.” Though such a reading also makes sense (since self-production is what is negated with respect to other-powered natures), the former reading is preferable, given that Dzong-ka-ba is paraphrasing Vasubandhu, the Peking edition (5527, vol. 108, 77.3.3) of which reads rang skye ba med pa. Also, the Sanskrit in both Bagchi (Mahāyāna-Sūtrālaṃkāra, 68.11) and Lévi (Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, 68.10) is swayamānapattau, which has the negative an.

That these readings parallel those found earlier strongly suggests that Dzong-ka-ba was seeking consistency; see p. 374, footnote c.

c  Zi ling sku ’bum (379.10); gnyis ka.

d  In Dön-drup-gyal-chen’s Four Interwoven Commentaries (158.6), read bya ba ’jug for bya ba la ’jug, in accordance with Delhi NG dkra shis lhun po (529.6), and so forth.
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XI.15; Peking 5521, vol. 108, 8.3.1. The Sanskrit in Bagchi (Mahāyāna-Sūtrālāmkaṇa, 59) is:

yathā māyā tathā bhūtāparikalpo nīrcyatet/
yathā māyākṛtam tadvat dvayabhrāntimīrcyatet/

See also Lévi, Mahāyāna-sūtrālāmkaṇa, vol. 1, 59.

For 'dod, the Peking of Maitreya's text (5521, vol. 108, 8.3.2) and the Peking of Vasubandhu's commentary (5527, vol. 108, 74.4.1) read brjod. Also, the next line reads sgyu ma byas pa ji tsa bar.

Zi ling sku 'bum (379.17): ba.

Delhi NG dkar shis lhun po (530.3), Se rva zhol (25b.5), Peking (177.3.1), and Kalimpong (63.6): pa'i; Zi ling sku 'bum (379.18) and Sarnath gtsang (55.7): ba'i.

Zi ling sku 'bum (380.1 and throughout): rgyang; the other instances will not be cited.

XI.16, Peking 5521, vol. 108, 8.3.2. The Sanskrit in Bagchi (Mahāyāna-Sūtrālāmkaṇa, 59) is:

yathā tasmānta sadbhāvaḥ paramārtha-thasthātyate/
yathā satyopalabdhiyo tathā saṃmuṭṭa-yañujataḥ/

See also Lévi, Mahāyāna-sūtrālāmkaṇa, vol. 1, 59.

The Peking of Maitreya's text (5521, vol. 108, 8.3.3): kun rdzob 'dod; the Peking of
Vasubandhu’s commentary (5527, vol. 108, 74.4.4): kun rdzob nyid.

a  Paraphrasing Vasubandhu’s Explanations of (Maitreya’s) “Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras.” The Peking (5527, vol. 108, 74.4.4) reads (with the parts that Dzong-ka-ba has condensed in bold):

\[ \text{sgyu ma byas pa de la dang po che la sogs pa med pa de bzhin du gzhon gyi dbang de la kun brtags pa gnyis gyi mthshan nyid med pa don dam par 'dod dlo}/ ji ltar} \]
\[ \text{sgyu ma byas pa de dang po che la sogs pa'i ngo bor dmigs pa de bzhin du yang dag pa min pa las kun brtag [sic] pa de kun rdzob kyi bden par dmigs so//} \]

For the Sanskrit, see Bagchi, Mahāyāna-Sūtraśāstra, 60.7-60.9 and Lévi, Mahāyānaśūtraśāstra, vol. 1, 59.11-59.13.

b  This is a paraphrase. The Peking of Vasubandhu’s Explanations of (Maitreya’s) “Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras” (5527, vol. 108, 74.4.4) reads (with the material that Dzong-ka-ba has condensed in bold):

\[ \text{sgyu ma byas pa de la dang po che la sogs pa med pa de bzhin du gzhon gyi dbang de la kun brtags pa gnyis gyi mthshan nyid med pa don dam par 'dod dlo}/ ji ltar} \]
\[ \text{sgyu ma byas pa de dang po che la sogs pa'i ngo bor dmigs pa de bzhin du yang dag pa min pa las kun brtag [sic] pa de kun rdzob kyi bden par dmigs so//} \]
422  ལེགས་འབུང་བོད་པ།

ཐོག་པ་[དབང་མོས་སྐྱེལ་པོ་ལྡན་པར་ལྟར་མཁང་]ིར། [182] (305)

དབང་མོས་སྐྱེལ་པ།

ལུག་གི་ཁོང་། རྡོ་རྗེ་བཞི་[305]

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དོན་བཞི། རྡོ་རྗེ་བཞི།

6

དོན་བཞི། རྡོ་རྗེ་བཞི།

7

དོན་བཞི། རྡོ་རྗེ་བཞི།

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དོན་བཞི། རྡོ་རྗེ་བཞི།

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དོན་བཞི། རྡོ་རྗེ་བཞི།

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དོན་བཞི། རྡོ་རྗེ་བཞི།

Notes:

1.1-2; Peking 5522, vol. 108, 19.4.5. The Sanskrit in Nagao (Madhyantavibhaga, 17 and 18) is:

abhuta-parikalpo 'stit duyan tatra na vidyate/
śūnyatā vidyate tv atra tasyām api sa vidyate/
na śūnyam nāpi cāśūnyam tasmāt sarvam [Pandeya: sarvam] vidhiyate/
satvād asattvāt sattvāc [Pandeya: sattvād asattvāt sattvāc] ca madhyamā pratipac ca sā/

See also Pandeya, Madhyanta-vibhaga, 9 and 13.

b Delhi NG dkra shis lhun po (531.5), Se rva zhol (26b.1), Peking (177.4.3), and Kalimpong (65.5): bitan no; Zi ling sku 'bum (381.2): bitan to. Sarnath gsang (56.17) misreads bitan na.

c Delhi NG dkra shis lhun po (531.6), Se rva zhol (26b.2), Zi ling sku 'bum (381.5), Sarnath gsang (57.1), and Kalimpong (65.6): bitan to. The Peking (177.4.4) misreads sttan to.
ཁྲིད་ཁྲིད་གི་བོད་ལྕགས་

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བོད་ལྕགས་དང་རྒྱད་དེ་ནཱ་རླུང་བར་བཞིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་བུམ་བུགས

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Delhi NG dkra shis lhun po (532.1), Se rva zhol (26b.3), Peking (177.4.177.4.5), Sar

Peking 5334, vol. 109, 138.1.5. The Sanskrit in Pandeya (Madhyānta-vibhāga, 9.25) is:

Peking 5334, vol. 109.1.6. The Sanskrit in Pandeya (Madhyānta-vibhāga, 9.28) is:

\[abhūtāparikālo \ 'śātī\]

\[svabhāvata iti vākyate\]


Delhi NG dkra shis lhun po (533.3) misreads yad.

Peking 5334, vol. 109, 138.1.7-138.2.1. The Sanskrit in Pandeya (Madhyānta-vibhāga, 9.32) is:

\[ \text{yadavam dvayam śālaviśānavas sarvastāh nāstī/ abhātāparikalpāca paramārthatāḥ} \]
\[ \text{svabhāvato treyevam śānyatāḥ bhāva-prasaṅgāḥ naiśadevaṃ yamātā—} \]
\[ \text{śānyataḥ vidyate tvatra} \]
\[ \text{īyameva hi śānyatāḥ yā grāhyagrahaḥarahātāḥ bhātāparikalpaḥ-paṇi na śānyatāḥ} \]
\[ \text{naiśādevaṃ bhavati//} \]

Delhi NG dkra shis lhun po (533.5) misreads yong.

Ser-shul (Notes, 40a.1-40a.6) cogently explains that bual lo is correct and should not read gyal lo; indeed, bual lo is found in the Peking edition (178.1.2), as well as in Delhi NG dkra shis lhun po (533.6), Se rva zhol (27b.1), Sarnath gtsang (59.3), Zi ling sku 'bum (382.17), and Kalimpong (68.2). Ser-shul explains away the fact that gyal lo appears in Gung-rang's Annotations (khrū 122.4), which is cited the same way in Dön-drup-gyet-sen's Four Intertwined Commentaries (168.3). He points out that:

- Dütsong-ka-ba takes the third line of Maitreya's stanza as being concerned with how to clear away the qualm that emptiness does not exist—"with respect to how the third line clears away a qualm"—not with how that qualm arises; and
- Dütsong-ka-ba's text reads dogs pa byung ba and not dogs pa byung bar as it would if the reading were gyal lo.
Given this evidence of Đrông-ka’s intention, Ser-shul doubts that those scholars (mkhas pa de dag), that is, Gung-tang and Dön-drup-gyel-tsen, considered bshal lo as a corrupt reading that was to be corrected (dag rgyu). His implication is that gual lo in Gung-tang’s and Dön-drup-gyel-tsen’s texts merely represents a scribal error and not their considered intention.

It is amusing that Ser-shul’s own text (40a.3) reads gual lo just before he so carefully explains that it should be bshal lo; he was subject to the same scribal error from which, he suggests, Gung-tang and Dön-drup-gyel-tsen suffered.

a The Sanskrit in Lévi, Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi, 15.12, is:

\[
\text{athaḥastav iṣṭānabdavijñeyamapi dravata eveti kecimasyantel viṣṇeyuvad viṣṇānāmapi samastita eva na paramārthata itiṣya vṛtvikāraśāpyēkāntavādasya pratisedhāhaṁ prakaramārmbhabhah}
\]

See also K. N. Chatterjee, Vijñapti-Mātratā-Siddhi (with Shhiramati’s Commentary) (Varanasi, India; Kishor Vidya Niketan, 1980), 27.11.

b The Peking and Tokyo sde dge of Shhiramati’s text as well as Teramoto, Shhiramati’s Trīṃśikābhāṣyam, 2.11, all read rab tu byed pa ‘di, whereas Delhi NG dkra shis lhun po (534.2), and so forth, read rab tu byed pa without ‘di. The Sanskrit merely has prakaramārmbhabh; see the previous footnote.

c med ces gog has been emended to med ces pa gog in accordance with Ser-shul (Notes, 40a.6), who is following Gung-tang. This is to make it clear that the statement is what is being refuted and is not how something else is being refuted.

d Zi ling sku ’bum (383.9), not taking into account the non-manifest extra suffix da at
the end of the previous syllable, reads ba'i.

