



Russia's *Operatsiia Trest*: A Reappraisal

By Dr. Richard Spence

Anyone interested in the history of Soviet intelligence likely has encountered the so-called "Trust" Operation (*Operatsiia Trest*). In the view promulgated by the KGB, and dutifully perpetuated by the successor FSB and SVR, the Trust represented the Soviet security service's first large-scale offensive campaign (1922-1927) against the combined forces of counter-revolution and imperialism.¹

In addition to foiling the terroristic schemes of White emigres and their foreign backers, the operation liquidated two key figures in this hostile alliance, the anti-Soviet political renegade Boris Savinkov and Sidney Reilly, the British "Ace-of-Spies."

West Sees 'Masterful Deception'

This view, widely accepted in the West², portrays the Trust as a masterpiece of deception and provocation which established a successful model for future efforts in the same vein. Strangely, mention of this important operation is missing from Soviet works on intelligence until the 1960s.³ Surely this silence was not intended to keep a secret; the Trust's role as Soviet provocation was an open topic of debate in emigre publications from the late 1920s through the 1950s, and its exploits were common knowledge in Western intelligence circles.⁴

The glorification of the Trust seems to have been part of a belated post-Stalin effort to rehabilitate the image of the Soviet security service by playing up its early "Leninist" triumphs. The fact that almost all the *chekisty* involved in the Trust later fell victim to Stalinist purges was an added plus. However, as in any propaganda cam-

paign, historical accuracy was valued only so far as it was useful. This trend found its best expression in Lev Nikulin's *Mertvaia Zyb'* (1965) which portrayed the Trust as a masterpiece of deception.

Surviving records of *Razrabotka Trest* in the Russian State Security Archives are said to consist of some 38 volumes, each with up to 300 pages of material.⁵ To date, however, only a tiny, carefully selected, fragment of this material has become available to scholars, all of it reinforcing the established Soviet view.⁶

This article will argue that the "Nikulinesque" portrait is not only

exaggerated, but also in important respects quite misleading about the operation and its achievements. The reassessment will center on documents retrieved from the personal *fond* of Feliks Edmundovich Dzerzhinskii in the *Rossiiskii Tsentr Khraneniia i Izucheniia Dokumentov Noveishei Istorii* (RTsKhIDNI—ex-Central Party Archive). Far from demonstrating the power of the KGB's parent GPU/OGPU, the Trust may have been a better indication of its limitations.

One of the fundamental questions about the Trust is just what the operation was and what it was not. Building on information—or disinformation—gleaned from various sources, some have argued that the



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Russian *Trest* Was Multifaceted Plan

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Trust had its provocative roots in the so-called "Lockhart Plot" of 1918 and that, in one form or another, it continued straight through the 1980s.⁷ One anonymous writer has charged that the Trust predated 1917 as a "network of financial interests" dedicated to bringing about revolution in Russia!⁸

In the strict sense, the Trust was a "tsentral'naia razrabotka" (project) of the GPU/OGPU effort to penetrate emigre groups, in this case monarchists, via the so-called Monarchist Association of Central Russia (*Monarkhicheskoe Ob'edinenie Tsentral'noi Rossii*, MOTsR).⁹ More broadly, the *Trest* rubric covered a multi-faceted operation aimed at the parallel penetration of emigre groups from the monarchists, to the "Eurasian" movement and the left-wing SRs.¹⁰ Each of these sub-operations

had its own legend or cover story. *Yaroslavets* targeted the monarchist circle centered on the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich Romanov, *Peski* aimed at the Kadets, *Sindikats* seems to have been developed for the express purpose of neutralizing Savinkov, while another branch was aimed at dissident communists. The overall plan was to link all or most of the emigre factions into a "united front" controlled by Soviet agents.

Trust 'Spark' Was Late 1920

There also is some confusion about just when the Trust, in one form or another, began and who supervised its creation. The initial spark has been traced to late 1920 when Lenin supposedly charged Cheka¹¹ chief Feliks Dzerzhinskii with the creation of a "spurious White Guard organization" for the purpose of detecting counter-revolutionary agents in Russia and infiltrating anti-Soviet groups abroad.¹²

However, Dzerzhinskii's actual role in or support for the operation is doubtful, as will be noted below.