* Delhi NG dkra shis lhun po (534.4) and Sarnath gsang (59.19): *stong ba'; Se rva zhol (27b.6), Zi ling sku 'bum (383.10), Peking (178.1.7), and Kalimpong (69.2): *stong pa*.

b  Se rva zhol (28a.6) misreads mdaed; Delhi GD zhol has been corrected to mdaed. Delhi NG dkra shis lhun po (535.4) misreads mjad. Zi ling sku 'bum (384.5), Peking (178.2.6), Sarnath gsang (60.20), and Kalimpong (70.3) correctly read mdaed.

c  Delhi NG dkra shis lhun po (535.5): lal'; Sarnath gsang (61.3): lal'; Se rva zhol (28b.1), Zi ling sku 'bum (384.8), Peking (178.2.7), and Kalimpong (70.4): lal'. The latter is more likely, especially given the double shad in the Delhi NG dkra shis lhun po.
དྲལ་འབྲིས་རྣམས་ཞྲི་བཞི།

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tsad ma nram 'grel gyi tshig le'ur byas pa, pramāṇavarttikaḥ śāstra: III.213. The Sanskrit in Dwarkadāsa Šāstrī, Pramāṇavarttikā of Āchārya Dharmakīrtti (Varanasi, India: Bauddha Bharati, 1968), 164.5, is:

tatraikṣayāpyabhāvena dvaśamaparyuvabhāye/
sasmāt tadeva tatāyāpi tattvam yā dvaśamaparyuvatā///

III.214-215. The Sanskrit in Šāstrī (Pramāṇavarttika, 164.7) is:
tadbhedātyayini ceyam bhāvānām bhedaśamścāśihi/
tadāpapālaśāyeva ca teṣām bhedaḥ 'pyupapaśāvah///
na grāhyagṛhākārābhyamastī ca laksanām/
atō laksanāniyavāniyāśvabhāsvabhāvāḥ prakāśāt̄̄h///

Sarnath gisang misreads rīg.
གཞན་ལེའི་ཤིག

མཐུན་པོ་བཞིན་གནང་པོ་ཆེང་ཤིང་ཆེད་པོ་[191] (315)

[316]

a) Zi ling sku 'bum (384.18): bsld.
b) Zi ling sku 'bum (384.18): rdzn.
c) Zi ling sku 'bum (384.18): rdzun.
d) All of the editions read la although lat may be more appropriate, since Dharmakirti’s text itself reads las. Sārthā’s commentary (Notes, 41b.5) similarly reads las, as does A-ku Lo-grö-gya-tso’s loose commentary (Precious Lamp, 233.1).

III.216. The Sanskrit in Shastri (Pramāṇavarttika, 165.3) is:

vyāptāropādhikam sarvam skandhādīnām vijnatam
lakṣyam sa ca tattvam na tenāpya vikāsanāh/ 

Delhi NG dkr a shis lhun po (536.3) misreads po’s.

III.4. The Sanskrit in Shastri (Pramāṇavarttika, 100.4) is:

āśaktam sarvam iti ced bijāderasākuraśāy/at

Shastri uses three lines for the last single line in order to make clear the different speakers.
ལུགས་པའི་ཐབས་དུས་ོག་རིན་པོ་ཆ་

དུས་བོད་དག་ཐོས་བོད་ོག་

ཚེ་བུ་དབང་པོ་ཉིད་བཐོད་བུ་གེ་བོ་

དབང་པོ་བོད་དུས་ོག་རིན་པོ་ཆ་

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བདེ་བོད་བོད་དུས་ོག་རིན་པོ་ཆ་
ནི་ཁྲིམ་[སྲུང་བོད་སློབ་སྐྱེས་དུས་དབང་།]བཟོས་ནི་རོགས་སྤྱིི་ཤེས་
དུས་དབང་བཅོས། [194 (319)

དཔོན་[སྲུང་བོད་སློབ་སྐྱེས་དུས་དབང་]ི། [194 (319)

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དཔོན་[སྲུང་བོད་སློབ་སྐྱེས་དུས་དབང་]ི། [194 (319)

དཔོན་[སྲུང་བོད་སློབ་སྐྱེས་དུས་དབང་]ི། [194 (319)

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a Zi ling sku 'bum (386.2): bo.
b Delhi NG dkra shis lhan po (537.6), Zi ling sku 'bum (386.5), Peking (178.4.7), and Sarnath gtsang (63.11): par; Se rva zhol (259.2) and Kalimpong (73.2) misread pa.
བོད་སྐྱིད་དབང་བོད་སྐྱིད་དབང་བོད་སྐྱིད་དབང་བོད་སྐྱིད་

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bhavasamkrāntisūtra; Peking 5538, vol. 110, 145.1.6. The Sanskrit—as cited in
Asanga's *Grounds of Bodhisattvas*—in Wogihara (*Bodhisattvabhūmi*, 48.12) is:

ya* ya* hi nāṃmā vai yo yo dharma bhilapayate
na sa samvidyate tatra dharmānām sā hi dharmateti [Dutt: dharmatāt iti]//

See also Dutt, *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, 33.1, and N. Ayyaswami, "Bhavasamkrānti Sūtra" *Journal
do Oriental Research* (Madras) 5, no. 4 (1931): 252, stanza 9; Ayyaswami (252, n. 3) points
out that the stanza is cited twice in the *Tattvasamgrahapāñjikā*.

b  Zī ling sku 'bum (387.9): ba'i; see p. 426, footnote a.
བསམ་སེམས་ཀྱིས་བདེ་ནི་དེ་དག་བྱེད་པ་ཡང་དགོས་པའི་ཤེས་ཤིན་ཐམས་ཅད་མཁྱེན་ཅིང་
[2001] (322) འཐབ་པར་བོ་སྐྱོང་དྲུགས་པོ་གཞན་སེམས་གྲོས་ཀྱིས་དབང་པོ་
གཞན་གྱི་མཐོང་གཙོ་བོ་མཐོང་གཙོ་བོ་མཐོང་གཙོ་བོ་མཐོང་
[201] (322) དེར་བུ་ཞིང་
དེར་བུ་ཞིང་དེར་བུ་ཞིང་
[201] (322) དེར་བུ་ཞིང་
དེར་བུ་ཞིང་
[201] (322) དེར་བུ་ཞིང་
དེར་བུ་ཞིང་
[201] (322) དེར་བུ་ཞིང་
དེར་བུ་ཞིང་
[201] (322) དེར་བུ་ཞིང་

d. Zi ling sku 'bum (387.15): bas. Again, this is an overcorrection for the rule that ba
follows the suffixes nga, 'a, ra, la, and suffixless syllables, since that rule is contravened by 
the dictum that only pa should be used for ownership (bdag sgr) which is the usage here; see p.
373, footnote b.
d. Zi ling sku 'bum (387.18): ba; see the previous footnote.
d. Zi ling sku 'bum (387.18): pa la. 'gog pa and 'gog pa la have the same meaning.
d. Zi ling sku 'bum (388.8) unnecessarily emends to smra yi.
དེབ་བརྩ་བུས་བཟང་ཤུབ་ཀྱིས་ཐང་ཐས་པའི་གཞི་གནས་པོ་གཅིག་གི་དེ་བུར་བུ་གང་རབ་གྱི་ཤུག་གཞི་དཔེར་ནས་
གྲོས་བུར་བུ་ཕྱིན་པ་ལྟོག་སྤྱོད་ཀྱི་གཙྜྷ་སྤྱོད་མེད་ཀྱང་དེ་བུར་བུ་གང་རབ་གྱི་ཤུག་
གཞི་དཔེར་ནས་པོ་གཅིག་གི་དེ་བུར་བུ་གང་རབ་གྱི་ཤུག་

g་པོ་གཅིག་གི་དེ་བུར་བུ་གང་རབ་

5  དེབ་བརྩ་བུས་བཟང་ཤུབ་ཀྱིས་ཐང་ཐས་པའི་གཞི་གནས་པོ་
གཅིག་གི་དེ་བུར་བུ་གང་རབ་
gྱི་ཤུག་གཞི་དཔེར་ནས་

10  དེབ་བརྩ་བུས་བཟང་ཤུབ་ཀྱིས་ཐང་ཐས་པའི་གཞི་

gཅིག་གི་དེ་བུར་བུ་

![Delhi NG dkar shis lhun po (540.4), Se rva zhol (30b.6), Zi ling sku 'bum (388.11), and Kalimpong (76.4): bka'as; Peking (179.2.2) and Sarnath gtsang (66.13) misread ba lta.s.](image-url)
ཚུས་ལ། [དོན་ལ་རི་ཁྱབ་པའི་ཐབས་]གཏོད་མེས། ཉེས་པར་བོད། སྐྱེལ་དུ་འོག

5  སྲིད་ལ། [དོན་ལ་རི་ཁྱབ་པའི་ཐབས་]གཏོད་མེས། ཉེས་པར་བོད། སྐྱེལ་དུ་འོག

10  སྲིད་ལ། [དོན་ལ་རི་ཁྱབ་པའི་ཐབས་]གཏོད་མེས། ཉེས་པར་བོད། སྐྱེལ་དུ་འོག

15  སྲིད་ལ། [དོན་ལ་རི་ཁྱབ་པའི་ཐབས་]གཏོད་མེས། ཉེས་པར་བོད། སྐྱེལ་དུ་འོག

20  སྲིད་ལ། [དོན་ལ་རི་ཁྱབ་པའི་ཐབས་]གཏོད་མེས། ཉེས་པར་བོད། སྐྱེལ་དུ་འོག

* Zi ling sku 'bum (389.6) unnecessarily emends to de'i.
* Delhi NG dkra shis lhun po (541.5) misreads sem.
[209] (325) ༠༠༠༠

[210] (326) ༠༠༠༠

a  Zhi ling sku 'bum (390.9) unnecessarily emends to po la.
b  Delhi NG dkra shis lhun po (543.2), Peking (179.4.5), and Sarnath tsang (69.13) read yin phyin chad, an obviously faulty scribal error, since the term is yin phyin chad; Se rva zhol (32a.5), Zhi ling sku 'bum (390.16), and Kalimpong (79.6) correctly lack the shad. Delhi GD zhol is mistakenly edited to yin phyin chad.
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\* Zi ling sku 'bum (391.4):  ba\'; see p. 373, footnote b.
\* Grags pa & nam rgyal (69.4) misread gye.
\* Se rva zhol (32.4) misreads 'grel pa; Delhi GD zhol has been corrected to 'brel ba, which is the reading in Delhi NG dkra shia lhun po (544.2), Zi ling sku 'bum (391.11), Peking (179.5.3), Sarthath gtsang (70.14), and Kalimpong (81.1).
[215] (320) ཨི་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་پ