Archival files indicate that the operation commenced in 1921 under the aegis of the Cheka's "Special Department" (*Osobyi Otdel*) and concluded

Russian archives show operation began in 1921 and ran until 1927

under the OGPU's KRO (*Kontr-razvedyvatel'nyi Otdel*-counterintelligence) in 1927.¹³ This effort seems to have eclipsed or absorbed existing bogus anti-communist groups run by the rival INO (*Innostrannykh Otdel*-foreign intelligence).¹⁴ The best evidence puts the actual formation in early 1922.¹⁵ This was in the hands of A.A. Agranov, a veteran Cheka troubleshooter with recent experience in the penetration of anti-Communist groups.

The Trust was born at an interesting time. Late 1921-early 1922 coincided with the "dissolution" of the Cheka and its reconstitution as the GPU (*Gosudarstvennoe Politicheskoe Upravlenie*—State Political Administration, later OGPU). This, in turn, was part of the sweeping systemic change resulting from the New Economic Policy initiated by Lenin in 1921. The NEP preserved the Communist monopoly of political power, But Red control otherwise was compromised in several respects. The Party's 1921-1922 purge of undesirables left barely 500,000 members,

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Controversial Oppenput Enters in 1922

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only a fraction of whom possessed the practical skills to keep the huge nation of some 155 million running.¹⁶ From the economy to the armed forces, the Soviet regime depended on legions of non-Party specialists—*spetsy*—among whom were not a few real or potential enemies of the new order.

Savelov, Ring, Kasatkin, Levine, etc.).

Iakushev, a “debonair civil servant,” was the former personal secretary of Prince N.V. Shakhovskoi and was later Trotsky’s “right hand” staffer during the civil war.¹⁹ In 1921 he entered the service of *Vneshtorg*, the Soviet foreign trade agency. Iakushev also was connected with the *Moskovskoe Obshchestvo Vzaimnogo*

ted the job. As the Trust’s “foreign minister,” he had his first meeting with monarchist representatives in Berlin in November 1922. The following summer he secured an audience with the reclusive Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich in Paris and a year later negotiated with Polish intelligence in Warsaw.

Roaring Success?

In the meantime, so the legend goes, the Trust and its satellites were busy gaining the confidence of British, Finnish, Latvian, and other intelligence agencies through the White Russian agents they employed. In the summer of 1924, Trust emissaries lured the inveterate anti-Bolshevik Boris Savinkov back to Russia and into the waiting clutches of the OGPU. The operation was a roaring success—or was it?

A different picture emerges from a late 1924 secret report to Dzerzhinskii on the activities of the KRO during the preceding two years.²² This report makes *no reference to the Trust* in any form. Was it that insignificant, or were its architects concealing its existence even from their superiors? The report describes an uphill battle with inadequate resources against the hydra-headed forces of

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The OGPU was no exception. In its vital INO, an astonishing 90% of the officials were ex-tsarist servants, mostly from the Imperial *Department Politsii* (Okhrana), Gendarmes, or intelligence and counter-intelligence services.¹⁷ The situation in the KRO is unlikely to have been much different.

A similar picture emerges from the MOTSR-Trust, where some 40 OGPU agents managed an estimated 400 activists.¹⁸ Among the agents themselves, “converted” or compromised anti-communists predominated, working under the presumably watchful eyes of a handful of regular OGPU officers. This precarious situation is exemplified by the cases of two men who were the Trust’s most important activists. These were Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Iakushev (aka Fedorov, Rabinovich) and the man best known as Eduard Ottovich Oppenput (aka Upeninsh, Uppelintz, Uppeliuts, Staunitz, Selianinov, Global Intelligence Resources

Kredita (“Moscow Credit Society”), the financial “arm” of the Trust.²⁰ Despite his loyal service to the Soviet regime, Iakushev maintained monarchist sympathies and contacts abroad, the latter leading to his arrest in late 1921.

1922 - Enter Oppenput

It was in prison in early 1922 that Iakushev encountered Oppenput. The latter was awaiting execution for his part in the recently unmasked Savinkov organization—or so he claimed. Oppenput remains the most controversial figure in the whole affair. The weight of evidence strongly suggests that he was a veteran Soviet provocateur, though never a communist or chekist per se.²¹

Oppenput’s provocateur past made him unsuitable as a front man for the new operation. For this purpose he suggested Iakushev who, out of self-preservation or venality, accep-

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Savinkov 'Elimination' Was Symbolic

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
counterrevolution and espionage. The author noted that as of 1922-23, there was little reliable information about the activities of emigres and their links to foreign intelligence. In 1924, however, the situation improved significantly thanks to new sources of information inside the Paris-based *Tsentr Deistviia* ("Center of Action"). The latter was an effort to form a "united front" (!) among diverse emigre organizations for the purpose of political and propaganda work outside and *inside* Russia.²³

This certainly sounds like something in which the Trust would, or should, have taken a role. The KRO gleaned valuable information from thousands of repatriated "Whites." However, the returnees constituted another security threat and, according to the report, were the focus of British intrigues.²⁴

Savinkov Lured Back to Russia

The highlight of foreign operations was the capture of Savinkov. However, the author makes clear that this coup was possible through a "lucky break" as opposed to crafty planning.²⁵ The truth was that very little had to be done to coax Savinkov back to Russia. He had steered himself in that direction since his secret, inconclusive talks with the Soviet representative in Britain, Leonid Krasin, in late

1921.²⁶ By 1923, Savinkov was a politically bankrupt drug-addict whose influence was limited to a shrinking circle of friends and sycophants.²⁷ His "elimination," therefore, was a purely symbolic gesture. Savinkov's initial contact with the Trust occurred in the summer of that year.²⁸ "I did not believe much [in the Trust]," he later admitted, but desperation, and per-



haps other influences, made him jump at the opportunity.²⁹ That fall, Reilly confessed to his and Savinkov's mutual friend Paul Dukes, that "Savinkov is going back to Russia to give himself up. I too am going back, but I shall continue to fight."³⁰ Who was manipulating whom?

The central issue to Savinkov was what would happen to him afterwards. He finally received guarantees from the Soviet *Politburo* of a public trial and personal safety. He thus revealed his lack of faith in the Trust emissaries, and forced them to reveal their OGPU roots. It is noteworthy that in the *Politburo* debates, Dzerzhinskii adamantly opposed Savinkov's return

under any circumstances.³¹ He was overruled, but the incident suggests a less than supportive relationship between "Iron Feliks" and the Trust operation.

Dzerzhinskii had reason to be concerned. During 1924, the KRO "lost control" of the MOTsR branch in Leningrad. This branch, which controlled links to Finnish intelligence and the British SIS (Secret Intelligence Service—MI6) station in Estonia, had remained under the domination of authentic monarchists. By some means, the group's leader, A.S. Putilov, identified a follower as an OPGU agent and ordered his liquidation.³² The KRO was forced to terminate the Leningrad group before further damage was done.

Dzerzhinskii Has Concerns

Dzerzhinskii probably wondered about the security and wisdom of the entire operation. This would explain another report dated 5 February 1925 dealing specifically with the Trust. The author was Estonian chekist and KRO officer V.A. Styne, the man who later would handle the Reilly case.³³ The document in effect pleads for the continuation of the operation.³⁴ It was, Styne argued, passing through a critical phase. He acknowledged past failures (Leningrad?), but blamed these on the want of adequate re-

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Writer Seeks Ex-OSS/FBI Personnel from WWII

Dan Fruchey is conducting research on counterespionage activities within the continental U.S. during WWII and would like to interview former OSS and FBI personnel who were engaged in such activities. Please contact: dfruchey@sonoma-county.org



OGPU Never Had Emigre Control

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sources. The Trust network would yield great results for the OGPU given more time and money.

Styrne emphasized relations with the monarchist factions. Penetration of Grand Duke Nikolai's circle (probably the least active of the lot) had facilitated more limited access to the faction under Baron Petr Vranghel and the allied combatant organization of General A.P. Kutepov. At the same time, Trust agents encouraged the ambitions of Nikolai's primary rival, Grand Duke Kyril.³⁵

Monarchists Were Divided

Styrne, however, admitted that the monarchists remained divided on collaboration and refused to subordinate themselves to a single authority or unified movement. Vranghel's political adviser, Nikolai Chebyshev, flatly denounced the Trust as a Bolshevik provocation.³⁶ Many others remained circumspect. Among the few outright converts was the journalist V.V. Shulgin who later admitted warnings from fellow emigres that Iakushev was a Soviet agent.³⁷ Interestingly,

the time of Styrne's report the OGPU seems to have been unaware of the formation of a "secret independent" intelligence organization (a sort of "anti-Trust") within Vranghel's organization, a failing that only became apparent in 1927.³⁸ While the Trust achieved some success, it was never the case that it allowed the OGPU "to control the activities of the Russian emigres."³⁹

Styrne's report went on to note some success among the "Eurasian" exile circle in Berlin and useful links to the Estonian, Finnish, Latvian and Polish intelligence services.⁴⁰ There even was an American thread developed through ex-State Department official Arthur Bullard and the journalist Karl Decker. Styrne, however, emphasized a very cautious approach to the British.