5 ཞེས་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན

[217] (329) རང་གི་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན

[217] (329) རང་གི་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན

[218] (330) རང་གི་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན

20 རང་གི་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན

[218] (331) རང་གི་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན

438 རུང་དཔྱིན་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན

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a  Se rva zhol (34a.1) misreads na mkha', which was most likely intended to be the contraction namkha' which is an elision of nam and mkha'.

b  Se rva zhol (34a.4) misreads dge.
དེ་བཟོ གུང་རྒྱུས་བེད་སྐྱེས་པ་དེ་ལ་འོང་བྲེལེ་བཟོ་ན་པའི་སྒྲིག་པ་
དེ་བཟོ་བཟོ་ཐ་དེ་ལ་འོང་བྲེལེ་བཟོ་ན་པའི་སྒྲིག་པ་
དེ་བཟོ་བཟོ་ཐ་དེ་ལ་འོང་བྲེལེ་བཟོ་ན་པའི་སྒྲིག་པ་
དེ་བཟོ་བཟོ་ཐ་དེ་ལ་འོང་བྲེལེ་བཟོ་ན་པའི་སྒྲིག་པ་
དེ་བཟོ་བཟོ་ཐ་དེ་ལ་འོང་བྲེལེ་བཟོ་ན་པའི་སྒྲིག་པ་

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a Sarnath gtsang (74.2) misreads zhan.
b Delhi NG dkra shis lhun po (547.1), Se rva zhol (34a.5), Sarnath gtsang (74.2), and Kalimpong (84.6) misread bdag; Zi ling sku 'bum (394.3) and Peking (180.3.3) correctly read ba dag.
c Delhi GD zhol (34a.5) has been mistakenly emended to gags. Peking (180.3.1) misreads gongs.
d Zi ling sku 'bum (394.5): dka'lo.
e Peking (180.3.2) misreads gungs.
f Zi ling sku 'bum (394.8): 'shol.
ང་རྟོན་པོར་རྒྱུ་འཕྲིན་བཅུས་འཕྲིན་ལ་མི་གང་བྱོས་བལྟ་ལ།

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a  Delphi NG dkar shis thun po (549.6), Peking (180.5.5), Sarnath gtsang (77.6); bau; Se rva zhol (35b.4), Zi lings kyi 'bum (396.10), and Kalimpong (88.3): pas, the latter appearing to have been cruelly emended. The difference is due to whether the non-manifest extra suffix da in 'grel is heeded.

b  For de la, the Peking of the source text (5206, vol. 93, 230.4.4) reads de la mig mig gi stong zhes bya ba la.

c  Se rva zhol (35b.6) misreads mig, corrected in the Delhi GD zhol to mig.

d  Zi lings kyi 'bum (396.15) misreads kyis.
བདེན་པར་ཆོད་པའི་བཟང་བོ་མོག་

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a Sarnath gsang (77.17): drang; Delhi NG dkra shis lhun po (550.3), Se rva zhol (36a.1), Zi ling sku 'bum (396.18), Peking (180.5.8), and Kalimpong (89.1): drang.

b Zi ling sku 'bum (397.7): pa.
\[\text{Natural Text Goes Here}\]
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ཀུན་ཅྡན་བྲེལ་ཀྱི་ཐོན་པོ་བོད་རྗེ་ཐོན་པོ་དང་ཐོན་བོད་་ཁྲིམ་ཐོན་པོ་གཞི་ས་མི་གཞི་བཤད་པར་བཏང་།

དེ་བཞི་དམ་པར་བསོད་ནམས་ཀྱང་དཔལ་འཛིན་དོན་དར་བཏང་།

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ཐོན་འཕོ་བོད་ཅིག་གཅིག་འཇོག་པའི་ཐོན་བོད་ཀྱི་བོད་ཀྱིས་གད་གཅིག་པའི་ཐོན་བོད་ཀྱི་བོད་ཀྱིས་

ཀྱང་དཔལ་འཛིན་དོན་སྐྱེས་པ་དགེ་བསྟན་བདེ་ནུས།

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ཐོན་ཏོ་[230] (337) དེ་ཁབ་བྱེད་པ་རང་གི་བདེན་པོ་ཞེ་ཞེ་མི་ཐོན་པོ་ལྡན་པའི་ཐོན་བོད་ཀྱི་བོད་ཀྱིས་

དཔལ་འཛིན་དོན་[81] རྩེ་རྩེ་

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ཐོན་ཏོ་[230] (340) དེ་ཁབ་བྱེད་པ་རང་གི་བདེན་པོ་ཞེ་ཞེ་མི་ཐོན་པོ་ལྡན་པའི་ཐོན་བོད་ཀྱི་བོད་ཀྱིས་

པའི་ཕྱི་ཕྱུག་ཤིག་[230] (340) དེ་ཁབ་བྱེད་པ་རང་གི་བདེན་པོ་ཞེ་ཞེ་མི་ཐོན་པོ་ལྡན་པའི་ཐོན་བོད་ཀྱི་

བོད་ཀྱིས་གཅིག་གི་མི་ཁ་མི་མི་མི་མི་མི་མི་མི་མི་མི་མི་མི་མི་མི་མི་མི་མི་མི་མི་མི་མི་

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ཇི་ལྟར་ཇི་ལྟར་ཇི་ལྟར་ཇི་ལྟར་ཇི་ལྟར་ཇི་ལྟར་ཇི་ལྟར་ཇི་ལྟར་ཇི་ལྟར་ཇི་ལྟར་ཇི་ལྟར་ཇི་ལྟར་ཇི་ལྟར་ཇི་ལྟར་ཇི་ལྟར་ཇི་ལྟར་

དེ་བཞི་དམ་པར་བསོད་ནམས་ཀྱང་དཔལ་འཛིན་དོན་སྐྱེས་པ་དགེ་བསྟན་བདེ་ནས།

a The Peking edition of the source text (5206, vol. 93, 230.4.3) does not have de nyid; see 229, footnote d.

b Zi ling sku 'bum (399.1) misreads dag.

c The Peking edition of the source text (5206, vol. 93, 230.4.3) does not have de nyid; see 229, footnote d.

d Zi ling sku 'bum (399.8) misreads ba'i.

e Delhi NG dkra shis lhun po (553.4) misreads dpyed.
བོད་དོགས་གཞི་གཞུ་གཞི་མོངས་ཐོག་བཞི་བཞི་བཞི་བཞི་བཞི་བཞི་བཞི་བཞི

* In Sarnath tsang (81.18) and Kalimpong (93.4) read ngo na for don, in accordance with Delhi NG dkra shis lhun po (553.6), Se eva zhol (37b.5), and Zi ling sku ’bum (399.18), as well as Da-drin-rap-den 153.3. In Peking (181.4.1) read ngo na for ngor.
西藏南部地域的文献[西藏南部地域の文献 (234) (342)]

西藏南部地域の文献は、多くの地域が含まれており、各地域の文化・宗教・社会の多様性が反映されています。特に、チベット文化の一部であるこの地域の文献は、チベット語で書かれ、チベット仏教の教えを含む重要なものとして知られています。

以下、一部の文献を引用します。

1. (西藏南部地域の文献) (234)
2. (西藏南部地域の文献) (342)

これらの文献は、チベット仏教の教えを含むものであり、各地域の文化・宗教・社会の多様性が反映されています。特に、チベット文化の一部であるこの地域の文献は、チベット語で書かれ、チベット仏教の教えを含む重要なものとして知られています。

参考文献

1. 斯特羅梅斯特, Vijnapti-Mātratā-Siddhi, 9.1.
2. 斯特羅梅斯特, Vijnapti-Mātratā-Siddhi, 8.5.
[text in Tibetan script]

Footnote:

1. Se rva zhol (39a.1) misreads de, corrected in the Delhi GD zhol to de.


[Translation or transcription of the text in the image]

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\(^a\) Zi ling sku 'bum (402.5): \textit{pa}'o.

\(^b\) Zi ling sku 'bum (402.9): \textit{ma} \textquote{\textit{d}u}.

\(^c\) Se rva zhol (39a.6) misreads \textit{physi}, corrected in the Delhi GD zhol to \textit{phye}.

\(^d\) Se rva zhol (39b.2): \textit{dpa}.'

\(^e\) The Peking of Vasubandhu's text (5562, vol. 113, 279.3.1) more sensibly reads \textit{yang na de lair blang bar bya ba ni ci zhig blang bar bya bar} sens, rather than \textit{yang na de lair blang bar bya ba} sens.
bya ba ni ci zhi brang bar bya ba ni ci zhi brang bar bshes

bya ba ni ci zhi brang bar bya ba ni ci zhi brang bar bshes, which is found in all editions of Đzon-ka-DBG's text—Delhi NG dkar shis lhun po (557.5), Se rta zhol (39b.3), Zi lings kyi bya ba (403.1), Peking (182.2.4), Sarnath gtsang (86.2), and Kalimpong (98.1). The extra phrase appears to be a scribal addition.

a The Peking of Vasubandhu's text (5562, vol. 113, 279.3.1): de rnam bskri ni.

b The Peking of Vasubandhu's text (5562, vol. 113, 279.3.1): gsung ba.

c Se rta zhol (39b.5) misreads spyan.

d Zi lings kyi bya ba (403.18): rdom.

e Zi lings kyi bya ba (403.20): ba; see p. 373, footnote b.
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[Text in Tibetan script]

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注: 1. Zi ling sku 'bum (404.6); zhig.
   2. Zi ling sku 'bum (405.2); de yi.
   3. Se rva zhol (40b.6) and Kalimpong (101.2); le'u; Delhi NG dkar shis lhun po (560.1).
Zi ling sku 'bum (405.7), Peking (182.4.5), and Sarnath gtsang (88.18); le′us; the latter accords more with the instrumental in the similar construction in the next line dgongs 'grel gyis.

* Se rva zhol (41a.1) misreads da, corrected to de in the Delhi GD zhol.
Appendix 1. Commentaries on the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought

Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 413.4) lists eight commentaries on the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought as found in earlier catalogues:

1. A small commentary (grel chung) falsely attributed to Asaṅga, 220 stanzas long, translated by Shang Ye-shay-day (zhang ye shes sde)

I take this to be the very short commentary entitled āryasamādhinirmocanaḥḥāya (’phags pa dgon s pa nges par grel pa’i rnam par bsad pa; Peking 5481, vol. 104, 1.1.1-7.5.1; T3981). Bu-don in his history (E. Obermiller, History of Buddhism (Chos-hbyung) by Bu-ston [Heidelberg: Heft, 1932; Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation, n.d.], 140) attributes it to Asaṅga.