Through the White/British agent N.N. Bunakov in Finland, the Trust made with the SIS station in Estonia headed by Commander Ernest T. Boyce.⁴¹ Boyce eagerly proposed joint operations, but these overtures were rejected in the Lubianka; it was too dangerous to "play with the English."⁴² How odd, therefore, that

The Trust



the Trust's next operation violated this rule. Given that the Trust had little to show for its effort, might Dzerzhinskii have demanded some action—*against the British*—as the price of continuation?⁴³

Reilly - No Faith in 'The Trust'

Reilly's return to Soviet Russia in September 1925 and subsequent fate raise questions that cannot be addressed here. It must suffice to emphasize that if Savinkov put little faith in the Trust, Reilly put none at all. He knew Aleksandr Iakushev was a corrupt bureaucrat, Opperput a provocateur and the Trust a creation of the OGPU.⁴⁴

Reilly received an overture from Trust representatives, via Boyce, in January 1925. Curiously, this pre-dates Styrne's report and raises a question of whose initiative was at work. Reilly dismissed their proposals as vague and impractical. He had no interest in the Trust except to exploit it for his own purposes. A careful reading of his correspondence with Boyce shows that Reilly's real intention was to make business deals with pragmatic communists, and it was that intention that led him across the

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Trust Winds to an Aggressive Close

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Soviet border in September.⁴⁵ Subsequent Soviet behavior is puzzling, to say the least.⁴⁶ Unlike Savinkov, there was no effort to milk propaganda from the stunning catch or even admit that it had happened. After more than a year and a half of utter silence, the first clear story of Reilly's demise came from a Soviet defector—Eduard Oppenput.

Oppenput's flight to Finland in April 1927 and his "revelations" in the emigre and foreign press put an end to the Trust. Perhaps by design, his story contradicted official Soviet claims to have liquidated a "great anti-Soviet organization."⁴⁷ Nikulin insists Oppenput was an authentic monarchist, but it is much more probable that he was continuing to do the bidding of the OGPU.

Oppenput - Dead or Alive?

Barely two months after his return, he led an ill-fated attack against the Lubianka itself and, so it was claimed, perished in the attempt. Less than a year later he was reported operating as a Red agent in China under a new name.⁴⁸ Oppenput's revelations were a convenient means of putting an end to a bad business.

They also were the first step in establishing the legend of the Trust as a brilliant counter-intelligence operation, a legend that has proved far more durable and successful than the actual operation.

This reappraisal only scratches the surface of the Trust, but hopefully it is sufficient to show that the later picture of the operation is at odds with

contemporary assessments. Ultimately, the Trust may have been a better lesson in what not to do than anything else. It is noteworthy that in the wake of *Operatsiia Trest*, OGPU strategy towards the emigres took a more aggressive turn. In 1928, Red agents murdered Baron Vrangeli; in 1930 they abducted and killed Kutepov, and seven years later did the

same to his successor Gen. E.K. Miller. Finally, the end of the Trust also coincided with the rise in influence of I.V. Stalin, never a man to tolerate half-measures.

Dr. Richard B. Spence is a noted history professor at the University of Idaho and has contributed to numerous intelligence-related publications.

Notes

¹In addition to Nikulin's book, others in the same vein include, Vasilii Ardamatskii, *Vozmezhdenie* (Moscow, 1968), and Fedor Gladkov and Nikolai Zaitsev, *Ia emu ne mogu ne verit'...* (Moscow, 1983). More recent examples are Gusachenko and V. Merzliakov (eds.), "Zakliuchennyi No. 73: Legenda i Fakty," *Sluzhba Bezopasnosti* (Feb. 1993), 16-18, and Iurii Miliutin [Igor Prelin], "Konets Shpiona Reilly," *Sovershenno Sekretno*, #12 (1990), 21-23.

²An early example is Great Britain, Public Record Office (PRO), Foreign Office file (FO) 371/12602, 6223/1874, Rennie (Riga) to Pailaret, 30 Dec. 1927; a later, George Leggett, *The Cheka: Lenin's Political Police* (Oxford, 1981), 297-298.

³N. Kichkassov, *Belogvardeiskii terror protiv SSSR* (Moscow, 1928) and V.N. Minaev, *Podryvnaia deiatel'nost' inostrannykh razvedok v SSSR* (Moscow, 1940) hail the capture of Savinkov and Reilly, but omits mention of the Trust and its agents, as does Minaev's 1960 *Tainoe stanobitsia iavnyim*.