2. A great commentary (grel chen) falsely attributed to Asaṅga, in forty sections (bam po)

This is difficult to identify. Ďzong-ka-ba (156) cryptically makes reference to a Great Commentary:

the explanation in a certain Great Commentary on the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought is not the thought of that sūtra when that commentary says:

Imputational factors do not exist as either of the two truths [ultimate or conventional]. The dependent-arisings of other-powered natures of apprehended-objects and apprehending-subjects [which are different substantial entities] exist conventionally [and do not exist ultimately] like magical creations. The thoroughly established nature is the ultimate, and its existence in the manner of naturelessness also ultimately exists.

[This is not the thought of the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought, because] it contradicts the proof of no external objects in Asaṅga’s Summary of the Great Vehicle—that is made within citing the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought—and thereupon the explanation of external and internal objects and subjects [which are different substantial entities] as imputational factors. It also contradicts Asaṅga’s Grounds of Bodhisattvas and his Compendium of Ascertainments. Furthermore, a passage of [Dharmakīrti’s] Ascertainment [of Prime cognition] is cited in that [above-
mentioned Great Commentary]. Hence, one [scholar's] saying that it was written by Asaṅga is a case of a great absence of analysis. In his Compendium of Ascertaining Asaṅga quotes, except for the introductory chapter of the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought, most of the remaining chapters and settles well the difficult points; hence, there also does not appear to be any need for this master's [that is, Asaṅga's] composing a separate commentary.

This Great Commentary on the "Sūtra Unraveling the Thought" is not the one by Wonch'uk but, as Ser-shül (Notes, 29b.4) reports, may be one that Bu-don says is by a Tibetan and speculates is by Lu-gyal-tsen (klu'i rgyal mtsan). Ser-shül identifies Lu-gyal-tsen as the Great Translator Jok-ro. Jik-may-dam-chö-gratso (Port of Entry, 414.3) also cites the Catalogue of the ldan dkar Palace Collection (pho brang stod thang ldan dkar gyi chos 'gyur ro cog gi dkar chags) Peking 5851, vol. 145; Dharma, 4364; compiled early in the ninth century by dpal brtsegs rabsgra, nam mkha'i snying po, and others, which refers to an extensive commentary by Lu-gyal-tsen that is in 22,000 stanzas, that is, forty sections (bam po); so by sheer similarity in length, I consider it somewhat safe to identify item 2 as by Lu-gyal-tsen, the Great Translator Jok-ro. This is the Explanation of the "Sūtra Unraveling the Thought" (Peking 5845, vol. 144, 191.1.1-191.1.2; Tohoku 4356; phags pa dgon gyi 'gyur nges pa 'gyel pa'i mdo'i rnam par bshad pa, ārya-samādhīnirmocana-sūtrasa-vyākhyāna; also Delhi: Delhi Karmapae Choehey, 1985, vol. 205).


A long commentary is attributed to Jang-chup-dzū-trul (byang chub rdu-'phrub) in the ide dge edition, and thus it is also sometimes attributed to the

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a. Dzong-ka-ba most likely draws this critique of an unnamed scholar from Bu-don's Catalogue of the Translated Doctrine (chos 'byugur dkar chags), which makes this very point to show that the text is not by Asaṅga (see Ernst Steinkellner, "Who Is Byaṅ chub rdu-'phrub? Tibetan and non-Tibetan Commentaries on the Samādhīnirmocanaśūtra—A Survey of the Literature," Berliner Indologische Studien 4, no. 5 (1989): 239). Bu-don also does not identify who the scholar is; none of Dzong-ka-ba's commentators does either.

b. Dharmakīrti, being an indirect student of Dignāga, who was a direct disciple of Asaṅga's half-brother Vasubandhu, is clearly post-Asaṅga, and thus Asaṅga could not have cited him.

c. cog ro lo chen. The Treasure Revealer Karma Ling-ba (gter ston kar ma gling pa, 1356-1405) is considered to be a reincarnation of Jok-ro Lu-gyal-tsen; see Dudjom Rinpoche, The Nyingma School of Tibetan Buddhism (Boston: Wisdom, 1991), 1, 800-801.

eighteenth-century Tibetan King Tri-song-de-rgyan (khri srong lde brtsan, 742-797), since Tri-song-de-rgyan was also known by that name. However, both attributions are questionable in the light of Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso's citation (Port of Entry, 414.2) of a passage from the commentary that refers to Jang-chup-dzü-trul:

The divisions of those characters are to be viewed in accordance with what appears in the Validity of the True Word (bka’ yang dag pa’i shad ma; Peking 5839) written by the glorious god emperor Jang-chup-dzü-trul, sovereign of true lords (dbang phyag dam pa’i mnga’ bdag dpal lha btsan po byang chub rdzu ’phrul).

Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso's point is that this text could not have been written by Jang-chup-dzü-trul, that is, Tri-song-de-rgyan, and indeed though he might cite his own text, he most likely would not have done so in such an exalted manner. (Even with the proviso that the author is not Jang-chup-dzü-trul, Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso himself [Port of Entry, 423.2] backs off equating the commentary to which Dzong-ka-ba refers with that in the sde dge, and so forth.) Also, Steinkellner (Who Is Bya’i chub rdzu ’phrul?, 238-241, and summary in John C. Powers, Hermeneutics and Tradition in the Samdhinirmocana-sūtra [Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 1993], 21) points out that the work does not appear “in the two old inventories we have of the king’s works….And Bu ston says nothing about Bya’i chub rdzu ’phrul, the king, as its possible author.”

A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso reports that (1) even though he found in the two-volume commentary “possible equivalents” (dod thub) of Dzong-ka-ba's citation (or paraphrase?), he did not find the exact passage and (2) although the two-volume commentary cites a passage from the Ascertainment (presumably Dharmakirti’s Ascertainment of Prime Cognition), beginning rje ’i sde dpag par bya ba la yod pa nyid, it does not mention that text by name.* He draws no conclusion from these points; thus, it may be that he is not challenging the basic point that Dzong-ka-ba is indeed referring to this two-volume commentary. Given that when Dzong-ka-ba refers to the Ascertainment, he is using the very argument employed by Bu-don to prove that this text was not written by Asanga, it is likely that Dzong-ka-ba was indeed referring to that two-volume commentary and was merely paraphrasing instead of quoting that text, something he frequently does.

Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 411.4) cites the possible passages in (Lu-gyel-mtse’s) Explanation of the “Sutra Unraveling the Thought” from which Dzong-ka-ba may have drawn his “citation” but points out that these

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* A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso also points out that Jam-yang-shay-ba’s Notes on (Dzong-ka-ba’s) “The Essence of Eloquence” identifies the passage in question as from Vasubandhu’s Commentary on the “Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra,” but he says that Jam-yang-shay-ba’s text is corrupt at this point. I take this to be a polite way of disagreeing with him.
passages do not explain that other-powered natures exist conventionally and that thoroughly established natures exist ultimately. Rather, they say that other-powered natures exist as conventional truths and that thoroughly established natures exist as ultimate truths. Still, it seems likely that item 2 is the commentary by Lu-gyel-tsen, falsely attributed to Jang-chup-dzü-trül, who may be the same person as King Tri-šong-de-dzin.

For other, lost commentaries on the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought, see the article by Steinkellner cited just above.

3. A condensed commentary (bdus 'grel) falsely attributed to Asaṅga, in one section (?)

4. A great commentary (tikchen) in sixty sections (?)

5. An explanation of the "Questions of Maitreya Chapter" by Jñānagarbha in two sections and seventy stanzas

This is the Small Explanation of the Superior Maitreya Chapter of the "Superior Sūtra Unraveling the Thought" (phags pa dgongs pa nges par 'grel pa'i mdo las 'phags pa byams pa'i le'u ngyi sde'i bshad pa, ārya-samādhi-nirmocana-sūtra-ārya-maitreyakevala-parivarta-bhāṣya; Peking 5535, vol. 109, 196-211; T4033.4

6. A commentary (sikka) translated from Chinese in nine sections

I presume that this is a commentary by Paramārtha, frequently cited by Wonch'uk (see item 7) sometimes approvingly and sometimes not; it may be that the text is known only through Wonch'uk's commentary on the sūtra.

7. A great commentary ('grel chen) by Wonch'uk in seventy-four sections

This is the Extensive Commentary on the "Superior Sūtra Unraveling the Thought" (phags pa dgongs pa zab mo nges par 'grel pa'i mdo'i rgya cher 'grel pa; ārya-gambhirā-samādhi-nirmocana-sūtra-sīkā; Peking 5517, vol. 106, entire; Tohoku 4016; also Delhi: Delhi Karmapa Choedhey, Gyalwa Sunggrab Partun Khang, 1985, mdo 'grel, vol. 118)). This erudite commentary was translated into Tibetan from Chinese; see p. 39ff.

8 A great commentary ('grel chen) by the Chinese master Dzok-šel (rdzogs gsal) in seventy-five sections

Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso mentions that Bu-dun calls for analysis as to whether this and item 7 are the same; rdzogs gsal is the Tibetan translation of the Korean Wonch'uk (Chinese: Yuan sie), which is often rendered in Tibetan transliteration as wen shigs.

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4 For a translation, see John C. Powers, Jñānagarbha's Commentary on Just the Maitreya Chapter from the Samādhi-nirmocana-Sūtra: Study, Translation and Tibetan Text (New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1998).
Appendix 2. Chinese Translations of the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought

Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 136.1) identifies the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought explained by Wonch’uk as having eight chapters:

1. Introduction
2. The Character of the Ultimate Truth
3. The Character of Mind, Sentience, and Consciousness
4. The Characters of All Phenomena
5. The Character of Naturelessness
6. Revealing Yoga
7. The Grounds and Perfections
8. Achieving the Activities of a One Gone Thus

According to Wonch’uk, the second through fifth are what are to be analyzed; the sixth is the yogic path, and the last is the fruit to be attained. Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso reports that the second chapter of Wonch’uk’s rendering corresponds to the first four chapters of the Tibetan translation of the sūtra and that the remainder of Wonch’uk’s version corresponds to the fifth through tenth chapters of the Tibetan translation of the sūtra. Thus, the Tibetan version of the text has an introduction and ten chapters, whereas Wonch’uk’s has eight chapters, with the introduction being counted as a chapter.