⁴Examples: the above FO 371/12602, 30 Dec. 1927, Sidney and Pepita Reilly, *The Adventures of Sidney Reilly* (London, 1931), N.N. Chebyshev "Trest: Istoriia Odnoi Provokatsii," serialized in *Vozrozhdenie* (Paris), July-Oct. 1935, Geoffrey Bailey [George Vassiltchikov], *The Conspirators* (New York, 1960), and Edward Van der Rhoer, *Master Spy* (New York, 1980). An excellent summary and comparison of writings on the Trust (as of the late 60s) is found in CIA, Historical Intelligence Collection, "The Trust" (unpublished study, March 1969).

⁵Russia, Arkhiv Gosbezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii (AGRF), delo (Arkh. No.) 302330, *Razrabotka Trest*, in three parts.

⁶From various sources, less than a hundred pages total, all, apparently, from d. 302330, Chast' II, 1924-25.

⁷Allen and Rachel Douglas, "The First Chapter of the Trust: The Lockhart Plot," *Executive Intelligence Review* (Nov. 1988), 1-15.

⁸Third World Press, "Investigative Report: An International Jewish Mafia?," <http://193.88.86.11/twp33.htm> #2.

⁹In the course of the operation MOTsR was converted into or combined with the so-called *Rossiiskii Monarkhicheskii Soiuz* (Russian Monarchist Union).

¹⁰A partial list of these legends and their key personnel can be found in HIA, B.I. Nicolaevsky Collection, file 300-1, "Oppenput."

¹¹Common name for the VChK, *Vserossiiskaia Cherezvychainnaia Komissiiia*—All-Russian Extraordinary Commission.

¹²Roland Gaucher, *Opposition in Russia, 1817-1967* (New York, 1967), 140, and Lennard Gerson, *The Secret Police in Lenin's Russia* (Philadelphia, 1976), 234-235.

¹³See photo of cover in Miliutin, 21.

¹⁴Hoover Institution Archives (HIA), Stanford, CA B.I. Nicolaevsky Collection, 217-6, misc. GPU documents, Jan.-March 1922.

¹⁵HIA, B.N. Priianishnikov Collection, *Materialy Oppenputa*, "Kak Voznik Trest," and PRO, FO 371/12602, N2131/1874, "Activities of Oppenput-Upeliuz," 27 April 1927.

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Intelligence Bookshelf

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While Adams, who has researched this case and others involving the Mounties for more than two decades, does a good job of "fictionalizing", he falls short of the mark in regards to the total premise.

While suggesting the Mounties

were acting at the behest of the CIA the question becomes one of "why."

Albeit there is a "get Pearson out because he is a Russian agent" angle, but that is about as far as it goes.

Why was the CIA operating behind the scenes? Did it have even oblique government sanction? What was the motivation for the RCMP to serve as a CIA lackey?

Alas, while putting forward a good story with plausible plot lines, Adams

leaves a few too many rough spots along the way, especially when considering the "fiction" approach. With such a writing option at hand the latitude was certainly available for putting forth more supposition and adding more substance to the novel.

On the other hand, Adams may still be a little gun shy from having lost a court battle over an earlier "fictional work" which wound up costing him \$30,000, five years of legal expenses and a disclaimer in future printings of the book.

Notes

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Agranov, interestingly, was not associated with the KRO, but with the OGPU's "Secret Section" that specialized in counterintelligence within the Communist Party and Soviet institutions. See also PRO, FO 371/12602, #277, "The Organization and Method of Work of the OGPU," 3 Nov. 1927.

¹⁶Some 136,000 Party members (24% of the total) lost their cards in the comb-out of criminal and "passive" elements. Helene Carrere d'Encausse, *Lenin: Revolution and Power* (London, 1982), 130-131.

¹⁷Viktor Bortnevskii to Author, 5 Oct. 1995, quoting Starkov's remarks at a recent conference in Warsaw.

¹⁸HIA, Prianishnikov, #6, "Materialy Opperputa."

¹⁹Jonas Lied, *Prospector in Siberia: the Autobiography of Jonas Lied* (New York, 1945), 159, 242, and USDS 861.00B/509, Coleman to Sec. of State, 22 Oct. 1927, summarizing item from Segodnia, 21 Oct. 1927.