According to Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 134.5, citing the description in Wonch’uk’s Great Commentary), there are four translations of the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought into Chinese resulting in four different Chinese editions:

1. The nam par 'grol ba'i mdo in two fascicles (bam po; Chinese: chüan), put together by the Indian professor (mkhan po) Guṇabhadra (yon tan bzang po) during the Liu Sung Dynasty (rgya rje song) in 443-445 (Taishō 678, vol. 16), which consist of only the last two chapters of the eight-chaptered Sūtra Unraveling the Thought as listed above:
   7. The Grounds and Perfections
   8. Achieving the Activities of a One Gone Thus

2. The zab mo nam par 'grol ba'i mdo with eleven chapters translated by the Indian master Bodhiruci (bo de le'u ci) during the latter Ling Dynasty (rgya rje 'gris [?] phyi ma) in 514 (Taishō 675, vol. 16). The section on the ultimate truth—which in Wonch’uk’s version is one chapter (chap. 2)—is

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* The specific years are from John C. Powers, Hermeneutics and Tradition in the Samādhi-nirmocana-sūtra (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 1993), 5-6.
treated in this edition as four chapters, whereby, with the other seven, it has eleven chapters:

1. Introduction
2-5. The Character of the Ultimate Truth
6. The Character of Mind, Sentience, and Consciousness
7. The Characters of All Phenomena
8. The Character of Naturelessness
9. Revealing Yoga
10. The Grounds and Perfections
11. Achieving the Activities of a One Gone Thus

3. The *tshigs nges par 'grel pa zhes bya ba'i mdo* in one fascicle, translated by the Indian master Paramārtha (*yang dag bden pa*) during the Ch'en Dynasty (*rgya rje tsuin*) in 557 (*Taishō* 677, 679, vol. 16). It has four chapters, consisting of the section on the ultimate which, as in Bodhiruci's version (chaps. 2-5), is divided into four chapters:

1-4. The Character of the Ultimate Truth

4. The *dzongs pa zab mo nges par 'grel pa zhes bya ba'i mdo* in five fascicles translated by the Tripitaka master Hsian-tsang (*hyan tsang*) during the T'ang dynasty (*thang*) in 647 (*Taishō* 676, vol. 16). It has eight chapters, as listed above for Wonch'uk's commentary:

1. Introduction
2. The Character of the Ultimate Truth
3. The Character of Mind, Sentience, and Consciousness
4. The Characters of All Phenomena
5. The Character of Naturelessness
6. Revealing Yoga
7. The Grounds and Perfections
8. Achieving the Activities of a One Gone Thus

Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso mentions (but does not identify) a history of China that speaks of the second and the fourth translations as being in five fascicles and that also possibly refers to the other two when it speaks of two extracts (*khol phyung rnam gnyis*). He says that of the two versions of the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*—an extensive one the length of a hundred thousand stanzas (that is no longer extant, if it ever was) and a brief one the length of five thousand stanzas—the one studied in Tibet is the latter.
Backnotes

NOTES TO THE PREFACE
1. snyags rim chen mo'i 'rgyal ba bshub bsdag nyo rje 'chung chen po'i lam gyi rim pa' gsal ba kun gyi gnad rnam par phybe ba; Great Exposition of the Stages of Mantra / The Stages of the Path to a Conqueror and Persuasive Master, a Great Vajradhara: Revealing All Secret Topics; Peking 6210, vol. 161.
2. lam rim brinang lam rim chung ngu; Medium Exposition of the Stages of the Path / Small Exposition of the Stages of the Path To Enlightenment; Peking 6002, vol. 152-53.

NOTES TO PART ONE, CHAPTER 1
5. Ibid., 5.
6. Ibid., 5.

NOTES TO PART ONE, CHAPTER 2
8. tshad ma rnam 'grel; pramāṇavarttika; Peking 5709, vol. 130.
9. chos mgon pa'i medod, abhidharma sktika; Peking 5590, vol. 115.
10. 'dul pa'i mdo, vinayasutra; Peking 5619, vol. 123.
12. lam rim chen mo; Peking 6001, vol. 152. Dzong-ka-ba makes reference to this text in the section on the Autonomy School, "I have explained this mode of reasoning at length elsewhere."
13. 'du ma rtsa ba'i sbyog le ur bka' 'bas ra zhes rab ces bya ba; praṇāṅnamālamahāvyākārakā; Peking 5224, vol. 95.
14. rigs pa'i rgya mtho; Peking 6153, vol. 156.
15. skyes bu gsum gyi nyams tu blang ba'i byang chub lam gyi rim pa; Peking 6002, vols. 152-153.
16. This material on the request for the teaching is drawn from Wel-mang Gön-chok-gyal-tsen's Notes on (Gön-chok-jik-may-wang-bo) Lectures, 381.5-382.3; for a partial listing of the transmisation of The Essence of Eloquence within Ge-luk-ба, see the same text, 382.3-384.4.
17. Wel-mang Gön-chok-gyal-tsen's Notes on (Gön-chok-jik-may-wang-bo) Lectures, 382.1.
19. sdb mo stong pa nyid rab tu gsal bar byed pa'i bstan bcos skal bsang mig 'byed. The work has been translated in its entirety in José Ignacio Cabezón, A Dao of Empinness (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1992).
20. Cabezón, Dao of Empinness, 52.
21. legs bshad snying po'i dba' 'grel bstan pa'i sgron me.
22. rje btsun thams cad mkhyen pa' gsal 'bum las drang nges rnam 'byed kyi lta'i 'grel dgyungs pa'i don rab tu gsal bar byed pa'i sgron me.
23. drang nges rnam 'byed kyi sbyi don rgyal ngan tshar gcod rin po che'i phreng ba.
24. drang ba dang nges pa'i rnam par 'byed pa legs bshad snying po btes bya ba'i mtho' dbyod padma dkar po'i phreng ba.
25. General Meaning of (Dzong-ka-ba)’s “Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive”: The Essence of Eloquence, Garland of White Lotus (drang nges rnam 'byed kyi sbyi don legs par bshad pa'i snying po padma dkar po'i 'phreng ba); and Decisive Analysis of (Dzong-ka-ba)’s “Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive” (drang nges rnam 'byed kyi mtho' dbyod).
26. drang ba dang nges pa'i don rnam par 'byed pa'i mtho' dbyod khrul kral lugs bka'i dus dkar pa'i gan grol skor skal bsang re la kun skong.
27. See the table of contents (most likely by Gene Smith) to the Nguwang Gelek edition.
28. dge lha'i chen mong mo rin pa dang ba dang nges pa'i don rnam par phyeb ba'i bstan bcos legs bshad snying po'i rgya choc bshad pa dang nges babs 'drel.
29. drang ba dang nges pa'i don rnam par phyeb ba gsal bar byed pa legs bshad snying po'i don mtho' dag rnam par 'byed pa'i bstan bcos legs bshad snying po'i jug ngogs.
30. drang nges rnam 'byed kyi sin brics sab don gsal ba'i sgron me.
NOTES TO PART ONE, CHAPTER 3
32 Chap. 7; Étienne Lamotte, Sandhinirmocana-sutra: L’Explication des mystères (Louvain: Université de Louvain, 1935), 70 [10], and 196; and John C. Powers, Wisdom of Buddha: Sandhinirmocana Sutra (Berkeley, Calif.: Dharma, 1995), 105-106.
33 Chap. 7; Lamotte, Sandhinirmocana, 72-73 [13-14] and 197-198; and Powers, Wisdom of Buddha, 111.
34 Janice D. Willis’s translation of the material that Dwong-ka-ba is summarizing is found in her On Knowing Reality: The Tatttvārthas of Asanga’s Bodhisattvabhumi (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979; reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarasidas, 1982), 167 (middle) through 170 (middle).
36 Annotations, 110.3.
37 Chap. 7; Lamotte, Sandhinirmocana, 79 [17-18] and 199; and Powers, Wisdom of Buddha, 115-117.
38 rgyud gel ba sbe’i sna rab cu byed pa, samādhyānasūtra-dhāna-prakrama.

NOTES TO PART ONE, CHAPTER 4
41 The Tibetan translation of his name is yong dag bden pa.
43 Robert E. Buswell, trans., Buswell, Robert E., trans. “Wonch’uk (613-696): Memorial Inscrip-
44 tion,” unpublished manuscript, 2.
45 Chinese: Ch’eng wei-shih lun. There are translations into French and English; see the Bibliography.
48 Ch’en, Buddhism in China, 237.
49 See Thomas Waters, On Yuan Chwang’s Travels in India (Delhi: Munshi Ram Manohar Lal, 1961); and Beal, Buddhist Records of the Western World.
50 Weinstein, Buddhism under the T’ang, 31.
51 Ibid., 121.
53 Ibid., 1.
55 Ibid., 146.
57 Lee, Sourcebook of Korean Civilisation, 167.
58 For discussion of how the text came to be translated by Fa-ch’eng, see Shōtarō Iida, “A Mukung-hwa in Ch’ang-an—A Study of the Life and Works of Wonch’uk (613-696),” with Special Interest in the Korean contributions to the Development of Chinese and Tibetan Buddhism,” in Proceedings, International Symposium, Commemorating the 30th Anniversary of Korean Liberation (Seoul: National Academy of Sciences, Republic of Korea, 1975), 243-246; and “The
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For the date, see Gareth Sparham in collaboration with Shōtaro Iida, Ocean of Elocution: Tsong kha pa’s Commentary on the Yogācāra Doctrine of Mind (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1993), 17-18.


The biographical material is drawn from Cyrus R. Stearns, The Buddha from Dol po and His Fourth Council of the Buddhist Doctrine (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, 1996), 14-64.


Stearns, The Buddha from Dol po, 20.

Ibid., 21.


Ibid., 24.

Ibid., 26.

Ibid., 34.

Ibid., 34.

Ibid., 45.

Ibid., 51.

Ibid., 51; brackets mine.

Ibid., 120.

Ibid., 52.

Ibid., 53.

Ibid., 58.

Ibid., 63.

Ibid., 64.

Ibid., 89.

Ibid., 148.

Shay-rap-gyal-tsen’s Ocean of Definitive Meaning, 209.4

See also Powers, Wisdom of Buddha, 255.


Ibid., 211.4.

Stearns, The Buddha from Dol po, 154; brackets are Stearns’s.

theg pa mtha’ ’dag gi don gsal bar byed pa grub pa’i mtha’ rin po che’i mdo’dad (Gangtok, Sikkim: Dodrup Chen Rinpoche, 1969?), 260.

Ibid., 267.

Ibid., 266.

Stearns, The Buddha from Dol po, 151.

NOTES TO PART TWO, PROLOGUE

Bel-jor-blun-drup’s Lamp for the Teaching, 6.3.

Jik-may-dam-chö-’gya-tso’s Port of Entry, 56.1.

Jay-dzin Chö-gyi-g gel-tsen’s General-Meaning Commentary, 4b.2.

Ibid., 4b.2.

Da-drin-rap-den’s Annotations, 5.3.

Ibid., 5.3.

Gung-tang’s Difficult Points, 24.2.

Ibid., 24.2.

Ibid., 24.4.

Ibid., 24.10.

Ibid., 24.10, and Ser-shul, 12b.

Jay-dzin Chö-gyi-g jel-tsen’s General-Meaning Commentary, 5b.1.

NOTES TO PART TWO, CHAPTER 1

Da-drin-rap-den’s Annotations, 8.5: ’khor ba ’khor sa.

Ibid., 8.6.

Ibid., 8.6; and Gung-tang’s Annotations, 13.5.

Gung-tang’s Annotations, 13.5.

Gung-tang’s Difficult Points, 76.10.

Da-drin-rap-den’s Annotations, 9.2.

Ibid., 9.2.

Ibid., 9.3.

Ibid., 9.3.

Ibid., 9.3.

Ibid., 9.4.

Ibid., 9.4.

Ibid., 9.4.

Ibid., 9.4.

Da-drin-rap-den’s Annotations, 9.5.

A-ku Lo-ló-’gya-tso’s Precious Lamp, 55.4.
117 Gung-tang’s Annotations, 13.7.
118 Da-drin-rap-den’s Annotations, 9.5; and Gung-tang’s Annotations, 14.1.
119 Gung-tang’s Annotations, 14.1.
120 Ibid., 14.1.
121 Da-drin-rap-den’s Annotations, 9.6.
122 Ibid., 10.4.
123 Don-drup-gyal-tsen’s Four Intertwined Commentaries, 41.5.
124 Ibid.
125 Da-drin-rap-den’s Annotations, 10.6.
126 Ibid., 10.6.
127 Ibid., 10.6.

NOTES TO PART TWO, CHAPTER 2

128 Da-drin-rap-den’s Annotations, 11.6.
129 Ibid., 11.6.
130 Chap. 7; Etienne Lamotte, Sambhijnamāra: L’Explication des mystères (Louvain: Université de Louvain, 1935), 67 [3], and 139; Don-drup-gyal-tsen’s Four Intertwined Commentaries, 6.6-7.1.
131 nams par gyi la dbab pa bsdus pa, visuccaya-samyagadhipi, Peking 5539, vol. 111, 71.2.8; Tokyo sde dge, sems suam, vol. 9 (a), 8.4.5.
132 Da-drin-rap-den’s Annotations, 12.4.
133 Ibid., 12.3.
134 This is cited also by Wonch’uk (Peking 5517, vol. 106, chap. 5, 130.4.8). For the Sanskrit, see p. 371, footnote b. For other translations, see Stefan Anacker, Seven Works of Vaishravana (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1984), 188, and Thomas A. Kochumuttom, A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1982), 628.
135 Ser-thul’s Notes, 14b.5; and Da-drin-rap-den’s Annotations, 12.4.
136 Jam-yang-shay-ba’s Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive, 45.4; and Ser-thul’s Notes, 145.5.
137 Da-drin-rap-den’s Annotations, 12.5.
138 Gun-gu Cho’-jung’s Garland of White Lotus, 18b.2; and A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso’s Precious Lamp, 70.4.
139 Da-drin-rap-den’s Annotations, 13.1.
140 Ibid., 13.2.
141 A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso’s Precious Lamp, 91.1.
142 Chap. 7; Lamotte, Sambhijnamāra, 67-68 [44], and 194; Don-drup-gyal-tsen’s Four Intertwined Commentaries, 7.1-7.2; and John C. Pow-
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199.3.
165 Ibid., 199.6.
166 Ibid., 200.3.
167 Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 200.5.
168 Ibid., 200.6.
169 Ibid., 201.6.
170 Chap. 7; Lamotte, Sandhinirmocana, 77 [20], and 200-201; Dön-drup-gyel-tsen’s Four Interwoven Commentaries, 17.1-17.6; and Powers, Wisdom of Buddha, 119.
171 Da-drin-rap-den’s Annotations, 27.3.
172 Ibid., 27.6.
173 Ibid., 28.3.
174 Ibid., 28.6.
175 Ibid., 29.1
176 Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s Port of Entry, 207.5.
177 Chap. 7; Lamotte, Sandhinirmocana, 69-70 [8], and 195; Dön-drup-gyel-tsen’s Four Interwoven Commentaries, 8.4-9.1; and Powers, Wisdom of Buddha, 103.
178 Da-drin-rap-den’s Annotations, 30.1.
179 Ibid., 30.3.
180 Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s Port of Entry, 209.2.
181 Chap. 7; Lamotte, Sandhinirmocana, 70 [9], and 195; Dön-drup-gyel-tsen’s Four Interwoven Commentaries, 9.2-9.6; and Powers, Wisdom of Buddha, 103.
182 Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s Port of Entry, 211.1.
183 Da-drin-rap-den’s Annotations, 31.6.
184 Ibid., 32.1.
185 Ibid., 32.1.
186 Ibid., 32.1.
187 Peking 5550, vol. 112, 266.1.3-266.1.6, near the end of the second section, entitled dharmarājasamuccaya (choe rnam par rjes pa bun las bsdus pa). For fragments and reconstructed Sanskrit text, see Pralhad Pradhan, Abhidharma Samuccaya (Santiniketan, India: Visva-Bharati, 1950); for Yashomita’s commentary see N. Tatia, Abhidharma samuccaya-sahasrabhyam, Tibetan-Sanskrit Works Series, No. 17 (Patna, India: K.B. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1976). For a translation into French, see Walpola Rahula, Le Compendium de la super-doctrine (philosophie) (Abhidharmasamuccaya) d’Asanga (Paris: École Française d’Extrême-Orient, 1980), 142. For Wonch’uk’s citation of this passage, see Peking 5517, vol. 106, chap. 5, 134.1.2 and 134.1.8.
188 Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s Port of Entry, 212.4.
189 Da-drin-rap-den’s Annotations, 33.3.
190 Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s Port of Entry, 213.1.

NOTES TO PART TWO, CHAPTER 3
191 Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s Port of Entry, 224.6.
192 Chap. 7; Etienne Lamotte, Sandhinirmocana: L’Explication des mystères (Louvain: Université de Louvain, 1935), 81 [25], and 203; Dön-drup-gyel-tsen’s Four Interwoven Commentaries, 21.3-21.15; and John C. Powers, Wisdom of Buddha: Sandhinirmocana Sûtra (Berkeley, Calif.: Dharma, 1995), 131.
193 Da-drin-rap-den’s Annotations, 34.2.
194 Ibid., 35.1.
195 Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s Port of Entry, 229.5.
196 Chap. 7; Lamotte, Sandhinirmocana, 81 [25], and 203-204; Dön-drup-gyel-tsen’s Four Interwoven Commentaries, 21.6; and Powers, Wisdom of Buddha, 131.
197 Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s Port of Entry, 230.3.
198 Da-drin-rap-den’s Annotations, 36.1.
199 Ibid., 36.4.
200 Ibid., 37.2.
201 Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s Port of Entry, 232.2.
202 Ibid., 232.2; Da-drin-rap-den’s Annotations, 37.3.
203 Da-drin-rap-den’s Annotations, 37.5.
204 Ibid., 37.6.
205 Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s Port of Entry, 233.3.
206 Gung-tang’s Difficult Points, 207.11.
207 Da-drin-rap-den’s Annotations, 38.2.
208 Ibid., 38.4.

NOTES TO PART TWO, CHAPTER 4
209 This and the next two bracketed additions are from Da-drin-rap-den’s Annotations, 39.4-39.5.
210 Ibid., 39.5.
211 Gung-tang’s Difficult Points, 232.14; and Da-drin-rap-den’s Annotations, 40.1.
212 Ibid., 40.1.
NOTES TO PART TWO, CHAPTER 5

Peking 5539, vol. 111, 83.2.6-87.2.3.

253 Peking 5539, vol. 111, 88.2.2.
254 Peking 5539, vol. 111, 89.2.2.
255 A-ku Lo-dro-gya-tso’s Precious Lamp, 176.3; and Da-drin-rap-den’s Annotations, 51.4.

NOTES TO PART TWO, CHAPTER 6

Peking 5538, vol. 110, 144.1.3-144.1.4; and Janice D. Willis, On Knowing Reality: The Tattvārtha Chapter of Asaṅga’s Bodhisattvabhumi (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979; reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banaridas, 1982), 158; for the Sanskrit, see p. 393, footnote b.

For the entire citation, see Peking 5538, vol. 110, 144.2.8-144.3.3; and Willis, On Knowing Reality, 160; for the Sanskrit, see p. 393, footnote d. Da-drin-rap-den’s Annotations, 52.5ff, has extensive explanations of these citations.


Dra-di Ge-shay Rin-chen-dön-drup’s Ornament for the Thoughts, 51.11.

Da-drin-rap-den’s Annotations, 52.4.

Ibid., 55.5.

A-ku Lo-dro-gya-tso’s Precious Lamp, 182.1.

Da-drin-rap-den’s Annotations, 56.1.

Ibid., 56.1.

Ibid., 56.2.

Ibid., 56.2.

Dra-di Ge-shay Rin-chen-dön-drup’s Ornament for the Thoughts, 52.15.

A-ku Lo-dro-gya-tso’s Precious Lamp, 182.6.

Peking 5538, vol. 110, 144.3.5-144.3.6; and Willis, On Knowing Reality, 161; for the Sanskrit, see p. 395, footnote d.

Da-drin-rap-den’s Annotations, 56.4.

Ibid., 56.5.

A-ku Lo-dro-gya-tso’s Precious Lamp, 183.1.

Da-drin-rap-den’s Annotations, 56.6.

Peking 5538, vol. 110, 144.3.6-144.5.1; and Willis, On Knowing Reality, 161; for the Sanskrit, see p. 396, footnote b.

A-ku Lo-dro-gya-tso’s Precious Lamp, 185.6.

Da-drin-rap-den’s Annotations, 57.5.

Ibid., 57.6.

Ibid., 57.6.

Ibid., 57.6.

A-ku Lo-dro-gya-tso’s Precious Lamp, 186.1.

Ibid., 186.1.

Da-drin-rap-den’s Annotations, 58.1.

Ibid., 58.1.
Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s *Port of Entry*, 408.1; and Da-drin-rap-den’s *Annotations*, 69.1.

Da-drin-rap-den’s *Annotations*, 69.2.

Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s *Port of Entry*, 408.3; and Da-drin-rap-den’s *Annotations*, 69.2.

Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s *Port of Entry*, 408.2.