²⁰Opperput also notes a *Moskovskoe Obshchestvo Vzaimnogo Kredita* (Moscow Credit Association) linked to the Trust (*Materialy Opperputa*, 37). Whether this was a distinct organization another name for the MGKB is uncertain.

²¹See: US National Archives, RG 165, Records of the Military Intelligence Division (MID), 9944-A-183, AA2 6015, Swett to G-2, 7 Sept. 1927.

²²RTsKhIDNI, fond 76, opis 1, delo 306, "Kratkaia Spravka I: O deiatel'nosti K.R.O.O.G.P.U. za 23/24 oper. god," and "Spravka II: po shpionazhu."

²³"Le Centre d'Action & le mouvement monarchiste russe en France," *Les Documents Politiques, Diplomatiques et Financiers*, #9 (Sept. 1924), 322-323.

²⁴RTsKhIDNI, "Kratkaia Spravka," 6.

²⁵Ibid., 5-6.

²⁶Richard Spence, *Boris Savinkov: Renegade on the Left* (Boulder, CO, 1991), 320-323.

²⁷Reilly, too, regarded Savinkov as washed up. See Richard Spence, *Savinkov*, Chapter VIII, and "The Terrorist and the Master Spy: The Political Partnership of Boris Savinkov and Sidney Reilly," *Revolutionary Russia* (1991), 119-120.

²⁸Spence, *Savinkov*, 338.

²⁹HIA, R.H.B. Lockhart Collection, box #6, Savinkov to Reilly, 7 Oct. 1924, 2.

³⁰Robin Lockhart, *Reilly: Ace of Spies* (London, 1967), 138. Lockhart

received this information from Dukes.

³¹Richard Spence, "The Savinkov Affair Reconsidered," *East European Quarterly*, vol. 24, #1 (March 1990), 34.

³²CIA, "Trust," 34-35, 50.

³³I. Il'in, "Trest Protiv Reili," *Literaturnaia Gazeta*, #51 (1967), and Gusachenko and Merzliakov, 17-18.

³⁴RTsKhIDNI, fond 76, opis 1, delo 356, "Doklad Stryne: Osnovnye momenty v razrabotke Iaroslavets/Trest."

³⁵In 1923 Kyril incurred the wrath of Nikolai and other Romanov partisans when he proclaimed himself tsar.

³⁶CIA, Trust, 12. See also Chebyshev's articles (n.4).

³⁷USDS, 861.00B/509, F.W.B. Coleman to Sec. of State, 22 Oct. 1927, summarizing material from *Segodnia*, #234-#237 (16-20 Oct. 1927).

³⁸Viktor Bortnevskii to author, 7 and 9 June 1995. The chiefs of this organization, first proposed in 1922, were exile industrialist A.I. Guchkov and Gen. A.A. von Lampe.

³⁹PRO, FO 371/12602, 30 Dec. 1927.

⁴⁰The Poles seem to have been the worst compromised. On this point see the writings of ex-Polish intelligence officers Ryszard Wraga, "Trest," *Vozrozhdenie*, #7 (Jan.-Feb. 1950), 114-135 and Viktor Drymmer, "Trust," *Kultura*, #11/217 (1965), 96-106.

⁴¹Boyce has been labled a Soviet agent by writer Nigel West, a view disputed by others. See Michael Smith, "Who Murdered the Ace of Spies?," *Daily Telegraph*, 3 Oct. 1998.

⁴²Styme's notes that the British were inveterate enemies of Russia in any form and could not be trusted—they even conspired against the tsar.

⁴³Dzerzhinskii died suddenly in July 1926.

⁴⁴Robin Lockhart, *Reilly: The First Man* (London, 1987), 29, noting Reilly's statement to William Van Narvig (Lucas), Spence, *Savinkov*, 334-335, and Reilly's notations on Savinkov's 7 Oct. 1924 letter.

⁴⁵Most of this correspondence (24 Jan.-5 June 1925) is found in Reilly & Reilly, 172-183. Other letters and some originals are in HIA, Lockhart, 6-3.

⁴⁶See, Richard Spence, "Sidney Reilly's Lubianka Diary, 30 October-4 November 1925," *Revolutionary Russia*, vol. 8, #2 (Dec. 1995), 179-194.

⁴⁷PRO FO 371/12602, 2131/18714, 27 April 1927, quoting interview in *Hufvudstadsbladet*, 25 April 1927.

⁴⁸MID, 9944-G-183/5, #7247, US Mil Attache, Peking to G-2, Washington, "Russian Communist E. Opperput-Staunitz," 5 April 1928.