Ibid., 408.2; and Da-drin-rap-den’s *Annotations*, 69.2.

Ibid., 69.4.

Ibid., 69.4.

Ibid., 69.4.

Ibid., 69.5.

Ibid., 69.5.

Ibid., 69.5.

Ibid., 69.5.

Ibid., 69.5.

Ibid., 69.5.

Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s *Port of Entry*, 408.5.

Ibid., 412.1.

Da-drin-rap-den’s *Annotations*, 70.2.

Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s *Port of Entry*, 409.3.

Tokyo *sde dge, sms tams*, vol. 8 (šrī), 194b.2.

Ibid., 194b.4.

Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s *Port of Entry*, 409.5; and Da-drin-rap-den’s *Annotations*, 70.5.

Da-drin-rap-den’s *Annotations*, 71.1.

Ibid., 71.2.

Ibid., 71.2.

Ibid., 71.2.

Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s *Port of Entry*, 410.2.

Da-drin-rap-den’s *Annotations*, 71.2.

Tokyo *sde dge, sms tams*, vol. 8 (šrī), 279b.1.

A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso’s *Precious Lamp*, 194.3; and Da-drin-rap-den’s *Annotations*, 71.3.

Peking 5539, vol. 111, 781.8; and Tokyo *sde dge, sms tams*, vol. 9 (šrī), 32a.5.

Da-drin-rap-den’s *Annotations*, 72.3.

Ibid., 72.3.

Peking 5539, vol. 111, 781.23; and Tokyo *sde dge, sms tams*, vol. 9 (šrī), 32a.6. Dzong-kha-ba has not cited a line that intervenes between this and the last quotation.

Da-drin-rap-den’s *Annotations*, 72.4; I have added the examples.

Ibid., 72.5.

Ibid., 72.5.

Ibid., 72.6.

Da-drin-rap-den’s *Annotations*, 73.1) adds this qualification.

Bel-jor-lhun-gyur’s *Lamp for the Teaching*, 44.5; and Da-drin-rap-den’s *Annotations*, 73.2.

Bel-jor-lhun-gyur’s *Lamp for the Teaching*, 44.5; and Da-drin-rap-den’s *Annotations*, 73.3.

Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s *Port of Entry*, 414.2 and 423.1; the latter lists other attributions, such as to Vasubandhu and Asanga.

Da-drin-rap-den’s *Annotations*, 73.4.

Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s *Port of Entry*, 414.6.

Da-drin-rap-den’s *Annotations*, 73.6.

Ibid., 73.6.

Ibid., 74.1.

Ibid., 74.1.

A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso’s *Precious Lamp*, 196.3.

Ibid., 196.5.

Da-drin-rap-den’s *Annotations*, 77.1.


III.10c; Peking 5522, vol. 108, 20.3.5; and Stefan Anacker, *Seven Works of Vasubandhu* (Delhi: Motilal Banaridas, 1984), 236; for the Sanskrit, see p. 407, footnote d.

Peking 5528, vol. 108, 126.2.2; and Anacker, *Seven Works of Vasubandhu*, 236; for the Sanskrit, see p. 408, footnote a.

Paraphrasing Vasubandhu’s Explanation of (Maitreya’s) “Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras” (mo ibs rgyan gi bshad pa, stūrālaṃkāra-bhāṣya; Peking 5527, vol. 108, 63.5.5); for the Sanskrit, see p. 408, footnote e.

Da-drin-rap-den’s *Annotations*, 76.2.

Peking 5539, vol. 111, 61.4.7.

Ibid., 61.5.1; and Tokyo *sde dge, sms tams*, vol. 9 (šrī), 289a.2.

A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso’s *Precious Lamp*, 197.6.

For Da-drin-rap-den’s two explanations of this, see his *Annotations*, 76.5.

Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s *Port of Entry*, 423.5; 426.2.

Ibid., 426.2.
Backnotes

401 A-khu Lo-drö-gya-tso's Precious Lamp, 198.1; Da-drin-rap-den (78.1) misidentifies "chis" as referring to other-powered natures (ghosân dbang 'di ni).

402 Da-drin-rap-den's Annotations, 78.3.

403 Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso's Port of Entry, 427.2.

404 Peking 5539, vol. 111, 78.1.5; and Tokyo sde dge, smsi tshan, vol. 9 (zhi), 32a.2. See Da-drin-rap-den's Annotations, 78.4, for commentary.

405 A-khu Lo-drö-gya-tso's Precious Lamp, 198.4; and Da-drin-rap-den's Annotations, 79.2.

406 A-khu Lo-drö-gya-tso's Precious Lamp, 198.5; and Da-drin-rap-den's Annotations, 79.3.

407 Da-drin-rap-den's Annotations, 79.4.

408 Ibid., 79.4.

409 Tokyo sde dge, smsi tshan, vol. 8 (zhi) 199a.7.

410 Da-drin-rap-den's Annotations, 80.4.

411 Ibid., 80.3.

412 Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso's Port of Entry, 441.1; and Da-drin-rap-den's Annotations, 80.3.

413 Da-drin-rap-den's Annotations, 80.5.

414 Ibid., 80.6.

415 Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso's Port of Entry, 441.2; and Da-drin-rap-den's Annotations, 81.1.

416 Da-drin-rap-den's Annotations, 81.5.

417 Ibid., 81.4.

418 Ibid., 81.6.

419 Ibid., 81.6.

420 A-khu Lo-drö-gya-tso's Precious Lamp, 215.5. III.11ab; Peking 5522, vol. 108, 20.3.6; and Anacker, Seven Works of Vasubandhu, 236-237; for the Sanskrit, see p. 410, footnote b. The three identifications are from Ser-shül's Notes, 34b.5, based on Sthiramati's commentary.

421 Peking 5528, vol. 108, 262.2; and Anacker, Seven Works of Vasubandhu, 237; for the Sanskrit, see p. 410, footnote c.

422 Da-drin-rap-den's Annotations, 82.3.

423 Ibid., 82.4.

424 Ibid., 82.5.

425 Ibid., 82.5.

426 Ibid., 82.5.

427 Ibid., 82.5.

428 Peking 5528, vol. 108, 262.3; and Anacker, Seven Works of Vasubandhu, 238.

429 Da-drin-rap-den's Annotations, 82.6.

430 Ibid., 82.6.

431 Ibid., 83.4.

432 Ser-shül's Notes, 35b.5; and Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso's Port of Entry, 460.6.

433 Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso's Port of Entry, 426.2; 471.5.

434 Peking 5539, vol. 111, 61.4.8; and Tokyo sde dge, smsi tshan, vol. 8 (zhi), 288b.7.

435 nam par bzhad pa rin po che, sgyagthaykri; Peking 5562, vol. 113, 276.2.5-276.2.7.

436 Da-drin-rap-den's Annotations, 86.3.

437 Ibid., 86.4.

438 Ibid., 86.6.


440 Da-drin-rap-den's Annotations, 88.2.

441 Ibid. I have added "in the literal reading of."

442 Ibid., 88.3.

443 Ibid., 88.5.

444 Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso's Port of Entry, 483.1.

445 Da-drin-rap-den's Annotations, 88.6.

446 Ibid.

447 Ibid.

448 See Ser-shül's Notes, 37b.1-37b.5, and Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso's Port of Entry, 489.2-489.6.

449 Bel-jor-blun-drup's Lamp for the Teaching, 51.6; and Da-drin-rap-den's Annotations, 89.1.

450 Ibid., 89.2.

451 Ibid., 89.3.

452 Ibid., 89.3.

453 Ibid., 89.4.

454 Ibid., 89.4.

455 Ibid., 89.5.

456 Ibid., 89.5.

457 Ibid., 89.6.

458 Ibid., 90.1.

459 Ibid., 90.1.

460 Ibid., 89.6.

461 Ibid., 90.2.

462 Ibid., 90.1.

463 Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso's Port of Entry, 484.5.

464 A-khu Lo-drö-gya-tso's Precious Lamp, 219.2. The cited text is III.10bc; Peking 5522, vol. 108, 20.3.5; for the Sanskrit, see p. 414, footnote c.

465 Ser-shül's Notes, 38a.5.

NOTES TO PART TWO, CHAPTER 8


467 XI.50; Peking 5521, vol. 108, 9.1.3; for the Sanskrit, see p. 416, footnote a. The material in the square brackets is from A-khu Lo-drö-gya-tso's...


469 Da-drin-rap-den’s *Annotations*, 93.1.

470 A-ku Lo-ðro-gya-tso’s *Precious Lamp*, 220.3.

471 Ibid., 222.2.


473 A-ku Lo-ðro-gya-tso’s *Precious Lamp*, 221.4.

474 XI.51; Peking 5521, vol. 108, 9.1.3; and Lévi, *Mahāyānaśūra-lāmkāra*, vol. 2, 122. For the Sanskrit, see p. 417, footnote c.

475 A-ku Lo-ðro-gya-tso’s *Precious Lamp*, 221.5.

476 Döns-drup-gyal-tsen’s *Four Interwoven Commentaries*, 157.5, and Da-drin-rap-den’s *Annotations*, 94.4.

477 *Explanation of (Maitreya’s) “Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras”* (Peking 5527, vol. 108, 77.3.2-77.3.5). For Lévi’s translation, see his *Mahāyānaśūra-lāmkāra*, vol. 2, 123-124.

478 Da-drin-rap-den’s *Annotations*, 95.2.

479 Ibid., 95.3.

480 Ibid., 95.5.

481 Ibid., 96.2.

482 A-ku Lo-ðro-gya-tso’s *Precious Lamp*, 224.2.


484 *Explanation of (Maitreya’s) “Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras”* (Peking 5527, vol. 108, 74.4.2).

485 Paraphrasing his *Explanation of (Maitreya’s) “Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras”* (Peking 5527, vol. 108, 74.4.4); Lévi’s translation, for the Sanskrit, see Bagchi, *Mahāyāna-Sūtra-ālāmkāra of Asanga*, 60.7-60.9; and Lévi, *Mahāyānaśūra-lāmkāra*, vol. 1, 59.11-59.13.

486 Da-drin-rap-den’s *Annotations*, 98.2.

487 A-ku Lo-ðro-gya-tso’s *Precious Lamp*, 224.4.

NOTES TO PART TWO, CHAPTER 9


489 The phrase “ideation and emptiness” is drawn from Dzong-ka-ba’s own commentary which follows, Dra-di Ge-shay does not mention the last “exist.”

490 Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s *Port of Entry*, 508.5.
491 Śer-shül's Notes, 40a.1; in that, read dhu misha's lung for dhu ma'i lung.
492  Da-drin-rap-den's Annotations, 100.2.
493  Ibid., 100.2.
494  Ibid., 100.3.
495  Ibid., 100.4.
496  Don-drup-gyal-tsen's Four Intertwined Commentaries, 163.3.
497  Peking 5334, vol. 109, 138.1.5; for the Sanskrit, see p. 423, footnote b. For English translations, see Friedmann, Sthiramati, Madhyānantavibhāgatikā, 10.16; and Scherbatsky, Madhyānantavibhāga, 17.19.
498  Peking 5334, vol. 109, 138.1.6; for the Sanskrit, see p. 423, footnote c.
499  Da-drin-rap-den's Annotations, 101.5.
500  Ibid., 101.5.
501  Ibid., 101.6.
502  Ibid., 101.5.
503  Peking 5334, vol. 109, 138.1.7-138.2.1; for the Sanskrit, see p. 424, footnote b.
504  Da-drin-rap-den's Annotations, 102.4.
505  Ibid., 102.6.
506  A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso's Precious Lamp, 228.1-228.3; and Śer-shül's Notes, 40a.2-40a.4.
507  Da-drin-rap-den's Annotations, 103.3.
508  The citation is from Sthiramati's introduction to Vasubandhu's text in which he gives three different reasons why Vasubandhu composed *The Thirty*, of which this is the third. For the Tibetan, see Peking 5565, vol. 113, 300.3.6; and Enga Teramoto, Sthiramati's Trimaghābhāyatam (Sum-vu-pa-tshis Grel-pa): A Tibetan Text (Kyoto: Association for Linguistic Study of Sacred Scriptures, 1933). 2.11; for the Sanskrit, see p. 425, footnote a.
509  Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso's *Port of Entry*, 512.5.
510  Da-drin-rap-den's Annotations, 103.6.
511  Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso's *Port of Entry*, 512.5; and Da-drin-rap-den's Annotations, 103.6.
512  The brackets in this sentence are from Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso's *Port of Entry*, 513.5; I have changed his "true existence" to "ultimate existence" to maintain consistency.
513  Da-drin-rap-den's Annotations, 105.5.
515  Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso *Port of Entry*, 514.5 cites the passages from Vasubandhu and Sthiramati.
516  Da-drin-rap-den's Annotations, 106.2.
517  Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso's *Port of Entry*, 515.2.
518  Ibid., 515.1.
519  Peking 5334, vol. 109, 139.3.2-139.3.4; Friedmann, Sthiramati, Madhyānantavibhāgatikā, 17.1-17.8; and Scherbatsky, Madhyānantavibhāga, 26.5-26.13.
521  Ibid., 231.1; Śer-shül's Notes, 40b.3; and Da-drin-rap-den's Annotations, 106.5.
522  A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso's *Precious Lamp*, 231.2; Śer-shül's Notes, 40b.3; and Da-drin-rap-den's Annotations, 106.6.
523  Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso's *Port of Entry*, 536.1.
524  Da-drin-rap-den's Annotations, 107.3.
525  III.214-215; for the Sanskrit, see p. 427, footnote b. The bracketed material in these two stanzas is drawn from Śer-shül's Notes, 41b.2-42a.1.
526  Śer-shül's Notes, 41b.6.
527  III.216; for the Sanskrit, see p. 428, footnote e. See also Nga-wang-bel-den, *Annotations for (jam-yang-shay-ba) 'Great Exposition of Tenets,'* dngos, 142.6.
528  Śer-shül's Notes, 42a.3.
529  Ibid., 42a.2.

NOTES TO PART TWO, CHAPTER 10
530  Da-drin-rap-den's Annotations, 110.1.
531  Ibid., 110.2.
532  Ibid., 110.2.
534  Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso's *Port of Entry*, 546.2.
535  Da-drin-rap-den's Annotations, 110.6 qualifies this as "explicit explanation."
536  Ibid., 111.3.
537  Ibid., 111.6.
538  Ibid., 112.2.
539  Ibid., 112.2.
540  Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso's *Port of Entry*, 564.1.
541  Jam-yang-shay-ba's *Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive*, 186.4.
542  Da-drin-rap-den's Annotations, 113.2.
543  A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso's *Precious Lamp*, 238.2. Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 565.3) treats this objection as two, beginning the second
with "Also, even if..."

544 Jam-yang-shay-ba’s Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive, 187.6, and Da-drin-rap-den’s Annotations, 113.4.  
545 Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s Port of Entry, 572.5.  
546 Da-drin-rap-den’s Annotations, 113.4.  
547 Ibid., 113.5.  
548 Ibid., 113.6.  
549 Ibid., 114.1.  
551 Da-drin-rap-den’s Annotations, 114.2.  
552 Ibid., 114.3.  
553 A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso’s Precious Lamp, 239.2.  
554 Da-drin-rap-den’s Annotations, 114.4.  
555 Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s Port of Entry, 567.2.  
557 Da-drin-rap-den’s Annotations, 115.1.  
558 Ibid., 115.2.  
559 A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso’s Precious Lamp, 240.2-240.4.  
560 Ibid., 240.5.  
561 Ibid., 240.4; and Da-drin-rap-den’s Annotations, 115.6.  
562 A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso’s Precious Lamp, 240.4 and 243.2, the latter being where his commentary begins.  
563 Peking 5539, vol. 111, 73.2.4; and Tokyo ed. dge, sems tsham, vol. 9 (as), 21a.2.  
564 Da-drin-rap-den’s Annotations, 117.2.  
565 Ibid., 117.2.  
566 Ibid., 117.5.  
567 Ibid., 118.4.  
568 Ibid., 118.5.  
569 Ibid., 118.5.  
570 Ibid., 119.1.  
571 Ibid., 118.6.  
572 A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso’s Precious Lamp, 244.1; and Da-drin-rap-den’s Annotations, 119.1.  
573 Ibid., 119.3.  
574 Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s Port of Entry, 579.1.  
575 A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso’s Precious Lamp, 256.3.  
576 Peking 5538, vol. 110 144.2.2-144.2.7; and Janice D. Willis, On Knowing Reality: The Tatttvārtha Chapter of Asaṅga’s Bodhisattvabhumi (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979; reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1982), 159.  
577 Dzong-ka-ba paraphrases it below.  
579 Da-drin-rap-den’s Annotations, 120.5.  
580 Ibid., 121.2.  
581 Ibid., 121.4.  
582 Ibid., 121.5.  
583 Ibid., 121.6.  
584 Ibid., 122.1.  
585 Ibid., 122.1.  
586 Ibid., 122.1.  
587 Ibid., 122.1.  
588 Ibid., 122.2.  
589 Ibid., 122.4.  
590 Ibid., 122.4.  
591 Ibid., 122.4.  
592 Ibid., 122.4.  
593 Ibid., 122.5.  
594 "Of one continuum" is from ibid., 122.5.  
595 A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso’s Precious Lamp, 254.3; and Da-drin-rap-den’s Annotations, 123.2.  
597 A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso’s Precious Lamp, 258.1.  
598 Da-drin-rap-den’s Annotations, 124.1.  
599 Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso’s Port of Entry, 599.5 (heading at 589.3).  
600 A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso’s Precious Lamp, 259.4.  
601 Da-drin-rap-den’s Annotations, 125.6.
bracketed additions, except where noted, are drawn from Ser-shul's Notes, 43a.1-43a.5.
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ri chos nges don rgya mtha


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bka’ bsdus bzhis pa’i don bstan rtsis chen po


Śi-due Chö-ji-pung-gnyan (si tu cho jang gyi ’byung gnas. 1700-1774)

Explanation of (Tön-mi Sambhota’s) “The Thirty” and “Usage of Gender,” a Treatise on the Thorough Application of the Language of the Snowy Country: Beautiful Pearl Necklace of the Wise

yul ganga kun pa’i brda yang dag par sbyor ba’i bstan bcos kyi bye brag sum cu pa dang rtags kyi ‘jug pa’i gzhung gi rnam par bshad pa mkhas pa’i mgul rgyan mu tig phreng mdzes


Sthiramati (klo gros brtan pa; f. late fourth century)

Explanation of (Vasubandhu’s) “Commentary on (Maitreya’s) ‘Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes’”

madhyāntavibhāga-tīkā

dbus dang mtha’ rnam par ’byed pa’i ’grel bshad / dbus mtha’i ’grel bshad
P5334, vol. 109


English translation (chap. 1): F. Th. Stcherbatsky. Madhyāntavibhāga, Discourse on Discrimination


Explanation of (Vasubandhu’s) “The Thirty”
trimśikābhāṣya
sum cu pa’i bshad pa
P5565, vol. 113


Explanations of (Vasubandhu’s) “Commentary of (Maitreya’s) ‘Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtra’” sütrālāṃkārāvyutkhāya
mdo sde’i rgyan gyi ’igrel bshad
P5531, vol. 108


Tu-γen Lo-sang-chö-grī-nyi-ma (shu’u bhrun blo bshang chos kyi ngyi ma; 1737-1802) Mirror of Eloquence Showing the Sources and Assertions of All Systems of Tenets grub mtha’ thams cad kyi khungs dang ’dod thul ston pa legs bshad shel gyi me long Sarnath, India: Chhos Je Lama, 1963. Also: Gansu, China: kan su’u mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1984.

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The Thirty / Treatise on Cognition-Only in Thirty Stanzas

trimśikākārikā / sarvavijñānānātadaksakākārikā

sum cu pa’i tshig le’ur byas pa / thams cad nam rig tsam du ston pa sum cu pa’i tshig le’ur byas pa

P5556, vol. 113


The Twenty

vinīśtādikā / vinīśṭākārikā

nyi shu pa’i tshig le’ur byas pa

P5557, vol. 113


Vimuktasena, Ārya (‘phags pa’i grol sde)

Commentary on the “Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra”
āryapaścativinīśṭādikāprajñāputrāramitopadesaśāstraśāstraśamayāśamkāraśākārikāvṛtti

‘phags pa’i shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa stong phrag nyi shu lings pa’i man ngag gi bstan bcos mding par rims pa’i rgyan gnyis grol pa

P5185, vol. 88

Vimuktasena, Bhadanta (bdun pa’i grol sde)

Commentary on the “Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra”
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nyi khrīd nam ’grel / ’phags pa shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa stong phrag nyi shu lnga pa’i man
ngag gi bstan bcos mgon par rtogs pa’i rgyan gvi tshig le’ur byas pa’i rnam par ’grel pa
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rab tu byed pa nyi shu pa’i ’grel bshad
P5566, vol. 113

English translation (commentary on stanzas 1-10): Gregory A. Hillis. An Introduction and Translation
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